De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 128: Emotions, Rhetoric, Music, and the Obedience of Appetites to Reason

Transcript
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you can understand the matter about which a number of the virtues and vices are concerned with. Now, it's also important for rhetoric, because the second means of persuasion of the rhetorician is the way he moves his audience's emotions and so on. Now, I mentioned before how important a courtroom are anger and pity, you know, but in the liberty of rhetoric, the rhetoric he's in the courtroom, not in the courtroom, but in the political assembly, fear and boldness might be important, huh? So if we're talking about, what, whether we should go to war with such and such a nation, right? Fear and boldness, right? Obviously, if the audience is moved to boldness, they're going to be more apt to vote in favor of war, right? Now, we can, because you realize, you know, if you read, you know, the whole history of the First World War, you know, they thought the war was going to be over in a few weeks or months or something like that. They were really, you know, well, pick the heck off of those Frenchmen or those Germans, or whoever it was, whatever side you're on, right? You know, and if they realized what the war was going to be like, you know, you read about Verdun, 600,000 people died, that's an awful one, and in the battle of Verdun between the Germans and the French, 600,000 people, that's more than we did in some of our wars, in the civil war, you know, battles and some more, but, you know, it's really incredible. But, but, but, um, uh, that was the boldness there, right? Yeah. See? But again, if you had a certain fear, right, then you might be less inclined to go to war, right? You had this feeling of fear, right? So, Aristotle, in the second book of the rhetoric, would talk about the emotions that are relative to what? Uh, that influence people, the decisions they make on a jury or the decisions they make in a legislative or an election or something like that, right? So if I can, you know, get, you know, get friendly feelings towards me, I can, you know? If I get you feeling, you know, unfriendly towards somebody, that's going to influence your vote and your, you know? So there are different emotions and different emphasis upon different emotions. But it's very important for, for understanding, what, the second means of persuasion of rhetoric, huh? I think anger is, if you're right, is the first emotion Aristotle takes up there. This is an obvious one, huh? Mm-hmm. Is it? Um, mm-hmm. Okay? So it's useful, it's very necessary for ethics then, for rhetoric and for the poetic science, right? And then for, what, music, right? Okay? If you take our great music in, let's say, the 18th century, especially. But, um, what you see in the great music of the 18th century is there's a tendency, uh, almost across the board, to use major keys for certain emotions and minor keys for other emotions, huh? And sometimes, you know, with some composers in particular, you'll see a tendency to use even, among the major keys, certain keys more for one thing than for another, right? It's in feel for these keys, right? So, um, if you're representing, um, joy, you'll tend to use a major key. If you're representing sadness, you'll be using a, what, minor key, right? Uh, now, down here, it's a little different. If you're representing anger, it would be a minor key. If you're representing, what, hope, it would be a major key. Despair will tend to be a minor key. Fear will be a minor key. But boldness would be a, what, major key. Yeah, yeah. So, if you have a march like that, you know, you can use, say, C major or D major, right? You have the Jupiter Symphony of Mozart, right? Or the Linds Symphony, right? These representations of hope, right? Magnanimity, right? So, they're in, in, what, C major, right? Mozart tends to use, uh, maybe, uh, B flat or, or, uh, G major, right? More for, it gives them all, right? And C major or D major, more for marches and for the irascible, right? Okay? And he represents anger. Um, the two concertos where he represents anger, the 24th and the 20th. Uh, the 24th is in D minor, and the, uh, 20th, I mean, the 20th is in D minor. The 24th is in, what, C, okay? C minor, right? Okay? Don Giovanni's going down to, uh, L, I think it's in D minor, right, huh? Okay? So, uh, but say Mozart, you know, Mozart has these two quintets, they call the heavenly twins, you know, but they're, you know, 5, 15, 5, 16, we're together. One is a representation of Joads in C major. Like that, 5, 15, and then the one in the Potsdam is 5, 16, you know? It's in, what, G minor, huh? So, um, but the great 16 is in between the major and the minor, huh? And sometimes you have in Mozart's pieces, you have like a little bit of a plot, huh? Like in the development, especially in the major movement, and a melody that's in the major key will come back in the minor key. Oh, wow. After it's been a, you know, a turning around, huh? Mm-hmm. You know? And, uh, so it's important to understand the emotions to understand music, you know? Even though it's not always clear exactly what the joy is about or something. So those, those four arts are four sciences, huh? Uh, ethics, right? What are the four? Ethics. Right on here. Because ethics is about the moral virtues, you know, in a large part, and many of the moral virtues have as their matter some emotions, right? Yeah, that's true. Mm-hmm. So, so temperance is about, what, hunger and thirst and the pleasure you take of these things, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And, uh, courage is about fear and boldness, right? Mm-hmm. And mildness, is about, what, anger. And, uh, magnanimity is about hope and despair, right? Pusanimity, the vice. Mm-hmm. Despair, huh? Patience, what's said, and so on. So, rhetoric is about the emotions for a different reason, though. Rhetoric is about, is the art of persuasion, right? And, and, and one means of persuasion, as Aristotle says, is the image you project in yourself. Okay? The second means of persuasion is the way you move the emotions and the customs of the people you're talking to, right? And the, the least important is the argument you have, he says. Here's the father of logic, says that, right? Okay? So people are more moved by the image than by the argument. It's interesting, you know, in the famous Nixon-Kennedy debate, right? Yeah. Those who heard them on the radio thought Nixon did better, because he was more, he was, in terms of reason, he was better, huh? Right. But Kennedy projected this image, you know, of a young, vibrant guy, and so on, and Nixon, even the makeup