De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 126: Sensuality as Desiring Power: Knowledge vs. Desire

Transcript
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Now if you transliterate this word sensualitas it would have exactly the same meaning in English although sensuality does refer to the emotions maybe a disorder in them or an excess in them but it doesn't have necessarily that sense in Latin it's interesting about words though sometimes I remember how they list the capital vices when I was a child one of the capital vices was anger and anger of course doesn't necessarily name a vice anger names an emotion and if you're using my kids for target practice I mean anger is not a vice and actually you see there's in the gospels sometimes our lord when he chases them out of the temple and so on other times when they're being particularly stiff necked and obtuse and rebellious he's said to be angry right in the gospel but because people often and most often go astray I suppose because of their emotions then these emotions sometimes that are strong take on this bad sense so anger becomes a name of a vice when it isn't really so as I say you don't want to translate this as sensuality in English because that would be not exactly the sense of it here at all right and Thomas will explain the word in the body of the article and we'll see a little better how he understands it it's going to be applied to what we call the ability for emotions right the ability to feel emotions or the ability to have these sometimes we call them feelings but feelings has a lot of other meanings too in Latin they call them passions okay to the first that's the proceeds it seems that sensualitas I'll leave it in Latin then not only is a desiring power but it's also a what knowing power this is what the objectionists say because the word seems to be borrowed obviously from the the word sense isn't it yeah for Augustine says in the twelfth book of the trinity it's our world what it said in the beginning of article one question 81 yeah yeah okay I thought I might turn two pages or something for Augustine says in the twelfth book of the trinity that the you might call it in the sensible motion of the soul right which is what directed towards or aiming at the senses of the body right it's common to us and to the the beasts but the sense the senses of the body right probably the plural there senses the senses of the body are contained under the knowing power right therefore sensualitas is a knowing power by Thomas and I don't understand the words of Augustine as not meaning exactly what the objection takes him to mean right but we'll see with that moreover the things which fall under one division seem to be of one kind but Augustine in the twelfth book of the trinity divides sensualitas against higher and lower reason which obviously pertain to knowledge he says therefore sensualitas is also is also a what knowing power right now interesting you know that sometimes we put things together that are of different genre like you hear this remark sometime that there are four cardinal virtues huh and actually justice is in the will and fortitude is and and temperance are in the what we call sensuality here but prudence or foresight is what in the mind or reason huh okay they're put together because they're dealing with the same what matter right okay because foresight or prudence is directing us in these things that are the matter of justice or courage and so on and then this word sensualitas comes up in the temptation of man it's discussed when Augustine talks takes it up and it's symbolized by the serpent huh yeah but the serpent in the temptation of the first parents um is the one announcing and proposing the sin now you'll be like the gods or like God himself if you eat of this fruit right and of course to uh announce something propose something seems to be something belonging to knowing power okay therefore sensualitas is a what knowing power right okay but now against this is that sensualitas is defined and and notice in the yeah yeah they give you the reference there right it goes back to the what Peter Lombard oh yeah the second book of the sentences distinction 24 you know Thomas is a commenter in the whole of the sentences just about all of it okay and and it's divided into four books sentences and sentences means kind of what famous sayings you know but going back to the church fathers but mainly from what Augustine right okay and then Lombard develops this and uh distinguishes things and they're divided into distinctions okay distinction 24 oh so Thomas will will divide the text of uh Peter and then he'll take up questions like the Summa I guess when Thomas was going to write the Summa Theologiae he was he first thought he was going to revise this thing on the sentences oh okay and then he decided to do his own thing right with his own order right order right okay which in some ways is better than the order of Peter Lombard but anyway but it's good to go back to that sometimes because sometimes he's more what explicit there than he is in some of the later works okay okay now I answer Thomas says Siddh Kanta do we I think yeah the Siddh Kanta is one they just said referring to what the Magister says the teacher but against this is that sensuality is