De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 130: Necessity and the Will: Freedom and Natural Inclination

Transcript
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You know, explains how being and one are convertible in the fourth book of the metaphysics, fourth book of wisdom. But you can see it, maybe in the most inductive way, that if you divide something, it ceases to be. Right? Oh, okay, yeah. And so things resist their division just as they resist, you know, being put out of existence. Yeah. So even an army, right, as opposed to a crowd, right, there's got to be a certain order, unity, in other words, it doesn't exist. And if you smashed up one of these chairs, would you have a chair anymore? No. That's all in the parts that are joining there, right? Yeah. And if the man and woman are divorced, they have a marriage, you know, do you have to do that? If you divide the letters C, A, and T from each other, you don't have a good cap anymore. It's in the first question of the day of Veritake, right, that Thomas, following Avicenna, distinguishes what they call often the transcendentals. Yeah. But these are the most universal things, right? Okay. And Thomas will explain there how the most universals are things that are equally universal with being. They can't add something real to being, right? But they have to signify something, right? It's not signified explicitly by the word being, right? And so one is one of them. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Good is another one, right? Okay. True is another one, so I know. But he'll come back to the stage of the soul to explain how good and true, because he'll go back to what Aristotle points out in the third book about the soul, that the soul is in some way all things. Yeah. And so he needs something, like our mind, our reason, right, or our will, that is open to all things, right? And then relative to which you can speak of true and good, right, is in some way covering everything. But so what does it mean to say that two things are, what, distinct? Well, they can't be the one and the same, huh? Yeah. You see, two things are distinct in a way is to say that one is not the other, right? Yeah. So a distinction there, which is tied up with unity in some way, right? Mm-hmm. There's involved negation there, right? Okay. And sometimes, you know, Thomas will take it as many only negation of what? Indistinction within you, right? Or division within you, right? Other times he'll take it as also including distinction from other things, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. But even the idea of being distinct from other things is involved in negation, isn't there? Sure. One thing is not another. Yeah. You know, it's just amazing, Thomas' treatise there on the substance of God in both the two summas. And, you know, there he divides that consideration of the substance of God into five parts, you see, which is an exception to the rule of two or three. Okay, yeah. And she follows, right? But I think he's correct in doing it to five. Mm-hmm. And I was looking just this morning again at one of the dogmatic constitutions of Vatican I there, and there's a chapter there on God, right? So many things are said about God, right? And some things that are said about God in that chapter are pertaining to the divine substance, right? Out just to the divine operation, right? To his, you know, being the creator and so on. But they're all kind of tumbled up, right? Mm-hmm. I mean, like, you know, you find one of the, you know, first three words of the word eternal, and then later on you find these unchangeable, right? Okay. But Thomas puts those two together, right? Okay. Okay. Because God's being eternal falls upon as being unchangeable. Oh, okay. And being unchanging, right? Yeah. You know, the way Thomas will order things. Yeah, sure. If you look at the second Vatican consul there, talking about the education of priests, right? Yeah. And especially in dogmatic theology, so we've got to meet these things as they are said in Scripture first, right? And then you should look at what the, you know, church fathers of the East and West have contributed to the elucidation of individual misdisease. It speaks that way, right? Mm-hmm. And also the church councils, right? Mm-hmm. Who are addressing very often in part of the specific era of the time, right? And then finally you should use that work of speculation, he says, with Thomas as a teacher, right, in order to understand as much as possible. It's an ultimate understanding of these things in theology. And it adds to their connection, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. You see? Yeah. Once you see kind of the way Thomas treats the substance of God, he knows exactly how to divide it. Yeah. And then the order is very interesting, too. Mm-hmm. But it's one of those things that is very hard to give an exact reason to say, everything you want to say about the substance of God is type one of these five, or comes into one of these five, you know? But it seems that, I'll just go through the list, you know, there's nothing in what it says in the council there of Vatican I that Thomas doesn't say, right? Mm-hmm. But it's all distinguished in a very reasonable way by Thomas and ordered, right? Mm-hmm. And if you stay at the Greek philosophers, though, you'll see that Thomas is right. Mm-hmm. I'll match it