De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 127: The Irascible and Concupiscible Appetites

Transcript
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that would differ from the concupisable. Well, this is an interesting objection, because the irascible, you see, moves us to do things that are not agreeable to our senses. Okay? So, if I fight you over that piece of meat, this fight may be, you know, painful, and, you know, you see? Okay? So, I don't seem to be, what, moved to fight you immediately, because this is agreeable to my senses to fight you. Right. See? Or vice versa, if I'm, you want to eat me for your dinner or something, huh? And I'm running as fast as I can. Well, this may not be pleasant to be running at that speed and trying to get away, huh? Right. But you've got to realize that the irascible is, in some sense, a higher power than the concupisable, in one sense, huh? That involves some kind of knowing more than just the outward senses, sensing something as agreeable to them, huh? Or disagreeable, huh? And that will come out in the, apply to the objection, huh? Moreover, hate is in the irascible. Now, this is actually not true, but the objector is saying that, right? Why? Well, it seems so because Hieronymus, that's Jerome, I guess, huh? Jerome says, in commenting on Matthew 13, we possess in the irascible a hatred of our, what, vices, huh? Okay. Now, notice, huh? You can see that confusion kind of arises, huh? You heard the time when Thomas Aquinas himself, say, is tempted, or his brothers, I guess, or somebody tried to break him down, right? So he has some kind of a woman there, right, huh? Right. When Thomas is said to, you know, grab the poker, whatever it was like, you know? Yeah. And the woman fled, you know, his wrath, right? And as she left, he's supposed to, you know, burnt a cross over the door, right, huh? And then that's when he received, you know, some kind of a special grace from God, right? You know, so he was not bothered by sensuality and this. Well, was this anger or hatred of vice here in Thomas? What was it, you see? They kind of mixed up together, right? Yeah. You see? So that's part of the confusion here, right? But hate, since it is contrary to love, is in the, what, concupisable, right? Therefore, there is the same, what, power for the concupisable and the irascible. Okay? But it's, in a sense, the anger, in a way, what, arises from the hate or from the disliking, right? Yeah. Okay? I hate it when you're sticking me with pins, right? And therefore, you know, anger arises, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, against this is what Gregory Nicene says. And in the footnote of the edition, it says that Thomas has got the wrong guy. It's Nemicio's son. Oh. But another father, yes. And Damascene, right, laid down two powers, the irascible and the concupisable. Well, in Plato and in Aristotle, you have, the Greek words would be thumas, for the irascible and epithumia, for the, what, concupisable. And thumas in Greek can have the sense of anger, right? Can have the sense of boldness, right? Um, epithumia is more the sense of, of sense desire, the desire for the, what is pleasing to the senses, huh? Okay, now, now Thomas' reply here. I answer that the ability to desire, following upon sense, is one power in genus, right? You know what a genus is, right? A genus is a general kind of thing, right? That has particular kinds of things under, right? And so every genus has at least two particular kinds under it, right? So number is a genus, having under it, let's say, odd number and even number, right? Or triangle is a genus, having under it equilateral isosceles and scalene triangles, right? So he's saying the ability to desire, following upon sense, right? What he calls the petitus sensitivus, right? Is something like a genus, right? And under it we have two different powers, huh? Just like sense is what a genus, for the sense of sight and the sense of hearing and the sense of smell and so on, right? Okay? But the sense is divided into at least five particular kinds, isn't it? Five species, right? But this ability to desire, following upon sense, is divided into two kinds, right? The concubisable and the rascal, that's what Thomas is saying. He's going to try to manifest that. Do you see that? Yeah. Okay. I mean, this is a very common thing to have a genus divided into species. Yeah. And we divide government into monarchy and oligarchy and democracy. And every science divides usually some kind of, general kind of thing into a particular kind, right? The sonnet is divided into the, what, English sonnet and the Italian sonnet, huh? Drama is divided into tragedy and comedy and maybe some other kinds in between, right? Okay? Mm-hmm. Yes. Mm-hmm. In English, you know, we sometimes use the English word for species, which is form. So you might say that democracy is one form of government. Okay. Now, to the evidence of this, Thomas says, huh? It should be considered that incorruptible, natural things, right? Mm-hmm. Not only is it necessary that there be an inclination to pursuing those things that are, what, suitable or fitting to you, right? Mm-hmm. And to, what, refuse those things that are, what, harmful, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But also, it's necessary to have an inclination to resist what might corrupt you, right? Mm-hmm. And to resist things that are contrary, huh? Mm-hmm. Which