defined as a desire of things that pertain to the what body right or you could say it's a desire of bodily things yeah and that definition then is what is given by the by Peter Lombard but notice he's always referred to by Thomas as what Magister right the teacher so he has that title there right in the Middle Ages by Antoinio Messiah and it was amazing for how many I don't know several centuries that people who wanted to to get a degree you might say in theology would comment or lecture on the what senses so you have commentaries by all kinds of medieval teachers right on the senses Thomas is undoubtedly the best but you know even for several centuries after Thomas this was kind of the key text right you know closer to our time the Summa Theologiae became kind of the standard text you know everybody was kind of exposed to but excuse me but do you all have Magister in your text no no I'll say in the Marietta edition they have a footnote here that alright that's fine because Thomas' text doesn't identify where it comes to but if you know the Marietta edition there maybe you have edition is it or not this is what it does BAC must be a Marietta copy then yeah in the the definition is there it's put in italics right like it's exact words that someone who's defined it who is it that's given that definition well the Magister has done it right the Master I do have a Marietta I do have a Marietta I do have a Marietta I do have a Marietta Okay, I... Did you have the footnote or what? I don't have the footnote. In the same counter, I have it in quotes. Yeah, yeah. Okay, so that's what you're saying. Yeah, yeah. So if there's a quote and it's unidentified, is it always the sentences? No, no, no. You'd have to... But it's like, it's a common thing, you know. That's people where Thomas doesn't identify it so much there, right? All right. See where we're saying that. I answer. It should be said that the name of sensualitas, right, seems to be taken from a, what, sensible motion, right, huh? Okay? And Thomas sees that in the Word, right, huh? Yeah. About which Augustine speaks in the Twelfth Book of the Trinity, huh? Now, if you go to Peter Lombard's work, right, he does draw upon many of the Church Fathers, right? But I would say, you know, most of all, and almost predominantly, upon, what, Augustine, right? Now, Augustine, you know, writings are kind of, what, ad hoc, huh? Because he's always replying to some heretic or something who's getting out of line, right? Okay. And so it's not quite as digested and ordered the way like the Summi is, right? Sure. But the sentence is doing that in a sense for us, huh? Okay. But you're getting kind of an account of what Augustine and sometimes some of the other Church Fathers are saying, right? This is kind of bringing together what is in the tradition of the Church, right? Yeah. And then raising questions and then solving them, right? Mm-hmm. Sometimes Thomas doesn't completely agree with the Magister, but they have to go that bit by bit. But he's a very important writer, nevertheless. So he says the name of sensualitas seems to be taken from a sensible motion, let's put it that way, huh? Okay. About which Augustine speaks in the Twelfth Book about the Trinity. Just as from a, what, act is taken the name of a power, right? In other words, sensualitas here is naming a power, but originally it's naming a, what, a sensible motion, right? Mm-hmm. But you tend to name a power by its, what, act. Act, yeah. So for example, sometimes you say, instead of saying that man has a reason, we say man has, what, understanding and will, right? When you say man has understanding and will, what does understanding mean? Knowledge and understanding. Yeah, the ability to understand, right? But it's named in a way, or given the same name as the act, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And you see that with the senses, don't you, sometimes, and he gives the example here from the senses, as vision from, what, sight, right? Or like smell, right, huh? Or taste, right? So what is taste's name? Does taste name the object or the act, or does it name the sense that is able to taste things? Well, sometimes you give taste as a name of a sense, don't you? Mm-hmm. But maybe we see that taste might name the act of tasting something before it names that ability to, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, Thomas seizes upon the word motus there in that meaning of the word, huh? And he makes a very interesting point here. And he says, a sensible motion is the desire following upon, what? Sensing. Grasping. Grasping, yeah, yeah. Now, he often uses that word apprehensiva, right? Okay. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Grasping, to refer to the knowing power. Sure. Yeah. And he's going to be coming back to the thing that we see most clearly, in the case of the mind, but also of any knowing power, that when you know, you've got the thing you know inside your knowing power. Mm-hmm. See? And that's brought out, in a sense, by the word grasp, which comes from the hand. So when I grasp something, it's contained in my hand, huh? Okay? And because of that, he's going to see a distinction here. Why the word motion applies more to the desiring power than it does to the, what? Knowing power. Because the knowing power knows by having the thing known in it. And therefore, the knowing power seems to be more like rest. Mm-hmm. And that's why, that's seen in the greatest kind of knowing, which is understanding. Right. Which is named from standing, which is a rest, not a motion. But motion applies more to the desiring power, because when I desire something, I'm, what, moving towards that, going out to the thing, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So he says, the act of the grasping power, the act of the knowing power, is not so properly called motion as the action of the desiring power. Now, why is that? For the operation, or the action, or the doing, of the grasping power, the knowing power, is perfected in this, that the things grasped are in the one grasping them. Yeah. Mm-hmm. But the operation of the desiring power is perfected in this, that the one desiring is inclined towards the desirable thing. Yeah. And therefore, he says, the operation of the grasping power, the knowing power, is like rest, huh? Okay. Creating. Yeah. Okay. But the operation of the desiring power is more like motion. Of course, we do have the emotions very much, don't we? The emotions are named from what? Yeah. Yeah, you see? You see? And those are the appetitive acts that are most known to us, the ones that belong to what he calls sensualitas in this article. See? Once he says, if the word sensualitas means, what, a sensible motion, one should understand by that the operation of a, what, desiring power, right? And if he carried over it to the ability, right, the power, then it's the name of a, what, sense desiring power, a power that, whose desire falls upon some kind of knowledge of sense, right? But still desiring power, huh? That's a very interesting distinction there, huh? Yeah. You know, I was teaching the love and friendship course this semester there, and we're talking in the beginning there about whether love is a giving. We had all kinds of readings indicating this, right? Yeah. Give your love to somebody, right? Yeah. And then we had a whole series of readings where love is said to be a suffering, right? Yeah. An undergoing, a being moved, right? Yeah. And he seemed to be saying contradictory things, huh? And Thomas in the article that we looked at there says that it's a, what, undergoing, huh? Okay. Okay? And then you have to resolve the question. Why do we use the word give for love? Why is that? Well, it goes back to the same difference here, right? Mm-hmm. See? Because in giving, what? You're going out to the thing, right? I left my heart in San Francisco. Or the opposite, people say. My heart is not in it, huh? Or Christ says, where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? So the heart goes out, right? To the thing, huh? Augustine says the soul is more ubi amat than quam ubi animat, huh? The soul is more where it loves than where it animates. Well, it's the idea that your heart is in what you love, right? And so it seems to be what? You're giving your heart, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So a lot of times, I'll say, you know, it's always bad to lose your mind. So a lot of times, I'll say, you know, it's always bad to lose your mind. Is it always bad to lose your heart? No, it depends upon to whom or to what you lose your heart, right? But I think that means that's a difference there, right? Because if we do love, you are in some sense said to lose your heart, right? And then you can see that the object of love is in things, right? And you've gone out to the things. And how can we fit in the sense of undergoing? Well, it's because the way you begin to like something is that you become aware of it through your senses or through your reason, right? It impresses you. Yeah, because the word impresses it with you sometimes, you know? You made a big impression on somebody. It means that your good qualities have been pressed upon their heart in some way, right? And the result of that is they begin to like you, right? Okay. So liking is a result of your heart being acted upon by the good, right? That is perceived. That is sensed or known in some way, huh? Okay. Okay. So this is a similar point he's making here, huh? Okay. But it's very clear in English when we use the word emotion to name these things, huh? Okay, yeah. Because Thomas is pointing out, he used to say that knowing is more like rest. And you can see that most of all in this wonderful word in English, understand, right? Mm-hmm. See? When I understand something, then I really know it fully, right? Mm-hmm. See? But understand, in English, it's obviously taken from the word to stand, huh? Okay? In the philosophy of nature there, we're talking about Heraclitus and the influence that Heraclitus had upon Plato, huh? Mm-hmm. And Cratchulus, one of Plato's early teachers, was a student of Heraclitus. Mm-hmm. And Plato has a dialogue in called the Cratchulus, where his two teachers, Cratchulus and Socrates, converse. Now, undoubtedly, Socrates had, you know, even a more, even a greater influence upon Plato than Cratchulus, huh? But Aristotle, who spent 20 years in school of Plato, and in the old age, obviously of Plato, he says, even in old age, Plato was still holding on to some things he had learned from what, Cratchulus, right? And Cratchulus had kind of exaggerated, if