when he does this. Well, ready. Okay. So now we're going to look at the will here, huh? Yeah. The rational deciding power. Then we're going to consider about the will, and about which five things are asked. First, whether the will desires something from necessity, huh? And then secondly, whether it desires all things from what? Necessity. And notice he's asking this about our will, right? But he has similar questions later on, actually earlier here, and philosophy later on, about the divine will. Is there something that God wills necessarily? Not necessarily, right? Mm-hmm. And there are some things that he does will necessarily, but other things, like us, he wills, not necessarily, but freely, right? Pretty gratuitous, huh? Now, the third, which is a more eminent power? Whether it's a more eminent power than the, what, understanding? And that's often a controversial thing in theology, right? Mm-hmm. And then fourth, whether the will moves the, what, understanding, right? If I think about something, I want to think about it. And fifth, whether the will should also be distinguished by the erasible and quipsible. Well, it's not going to be. It's going to be something like them, but it's only one power up in the will, huh? Just like reason is not there's only one and not five, like the five senses, huh? Well, let's look at the first one. Whether the will wills something by necessity. And it seems that the first one proceeds thus. It seems that the will does not desire, desires nothing from necessity. For Augustine says in the fifth book about the city of God, that if something is necessary, it is not, what, voluntary, huh? But everything that the will wills is voluntary. Therefore, nothing that the will wills is necessarily desired, huh? Okay? Now, of course, you've got to realize that the most common mistake in thinking is what? Yeah, it's what the father of logic says, right? And it's, of course, the word necessary. Necessary is a word that Aristotle talks about in the fifth book. He talks about equivocal words. Moreover, rational powers, according to the philosopher, have themselves to opposites. But the will is a rational power, because, as is said in the third book about the soul, the will is in reason. Therefore, the will has itself to opposites. To nothing, therefore, of necessity, is it what? Determined, huh? Now, notice, this is a teaching there, in the ninth book of wisdom. Aristotle takes up powers, right? And he distinguishes between a natural power and a rational power. And how the natural power is determined to one of two opposites. Like, fire necessarily will burn my hand and not cool it if I put my hand in the fire. But the doctor who has a rational power of operating, right? He can cure me or make me sick, huh? Okay? I can cook the steak or I can burn the steak, right? I know I do both by my art of cooking the steak, right? Okay? Now, some people misunderstand that distinction between reason and the will, huh? But that's a very good objection, huh? Okay? Secondly, or third, rather, because by the will, we are lords of our acts, right? But of that which is for necessity, we are not lords, right? Therefore, the act of will cannot be of necessity, huh? Okay? And notice how the modern existentialists, like Sark, for example. For them, the will wills nothing of necessity, huh? Mm-hmm. And so they would be in accord with these objections, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, against all this is what Augustine says in the 13th book about the Trinity, that all with one will desire, what? Beatitude, huh? Somebody really want to be miserable. I mean, sometimes you say that, you tell me a little kid, you know, but somebody really want to be miserable? Mm-hmm. Wretched? Mm-hmm. Doesn't everybody want to be happy? Mm-hmm. See? They may not know what happiness really consists in, but everybody wants to be happy, right? Okay? So now, as a little boy, I thought my father was a very foolish man, because with his money, he could have filled the refrigerator with soda pop, and he could have grape soda and orange soda and root beer all day long. And I've been a happy man, okay? You know, at that age, I desired happiness, but that doesn't really consist of it, right? Okay? If our way was not necessary, he said, but contingent, it would, what, fail at least in some, in a few, right? Therefore, the will from necessity or by necessity will something. Now, what does Thomas say in his reply? I answer, it ought to be said that necessity is said in many ways. Mm-hmm. He's been taught that by the Aristotle. Well, for the necessary is that which is not able not to be, okay? So he sometimes defined the contingent of what is able to be and not be, right? But the impossible is what is, what? Not able to be. And the necessary is what is not able not to be. Not able to not be. But he says this can belong to something in one way from an intrinsic, or inward principle or beginning. Whether it be a material thing, right? Contrary, as when we say everything composed from contraries necessarily is, what? Corrupted, right? Because it can take on a contrary form, right? Why does he say contraries here? I don't see. Well, because all change is between contraries. Oh, yeah. That's where they're in natural philosophy, see? Go back to natural philosophy. That's what Heraclitus first pointed out. Or, he says, from a formal cause. As we say