De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 125: Intellectual Desire and the Application of Universal to Singular

Transcript
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and it was my concentration or something that I'm on, right? And then I'm eating food, not because of this hunger, desire to eat, but because I realized I needed to maintain my strength and to do my duty because I see it that day or something, right? So really, it's not an object of my two kinds of desire in the same way, is it? Not at all, yeah. And sometimes, you know, now you're supposed to have a lot of vegetables, a lot of this, a lot of that, you know? And so you might not have much appetite for this particular food, without the appetite, right? Yeah. But you reasoned saying you should eat some of this because of this, you know? Yeah. See what I mean? Mm-hmm. Sure. See? But as I say, it sounds like French to sales. Even when you might have hunger, you can still, you know, desire this in a way that's wholly, what, is all to you thinking about why you should eat this, huh? See that? Mm-hmm. That's one way that you see that they'd be different. So even though I understand it, huh? Now, we'll go on to what he says here, huh? That the intellectual desire, although it is born towards the things which are singular outside the soul, right? Nevertheless, it is born towards them according to some, what, universal reason, huh? Just as when it desires something because it is good, huh? I think it's a very interesting example from the philosopher. Hence, the philosopher says in his rhetoric that hate, right, is able to be about something, what, universal, huh? Yeah. Mm-hmm. As we have in hate the whole genus of thieves, right? Yeah. Okay? See? Now, you know, you read the newspapers nowadays, you guys don't do, but you get all these terrorists running around, right? And people blowing themselves up and blowing other people up, you know? So you realize what a terrorist is, whether you disagree with people damn around, in kind of a universal way, you have a distaste for these sort of people, right? Sure. And so, it's not just that this terrorist here and now is hurting your senses, but you see him as coming under this genus, this universal thing of what a terrorist is, right? See, people around blowing themselves up, blowing other people up, then you hate the whole genus of what? Terrorists, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, another way you can distinguish them is that through the intellectual desire, we are able to desire what? Immaterial goods, not like truth, for example, or wisdom, right? Which sense does not, what? Grasp, right? As the sciences and the virtues and other things of this sort of, okay? Mm-hmm. And God himself, you could add, right? Okay? Because the senses don't know God as such, do they? Right? See, how do the senses know the good? But only as, what, as being agreeable to the, what, senses, therefore as pleasure. And they know the bad only as, what, pain, right? Mm-hmm. But we know good and bad in a much more universal way than that. Mm-hmm. So notice what Thomas is doing in there, right? He's saying there are some things that we desire by the will, by the intellectual desire, that we can't really desire by the emotions, and emotional, why? Because these are not known by the senses, okay? But even those things that might be known by the senses in some way, right, we can desire them by intellectual desire for a reason that is, what, universal, okay? So notice, by my emotions, can I dislike all terrorists? Well, my senses don't really know what a terrorist is in general. Oh, yeah. It just, you know, you know, it's like, it's like, you know, let's say if you mistreat an animal, that they kind of are afraid of you or they're angry, you know, they'll put up a fight, right, huh? You know, if you, and that's a common observation, right? Let's say if you're mean or cruel to an animal, right, then when that animal sees you coming, they get out of the way or else they, you're a shepherd, they do something, right, huh? See? In other words, but it's because you have, what, hurt them, huh? Pain them, right, huh? See? Yeah. But does the animal hate cruelty in general? See? Mm-hmm. See? Now, we might, huh? Say that we don't like cruel people, right? Yeah. You see? We don't like people who go around torturing people, that sort of thing, right? We don't like torturers. I mean, the whole class of them, right? Like he says about the thieves here in the example of Aristotle, right? Yeah. Right? And so when I recognize some individual as a torturer, right, I see him as something bad under something universal, don't I? He's a torturer, right? That's right. Or he's a terrorist, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Right? They catch somebody as a terrorist, you know. Well, I read it on the paper all the time these days, right? They're always catching some terrorist, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Well, you say, well, I see that as good, right? Because you see the terrorist is bad, right? But you see them under something universal. Mm-hmm. See, that's more subtle to see that difference, huh? Mm-hmm. But then there are other things that even the singular, the senses can't, what, know, like God himself, right? Mm-hmm. See? And so, but the understanding knows in some way, huh? I always joke, you know, about when I was in college there and he had this little Polish philosopher there, right? Mm-hmm. And kind of into symbolic logic and all that nonsense. Mm-hmm. And I used to give him kind of