you could, the idea of Heraclitus that everything is changing, right? Oh, yeah. Well, how can you understand something that doesn't stand still? Oh, yeah. So it's always changing, see? And there you see the contrast there, right? For sure. You know, that motion is opposed to that, huh? But when we talk about emotions now, you know, we say, I was moved to do this, right? Let's see? And then the English word emotion itself, obviously, is taken from the word motion. Mm-hmm. Okay. And so that fits more of that, it's a more, it fits more of the desiring power than the knowing power, right? And desire itself, huh? Hunger, thirst, seems to be kind of like emotion, doesn't it? Seeking it, going out to that. Mm-hmm. Okay. Now the, applies to the objections. To the first, therefore, it ought to be said, that to this that Augustine says that the, what, motion, the sensual, the sensualis motion of the soul aims at the senses of the body. He does not give us to understand that the senses of the body should be, what, comprehended or placed under sensualitas, huh? But more that the motion of sensualitas is a certain, what, inclination to the senses of the body, because we desire those things that are grasped by the senses of the body, right? And thus the senses of the body pertain to sensualitas as a preambula, the walk before, right? Mm-hmm. Well, in the sense that they are inclined towards what the senses have grasped in some way, right? Okay, yeah. Okay? Yeah. Okay. Now the second one here. To the second it should be said that sensualitas is divided against higher and lower reason, insofar as they come together or communicate in the act of motion, for the knowing power to which pertains higher and lower reason is a motive power, just as the desiring power to which pertains sensuality. Now we saw that in Aristotle's Daniel, remember that, in the third book? Yeah. I remember that. Absolutely. Yeah. But notice, huh? Mm-hmm. I thought it was very confusing, actually. Yeah. What moves me to go to the dining room, say, huh? Or to the place, huh? Well, the smell of the food, right? Right. And my desire for that food, right? Okay. So Aristotle says in the dining room that the food is the unmoved mover here. Okay. And the mood mover is both what? Um, the senses that know the food, right? Okay. And the desiring power that desires it. Okay. Okay? In a way, the two of them come together because it's the same thing, sense, that is what? Desired, huh? Okay? I smell this food, and then I, what? Desire what I smell, right? So what is desired and what is smelled is the same thing, right? Okay? Or I understand what wisdom is, and then I desire wisdom, right, huh? So wisdom is both what is understood here and what is desired, huh? Okay? So that's the reason why the settings are put together, because they're both, what? And some are responsible for our, what? Motion, huh? My going to the dining room is, my pursuit of the food is both a result of my sensing it, right? Right. And my wanting it, huh? Right? I keep thinking while you're talking is that also the, I mean, the mind knows intellectually that there's food there, so it doesn't matter. Or is that just the desiring? Well, both are involved, see? Oh, okay. Okay? So, I see the apple, right? And I want the apple, right? Right. So the apple is moving me, right? Right. But I'm moved in some way by my knowledge of the apple, right? Okay. And by my desire for it, huh? Okay. Right. So both of them together are, what, responsible, right? And Aristotle says they're kind of, they're kind of unified, the two, right? Through the unmoved mover, which in this case is the food itself, right? Okay. Because the food itself is both an object in one way of the senses, and in another way an object of desire, right? Oh, desire. Oh, right. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So in that sense, the two of them might be distinguished, right? You see? The way it's done in the third book on the soul is Aristotle says, what is it that initiates the movement of the animal towards something at a distance, right? Yeah. Well, is it some kind of sensation or knowledge? Right. Or is it desire? Well, you say both of them are involved, right? Yeah. See? But the two of them come together because what is known is the same as what is desired. Not that it's the same thing to be known and to be desired, right? Right. But he wouldn't pursue that food over there unless he didn't, if he didn't both, what, see it in some way, right, or smell it or something, right? And didn't, what, want it, huh? Okay. I see this cat at home, Muppet, she likes to come around, she can't, you know, the table with him, you know, kind of bothers you a little bit, right? Yeah. Okay. Well, sometimes I take the wine glass and say, you want some wine? And she'll usually sniff the wine, huh? And then she'll walk away. Yeah. And turn away, right? I see. Because she has no desire. But she smells it, see? So you have to both smell it and desire it, you see? But if I bring down a piece of meat and she smells it, she'll, she desires it. And you've got to watch your hands when you make it, you know? I know sometimes I'm at the table like this, too, because sometimes I'll come down and give myself my hand. But sometimes you see the table and I just, you know, your hand