it's necessary for a triangle to have, what? Three angles equal to right angles, huh? Or in straight lines intersect, it's necessary if these angles are equal, right? Or two is necessarily half a four. And that's what he calls this kind of necessity, right? This is a natural necessity, right? And absolute, right? Right. Now, sometimes the necessity from the end is said to be, what, hypothetical or conditional, right? We say, for example, food is necessary. Well, you don't necessarily get food, do you? Or we say it's necessary to eat. Well, if there's some place there's no food, you won't eat, right? So you don't necessarily eat, do you? No. But if you're going to live, then you must eat. If you're going to live, you must breathe, right? You see? So they call it conditional necessity, right? If this is to be achieved, then you must have this, right? Okay? Now, sometimes something necessary is something to be a period. Sometimes it's necessary something to be well, right? Remember how Thomas, in the first question of Sumas, asked whether theology is necessary. How's the answer to that? I mean, if man is directed towards an end, right, that surpasses the grasp of his reason and so on, right? And man's going to have to direct himself to this end, then he must have some knowledge. Does that mean, though, that everybody must have faith? There can't be anybody who doesn't believe. See? There can't be a two that isn't half a four. That's a different kind of necessity, isn't it? See, that's because of what two is, right? Okay? That's because God has called us to an end higher than an actual end, right? Then we need this other thing, right? Okay? So it's necessary to love God. What would you say? Well, not in the sense in which it's necessary that two be half a four. Because not everybody loves God. The devil doesn't love God, for example, right? But you'd say, if you're going to, you know, be joined to God, then you must, what? Love God, right? That's, if this end is going to be achieved, then this must precede, right? So natural necessity, is it? Natural necessity is from the form or from the matter, right? And he calls it also absolute, right? Okay. So, yeah. Now he's going to look at necessity that comes from something the extrinsic causes, right? Okay. Yeah. In another way, it belongs to something which is not able not to be, excuse me, in another way, this general necessity. It belongs to something that is not able not to be from something extrinsic, right? And that can be either the end or the agent, right? And notice how the four kinds of cause, matter, form, mover, and end, enter into this discussion necessity. If you go to the fifth book of wisdom in Aristotle, the fifth book of metaphysics, the word necessary is taken up right after the words for cause. You see? And Aristotle saw that connection, right? So that's the first part of the first group of words, huh? Our beginning, cause, element, nature, necessary. Then he goes to the names of the subject of wisdom. One and being, right? So it's beautifully set up, right? You can see here the connection between cause, discussion of cause, and of what? Necessity, right? Now he says, by the end we speak of necessity. When something is not able to be achieved, right, without this, right? Or, in a second way, when one cannot achieve it, what? Well, without this. And as food is said to be necessary to life, right? Well, that's the first sense, right? Okay. You can't live without food. And a horse is necessary for a journey. To journey well. To journey well, right? Okay? So, you know, if I say, is logic necessary? Well, to journey well. Yeah, yeah. If you want to do philosophy well, you can know some logic, right? Yeah. Okay. I told you the story there of Epictetus, huh? The Roman philosopher. He said your route logic is necessary. And he had a kind of a student who wasn't too happy to go on this idea. And he said to the student, Do you want me to prove to you that logic is necessary? And the student said, Yeah, yeah. Tough, you know? He says, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? He said, And how will you know whether my proof is in your life? okay so that's the sess of the end they sometimes divide into those two right okay so you probably in the spiritual life too right some things are a necessity right like the ten commandments right you know other things for adbeniasi right you know John Paul says always taking young man's conversation right and the man says what is necessary in order to be saved and Christ starts doing the right the commandments right he says why I've done all that if you wish to be perfect right then sell anything you have and give the poor and come follow me and so on so he starts to talk about what we call the consuls right the vows right but that's what adbeniasi right okay you see the idea that distinction is very important yeah okay yeah good now with a necessity from the agent huh when someone is were forced coerced by some agent right thus that he cannot do the contrary and this is called the necessity of force huh coactionis huh now he says this kind of necessity of coaction is altogether repugnant to the will huh it is a kind of a violence right for we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing right whether it be the inclination the natural inclination of a thing or it's a voluntary inclination right but the very motion of