a rough time in class there, you know, with my syllogisms, huh? Mm-hmm. And one day he's kind of frustrated with me, you know, in class, so he says, Mr. Berkowitz, he says, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism? Mm-hmm. And I just laughed at this. I could have an emotional attachment to a girl, but I certainly couldn't have an emotional attachment to a syllogism. Mm-hmm. But my reason to recognize the syllogism is an argument in which inclusion falls necessarily. Mm-hmm. My reason to recognize that's a good argument, huh? And if you can, you know, use a syllogism against somebody, that's the strongest argument you could use. See? But do my senses perceive, you know, is a syllogism somehow attracted to my senses? No. No. And, uh, now, notice, uh, they had, uh, meter in the words you're using, right? Sure. That could have certain appeal to the senses, maybe, huh? You know, meter has a thing, rhythm, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. You see? Uh, but syllogism has no, you know, since you don't really know that at all. You see, in, in Greek and in Latin, you have more words to name the different loves, huh? Mm-hmm. But say, like, in, in, in Latin, amor names more of the sense love, huh? Mm-hmm. The love that is an emotion, huh? Mm-hmm. You can kind of see it in English where amor gives us the word amorous or something of that sort, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Now, the Greek word corresponding to amor is eros, huh? Yeah. It's even more sensual, you might say, huh? You know, and in English, we use the word erotic or something of that sort. Mm-hmm. Uh, then you have another word in Latin, like you'll, you'll meet in Thomas' treatise on love, for the love of the will, and, uh, the Latin word is dilexio. Hence, you need it to the Latin word for what? Choice. Elexio, right? Now, in English, we don't have a name for each of these loves, huh? So, I translate them by a phrase. I'll translate amor by, what? Sense love, right? That kind of hyphenate or something like that. And I'll translate dilexio by chosen love, huh? The choice involves, what? The use of reason, huh? Comparing things, huh? Now, you see... You see... You see... They don't use the word eros so much in the name of the philosopher, they use the word philia, right? Which is more for a more chosen love, huh? Herstel says that the philosopher and the sophists differ by their choice of life. The philosopher, you give them a man of choice. You can either be wise or appear wise. You can be wise and not appear wise, or you can appear wise and not be wise. What do you choose? The philosopher chooses to be wise even if he doesn't appear wise. The sophists chooses to appear wise even if he's not wise. So they differ by their choice of life, he says. So that the love of wisdom is a, what, chosen love, huh? The other three Greek words would be chosen loves, right? And I say, I use this passage from Hamlet there. When Hamlet's talking about why he took Horatio as a friend, right? You know those words, I think I've quoted them before. It says, Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, her election has sealed thee for herself. Election is another word for choice, right? Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice. Well, when is the soul mistress of her choice? That depends upon certain development of reason, right? That you can, you know, distinguish men, right? And compare them, right? Of course, he goes on, he says. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, Her election has sealed thee for herself. For thou spend as one in suffering all that suffers nothing, right? A man that fortunes, buffets, and gores is tamed with equal thanks. And blessed are they whose blood and judgment are so well commingled. They're not a pipe for fortune to pay, but stop she pleases. Give me that man that is not passion's slave, right? And I'll wear him in my heart's, right? So, in other words, you can distinguish, you know, by reason, between this man who's not the slave of passion, right? And most men who are the slave of some passion, huh? So the irascible man is the slave of his anger, right? And the coward is the slave of his fear. The lustful man is, you know, the slave of his lust, huh? And the drunken is a slave of his passion for drink, and so on, right? So that's the example of a chosen love, right? Hamlet's love of Horatio, right, is a what? Chosen love, yeah. And, of course, the word for friendship there in Greek is philia, right? It's not eros, huh? And so we distinguish between those two. They have other words in Greek, too, agape and storge, you know. You know, C.S. Lewis talks about in that book, The Four Loves, huh? But it's built around four words in Greek, right? Eros, which is this very sense-love, almost sensual love, and philia, which is very often friendship, right? And agape, which is used for charity, and storge, which is kind of used for the natural affection we have for our children and that sort of thing. But in English, we don't have the same wealth of, what, words, huh? And so we use love for romantic love. We use love for what God sometimes, too, see? But in the Greek text, maybe they would use not eros, but they'd have the word agape, huh? You see? Now, the third objection was saying, what about the power to move around, huh? That's directed by knowledge, too, and it's therefore under knowledge, just as desire is moved by knowledge. So why isn't there two powers down there, right? Well, to the third it should be said, that as is said in the third book about the soul, the