is dangling or something, right? And all of a sudden, you know, her claws going out, her hand is like, hey! You know, that's a thing, see? So, because you think you're about to, you know, you get something in the hand that you can take care of her, huh? The other one's more clever. This one, I don't know if you see so well, but the other one you just kind of drop it and she'd catch you in the mid-air, you know? So it's a little safer. But they're very, very good at that. And the other guy was, I mean, the one that's gone, I don't know. What was this, I'm trying to remember, I can't remember at all, what's the Dianima? Um, this was in, uh, can you remind us of the context of that one? Well, you see, the order of Aristotle takes up the powers of the soul of the Dianima. He takes up the ones that the planet has first, right? Okay. Uh, you know, digesting your food, nourishing yourself. Yeah. Growth, reproduction, right? Yeah. Then he takes up the sense powers. Yeah. And the outward senses first, and then the beginning of the third book he starts to talk about the inward senses, like imagining. And then he takes up, what? Reason. Understanding, right? And then he takes up, um, uh, desire, because some desires follow upon sensing and some follow upon reasoning. Oh, yeah. Okay. And then finally the motive power, right? Okay. And that, um, uh, the motive power, um, goes into operation following some kind of knowing, right? Mm-hmm. And some kind of, what? Desiring, right? Yeah, okay. So an animal goes from one place to another. Because he desires. Because he knows something that he desires, huh? Yeah. Okay? Mm-hmm. And so as Stiles said, these are both movers, right? Mm-hmm. And that's why we want to distinguish those, huh? Okay. So when I'm eating my food, it's like that. I have a desire for my food, but maybe I have to, you know, reason, let's say you've had enough, Dwayne, or something, right? You know? So it's to move with knowledge and desire. Yeah, yeah. And so when Plato, when Plato divides up the soul in the Republic, I don't know if you're in the Republic, but he has, uh, he's talking about three parts of the soul, right? And one part is reason, and the other two parts are the ones of the, are the two parts of sensuality that he'd be talking about in the second article. And he compares reason to the, what? Chariot. To the, uh, well, in the parts of the city, he compares it to the rulers, right? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. He compares the Arasco appetite to the, um, thumas, it's called in Greek, to the, um, soldier, yeah. Yeah, and then the, um, epithumia, the, um, kusokat idea, to the crowd, right, the common people, so to speak, at the bottom, right? And, uh, they try to understand, you know, the relations of these, see? Okay. But, but notice, in the same division, you've got reason, and then two desiring powers, huh? Okay. And, uh, so you're talking about these in reference to action, and so on. Mm-hmm. So that's why they're, they're divided against each other, although you might, you know, you know, uh, but just like, you know, if you and I were, if we're dividing, uh, uh, the theological virtues, let's say, huh? Well, you see, you might say, well, hope and charity are both in the will, right? And so you're dividing them against each other. Well, then faith must be in the will, too, because you're dividing that against hope and charity, which are in the will. Well, it's not, is it? Faith is in, is in reason, right? Let's say. So you distinguish between faith and hope and charity, not because they're all in the same, what? All right. Hmm. No, see? But because they're all related to one, what? One end, right? Now, Thomas has an interesting way of putting, putting it. He says, faith, by faith we know the end. Okay. By hope we tend towards the end, and by charity we're joined to the end. Mm-hmm. See? So, they all have something in common then, don't they, right? Yeah. And so it makes some sense to distinguish, huh? Faith, hope, and charity. But someone might object and say, you know, if I had to object to that, like, you're drifting here and say, well, hope and charity are virtues of the will, right? And therefore, faith, which is divided against them, should be another virtue of the will. See? But you're not dividing virtues of the will when you divide faith, hope, and charity, are you? You're taking the division as a whole, right? Right? I have one for understanding and then one, but then two for the... Yeah, yeah. But what are you dividing there, see? You know? Two. Those three. You can't say you're dividing the virtues of the will because faith isn't a virtue of the will, right? Yeah. Yeah. So what are you dividing, right? See? Well, why should they be in the same division, huh? Right. See? Oh. You know, I mean, you know, if you go back to, you know, something very simple, like in geometry, in geometry you have a division of triangle into isosceles, scaly, and equilateral, right? Yeah. And you have a division of quadrilateral into what? Square and oblong and so on. We wouldn't expect some triangle to be in there with square and oblong, would you? No. Or vice versa, right? Yeah. See? So generally, you're dividing, you're dividing things that are the same in kind, generally speaking, right? Mm-hmm. But then