the will is an inclination towards something huh and therefore just as something is said natural because it is according to the inclination of nature so something is called voluntary because it's according to the very inclination of the will thus therefore just therefore as it's impossible that something be at the same time violent right and natural right an example that joy is having in ancient physics right if you need to go of a stone it naturally falls to the ground right but if you throw it up in the sky that's what a violent motion right it's not a natural motion right you see and so can the same thing be natural and violent no see well likewise the same thing cannot be violent and what voluntary because voluntary means according to the very inclination of the will thus therefore just as it is impossible that something be at the same time violent and natural so it's impossible that something simply be what forced or violent and voluntary right okay but now does the other kind of necessity repugnant to the will see he says the necessity of the end is not repugnant to the will when to the end one cannot arrive except in one way right okay just as from the will of going across the sea it becomes necessity in the will to will what the ship hope but likewise neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will okay that's the kind of thing that what it's the very nature of the will you might say to incline to what happiness right okay once is necessary that and again makes a comparison just as the understanding of necessity in adheres to the first what beginnings right something cannot both be and not be right the whole is more than a part right so the will of necessity adheres to the last end which is what the attitude happiness for the end this is the famous proportion of Aristotle the end is in things to be done as the principle is in what speculative matters so just as Euclid proceeds from understanding that a whole is more than a part to some other theorem right or even to the postulates right right so the will from going to the end proceeds to will the what meanings to that end so there's a real proportion there for as necessary and this is the general reason behind all this both in the reason and the will that what naturally belongs to something and in an unchangeable way therefore be the foundation and the origin of everything else because the nature of a thing is first in each thing in fact first is in the definition of nature if you will and every motion proceeds from something what yeah yeah Aristotle you know he gets into the biology books you know his example of the of the mouse trying to walk in a pile of grain and apparently they've seen that you've got to rest upon something what yeah it's that like Archimedes famous boat give me a place to stand and I'll move the earth right if you can fly the principle of the lever and so he's got a place to stand right a place to rest where you could do this yeah you see you get the folk where you go up there you know I'd rest so Thomas will often point out how we acquire what is not natural through what is natural and the most obvious example of it is that all these tools that we use right we acquire through the use of our hands and probably the first man he found a rock that was somewhat suitable for him to do it maybe he chiseled away to get it into an even better shape but you're acquiring that artificial tool through your hand ultimately right so you acquire what is not natural through what is natural and Aristotle points out in the book on the Poetic Art that man is the most imitative of the animals and that men are naturally delighted in imitations and they're first to hear an imitation so it's natural to imitate how is it natural to speak English no or French or some language but how do you acquire what is not natural to speak English how do you do it by imitating your mother and father and others speaking around you right you know you get these tapes to learn a foreign language and you can imitate repeat after the guy or whatever it is right so you acquire what is not natural to speak English what is natural to imitate and so the same way here for the will and the reason what the reason naturally understands or naturally it comes to understand right in fact one is not really aware of coming to understand or know that a whole is more than a part you know when did you learn that you know your mother and father say that it's a bit now no it's just but you sensed and remembered and experienced holes and parts then you started to understand what a whole and a part is and it was kind of obvious to you that a whole was more than a part natural understanding yeah yeah yeah and so that's the beginning of understanding everything else you know see you know I always take the example there in geometry of other proximates which you can kind of state it's about but you say when a straight line makes a straight line it makes equal angles we call it right angles that's the definition of right angle yeah now here's a proximate that all right angles are equal right and it's more or less obvious but some might say some humans understand the obviousness of it because you might say yeah you define right angle by equals right but you're saying this has made these two equal this line has made these two angles equal but how do you know these two are equal to those two well all