wasn't right, I guess, for him. You know? His beard was growing. Yeah, so it's kind of, the image, you know, of the people, it was different, right? Yeah. But Kennedy was seen to, was thought to win by those who saw on TV, right? Sure. But they were judging by the image, but the image is, is generally, he's speaking stronger, right, huh? Yeah. So the politician worries primarily about his image. But the second means of persuasion after that is the way he moves the emotions of his audience, huh? And you see them doing this all the time, huh? So, he has a different reason for talking about the emotions than the, the moral philosopher does, right? Yeah. Okay. So Thomas will usually talk about the emotions in the context of, you know, moral theology or moral philosophy, right? He won't talk about that, right? But then, you can say the poetic science is interested in emotions for two reasons. One is that it wants to represent people under various emotions, and then the other is that the different forms of fiction move different emotions in us. If they're good forms of fiction, they move the emotions to a better state than they usually are in, huh? If it's bad, they would move the emotions to a worse state than they usually are in. That's it. No. No. No. No. So, and then music, of course, both moves our emotions, but it's very much a representation of the emotions, especially by imitating the natural sign of emotions in the human voice. Because these names of emotions are carried over and given to, what, acts of the will sometimes. Okay? By a certain likeness between the, what, acts of the will and the emotions. But when you carry these names over to the acts of the will, you drop out anything bodily in these, okay? Because the will, like reason, is not a body. Emotions or the feelings, as the word feelings kind of suggests, they involve some kind of a bodily change. And it's very obvious when you get ashamed or when you get angry or when you get fearful that your body is changing. When you get sad, your body gets kind of weighed down. In some way, you're joyful, your body gets kind of... And so, so, Thomas will talk about how these names all become, what, equivocal by reason, huh? And so, perhaps almost all of these names can be carried over to the acts of our will. So, then Thomas will ask there, which ones can be carried over to God, right? Well, when you say, well, when you carry them over to the will, even to our will, you drop out the bodily change associated with these emotions, huh? You keep what you might call the formal aspect of them. But, if you examine the formal aspect of these, you'll see that some of them, in fact, most of them, cannot be carried over to God. So, for example, can you speak of desiring God? No, because then you'd be saying that there's something good that God doesn't have, right? So, you have to carry over to God. Can God undergo anything bad? So, all of these ones who concern the bad cannot be God, right? Okay? Even as an act of the will. Is anything difficult for God? So, none of these can be said of God. So, the only two names of the emotions can be carried over to the act of God's will are love and joy. Yeah. Okay? And you can say, properly speaking to God, there's love and joy. I think there's different things in God that they are not. So, St. John can say, God is love, right? Mm-hmm. There's more joy in heaven, or... Oh, good. So, in Aristotle, it's aware of the fact that there's love and joy, pleasure in God. But then, Thomas says, some names are carried over to God, metaphorically speaking. Not properly, right? Mm-hmm. So, anger is sometimes used as a metaphor for what? Mm-hmm. For the divine justice, right? The divine will to punish, right? And sometimes pity, which is the name of some sadness, is carried over and applied to God's, what? Mercy, his will to relieve our, what? Misery, right? But fear can in no way be carried over to God, even metaphorically, right? God is divine nature. And, but something like maybe boldness could be, right? You see? Because of a certain metaphorical likeness, huh? Yeah. That just as the bold man, you know, approaches dangers and overcomes him, right? So God, you know? You know? So we speak of God as being, you know, afforded to him, but these are the metaphors, right? So, it's beautiful. If you ever see that last time, the first book is in the U.S. He goes through the, you know, recalls the teaching about the emotions, and then he shows how the names of the emotions can be carried over to the acts of the will, about us, right? And that's one way in which a name becomes equivocal. By reason. By dropping part of its meaning. Yeah. Oh, that's right. You see? And in the emotions, there's both a formal aspect. I can say anger is a desire for revenge, or something like that, right? But there's also a bodily aspect of that. Yeah. So you drop the bodily aspect out and keep the formal aspect, right? Okay? So, same with hope. Wherever there's bodily hope is dropped out, but the idea that there's a movement of the desire and power towards the good that is difficult, right? You see? That's kept, huh? And then after he talks about that, he talks about which names can be carried most of them over to God. And it's only joy and pleasure, joy or love can be carried over to God, huh? Properly speaking, right? But some other ones can be carried over to God metaphorically, right? But not properly, huh? Okay. Now, what do we mean properly? You still drop out body aspect, right? Yeah. But you keep the formal aspect. You see, love is for a good, right? That's the basic thing. You don't have love, you don't have anything, right? In the thing. And you can have love for a good when it's present or it's absent, right? But the love is stronger when the thing is present, huh? Okay? Then what are you doing that's different in the metaphorical to the properly? What would be, what's different from the metaphorical? Well, as I say, if you speak of God as being, you see... Anger? Yeah, yeah. You see, anger arises from sadness. Well, there can't be any sadness in God because that means there'd be some kind of something bad that's enforced upon God, right? Okay? But because the angry man punishes, right? Oh, I see. It is like twice a minute. Yeah, like is there in the effect, right? Okay, yeah, okay. So because God punishes like the angry man punishes, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Although the angry man does so out of emotion and so on and so on. But God said that His will is to rectify things. So metaphorically, it's said to be angry, right? Okay. Yeah. Okay, thank you. And then one psalm that they say says at the beginning of the office 94 there, right? You know, the old number. 