there's a reason for what? Dividing them sometimes, things that are not of the same kind, huh? Oh. And maybe because they are what? They're all related to one end or something, right? See? Okay. So you say, what is moving me to go over to get the bacon on the table, right? Well, it all started when I was laying in bed there, and I smelled it, right? See? And then I felt hungry for bacon. For bacon. You see? So you see, both my hunger and my desire, right? Mm-hmm. Now, if I had smelled salmon, I would have gone out of bed. I would have probably come over me. An awful smell, I don't know. Open the windows. You see the idea? So, then you might divide and distinguish, right, my sensation of the bacon and my, what? Hunger for the bacon. They're not the same thing. Mm-hmm. See? And if I stuff myself and my hunger has been satiated, huh, and I smell the bacon, I might almost, I wouldn't have any hunger, I wouldn't be pursuing it, right? That's right. You see? So, if you're saying, what's involved in my pursuit of bacon? Mm-hmm. Then you would divide something that is an act of knowing, right? Mm-hmm. Smell and hunger, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Rather than dividing smell against, what, hearing and seeing, right? Right. So, if you're dividing up the senses, then you divide smell against, what? You see the character, the objection, and I'm showing how you could do a similar thing, right? Sure, sure. Mm-hmm. Okay? If you'd assume your spell against hunger, then hunger has been another kind of, what? Sin signs. Right? Yeah. But it's for a different reason, right? They're ordered to one end. Mm-hmm. And that's, in a way, the thing about faith, hope, and charity, huh? They're ordered to what? By faith, hope, and charity, we are, what? Ordered to God, right? By faith, hope, and charity, we are directed towards God, right? Mm-hmm. But by faith, we know that end, in some way. And by hope, we are tending towards that end. But by charity, we're already in some way joined to that end. That's why Thomas says that charity, like St. Paul says, is the greatest of the three, right? Mm-hmm. Because it actually joins us to the end. But hope is even greater than, what? But faith, because you're tending now towards the end, huh? Mm-hmm. You see that? When Aristotle defines moral virtue, he has something like that, because he defines moral virtue as a habit, huh? With choice. Mm-hmm. Existing in the middle. Mm-hmm. Between two extremes. But in the middle towards us, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. as determined by right reason, he says. So what's involved in there is this habituation of the heart, right, of the emotions to the middle, but also the direction that they get from what? Reason, huh? We can't know how much to eat unless you take into account the circumstances, right? If you're not going to have another meal until dinner or something, right, you might have to eat more, right? If you're going to be doing some, you know, a lot of walking or a lot of work or something, physical work, right, you might need more food, right? See? If it's Thanksgiving Day, you might eat more, right? See? But the only reason can take into account those circumstances and see what is appropriate now, huh? Yeah. Right? Can you put that definition, that's a habit, which is a habit? It's a habit with choice. With choice. A habit of choosing, in a sense. Existing in the middle. Existing in the middle. But not the middle of the thing, but the middle towards us, right? So if I have a roast there of meat, huh? It's not half of the roast that I should eat. That's the middle of the thing, right? You see? Well, what is towards us? Well, it's neither too much nor too little for me, right? See? If I have a gallon of whiskey there, or the middle, half the gallon, no, no. But it's a middle towards us, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? According to reason. I see. But as determined by right reason, which is foresight, prudence on the virtue of reason, huh? That says under these circumstances, you should eat this much, right? Yeah. And see, if you bump me in the hall, right? Should I get angry? Well, no. Was it an accident, right? Right. See? Were you being careless? You see? Or were you doing it on purpose? You know, like these guys in high school that are probably going down the thing, right? See? Okay. But now, if you're using my kids' or target practice, huh? That would seem to me to what? To me, that's the thing to, it's reasonable to be a lot more angry about than getting bumped in the hall. Yeah. Right? Okay, you bump into my car, should I get angry with you? I say, well, it depends upon things. Are you drunk? Are you being, you know, kind of, you know, driving stupidly? Or is it something anybody could do, you know? Los Angeles game. Yeah. Okay. Before we take our break, I want to just come back a little bit here on this idea that this contrariety, which I think is the most interesting thing, between the will, the desiring powers and the grasping powers, huh? The knowing powers, right? The siren powers. There are many ways you can show the contrariety of that, many signs of it, huh? But one way of showing it is that in things, huh? Health and sickness are, what, exclusive, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? If