universal opinion doesn't move except through the, what, particular, right? Well, if my opinion is that I should eat food, right, huh? Right. Unless I'm going to sense some food, I'm not going to, what, sit down and eat, am I? So, or if I say, you know, that I should pay my debts, right? See? Unless I recognize that I owe you something, right? It's not going to lead to any action, is it? Because the action is something singular, okay? Recognize that a man should honor his father and mother, right, huh? Right. Want to honor anybody? I don't understand what you would say. I say, if I think universally, right? Right. Honor your father and mother. Right. A man should honor his father and mother. Right. Want to honor anybody? I'd have to recognize you as my mother or father, right? Oh, right. See? And then if I think you ought to honor, once you're honoring his father and mother, it's universal, then recognizing you as my father or my mother, then I'm going to show honor to you. Sure. Okay? I used to have the camera on these, have you hugged your kid today? No. Okay. So, there's a universal thing there, right? You should show affection for your children. Mm-hmm. That's true university, isn't it? Right? Okay? I'm making any trouble just going and hugging anybody, right? Mm-hmm. Just recognizing this is my daughter now, you know? Or my son or something, right? Then I can hug them or something, right? Mm-hmm. Do you see that? See? So, um, uh, okay? Now. Yes, thank you. Yeah. Yeah. I would say, you know, man should drink, right? Okay? Right? Right. I'm not going to drink anything unless I recognize some individual thing to drink, right? So, it's going to, the universal doesn't move me unless it's applied to the, what? Singular, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, it's not like you go directly, therefore, from the universal to moving to this place or that place, right? The universal through the, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I see, uh, that comes out in a very vivid form in ethics, right? When they talk about a man being tempted, right? And, yeah, two universals, right? One is that adultery is, is, is bad, okay? Uh, this is adultery, this woman, right? Therefore, I shouldn't do it, okay? Um, pleasure should be pursued. This is pleasant, therefore, right? Okay? In other words, I'm putting the singular under the wrong universal, you might say, in this one case, right? Mm-hmm. So, but, when Aristotle's describing the man who is, what? Being tempted, right? His mind is actually, what? Uh, I'm talking about a man now who's being tempted, not a man who's simply, you know, bad, right? Mm-hmm. He's going back before, between those two, this is pleasant, or this is, uh, and this is adultery, you know, or adultery is wrong, right? See? But, but if he chooses to do it, you know, if he gets into it, he's getting into it, thinking that it's pleasant, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Mm-hmm. You see? But, but both universals in his head, he doesn't apply the one he should, right? And therefore, it doesn't end up in the right, what? Action, right, huh? Right. See? Okay? Now, that's how we make all our decisions, isn't it? We go through this process. Well, yeah, yeah, you know, you know, people talk about, uh, if you give money, you know, to, to, to this charity or that charity, right? They'll put you on their mailing list, maybe somebody else's mailing list, right? Mm-hmm. So you get these requests, right? We, you can't possibly give to all of them, right, huh? Right. You see? Mm-hmm. So you, you may have, in, in, in the idea in general that you should give, you know, to worthwhile causes and so on. Right. But there's more worthwhile causes than, than you could, you know, give to, right? So, um, somehow one of these worthwhile causes in particular has to come under the universal before you actually, what? I write a check out to them, right? Suddenly that way to the end of the month, you know, I get the paycheck, and then I say, then I open them all, you know, and I say, well, I give it to this people this month, or I give it to that, you know, or something, you know. But I have to tie it up with the particular, right? You don't give money to needy in general, but to this person here needing this for, you know, you see? Okay. But in the case of what? Of desire, reason can move desire directly without the, what? Sense, huh? But as it's said in the third book about the soul, the universal opinion doesn't move except by meeting the particular, right? And similarly, the higher, what? Desire moves the, what? Lower, right? And therefore there is not another motive power following what the understanding and sense. Is that what he's saying there? Not until I apprehend this individual glass of water, right? I think I'll drink some of this now. Because how about the first part? Universal opinion does not move except by means of that particular opinion? Yeah, yeah. See, what you do is something singular, isn't it? Yeah. I don't drink water in general. Oh, I drink this glass of water right here. And my wife has always told me how many glasses of water you're supposed to drink a day or something. I can say, I'm big enough, right? Okay. But that universal opinion about drinking water is good to you to drink some water for your bodily well-being, right? I have to recognize this as an individual glass of water before that universal opinion is going to move me to, what? Actually drink some water. Oh, okay. See? But what you just described, Dr. Berger, it's a lot like a higher appetite moves by