94 says, what? He's sworn is angry, you know, because they don't know my ways. Yeah. You know? You know? He's not here to know my rest, huh? Yep. But it's a very, you know, say, it's firm in His justice now not to take them into His rest. Mm-hmm. So, um, angry is said metaphorically, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. But Thomas would say, but fear, there's no reason to say fear, even metaphorically, of God. Mm-hmm. You see? There's no real likeness there, huh? Yeah. Okay. But none of the irascible wants to be said property of God because the irascible has the arduum, the difficult, as this object done. And nothing's difficult for God. That's right. It's kind of, you know, He's just kind of an incredible God. I mean, nothing's difficult for God. You know, I don't know if this is true or not, but, you know, Thomas Aquinas is supposed to, you know, on his deathbed there, you know, thank God that he had understood everything he had ever read. Yeah. I've heard that. I don't know if it's true or not. It's not true about me. Yeah. I'm not sure. But it would be so nice to have understood everything he had read, right? Yeah, yeah. I can't even understand the directions there for my computer or whatever it is, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's interesting. It's amazing, you know. We're trying to, you know, get a Greek font that the printer would print, you know, and print some, and really, it's really crazy that the things that can interfere with doing what you want it to do is extremely complicated. So, I mean, there are so many things. I can never... I understand directions anyway, but I get through things, you know. So I certainly can't say that I've understood everything I've read, huh? And certainly I can't say that everything has been easy. Yeah. But, you see. So, you see, here's the formal aspect of this, the practically bodily aspect, right? The formal aspect is, always there has to be something difficult, right? Right. A good, difficult to get. Well, there's no good which is difficult for God to get. Right. There's nothing bad that's difficult for God to avoid, right? No. And there's no badness that has been inflicted upon God that it's difficult for him to get rid of, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. So, no passion of the irascible could be said properly of God because of what, the very definition of it, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But, when you get up here in Odyssey, these things are the reason he gave whatever he said of God properly, right? But not even desire, because that would imply there's some good that God doesn't have, right? Mm-hmm. He's very good. And love, which, in Christ, is the basic one. You can enter a hell of love, you know? Yeah. And so, in time of somebody who's a poor Aristotle, you know, where he speaks of God's rejoicing, you know? And how simple his rejoicing is, huh? How perfect it is, huh? Now, when he said... But, you know, what does it, Christ said? Enter into the joy of your master, right? Was that a thing, you know? You've been faithful over little things, you know? Now you enter into the joy of your master. Mm-hmm. Now, when St. Thomas says that he understood everything he read, he also says in his letter to the... I don't know if he said that, I mean, I just said by... But, he said you've gained just a little bit at a time, so he went through that, too. He may have understood everything, but it wasn't just like he was, I understand, I understand. No, no, I mean, actually, it counts like it of Thomas, you know, where he was puzzled by somebody trying to understand St. Paul, right? Yes. And then he'd go down to the ground and start praying, you know, and then, get up now, I see it. That's what I read, too. He really thought things. Yeah, and there's supposed to have been one time, you know, where Thomas came out of his cell and said, you never believe who was in there. St. Paul was in there. Oh. He was conversing with St. Paul, you know? Wow. So, I mean, you know, it's not the thing about having understood everything, you know. It's like the story, you know, they tell Thomas, you know, having some kind of operation, you know, surgery, you know, and just, you know, thinking deeply about something, and then he goes, well, the surgery doesn't bother him, right? Because he's so... Oh, so good. Yeah. I find that sound questionable, you know? You know? It is. Shows the separation of powers, doesn't it? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Well, I think it's, yeah, maybe in some sense Thomas did understand everything he read, you know? Yeah. But not instantly. Yeah, not instantly, no, no. All right. But for God, strictly speaking, you know, nothing is difficult, right? That's right. So you can't really, you know, have the irascible things. No harm can come to God, huh? Mm-hmm. But, so only two of them can be said properly, but some other ones can be said metaphorically, right? Okay. It's a beautiful thing, so. So, so to understand these things is important for theology, too, for thinking about, you know, the will, but thinking ultimately about God, huh? Mm-hmm. So that's the fifth place where these, you know? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You have to understand these, you know, and see from their formal meaning even, which is part of their meaning, why some of them can be carried over to our will, but not to God's will. And we would say that with this metaphorical use, you really aren't keeping the formal aspect. No, no. Yeah, at all. So, because you're going down one. Oh, okay. Yeah. Because anger, formally speaking, is you're moving against, right, some evil that has been causing you sadness, right? None is possible for God, right? Yeah. Is it? Okay. Dr. Berg was saying, I still don't have the original four. Ethics, rhetoric, music, and... Ethics, rhetoric, poetic, and music. Poetic, I was going to say. Poetic science, and then music, yeah. I see the poetic science is interested in it both because it wants to represent, you know, people in various emotions, right? But also because the work of the tragedy or the comedy that he already writes moves certain emotions, huh? In the audience, right? And he wants to move these emotions in a certain way, huh? I thought you said in your notes, music's the most powerful way to move, and then poetic, second, or something? Yeah, yeah. Music is the most persuasive of things. To move our emotions, and then poetic is the second? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. And that's what's happening, like a movie out in the world. They're moving us both ways, with the music and emotion and reasoning. Yeah, yeah. They're really bad movies. Yeah, they're really wacky. They're a lot of musical. And the thing you notice about some of these successful movies, too, is that they were very fortunate to get just the right music to move on. Yeah. Great ones, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Science came as a god of the wind. That music really made the thing, you know, in some ways. And, you know, I didn't think of other movies, you know. The Brian song, then. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, like the march is kind of aggressive. Yeah, yeah. John Dryden there, huh? It's an ode in the Feast of St. Sicilia. It was a Pantanist, a music. But it's Timotheus, you know, the famous musician of ancient times, performing. At a banquet there, where Alexander the Great is. And he plays one kind of music, you know. Alexander's almost like back in battle, you know. He's a really formidable man he must have been, right? And then he changes the music, you know, and he's getting amorous with the lady next to him, and so on. He's like, he's like putting all his hands to both of you, so. But Shakespeare, you know, you know, is very much aware of the power of music, huh? How can we both do good or bad, huh? And this is the thing that you realize, too. Even, you know, at a place like TAC, you know, where you're getting kids who are pretty, you know, well-disposed, kids with an isocied, you can come from, you know, strong, you know, Catholic backgrounds and so on. You can more easily get them into good literature than into good music. If they've heard, you know, the wrong kind of music, huh? You know, and their emotions have been somehow, they, it's very hard to, to, uh, to me get there and change them, you know? Oh, interesting. And, and, you know, my daughter can see that, you know, you know, and, and other people I talk to. Mm-hmm. Um, I know where Brother Marcus, you know, sometimes when they, you know, they give a, you should talk about it, they, the tutors in the fall, you know, where Brother Marcus talks in music, you know, and you can see that, kind of that, you know, impediment that people have because their emotions have been, uh, malformed by the music they listen to. Yeah. Uh, customs so strong. Yeah, yeah. You see what, what a strong thing music is, what you get attached to, so you find the music. Yeah. But, by, literature's a little more, a little more intellectual, you see, and your emotions are not, it's not quite as, uh, as natural as music is. It's, uh, music bypasses reasoning, doesn't it, in a sense? It just moves. We're not entirely, no, no. But, you see, the, the excellence of the music of the 18th century is that it represents the emotions in a state of harmony with the reason, huh? Mm-hmm. And yet they respect, you know, the nature of the emotions. And, uh, that's why you should be, you know, accustomed to listening to the music of the 18th century. You get into the Romantic period, you see. Mm-hmm. Romantics wouldn't accept that, uh. Subordination of the emotions to reason, huh? Oh, that's right. But actually, music of the 18th century is more beautiful, huh, than the 19th, the Romantic music, you know? And it's very interesting, you know, to see how Tchaikovsky was so devoted to Mozart, right? Mm-hmm. And we have the letters of Tchaikovsky, you know, where he was listening to Mozart simply because he was trying to avoid the disorder of his own life, huh? Oh, yeah. You know? Like, like, he tried to kill himself and things of that sort, you know? Mm-hmm. You know, and because of all the water there, he had to quite go through with it, you know, and so on. And people are kind of surprised, he listens to the music of Mozart, you know, because it doesn't seem to fit his disordered life and the disordered thing, but he's trying to flee that to get some, some water into his life, huh? It doesn't fit his, his music reflected more his life, too, didn't it? Huh? It's me and... The music reflected more his life, too, than Mozart. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But you have his famous, you know, Mozartian in there. He's taking Mozart's melodies and kind of playing with them, you know, or varying them. And he's our Mozart, right? Oh, yeah. But, you know, the music of the Baroque and Mozart's music, huh, is much more healthy for the emotions than Romantic music is. Now, how does it move? I see, I got, when I was first in industry music, you know, I remember the first thing I remember in the house in the old 78s was, you know, when it picked over the symphony and some Tchaikovsky and so on, you know. Yeah. And my uncle who taught violin and his church of music had said, you'll come to Mozart, he said. Oh. You'll come to Mozart. He didn't argue with us, you know. Right, right. But then when Brother Richard got into college there and he had Austrii as a teacher, right? Oh. Austrii wrote that famous little essay, Towards an Evaluation of Music. Yeah. So that was one of the texts in the chorus. So that's when I first read that and that's when I really started listening to the Baroque and the Mozart. And I don't have much desire to listen to Tchaikovsky much or Beethoven. Beethoven, love him. Is Beethoven considered a romantic? Yeah. He's getting, well, he's kind of at the beginning of it, you know. You know, Schubert. So he was after Mozart? Yeah. Well, Mozart taught Beethoven, you know, at one time a little bit. Oh, okay. Yeah. That's interesting. They always have, you know, Beethoven when he was with one of the other students there and they were listening, hearing Mozart's 24th piano concerto. Oh. And Beethoven says, now he says, we shall never equal that, he said. Oh, I don't know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. All right, so if Mozart's the best, who would be second or third? Bach and Bach? Well, we were just discussing it on the Californian time about some of those reasonable men there. Yeah. We could put Mozart first and Handel second and Johann Sebastian Bach third, you know. Oh, that's true. Oh, Bach. Okay. Yeah. But, you know, Corelli up there too, you know. Who? Corelli. I heard that name recently. Yeah, he used to do something, yeah. Corelli. Corelli. How do I even know that name? Yeah, that's funny. No, no. Did we hear another? Art Angelo Corelli. It's a different Corelli. Yeah. How do you spell it? Do you know? C-O-R-E-L-L-I. Corelli. Yeah. First name? What's the first name? Oh, I think that... He's buried in the Pantheon, huh? We... The Cardinal had him buried in the Pantheon. Oh, Father, last. I think one of the pieces from the tenor, Andrea. Oh, okay. Look. He's a lesser tenor. He's a blind... Yeah. All the music we have, Corelli, is instrumental, you