I've got normal blood pressure, I can't at the same time have high blood pressure, can I? Right. Okay? Or if I have an overactive thyroid or something active too, right? I can't at the same time have one that's functioning in a way that's all together healthy, right? Right. Okay? But now, in terms of knowing, there's the same knowledge of both opposites. If I know what abnormal or high blood pressure is, for example, don't I have to know what normal blood pressure is? Yeah. See? Close together. Yeah. And one opposite helps you to know the other, huh? Just like in ethics, huh? If I know that virtue is a habit in the middle, right, towards us, right, that helps me to know that vice is a habit in the excess or in the defect, huh? And vice versa, huh? I told you about this wise guy, when I was first teaching out in California, was saying you shouldn't teach ethics, because he'd learn that there's the same knowledge of opposites. So if you study ethics, you learn not only how to become good, but how to become bad. And you can't really learn one without the other. And therefore, since most people are inclined to be bad, he says, you're making them worse. See, well, Aristotle, like in the fifth book of politics, he teaches you how to preserve a government and how to overthrow it. And it's the same knowledge, right? And, you know, we can see, you know, tyrants around the world using the things that Aristotle teaches them to overthrow governments, right? You see? And so I can't know, in a sense, how to preserve the American government without going to some extent, at the same time, how to overthrow it, and vice versa. So, this is the famous thing that Plato and Aristotle emphasize, huh? There's the same knowledge of opposites. And, you know, one of the famous examples in Plato there is at the end of the symposium. I mentioned that before. In the symposium, Socrates is talking to Aristophanes, the great comic poet, and Agathon has won the prize for his tragedy. But presumably, Agathon doesn't write comedies, and Aristophanes is reversed, and he says, if you guys knew what you were doing, you could write both tragedy and comedy. And that's what Homer could do, huh? Because Homer has a comic book that's been lost, the Margites, huh? But Aristophanes says the Margites is to comedy what the Iliad is to tragedy. And in Shakespeare, you have great comedies and great tragedies, huh? But now, what about love? Is there the same love of opposites? Does the love of one opposite help you to love the other one? No. No. If I love health, I can't love sickness, can I? If I love wealth, can I love poverty? Not for myself, anyway, right? If I love beauty, can I love ugliness? If I love virtue, that impedes me from loving vice, huh? If I love vice, that impedes me from loving what? Virtue. So you can see how the heart goes out to things, huh? It goes out to the health or the sickness in the thing itself. So if I love health, I hate sickness, huh? If I love virtue, I hate vice. But if I know virtue, I'm not ignorant of vice, in fact. It'll help me to know it. You really can't know it without doing that, right? So that's a sign that the mind is taking these things into itself, right? And they're in the mind, in the way of the mind, huh? And that's in the mind, that both opposites are what? Are there together, huh? See, in the definition of abnormal, or high blood pressure, is normal, isn't it? Right? Yeah. But in reality, one excludes the other. And so, love respects the condition of, what? Things in themselves, right? And that's because love is tending towards the thing itself, huh? So that's what we say. I left my heart in San Francisco, right, huh? Where Anthony says, To Cleopatra, I go back to Rome, my heart stays here with you. So that the love is said to be in the thing loved, by knowing it seems reversed. The thing known is in the knower. That's why I use the word grasp and the word take sometimes. If I'm talking about a definition, we want to get something into your mind in a distinct way. We've got to take the genus first of that, and then you've got to find the differences and take those. But then you're taking, you know, or grasping. But that doesn't seem to be, to name our loving, you know. A bit of popular thing, you know, love is in love until it's given away, you see. But you don't think of grasping, you know, as perfecting of love. But that's perfecting of knowing, right? Do you grasp what I'm saying? Do you understand what I'm saying, huh? This should be the principle behind anyone's picture says you cannot love God in love. It's not possible. Yeah, yeah, yeah. No man can serve two masters, you know, this sort of thing. You can't love virtue and love vice, right? Yeah. You can know both, though. In fact, you probably can't know one without the other. Now, another way of seeing this, too, is this. That knowing the bad is actually, what, good. And knowing something bad doesn't make you bad at all, even though the thing is bad. But loving what is bad doesn't make you, makes you bad, huh? Gita says it well, huh? We are shaped and fashioned by what we love, huh? Absolutely. Gita, the German poet. Right. So if you love disgusting things, they said, yourself will become disgusting, see? But if you love beautiful things, you are yourself, to some