means of the lower. No, it moves you to do something by the lower one as the middle, right? Because it's going to involve the body, right, huh? So we really have to look at our reasoning process that goes into our actions to see if we are really choosing the best option. Yeah, yeah. But Aristotle, you know, that's kind of the paradox there with Socrates and Aristotle, because Socrates is saying, doing bad is always a result of ignorance, huh? See? And you've got to be kind of careful about that, right? Yeah. See? See? Does the man who commits adultery, is he ignorant of the fact that adultery is wrong? Mm-hmm. See? Or is he at the moment when he actually moves to this act, right? Is he, to put it another way, not applying the universal opinion to this particular act? You see? See? At the moment he actually moves to that act, he's not, what, applying the universal opinion to that act, huh? Okay? Well, we all do that, huh? We all do that at times, don't we? Yes. See? Something we know, universally, we don't apply where we should apply it, huh? I don't mean just in moral matters, you know, in other matters too, right? Yes. And we're saying, Thomas says, especially with lust, that we don't tend to... Yeah, yeah. See? Because of the strong emotions there, right? Okay? Um, and that's why, you know, people in their dreams say, that's responsible for what they do in a dream, right? Then when they're awake, huh? That's a good thing. Because they're less able to, uh, to reapply the universal to the singular, right? Mm. Okay? So, the whole, you know, analysis of what people are going on under temptation, right, huh? The famous, the Rape of Lucrece, you know, that famous, uh, poem of Shakespeare's, Rape of Lucrece? And St. Dian used to think that was a very good representation of what temptation is, huh? Oh. You see? And, uh, the man knows he shouldn't be doing what he's doing, right? Uh-huh. You know? Uh-huh. And he's not even filing the woman, but he's, you know, the, the wife of his friend and so on, right, huh? Uh-huh. You see? You know, he might have been a second before thinking about it, huh? See? At the actual moment, he says, this is to be done, he's applying something, huh? Or he's not, he's not waiting for full consideration, right? See? He's not applying all he knows, huh? He knows something besides that the pleasant is desirable, right? Right. But he's not looking at the whole picture anymore, right? He's just considering this aspect of it, huh? Yeah. That's why he has, he has free judgment, as we say, right? Because you can apply all kinds of, what? Universals, huh? You know, procrastination, you know, and so on. Uh-huh. I saw a bumper sticker the other day, you know. I haven't begun to procrastinate. Oh, man. That's good. But, I mean, you know how yourself, you can find all kinds of reasons not to do something you don't want to do, right? You know? Uh-huh. And so you can have all kinds of reasons for not doing what you should do. Yeah. Right? And you can come up with all kinds of reasons for doing what you shouldn't do either. Right? Yeah. And especially, you know, if you proceed without waiting for a full consideration, right, of the matter, huh? Yeah. Yeah? So, in that sense, that's why we have free judgment, you see? Uh-huh. Right, the animals don't really have free judgment because they're kind of determined by nature to judge in a certain way, given the circumstances, huh? Even given the same circumstances, we can apply all kinds of universals and partial things, right? Yeah. And so we can do something if we see it as being good in any way, or we can avoid something if we see it as bad in any way, right? Yeah. Right? Can we quickly go back to what the objection was that we were answering? I'm trying to connect that again. What, the third objection here you mean? Yeah. Yeah. Well, the third objection is pointing out... Now, so the third objection is based upon a likeness, right? That just as the ability to desire comes under the knowing powers, huh? And is moved and directed by them in some way, right? Uh-huh. So also the ability to the animal has to go from one place to another, right? According to science. It comes under his knowing powers too, right? And is in some way moved or directed by that, right? Yeah. Okay? Now, you see that likeness and no difference, right? Yeah. And say, well, why isn't there, if there's two abilities to desire coming, corresponding to the two knowing powers, which they come under, right? Why shouldn't there also be two abilities to move from one place to another, corresponding to these two knowing powers, because they also come under them, right? Oh, yeah. Okay? But Thomas is saying that it comes down to an action. Action is always something singular, right? Uh-huh. And so you have to apply the universal to some singular, huh? And therefore the universal moves us to action only through the what singular? Uh-huh. And I can... Think and talk about honor your father and mother all day long, right? And never honor my father and mother that day, right? But if I recognize that this man here and now before me, right, is my father, right? And he has nothing to sit on. I should give him a chair or something, right? Give him my chair or fetch a chair for him, right? Then I'm going to run and get a chair for him, right? Because he's my father and he has nothing to sit on. You see that? Or if I'm a man who thinks you should pay your debts, as I said, right? And all of a sudden you come up and I realize, oh, that's a guy who has $20 too. Okay, well, I got $20 today, so I'm not starving, so