know. Oh, okay. You might make it into something. Other than I have. Yeah. Oh, good guess. All right, well. All right, so Mozart... Mozart, Handel, Bach. Handel and Mozart, you know, hyphen, because Mozart, you know, had revised it. They say improved it, actually. All right. Well, others say, you know, they want the pure Handel, you know, all those disputes you get, you know, so... Sure. So, but... Oh. You can see it, you know, especially in the later Mozart, you know, influence of Handel. But Mozart had great respect for Johann Sebastian Bach, too, you know. They went up to Bach's place and played the organ, you know, and they came out and said, just like the master, you know, Mozart was playing as well as Bach, you know, and then Mozart was seeing the manuscripts of Bach, you know, and they were not published, you know, and he had them all on the floor and he's learning from them, you know. He learned something from this, huh? But it's kind of interesting, the Baron von Zieten there, who was the royal librarian there in Vienna, he'd have only Bach in Handel at his Sunday active music. Oh. Yeah. So Mozart had a great respect for both of them, you know, Handel and Bach. But Mozart's life, I'm surprised that Mozart's life was actually disordered, I mean, it seems like... Well, are you judging by the movie you mean? Well, all right, look, you know, I'm sorry, but the fact is that I don't know anything about his life except what the movie may have reflected. I've never read anything about it. Yeah, no, the movie, you can't agree as accurate at all, I don't think. It's, it's, it's, it's... Yeah, it's just, it's trying to make Mozart a rock star. Oh, okay. Yeah, just, that's... That's why I see that movie, just close your eyes and just hear the music. Do you have a good, uh, a good, uh, biography of him? Einstein's biography. Oh, Einstein, there was a biography of Mozart? Oh, for Einstein, that's probably it. Oh, it is. Actually, he's a cousin, though, of Albert Einstein. Oh, really? Is he? But, but, you know, Einstein thought Mozart was the greatest composer, huh? Did he? Yeah, yeah. And he, he says... I've spoken to that. It's very, very, very interesting, the difference between Albert Einstein, his remark about Beethoven and, uh, and Mozart, you know, he said, he said, Beethoven made his music, huh? You know? Mozart found it. Mozart's music seemed, he says, to have been a part of the universe always, you know? Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, yeah. I think I'm interested in your observation, you know? I remember my brother Mark saying, you know, about Shakespeare there, and we can't quite imagine a world that doesn't have Roman and Juliet in it, that play, right? You know, it seemed like it had to be a part of our literature, right? Uh-huh. You know? And that's the way Mozart is, huh? It just, uh, seems so natural, you know? Mm-hmm. Mozart himself said, you know, if writing music doesn't come to you like piddling comes to the, the beast, he said, writing music, you know? I'm sorry, like what comes to the world? Piddling, you know, you know, with the, kind of a vulgar way of saying it, you know, the church, I mean, you know, just, you know, kind of naturally, you know, the way it would come. All right, thank you. It's, uh... Very natural, yeah. You realize, you realize, too, how short Mozart's life was. Yeah. I mean, people like, like, Haydn were, you know, composing up into their, you know, 70s, I guess. Yeah. How old was he when he died? 36. He wasn't even 36, he was in the 36th year. Oh, wow. Yeah, Mozart, yeah. I mean, I know myself, I, I went to the, uh, um, in 56, uh, 1956, I went to the, uh, concert song Mozart, the birth of Mozart. Yeah. The 200th anniversary of his birth. Yeah. And then I was present, you know, for the 200th anniversary of his death, right? Mm-hmm. That was, huh? If he had lived another 20, 30 years, I mean, you know, you know, I mean, that's like, it would have been no room for anybody else. Everybody else would have been pretty pushed off the, the thing, you know? It's a problem. Yeah, Vivaldi's good, but not as good as Corelli, you know? Okay. But he's Baroque. Vivaldi. Oh, yeah, yeah, Vivaldi's good, too, yeah. Yeah, there's all kinds of people there, you know, and they have nice pieces, I mean. Yeah. I mean, I like, uh, non-Christian Bach, you know, who had such an influence in Mozart. Oh. Yeah, because he's the one who went south and married a Catholic and became a Catholic. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Uh-huh. I asked my friend, Vivaldi, if he preferred Bach or Mozart, of course, he preferred Mozart, right? Uh-huh. But, you know, for him, Bach was trop severe, as he said in French, he's too astaire, you know? Oh, there's something to that, yeah. Yeah. But, right, Handel is warmer, you know? Oh, yeah. And, uh, you know, if I was, if I was going to argue that Handel was the greatest composer, you know, that he, you know, as compared to Mozart and Bach, I would say that you want two things for music, right? You want it to be noble and to be sweet. Um. And the music of Handel, someone could argue, is more noble than that of Mozart, huh? Yeah. I mean, I thought, it's... God our enlightenment, the guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, coordinate illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So, in question 81 here, article 3, whether the irascible and the concubiscible, being these two powers or the emotions that they have, whether they obey reason, huh? So he first objects, saying they do not obey reason. The first objection, of course, is taken from things that Guston says, partly. The irascible and the concubiscible are parts of what? We spoke before of how sensuality in English doesn't exactly mean it, but it fits the context here somewhat, right? Okay, we're 81-3 there, right? Yes. Okay, perfect. But sensuality does not obey reason, whence it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says in the 12th Book of the Trinity. Therefore, the irascible and the concubiscible do not obey reason, huh? Moreover, what obeys something does not fight against it, but the irascible and the concubiscible fight against reason, right? According to that of the apostle. Now notice how he calls St. Paul the what? The apostle. Yeah. And doesn't John Paul II, he'll sometimes refer to Peter and Paul as the princes of the apostles, huh? Oh, right. But Thomas, I guess there's some basis of that even scripture, huh? That Peter and Paul will call themselves apostles more in the epistles than the other ones, well. And so it's by Antonia Messiah, huh? But Thomas usually refers not to Peter, but to Paul, right, as the apostle. In the epistle of the