extent, what? Beautiful, huh? Right? Mm-hmm. If you love good things, you yourself are good. You love bad things, yourself are bad. But if knowing bad things made you bad, then, oh, no, it should be bad, wouldn't it? Because you have the same knowledge of the good and the bad. So then it comes back to what St. Thomas would say, we can only make one thing as an end. It's only possible. So many people are making money their end. They have no chance of happiness. Yeah. He's talking about taking towards the thing in itself, where one excludes the other, right? And that's what they view will make them happy, right? Everyone views this will make them happy. Yeah. And there's only one real source of happiness. So these are two sides then, right? If you compare it, there's the same knowledge of opposites, but there's not the same love of opposites, right? Mm-hmm. The knowledge of one opposite helps you to know the other one. The love of one impedes you from loving the other, right? Mm-hmm. Then the other thing is that knowledge of the bad doesn't make you bad. In fact, it's good to know the bad as such, right? Why, loving the bad already makes you bad, huh? That's why it's good to know human nature. Yeah. So essentially, you're taking on something of the character of what you love. See? If you love God, already you're godly in some way, right? Mm-hmm. But if you love vice, you're already, in some sense, vicious. If you love sickness, you're sick. If you love ugliness, you are ugly yourself now. See? Because you're tending towards this as it is in itself. Why, if you're loving God, then you are, in some sense, joined to God, huh? And this is very good. Makes you very good. I actually never did three. I don't know. Third objection? Yeah. Okay. To third, it should be said that the serpent not only shows and proposes the sin, right, of eating the apple where it was, but he also inclines them to the effect of the sin, right? Okay. And in this respect, sensuality is signified by the serpent. Okay. Okay. So should we take a little break here before we do the article two here? Now, what has been called, what, sensualitas in the previous article, or could be called sense-desire, right, huh? The ability to desire following upon sense, right? He's going to be divided into two different powers, huh? And this division was made by, what, Plato and Aristotle first. But in the same contrary, he referred to two doctors of the Church, right? Okay. To the second, one proceeds thus. It seems that, I know he says, I call it sense-desire, but if you want to, using the word desire there, a petitos to name the ability to desire, right? So he's saying that the ability to desire, that's what a petitos means, following upon sense, right? It seems that it's not distinguished into the irascible and the concupiscible, right? As in, to diverse, what? Powers, right? For the same power of the soul is of one contrariety, as sight is of white and, what? Black, right? Or the sense of taste is of sweet and of, what? Bitter, right? But what is suitable and what is, what? Harmful are contraries. Therefore, they ought to belong to the same, what? Power, huh? Since, therefore, the concupiscible power regards what is, what? Suitable, right? Of course, concupisence means, you know, it's something that's just pleasing to the senses, right? So you don't desire it, right? Okay. But the irascible is dealing with something that is, what? Harmful, right? You know, you're sticking a pin in me or something, right? Well, then get angry, right? Because you're a nocivo, you're harming me, right? You're hurting me, right? Okay. You're stepping on my toes, and I tell you you're on my toes, and you say, so what? So I get angry, right? And shove you off, see? Okay. So if these two things are contraries, then it seems that there should be the same power, right, of the soul, that includes both the concupisable and the irascible, right? Now, Thomas is going to point out that they're not really contraries here, huh? Yeah. Okay? And there's a contrariate in the concupisable, right? The true contrariate, yeah? The second objection, moreover, the sense desire, the ability to desire following upon the senses, that's what that phrase means, right? Okay? We get the word appetite from, what, the pity to us, right? Yeah. So just like our word appetite seems to name desire, right, huh? Okay? But then the ability to desire is given the same name, right? So pity to us is used in Latin a lot not to name desire, but the ability to desire. Okay. So we're not so accustomed in English to use the word desire to name the ability to desire, I don't think. You see? So if you translate this as sense desire in English, you might misunderstand it, right? And think you're talking about the desire rather than the ability to desire, right? So in this context, I sometimes might define this or translate it as the sensitive ability to desire. But even that could be so misleading. So it's the ability to desire that follows upon the sense, huh? Okay? So he says, such a desire is, or a power, is not except of what is, what, agreeable or convenient, suitable to the senses. But what is suitable, according to the senses, what is agreeable to them, is in fact the object of the concupisable. Therefore, there is no ability to desire falling upon sense.