I guess I'll pay him the $20 I owe him. You see? So it's not as if the will might, the reason immediately, right, and not through the singular is going to move you to, what, do something, right? But I might say, you know, that knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, and therefore knowledge of the best thing is the best knowledge. God is the best thing. Therefore knowledge of God is the best thing. I think I'll study about God today. See? Now, really, have my senses entered into that, though? Not really, no, see? I have the desire, right, huh? Okay. But I'm going to do it through a book, right? I don't have a universal book. I have this individual book in my desk or someplace, right? Mm-hmm. See? So I recognize that book, and then I forget that book, right? So the action always comes down to... The actions are singular, yeah. Okay. So sometimes we're going to have solutions that are universal, but then the action always come down to a particular singular... Yeah, it's coming... You're talking about an outward action like that, yeah. I mean, in philosophy, you might reason from universalist, you know, under all universal inclusion, right, like you do in geometry, huh? Yeah. All right angles, you know, I mean, all... Every triangle is interiated to right angles. It's universal truth, right? Yeah. But so you're talking about action, you're talking about in this subjection here, right? You're talking about moving your body from one place to another, right? Uh-huh. But now you're down with the singular, aren't you? Uh-huh. I'm not moving the human body from one place to another. Am I? I'm moving my body from one place to another, right? As I say, a sign that there's that application is, you know, this old moral dilemma, right? Where people don't apply something they know, right? A lot of times when they're correcting a young person or something like that, you know, you interrogate them, you know, and they'll admit they know the universal, see? Well, then why'd you do that, see? Well, they didn't do it applying the universal at that moment that they did it, but their emotions or their passions are something else, so it's involved, huh? And if you desire to strong, you know, I mean, I've had smokers, you know, say to me, you know, never start. So the sense of the guy is kind of admitting that it's bad for you, right? Uh-huh. But, uh, Aristotle makes a famous comparison there in the Nicomachean Ethics between a man who goes to the medical doctor to get medical advice, huh? Uh-huh. And then he doesn't apply it to his own life, right? And a man who goes and hears lectures in ethics and then doesn't apply it to his life? Yeah. And he says, the one man's a useless hearer of medical advice, huh? Why ask the doctor what you should be eating? You're not going to act upon what he says, right? Yeah. You see? Why does Aristotle say that he doesn't? Well, as I say, it's, it's, um, he makes a very strong statement in the ethics there, um, that for virtue, huh, to know is little or nothing, right? For virtue is? That for virtue to know, I mean, for more virtue, I think, to know is little or nothing, right? To know or nothing. Yeah. You know, you have to be accustomed to these things, huh? Ah. See? Yeah. What we call moral virtue, uh, ethical virtue. Actually, the word mas or ethos comes in the Greek Latin words for custom, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So you have to be accustomed to these things. And therefore, Aristotle insists that you have to be, you know, if a person isn't brought up well, it's very hard for them to, uh, yeah, yeah. When the thing becomes habitual, right, very hard for them to, uh, change. Yeah. Yeah. Because, um, have is like a second nature, right? It seems natural. Uh-huh. And that's what the spiritual life's really about a lot in trying to build up these virtues, uh, develop these. Yeah, I mean, because, in some sense, from repeated acts of the moral virtues, do, huh? Mm-hmm. So what your parents, in a sense, are starting to go out in that, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. So my grandmother or my aunt gives me a box of candy, and my inclination is to, what, stuff myself, right? And your mother says, well, no, that's enough for today. Let's put it away. Have another piece tomorrow, or something like that, right? So she's, uh, trying to accustom me to, what, eating candy in some, what, moderation, right? Okay? See, how did somebody like, you know, I guess people like St. Francis de Sales, they had a, they're irascible by, you know, birth, right? Mm-hmm. And then they, they became very mild and gentle men, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Patient men, huh? But they had to, what, repeat, they, right, control that, uh, rising anger, huh? Yeah. King Lear, you should call this hysteria. Mm-hmm. Who calls it that? King Lear, right? Mother of passion, hysteria. Yeah. I read one time that St. Francis de Sales was too soft on a person, or it came off as too soft. He didn't correct someone strongly enough. Yeah. I didn't think he used mine to kill himself or something, or something, or something, he did something terrible. Mm-hmm. St. Francis de Sales said, look, I worked 20, I worked 20 years to build up this virtue, I just can't throw it away. You know. Right. Something along those lines, but he wanted to control that passion, that anger. Yeah. Yeah. Holy Spirit, amen. God, your enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Praise. And help us to understand all that you've written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.