Romans, huh? Verse chapter 7. I see another law in my members, huh? Fighting against the law of my mind, huh? So, even Paul is experiencing this, huh? Yeah. Even Christ said, the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak, huh? Therefore, the irascible and the concubiscible do not obey reason, huh? Moreover, just as the desiring power is below the rational power of the soul, so also is the power to sense. But the sensing power of the soul does not obey reason. For we do not hear, nor do we see when we want to, right? So, Romeo can't see or hear Juliet, right? He says the mice there can see it here, rats can see it here, but I can't, right? So, if you're in control of that, right? Can't see if you're not here, huh? Therefore, likewise, neither are the, what, powers of the sense desire, namely the irascible and concubiscible, neither do they obey reason, huh? Okay? So, there you guys see that there's a distinction, right? Between the senses and the sense desire and why the one doesn't really obey the other, but the other can. But against this is what Damascene said, huh? So, John Damascene. What obeys and is persuadable, right, by reason, or true reason, is divided into, and notice the way they translate there, concubiscentium. I guess Damascene would be writing in Greek, huh? Originally, in concubiscentium and irum, that's probably just like the Greek words, what, epithumia and thumas, I would say, translate. But usually, when they refer to these two powers in Latin, now they use the term, concubiscible appetite and rascible appetite, but it's just one word in the Greek, huh? It's very close to it, huh? It goes back to Plato and Aristotle, huh? Epithumia and thumas, huh? So, Thomas is going to reply now. I answer that the irascible and the concubiscible obey the higher part, in which is the understanding or reason, and the will, right, in two ways they obey them. In one way, as regards reason, and the other, as regards what? Will. The will, huh? Now, you want to take a piece of those separately, right? Okay, yeah. They obey reason as regards their very acts, huh? Now, how is this so? Okay? Now, Thomas doesn't mean that they're going to, what, perfectly obey, right, huh? Or anything like that. But he's saying that they do, to some extent, obey reason, or they can. Now, what's the reason for that, huh? Because sense desire, huh? Now, notice when he says, a petit to a sensitivus, he means what? I mentioned before how in Latin, they're more apt to take the name of the act, right? And give it to the, what, power, right, huh? So a petit to us might mean desire, right? Yeah, yeah. But then the word desire in Latin, a petit to us, can mean the power or the ability to desire, huh? Now, I mentioned last time that sometimes in English we do that, huh? So someone might say this, understanding is the name of what? The act, but also you could say man is an animal with understanding, meaning the power to understand, right? Right. So sometimes we do use the same name, right, for the act and the power. And that's what happens with the word petit to us here, right? It means desire, right? But also the ability to desire. Well, it would be like in English if we took the word desire to name the act, the wanting itself, right? And then use it in another meaning, meaning the ability, the power, for that same act, huh? Okay. And sensitivus means the, what, ability to desire following upon the senses, right? Yes, yeah. Okay. He says the sense ability to desire in other animals, right, is apt to be moved by the estimative power. Now, what does the estimative power mean? Well, we talked about the internal senses, right? And there were four inward senses, huh, that Thomas distinguished, huh? But two of them are retaining what the other two do, huh? So it's what we call the common sense, huh? The senses communis. The sense that we're aware of from the fact that we not only sense the difference between white and black, or we sense the difference between sweet and bitter, which outward senses can do, one, the eye, one, and the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the But then, in the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the the, the, the, the, Yeah, to some extent, yeah, the estimative power is what we'd call instinct. Now, as we learned above, in place of instinct, there is in man, as has been said above, this cogitative power is called sometimes, which is called by some the particular reason, in that it is what? Bringing together individual, right, images and so on, just like the universal reason, brings together, what, universals, huh? Whence by it the sense desire in man is apt to be moved, just as in the animals, the sense appetite is apt to be moved by instinct, huh? Now, the difference, one difference between, if you didn't speak here fully, one difference between the cogitative power, as they call it, and the instinct of the animal is that the cogitative power sees the singular under the universal, right? There's a kind of a collaboration of these two powers, huh? Okay? So, I see this as, what, something to be dropped, right? I see this as a beverage, right? I see this as, what, I know it in a singularity, but I see it as coming under something more, what, universal that I know, right? And that's what the universal reason, right, can, what, influence this thing, right? So, he says, the particular reason is apt, naturally apt to be moved and directed by the universal reason. Whence, in syllogism, you might say, right, from universal propositions are concluded, what, singular conclusions, right? People always joke about the death of Ivanovich, or what's his name, one by Tolstoy, you know, where the guy said, gone to school and heard it, all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore he's mortal. But he never thought it applied to himself, right? And now he's on his deathbed. And therefore it is clear that the, what, universal reason can command the sense one, right? The sense desire, which is distinguished by the concubiscible and the irascible, and that this, what, desire obeys it, right, huh? See what he's saying there, right? He's saying that just as the sense desire of the animal obeys its instinct, right, so our sense desire is apt to obey, what, our cogitative power, right? Our cogitative power is under the influence of the universal, what, reason, huh? Okay? And therefore, universal reason, in some sense, commands, right, the sense one. And he says, and because to deduce universal principles, or from universal principles, to singular conclusions is not a work of, what, simple understanding, right? Right. But more reason, huh? It's a kind of movement there. Right. Therefore, the irascible