puts some impediment to... Yeah. ...in the way of the things that are suitable, right? Yeah. And that infers some kind of, what, harm, right? Yeah. And now he gives an example from inanimate things, huh? Okay. Just as fire, huh, has a natural inclination, not only that it recede from a lower place, right, which is not suitable for it, and that it tends in a higher place that is suitable for it, but it also resists things that corrupt and, what, impede it, huh? Yeah. See, or you could take the rock, right? The rock would tend towards the ground, just a suitable place of the rock, but it's going to resist being broken up. Broken up, yeah. Okay? Because, therefore, the ability to desire falling upon sense, huh? Petitus sensitivos is an inclination following upon some, what, sense knowledge, right? Some sense grasping. Yeah. Just as a natural desire, right, is an inclination falling upon the, what, natural form, it is necessary that there be in the sensing part two, what, powers or abilities to desire. One, by which the soul simply is inclined to pursuing those things which are suitable, according to the sense, and to refusing those things that are harmful, and this is called the conquistable. So, whereby you move towards what is agreeable to your senses, right? Yeah. And move away from what is disagreeable to your senses, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Others, okay, and this is the second one, by which the animal resists those things that are attacking it or fighting against it, right? Which fight against the things or prevent the things which are suitable, right? And that infer some kind of harm upon you, huh? Mm-hmm. And this power is called the, what, irascible, right? Mm-hmm. Whence it is said that its object is something that is arduous or difficult, huh? Yeah. Because it tends towards this, that it might overcome the contrary things, right? Okay. Okay? And rise above them, right? And he says, these two inclinations are not led back. to the same source, huh? Because sometimes, huh, the soul involves itself in sad things or even painful things, right? Against the inclination of the occupiable. So that according to the inclination of the irascible, it might, what? Attack the, what? Or fight against the things that contrary, right? And what's the thing that they say? Was it St. Benedict, right, was suffering from temptations of the flesh, right? And there were a lot of loose women appearing around. And he's supposed to have jumped into a bramble bush or something like that with the thorns. Now, you see, here he's trying to, he's going against the sense inclination of the, what? The desire for pleasure, yeah. Okay. Whence also the passions of the irascible seem to be repugnant, right, to the passions of the concupiscible. For concupiscence, when aroused, diminishes, what? Anger, right, huh? And anger aroused diminishes, what? Concupiscence, ut in pluribus, right? Okay? So the man and the woman sometimes are in an agreeable thing, right? And then they're not really angry with each other, right? And then they get angry about something, and they don't want to make love or something, right? This is a common example of what he's talking about there, right? Okay. And it shows that these are kind of two different powers, right? That one, the activity of one diminishes the, what? Other, right, huh? Okay? Oh, what? Manish is angry. Yeah. I never thought about that. You're playing a rough game of tackle football there, you know, huh? You may not be too pleasant when the sense is getting knocked and tackled and so on, you know? But you're kind of, what, trying to beat these other guys, right? And you're really trying to get even with them, right? Or something for the, in fact, they won the last game last year, or the, you know, they stopped you from winning the tournament, or I mean the conference, or whatever it might be, huh? And you got a million dollar contract. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. People's hands fight on, right? Even though they're getting painful, suffering pain, huh? The drive behind the man, right? Mm-hmm. I was curious that the activity of one dimension is the other. That would suggest that they go back to one source that's feeding both, and maybe you mentioned earlier that they don't lead back to the same source. Yeah. Yeah. But no, you seem kind of a contrariety, though, in the sense in there. You see, in general, in the soul, when one power is very active, right? It kind of, what? Shuts down others. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And you notice that like a little kid sometimes, you know, where dinner is, he's very hungry, and dinner is not getting ready or something, or delayed for some reason. But you get him interested in something else, and then he forgets his being, what? Hungry. Hungry, you know? It happens to us sometimes, too, see? Sometimes, yeah. Yeah. So, it shows you've got kind of two different powers, right here. Yeah. That's the kind of example I think he's thinking of. Okay. So, you could, knowing this, you could almost use this to pacify people. Are angry, give them candy? That's what you say, yeah? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You see, in the rhetoric there, Stalin talks about the emotions that are used in the courtroom, and two emotions that are very irrelevant to the courtroom, are anger and pity, huh? Pity. So, if you're in trial up there, and I'm feeling kind of angry towards you, what you've done may seem, you know, more than it is, right? And, or what you should be punished, I may want to punish you more than you should be punished, right? But then if I start feeling pity for you, see, then what you've done may not seem as bad as it is, and I might let you, I might let you off with less punishment than you really should have, right? And a pity is a, is a kind of what? Sadness, right? Oh, okay. And, uh, therefore, it's going to be the concubisable appetite, right? But anger is what? Irassable. Irassable, right? See? And so, they get in the way of each other, don't they, huh? Yeah. Because when I'm angry with you, anger in a sense is a desire to, what, get even, a desire to punish, huh? So, if I'm feeling anger, that gets in the way of my feeling pity for you, huh? Absolutely. But if I'm starting to feel pity for you, that kind of, what, diminishes the anger. And you see people sometimes, you know, sometimes people get angry at somebody, and they start hitting them and so on, and then they realize they've hurt them, and then they start, you know, feel sorry for the person or something like that, huh? And, uh, give them a hand up or something, you know? And it's the pity diminishes the anger, huh? Oh, so they just, they just try to move you to one of those emotions, depending on if you're... Yeah, Aristotle says it's like warping the ruler before you use it, huh? I think the idea, the idea that Aristotle's saying is if you warp a ruler, you won't get the proper link to the thing, will you? Yeah, yeah. So, um, if I'm angry with you, what you've done will seem, you know, bigger than it was. If I feel a pity, what you've done will seem less than it is, right? I don't get an accurate measurement, right? Yeah. See? Aristotle says you shouldn't, you know, allow these things really in the court, but, but, but they are, you know? So if a priest is given a homily, if he wants people to do some action, he wants to get angry maybe, but if he wants to maybe help some people, he would stir pity. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Okay. I was telling the story about that guy, you know, who had a spastic stomach, a friend of mine. Yeah. And he was doing the strict days of the leaden fast, right? Which I was observing, but he was excused by his, his, uh, so he'd go to the movie or something and he'd, he'd get a hot dog or two and then he'd get a big tub of buttered popcorn, see? And he'd say, Dwight, here, hold this for me, like, you know, you know, like popcorn. Well, see, if I laugh at it or get, or get angry about it, I'm going to kind of forget the fact that I'm hungry, right? You see? It's going to diminish my desire for this, right? You see? He's confessed I should have told him in conversation to give up movies, for the day. Yeah, yeah. It's like we sit down and eat a meal and we're both hungry, you know, and then we get some, some kind of terrible, angry spat with each other, right? You see? And I get up and I leave without even finishing my meal, right? So, and I'm hardly aware of the fact that I'm, what? Yeah. And you see that happen in human situations. I'm just, sometimes you don't get angry and they kind of, uh, don't satisfy their hunger, don't satisfy their desire to eat. And they kind of forget it, right? It's like their hunger is diminished, huh? Because it's been, this place has been taken by, by the anger. And he says, it is clear from this also, and this is maybe another point he's making, that the irascible is, as it were, the fighter for, right? That's neat. And the defensor, the incubusable, when it rises up, right? Against those things which impede one from the pleasant things, the suitable things, right? Which the incubusable desires. And the things that, what? Infer harm, right? Rises up against those, too. The things that the incubusable refuses. Still, but like the army there, which Plato compares it to the city, fighting for the common people, right? So the common people, um, are protected in their pursuit of pleasure, right? By the army, huh? and they're protected from those who had harmed them, right, and inflict pain upon them by the army, right? Well, it's like that with the concubstable, right? I mean, the irascible. It's like the defender and the fighter four of the other. Okay? And then he draws a conclusion on this. And on account of this fact, that it's the fighter four, right, all the passions, right, all the emotions, right, in Latin these are what passion is what we'd call, what, emotions, right, and in French you do that too, you know, Descartes has a tweet on the passions of the soul, right, emotions, and on account of this, all the passions, all the emotions of the irascible start from the passions that are concubstable, right, and they, what, terminate in them. He gives an example of that. Just as, what, anger arises from some, what, sadness, right, or pain, and in inflicting revenge, it ends in, what, joy, huh, you see? An account of this also, he says, the fighting among animals, which involves, what, anger and so on, are about things that are concubstable, pleasant to the senses, right? And he often refers to what Aristotle says, that the animals fight over food and over sex, right, huh? So you see it all the time in the animals, right? You throw a piece of meat between 200 dogs, and they're going to be fighting over the piece of meat, huh? And sometimes they'll fight over their mate, who's going to get the female, huh? So that the desire for what is pleasant there is at the origin of the, what, passions or the emotions of the irascible. That's always true with anger, or when anger sometimes be a slight. Yeah, but that causes certain sadness or pain, right, when we get insulted, huh? That would be a physical pain, exactly. Yeah. Ah, okay. But it's certainly something that at least imagination sees, huh? Imagination. The first, therefore, it should be said that the first objection is saying, what, isn't it the same power about contraries, right? Well, you do have contrariety there in the kiss of appetite, right? Yeah, yeah. Which is that of what is convenientes, he says, and inconvenientes, but might be more than suitable or unsuitable, something, what, agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, huh? Yeah. Okay? But irascible is not, you know, immediately about what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses, but to resisting what fights against, right? Yes. Yeah. Somebody is, it's fighting against something that is, somebody is getting in the way of the suitable, right? I don't know if that's right there. No, the contrary is what is agreeable, what is disagreeable to the senses. Yeah. And you're liking or disliking, loving or hating, right? There's a contrariety that you have in the accusable. But in the irascible, it's not the contrary of that, but now something else, right, that's getting in the way of what you want, or that's getting in the way of your avoiding what you want to avoid. Now, the second objection is saying, well, isn't the ability to desire falling upon senses, isn't that just limited to what is agreeable and disagreeable to the senses? And Tanya says, well, no, there are also inward senses, and we talked about those a bit before, didn't we? The second, it should be said, therefore, that in the knowing powers, the grasping powers, in the sense part of the soul, there is what we call the estimative power, right? Which is perceptive of those things which do not change the senses directly, right? Okay. Thus, also, in the sense desire, there is some desiring power, there is some power desiring what is not suitable according to the pleasure of the senses, but according to this is useful for the animal for its defense, and this is irascible. Now, notice what he's saying there, huh? He's saying that the irascible involves what? Something more than just the outward senses, huh? It involves what? One of the inward senses, okay? Now, a simple example Thomas often will take is that the sheep might run away from the wolf, right? Is it because the shape of the wolf is painful to his eyes? No. Not like the fire, right? Burning earth, you see? But when he sees that shape, this inward sense recognizes this is an enemy, something to be fed from, okay? You see? Okay? And again, when the mother animals say, you know, recognize you're young, right? Something to be fed, right? Okay? I'll give you an example. Remember one time I talked to you about that? I met my politician friend and saved his little kitten there, found his little kitten. We started playing with it. With the snake. Yeah, yeah, and he had the belt, right? Yeah, right. And the cat was playing with the belt, and, you know. Then finally he took this belt, it was kind of striated, you know, and looked up like a snake, right? And the cat was, you know? You couldn't hold it. You know, not trying to avoid it. Right before, I was playing with all the other belts we used. But it seemed like that was kind of an undeveloped vis estimativa, right? You see? The cat saw that somehow as a, what? Enemy, something to be feared, right? Right, huh? So, in some sense, the irascible is a higher power, it seems, huh? Yeah. Then the concubiscible, at least it involves a higher sense power, right? Than the concubiscible necessarily would, huh? Yeah. And therefore, it's a little bit more closer to reason in some way, huh? Mm-hmm. Because you're doing this not as immediately pleasing or immediately disagreeable, but because it's a means to getting what is desirable, right? Or avoiding, like a means to avoid what is painful, huh? Yeah. And therefore, it seems almost like reasoning, doesn't it? You understand? Yeah. So an older cat with a more developed estimative power wouldn't have been played with it or something? Wouldn't bother them? Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I mean, they would not recognize it as a, you know, make the mistake of recognizing it as an enemy, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. It seems to be where sometimes we think maybe animals can think when they can do that kind of stuff. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's really this kind of automatic thing with them, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. It's not discursive. Yeah. And it's by nature, you see. The thing they know is about these little birds that are pursued by the big birds. Oh, yeah. That they clutch when, you know, after they're born, when one of these birds flies over, right? Well, they have no experience, right? Yeah. And see, we have to be, what, taught everything from looking at them, right? When you go across the street, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And all these other dangers, right? But they have, inborn, you might say, right, a judgment about these things. They're doing a particular action without knowing the universal. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But they know they're limited to what is, you know, their enemy, right? Or their friend or something of that sort, huh? You see? And they had the universal mind directing them somehow. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And it's kind of... Yeah. I guess, you know, they say these animals, when they're going to be slotted, you know, for anybody else, you know? They're kind of, you know, kind of dumb going in there, right? You see? But they wouldn't be dumb with respect to their inactual, what? Enemy, right? Oh. But then they seem to have, right, inborn, a judgment that this is something to be avoided. Okay. That's why, you know, when you go back to Shakespeare's definition of reason there, huh? It's the ability for large discourse, right? It's the ability for large discourse, right? Of course, large is very important to see the difference between us and the animals, because they're limited to just certain things. Have I talked to you about those insects, you know? Yeah, the loss. Yeah, the one that squeezed the head of the insectum? Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Have you heard that? It's been a while. No, it's caught. There's one insect that Faber describes, you know, a great homologist. But an insect that would take another insect and squeeze its head, enough to paralyze it, but not so much as to, what, kill it. And then would go and dig a hole, and it would seem to run back and forth until the hole was big enough to contain the body of the victim. And then would get it by the antenna and drag it over to the hole and drop it in, and then would deposit its eggs upon it, and then would cover it up. And when the little ones hatched, right, they have a supply of food there ready for their first period of life. Yes, that's a lovely story. Yeah. Now, you see yourself, did they have a mind or reason that could figure out that you don't want to kill the thing because then it'll crop, and you want to paralyze it if you have to squeeze it this much and no more, right? And he was trying to, you know, take his pliers and try to, you know, get the same insect and try to squeeze just enough to paralyze it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And it's very hard to get just exactly the right touch, right? So it does one thing very well, right? That's true. See? But then he knows that he always pulled the victim by the antenna. Oh, that's right, yeah. So when he's over, you know, finishing up the hole, he took out his little scissors and cut off the antenna. Right. And he came back, you know? Nothing. Now there's a million and one other places to... Have on to. Yeah, yeah. And, but then frustration goes back and fills up the hole without the victim. You see? Interesting. Well, if he could figure out all this thing about squeezing the head, you could figure out there's a million and one other places to drag him by. Yeah, certainly. And, you know, I would say to the girls, I'd say, you know, our cavemen, you know, predecessors, you know, once they hit the woman over the head and drag her by her hair, you know, back to the cave. But if the hair came out, they could figure out that you could pour her by the leg or something, you know, back to the thing. Dumb as they were in the cavemen, right? Yeah. You see? But this thing doesn't have a mind, right? Yeah. Of course, the first thing that Anne Chagra says in the great fragment about the mind is that the mind is, what, unlimited, right? Yeah. There's something infinite about the mind. Yeah. So once you see these other animals, they can do one thing or a few things That's right. very well, but they're programmed for that. Limited. And they get them out of that thing and they're kind of, what, lost, you know? Interesting. You see? Okay. One thing I know is, you know, I've been around cats a lot, huh? And the cat knows that I'm on their side. I mean, I feed them every day. Yeah. I pet them and so on, right? But if I get a little bit aggressive with them, you see? You know, kind of, you know, like that, you know? You know, they kind of react, you know, like I really am an enemy, right? And they really get kind of tough, you know? Uh-huh. And they can't quite realize it's a slow game when I'm playing like that, huh? Yeah. You see? You know, they just kind of react in that way, huh? Mm-hmm. Uh... And I know it's true, if you look around the corner at a cat, huh? It'll, you'll... Because you see the cats facing each other out, down, down, down, I think. And, uh... And see the cats facing each other, you know? It's kind of interesting. Yeah, yeah. You see that, the way... They go to kind of a... Some bothered gestures, you know? You know, that be interpreted somehow. Oh, gee. The other one, too? Yeah. Who's talking about me? Meow. Yeah. Now, to the third, it should be said, huh? That hate, simply speaking, pertains to the concubisable. But by reason of the fighting, which is caused from hate, right? It can pertain to the irascible. It's like saying that, what? The irascible there is an effect of the hate, right? Yeah. Okay? Ah. Associated with it. Yeah. Yeah. So, Shakespeare, you know, often, you know, the way he speaks, you know, he'll use the effect of one thing as an adjective of the other, right? Okay? Oh, yeah. So, uh, hating