and concubiscible are more said to obey reason than to obey, what, understanding, right? See? So you have to apply universal, in a sense, the singular, that's like a kind of reasoning, right? So the old standard textbook is, this woman is not my wife, right? So this actor is adultery, adultery is prohibited by the Sixth Commandment or something, right? Therefore, I shouldn't do this, right? Okay? You see that? Okay, so you're applying the universal to this singular here and now, right? This money is yours, right? It's not mine, right? Okay? So to take what is not mine is robbery. Robbery is prohibited by the, you know? So the universal, right, is applied to the singular, right? And that is kind of like reasoning, huh? I should not steal. This would be stealing. Therefore, I shouldn't do this, right? You see? So that's why it's said to obey reason more than to obey simple, what? Understanding, right? It's not going to obey, in other words, my just understanding that robbing is wrong, right? But I've got to say that this is robbing. Therefore, this is wrong, right? So it's said more to obey reason than to obey, what? Simple understanding, huh? Adultery is wrong. Unless I bring under that the particular, this is adultery, then I don't syllogize, as he says, right? I don't reason that this is wrong, huh? He says, this also, each one is able to experience in himself, huh? That by applying universal considerations, he, what? Mitigates, right? He doesn't say illuminates entirely, right? But he mitigates anger, or what? Fear, or something of this sort, right? Or also that he, what? He might instigate it, right? Okay. So I was driving up to Quebec City one time in a new car, right? And I went through Maine, and what they call the route to President Kennedy, but it wasn't very well kept up, right? It was all kinds of potholes, right? Oh, that's fair, man. Yeah. So, I was always putting on the brakes there, because you're covering your pothole, right? So I had some crazy French driver behind me, right, who was getting impatiently, right? So finally, he roars by me, and as he roars by me, his car picks up a stone. I could hear it hitting the side of the car, right? Well, I knew it was going to leave a mark on the car, right? Oh, you see. And so the French reaction got a little bit, you know, except when I said, but I'm a philosopher, you know? Yeah. I'm going to get excited about this, you know? So I was applying something universal, right? Philosophers don't get excited about these sort of things, you know? I'm a philosopher, you know? What do I care, you know? But what did the missus say? Will. So. Oh, by the way, what did you say? Yeah, what? A couple times he says, natus est. Yeah, it's naturally apt, yeah. Natus is related to... Oh, I see what you're saying. Yeah, okay. So that's how you say aptum natum est, you see the whole phrase, right? But it's kind of a little more briefer, huh? Oh, okay. Okay. Now, in the Nicomachean Ethics, you see, when they talk about this experience here, right? If you don't have that experience, right, you're not in a position to do ethics, right? Yeah. Kind of a textbook common example there is that sense desire is diminished by, what, abstinence or something of this sort, right? Okay. And by saying no, and so on. Mm-hmm. And that's a matter of what? Experience, huh? Okay. When I was a little boy there, I was stuffing myself a candy one day. And my brother Richard there, four years older, right, said, you should stop eating all that stuff, right? And I said, well, it's no sin to eat candy, I said, to defend myself. And he says, well, no, it's not a sin, he says, to eat candy, he says, but if you can't say no to candy, you can't say no to something that's lawful, then you're going to end up, what, not saying no to something that's unlawful. Well, I think that was good advice, and I think, you know, you see something, you know, of what he's talking about here, right? Sure. That experience, huh? If you have, if you don't in any way say no to yourself, even those things that are lawful, right, then your appetite's getting too strong, right, for you, maybe, and you're going to not say no when there's something that's really unlawful, and that's a matter of experience, huh? But I think another thing that he knows a lot is, is in, in anger, I think it's interesting to me, his first thing is, maybe, got her hiring, you know, thinking of, of, uh, defenses to sales, and there have been other saints, I guess, you know, who were, by nature, what, irascible, huh? And, uh, sometimes you see this in, you know, children, too, that, you know, some children are more, more given to anger than others, huh? And, uh, if you correct them and try to make them mild, right, then they, they sometimes, what, you know? Yeah, well, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean, they do, yeah. And, uh, you hear people saying, you know, uh, some people are in nervous camp and speaking for a group, right, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, and, uh, They have a certain fear, right? And there's all kinds of little tricks that people have, you know. I have what repeats of them, but I mean, things that people will think about, right? To help them to be more, what, you know, to dominate the audience, so to speak, rather than to be intimidated by the audience. And, you know, in that, you know, that you're kind of, you know, kind of picking out one person in the audience, you're kind of addressing that person, right? And if that was the only person there, you know, and then maybe you're, you know, you don't want to stare at one person, obviously, they'll lecture or talk or whatever it is, and you look at somebody else, right? You're talking to him or her alone, right? So all kinds of little universal considerations that mitigate these things. When I was senior there to graduate, I had goofed up on something on my, you know, on the school requirements, you know, and the circle was my advisor, see. Yep. You see? And so he hadn't caught the thing, see. And he was all concerned, he said, he just laughed when he heard it, see. He says, Dwayne, he says, I thought you were smarter than that. You see? I might just have to feel a little bit of, you know, anger. I owed so much to him, I couldn't possibly get angry at the man, see, you know. So, you know, I'm thinking, you know, I can't get angry at this man, right? That's really the kind of experience that has to underlie ethics, right, huh? The experience that the emotions, right, can be to some extent calmed or tamed, right? Oh, yeah. It's like the Bible says, you know, a soft word turns away anger, huh? Oh, yeah. And to some extent it's true that it takes two to