envy or something like that, right? Or he'll say something like, uh, you know, loving hate. I hate that precedes some love, right? You know? I mean, in the wars there between the Capulets and the Montagues, huh? That the love of their, excessive love of their own household, right? Leads them to hate the other ones, huh? Okay? So, would the irascible be, then, a species of the confusible? Not a species, no. But, as he said in the Bible, the article, the emotions of the irascible arise from some emotion of the confusible. Start from. Because it's, they're the fighter for them, right? Right. And then, um, they, uh, can terminate in something if you have victory, right? Right, huh? You see? Okay? So, I want something, right? I want the girl, but you want the girl, too. So, we have a fight, right? And that's involving the irascible anger, right? But, and it could also involve boldness, which is, you know, another emotion, right? And so, but I overcome you, right? And now I have victory over you, and now I, what? Rejoice, right? Because they get, like, the, you know, army or the country rejoices after they've won the war, the battle, huh? Okay. Now. Could, uh, oh, any private plan, but could, any chance we could review the 11 emotions? Yeah, that's what I was going to do now. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Uh, there's, there's six emotions that belong to the incubusible, and five to the irascible. Oh, yeah. And so, let me just diagram them again here, huh? Good. Now, the incubusible emotions arise directly from something being, what, agreeable, or pleasant, therefore, to the senses, right? Or disagreeable to the senses. So, if something is agreeable to the senses, or something is disagreeable to the senses, Well, the first emotion, if something is disagreeable to the senses, is, I start to like it, right? Okay? Now, you can call the first one liking or loving, but you're talking about the same emotion, basically, right? Loving is, is, uh, stronger than liking, but, now, if, however, it is disagreeable to my senses, then, I dislike it, right? I hate it, right? Okay? Dislike it. I hate it. So, I taste the candy, and I like it. Okay? I taste it. I taste salmon. I find it disagreeable. I hate this. I dislike this. Okay? Um, remember as a kid, you know, sometimes you get a box of chocolate, or a box of chocolate, you know, that the family gets, or something, huh? And, a lot of times you weren't really identified, so you didn't want you to get it exactly until you have it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, what I didn't like was the maple ones. Oh, uh-huh. Those are the ones I didn't like, you know? And, of course, once you've been into it, you know, it's yours. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Put it back in the box. And, uh, so, uh, oh, I got a maple one. Yeah. That's dislike it. Now, those are the two basic emotions, huh? Yes. But now, if you don't have what you like, then there arises from your liking or loving a wanting or a desire for it, huh? Now, the Latin word is desire, but the English word is what? Wanting. So, if I like candy, I don't have any candy, then I want some candy, right? I desire some candy. And, what's interesting about the English word, which is, you know, I want some candy. I want some candy. It's a very marvelous language, English language, and all the best languages there is for philosophy. We also use the word want sometimes to mean lack. So I say to my students, if I say, you know, you're sadly wanting. I don't mean you're sadly desiring something, but you're sadly lacking in something you should have. So you can see in that other meaning of want, this aspect of wanting. When the thing is absent, you might say, or not have, right? When what I like is absent, or I don't have what I like, then I have the second emotion, which is a wanting or a desire. And this is a more obvious one, because there's a sort of, what? They're very much aware of that. They lack something, huh? So hunger and thirst are examples of this, right? I like food, but when it's been absent for a while, haven't had food for a while, then I, what, have this hunger, this desire for food, huh? And we don't have a good name in English for the opposite of that, the one down here, but we could say, use the Latin word, aversion, that's a turning away from, right? All right. So, if I get what I desire, when I have what I like, or when what I like is present, then I have a feeling of, what, joy or pleasure or delight, right? Okay. Now, suppose I can't avoid or avoid very well what is just give up to my senses. Well, then I have, what, sadness or pain, you know? So if I come to dinner to your house, and you're serving salmon, which just happened to me in San Francisco, it was other, I have this interior sadness, pain, and I don't want to, you know, fill this out, but, you know? What do we say about the first? St. Margaret Mary, you know, great saint there, if they could hear it. But her family apparently had a terrible dislike of cheese, kind of strange for a French, you know? Apparently her father had, you know, it was in the, it was, I don't know, the right tier, something like that. And when she went into the convent, you know, how sometimes there were certain arrangements made at the time of entry, you know, like, sometimes there would be a dowry pay, you know, and various things. But one thing was that she would never be required to eat cheese, so I just, in the convent, you see? And of course she wasn't, you know, they didn't fulfill that entirely, that agreement. Oh, yeah, right. But that's a good example, right, huh? So sometimes it's disagreeable to your senses, right? So you hate cheese in this case, right? And therefore you, what, turn away from it, right? Try to avoid it, huh? Yeah. You know, but if you're forced, it's forced upon you, then there's going to be, what, you know, real sadness, pain. So you have six emotions here, huh? The basic ones being liking or loving on the one hand, and disliking or hating, huh? I don't know if you can even read my... I think I'm pushing what I'm saying, huh? Okay. Liking or loving on the one hand, and disliking or hating on the other hand. But then, as they say, there are two other ones that arise from those, right? But one arises from it in the absence, right, of what you like, and the other in the presence of it, huh? Yeah. Now, if there's no difficulty in my getting what I desire, huh, then there's not going to be an irascible emotion, see? But if I desire the candy, or I desire the meat, but you also want this very same candy I want, the very same piece I want, or the very same steak where it is, or if there arises some difficulty in my getting that thing, right, huh? You know? It's hard to get it now, right, huh? Okay? Then, from desire, there can arise one of two emotions in the irascible. If I think, or estimate, that I can overcome the difficulties in the way of the, what, thing I desire, right? Then there arises something called, what, hope, okay? And this moves me to make an effort to get, right, the good that I desire that is hard to get, right? To have the example there, the fox that wants the grapes, huh? Yeah. And, but the grapes are up high, so it's a difficult good, right? Now, so long as the fox estimates that he can maybe reach them, right, he has hope of reaching them, right? By jumping up in the air, as he does, huh? You know the story, Asa, where it is. He has hope, right, huh? But after jumping for many times, his hope, what? Yeah, because he still can reach them, huh? And so, he could fall into the opposite of hope, which is despair, right, huh? Or the man desires the woman, right, huh? But other men desire her too, right? So she's not only good, but a difficult good, right? Now, if he thinks he can win her, then he has this hope that he's making effort, right? But if the other guys are more clever, or more handsome, or more wealthy, or whatever, combination, then he might fall into, what, despair, right, huh? Okay. So you see how these two emotions in the irascible, hope and despair, arise from desire, when what you desire is, what, difficult to get, right? And there are impediments in the way, right? Okay. This is why we carry the name of this emotion over to the will. And it's given a name even to one of the theological virtues, huh? Because you're moving there towards a good that is difficult to get, right? Okay. Now, the same thing with aversion out here, right, huh? The thing that I'm turning away from, if it's not easy to avoid it, right? If it's difficult to avoid it, right, huh? In fact, it might be forced upon me, right? Okay. Then there arises the feeling of, what, fear, right, huh? So suppose I have a little boy there, and there's a big bully there, right? Remember this big bully, you know? Unless I've lost my rubber in his yard, he's my dad, and he says, you come in my yard, and I'll cut your ears off. Nope. The big kid, you know? I was a little kid. I was scared stiff, right? Went home, got my brother Richard. We'll see about that. Okay, so if there's something bad that you want to avoid, right, but you estimate that you may not be able to overcome, you know, or resist it, or avoid it, then you have fear, right? But if you think you can overcome that type of thing, right, then you have the opposite of fear, which is boldness, huh? Sometimes I use the word confidence, too, but confidence is sometimes used for hope, too. So boldness is more of the name for it, I think. The opposite of fear there. So fear and boldness arise in aversion, in a way like hope and despair arise in desire, right? But only when there's a difficulty, right? Okay? Now, if you get the good that you desire, then there's joy or pleasure, and there's no difficulty in joy or pleasure. But suppose something bad is present or forced upon you, right? Well, if you estimate that you can do something to get rid of what is causing you the sadness or pain, then there arises what? Anger, right? Okay? So sadness or pain arises, or can arise, anger. So, for example, if you're stepping on my shoes, right? My toes and causing me some pain, right? I say, you're on my toes, and you say, so what? Well, if you're too big for me to do anything about it, I might just, you know, fear, you know, and go on suffering, right? If I think I can, what, kill you, right? And I'll get angry, and I'll shove you, and you can see the anger arising in me, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And in a way, you see, if somebody insults us or does something like that, it causes us in pain by their insult, right? And it's kind of like we're trying to repulse that by our, what, anger, huh? Okay? So that's a little more spiritual thing, right? Now, with fear, sometimes they distinguish between the white fear and the red fear by