make a fight, huh? Well, some people are pretty persistent trying to get you into a fight, but I think it's a matter of experience, right, that you can turn things off to some extent. And that's as far as, what, the reason itself, huh? But then he said there, the will also directly, huh? And he says, to the will also is the sense, desire, what? Subject in some way, right? As far as it's, what, execution, huh? Which comes about to the moving power. And other animals, right, at once, to the, what, desire, the incubusable or the harassable, their fowl's motion, just as the, what? Sheep. Sheep, yeah. Fearing the wolf immediately flees, right, huh? Yeah. Because there's not in them some superior amitite which fights against this, right? But a man is not immediately moved according to the, what, irascible or the incubusable appetite, huh? But he expects the command of the will, which is his superior desire, right? Yeah. So, when my brother's dad used to get, you know, when he was young and getting angry, he would pick up something to throw at me a block or something. Oh, right. My mother would always, what, you know? She'd say, whatever, and give him a little paddling, right, see? So, after a while, he'd pick up a block on him to throw, then he'd stop and run and say, my mother's there, right? So, he has some command over that, right? Mm-hmm. And a lot of times you see people and they're kind of seething, you know, with anger, you've probably seen this, you know, and they've got something in their hand, you know, but they're kind of thinking twice that they'd get in trouble if they really, you know, go and plopper you with this stick or whatever it is that they have in their hands, right? Mm-hmm. You see? So, but you're kind of learning to control your anger a bit, right? Because you're controlling the carrying out of this in your body, right? So, your body is not imaginable being your anger to hit this person, huh? Okay? And the same we see a bridge sometimes, you know, on a diet or, you know, the kind of, you know, struggle to keep from reaching for the candy bowl or the other drink or whatever it is, right, you know, and the, so the will is really, what, more powerful, right, than my desire to reach for the candy, right? I can say no, right? Okay. So he says, in all moving powers that are ordered, the second mover does not move except in the power of the first mover. Whence the lower desire does not suffice to move unless the superior desire consents, right? And this is what the philosopher says in the third book about the soul. That the superior power moves the lower one as the sphere, the higher sphere, the, what, lower, right? Mm-hmm. In this way, therefore, the irascible and incusable will be a reason, huh? You know, Plato sometimes compares reason with the emotions, though, like, what, a man and the, what, horses, right, huh? Yeah. I see. And how the man has to, to some extent, tame the horse, right? Mm-hmm. And, uh, kind of marvelous, you read, uh, Washington Irving, you know, the tour of the west, tour on the prairies, which he made when he came back from, uh, Europe for that first long time. And, uh, he's talking about how these wild horses, how they, they're very hard to capture, you know, but when they capture them, the men know how to break them in pretty quickly. It's kind of amazing to see how quickly the horse becomes tame, huh? And, uh, so, but sometimes the saints talk about this, too, you know, it's an inviolence that you have to use with yourself, right, in order to bring these emotions, what, and the control of reason. And obviously this control is something much less after the fall than, what, before, right? So Thomas, uh, you know, I think Augustine, too, when they talk about the fall of Adam and Eve, huh, they couldn't fall through the passions. It had to be a, what, a very spiritual sin, huh? It had to be a kind of, what, pride, huh? Okay? But now in the fall of this day, I mean, the emotions can instigate a lot of, what, sins, huh? So if you look at the so-called, uh, what, capital vices, right, which are the vices that, uh, lead the other kind of things in their train, huh? But a lot of them are named from, what, emotions, like, you know, one for anger and one for, you know, lust and one for, let me. You know, drunkenness and so on. Okay. Um, okay, now. The first objection was based on, what, uh, the irascible and cubstable coming under what is called the sensual power, right? And this was signified by the serpent, right, in the, uh, scripture, I guess. And Thomas says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the sensuality signified by the serpent as regards what is proper to it on the part of the sensing power. Okay? Well, he says the irascible and the cubstable more named the sensing desire on the part of the act which is induced from reason. That's a little bit strange that he says that. Um, but I mean, the distinction that underlies this is the idea that the, what, emotions, after all, are something common to us and the other animals, huh, because we share the other animal's senses. And so the emotions are going to be moved, as he goes on to say in reply to the objections, sometimes by the, what, uh, the sensible without, you know, reason at all, right? Um, okay? And, you know, this is always a question in, in moral theology, right, huh? When is, uh, uh, lust, so to speak, right, or even anger, right, when is that a, a sin or, or when is it a moral sin, right, you know? And whether these first movements of the appetite that seem to, what, recede almost, right, uh, the activity of reason or the will, um, they, they, they are, are less than a mortal sin, right, huh, okay? When, when the reason, the will aren't, not consenting, right, to, to that first move, huh? The same way, you know, this question that people have about, uh, judging others, right? You know? But sometimes somebody's, what they're doing is so flagrantly out of line that the minute you see it, you kind of recognize that they're, you know, there's a prosecutor down there sussling or something like that, or, or a man's listening to prostitutes, you know? Well, um, you, you kind of almost judge it automatically, right, you see? So it's not like you're giving necessarily a, a, a, a, a absolutely firm judgment, right? But, I mean, is this, you know, a sin of judging others? I don't think so, really, huh? Um, now the second objection, huh, and that's when he took, you know, less a person than St. Paul, talking about seeing another law in his memories, right? Okay. So, I've heard some priests describe, you know, the, the, uh, sin's desire. I don't think so, but I don't think so, but I don't think so, but I don't think so, but