their signs, you know? When a man is in fear of death, sometimes he turns white pale, right? Oh, white fear, huh? But if it's a question of honor, then in his shame, right, fear of dishonor, being disgraced, then he has the red fear, huh? And his face turns red, huh? Now, the physiological reason that they give for this is that when your, what, body's in danger, right, the blood withdraws into the source of life, right? Mm-hmm. Okay, what's needed? But if you're in danger of disgrace, which is an outward thing, then the blood rushes out to the cheeks there, where the toe is on the outside. Mm-hmm. See? Shakespeare plays upon that, one of the sonnets there, huh? Is that what physiologically happens? Have they studied that? Well, that's what the ancients say. But it makes some sense, huh? Mm-hmm. See, yeah. Yeah, true. Shakespeare's one of these sons where he's talking about how the flowers have stolen, you know, the perfume and the color of his beloved, right? And now they're afraid of him, you know? But some of them are ashamed and they've turned red, and some are white, they're pale with fear of being destroyed. Right? Okay? But notice, there's nothing analogous to that with joy or pleasure, right? Because there's no difficulty at all in joy or pleasure, see? Just enjoy yourself, see? But in sadness or pain, then there is, you have to get rid of whatever is causing the sadness or pain, huh? Right. There might be some difficulty, you know, if you say, so what, you know? What can you do about it, you know? Well, that might get you angry if you think you can, you know, do something about it. You can repulse this person that's causing you this. Sadness or pain, you know? Mm-hmm. Not to just remain the sadness and maybe fear for the future even if there's a worse thing happening. Mm-hmm. So there are five emotions in the irascible, huh? Yeah. And six in the conciscible, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, this distinction of the eleven emotions is very important for, what, ethics, right? And it's very important for rhetoric, huh? And it's very important for the, what, poetic science. And it's very important for music. Okay? Now, some of these, you know, can be subdivided, right? Okay? I mean, there's more than one kind of sadness, for example. In my article there in comedy, I'm distinguishing between pity and envy, right? And melancholy, right? These are three kinds of sadness that are important to distinguish, huh? And pity is a kind of good sadness, huh? Pity is sadness over the misfortune of another. And, but envy is a bad sadness, huh? It's sadness over the good fortune of another. Yeah. But melancholy is more sadness over your own miserable state, or the miserable state of the world, huh? Okay? Who is it? But these are all forms of what sadness, right? But they're distinguished by the object, right? Mm-hmm. In these cases, huh? Mm-hmm. So, that's very important now when you talk about ethics, right? Because envy would be something to be avoided, huh? Pity, something good, huh? But when Aristotle and Plato, and Shakespeare for that matter, talk about tragedy, they say that tragedy moves us to, what? Pity and fear, huh? And that it purges these emotions, huh? If you look at the prologue of Shakespeare to Roman Juliet, you'll mention those two emotions, pity and fear, huh? Two households, both alike in dignity. In fair Verona, where we are seen, from ancient grudge, breaking new mutiny, where civil blood makes civil hands unclean. From forth the fetal loins of these two foes, a pair of star-cost lovers take their life, whose misadventured piteous overthrows, see? With their death bury their parents' right. The fearful passage of their death marked love, you see? But Aristotle defined tragedy, those are the two emotions he put in the definition of tragedy. It's a likeness of an action, this serious, completion of some magnitude, right? In sweetened language, right? Moving us to pity and fear, but purging or purifying these emotions. And that's a very subtle thing. So you try to understand tragedy, huh? And you have to think of pity, which is a kind of sadness, and fear. But then you go to comedy, huh? Comedy moves us to mirth and to hope. And mirth is a form of what? Joy, huh? So the two main forms of fiction, tragedy and comedy, are about what we consider to be the four chief emotions, joy, sadness, hope, and fear. Now that's another thing we go into sometimes, because Thomas, well, you usually have an article on that subject, right? He goes to the four principal passions, but you find it in all kinds of church documents, huh? Look at the church in the modern world, that's big yet, so now, the joy, the sadness, the hopes, and fears. You go to St. John the Cross, you only have, you know, arguments of those four, rectifying them, right? But anyway, but now, it's very important to know about these emotions, true for ethics, because some of the moral virtues are about certain emotions. So, for example, courage is about fear and boldness, right? Moderation or temperance is about what? These ones here, are what's pleasing to the senses, right? Okay. Desire, pleasure, and so on. Patience is concerned with what? Sadness, right? Mildness is concerned with what? Anger, right? Magnanimity is concerned with hope and despair. You see? So, if you understand the emotions... So, if you understand the emotions... So, if you understand the emotions...