you have to do is imagine this laid upon that right okay now suppose you lay it upon it now if this we'll give you some numbers here if this line coincides with that then it's obviously they're equal right but if it doesn't it would go off one side right this side okay now I can imagine there's something observed right you can say well since C made the two angles equal right then angle CA here right is equal to angle CB right okay but since angle DB is only a part of CB right then CB must be greater than DB because the O is larger than the part you're kind of risking on the action aren't you yeah okay but now if CB is greater than DB then for the same reason AC which is equal to CB which is equal which is equal which is equal which is equal to CB must be greater than db, right? So if ac is greater than db, then a fortiority, ad, is going to be greater, because you're even more so, right? So ad will be much bigger than b, right? But it's also equal to it, right? It's a contradiction, right? So you're resting upon the way the possibility of something both b and not b, and the whole b, larger than a part, or when you see this axiom, right? In some way, the axiom rests upon that. And sometimes when you say no odd number is even, you're obviously resting upon something that can't both b and not b. Because in this case, they both b divisible to two and not, divisible to two and equal parts, where they both have a middle and not have a middle. So some of these things you naturally understand that the whole is more than a part, so they cannot both be equal and not be equal, right? Okay? You understand everything else, right? And you reason from those things, right? Okay? Okay? You know, even in that sixth theorem, you'll put there, where it's showing that in a triangle, if these angles are equal, the sides will be equal, where the theorem goes. And he says, well, if the sides are not equal, one will be longer, right? And then it's no difference in which one you say is longer. But from the longer one, cut off a line equal to the short, right? And then he draws a line from there to the vertex. And now he has two triangles, which have an equal angle, right? Yeah. Contained to equal sides. Therefore, these two are equal. Mm-hmm. But obviously, one is a part of the other, right? Yeah. So again, you're resting upon the axiom, aren't you? Yeah. So, it's through those things that you naturally understand that you come to understand the things you don't actually understand. And likewise, in, you know, by analogy, it's through what you naturally will, right? That you come to will what you don't naturally will. You can also see that through the idea of the, what, motion, right? Depending upon something unmoved, right? So those things that we're moved sometimes to both sides, right? And our mind kind of fluctuates between whether it is so or isn't so. We have to be determined by something that isn't both ways. Right? You have to think about it. What? I'm sure you're right, but I need to think about it. Yeah, yeah. See, even the simple theory, right? See, before I see the proof, I might say, well, either they are or they're not equal. I don't see one or the other kind of fluctuating between the two, right? Yeah. But then eventually I determine it's this one because of something else that I know even better, see? So I have to be determined to something else. But the moderns don't see that, see? So you read John Stuart Mill, for example, the essay on human liberty, and he talks in one of the sections on the liberty of thought. Well, for him, the liberty of thought is based on the fact that the mind never knows anything. Sure. You see? And it might incline to one side of the contradiction than another, right? Maybe something will show up in the future that would make it think the other one is so, right? Oh, sure. I mean, that happens with things you're not sure about, right? There's always, you know, revisionists in history, you know, you never know the facts of history entirely, right? And often something shows up, huh? Yeah. And so there's nothing immobile in the mind, huh? According to him, right? See? And likewise, for Sartre, there's nothing immobile in the will, right? You see? Nothing that you naturally will. But the kind of forgetting that the immobile can't be without the immobile. You can't even speak of change without something not changing. You can't figure, you know, that baseball that got knocked out of the ball crack the other night, right? You know, it's changed its place, yeah. But if the ball didn't remain, you couldn't speak of a change of place, could you? See? In a sense, what you mean by change is that a thing is different now than it was before. Well, it's got to remain in some way to be different now than it was before. And I run into you after a few years and I say, my, you've changed, you know? You're gray now or something, you know? But unless you have remained in some way, I couldn't say you're different. You see? So the very idea of change requires something unchanging. Yeah. From the underlying it, huh? Okay? Now he goes back to the first objection, right? To the first, it should be said that the word of Augustine should be understood about the necessary by necessity of what? Force, huh? The one from the efficient cause there, right? For natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will, as he himself says in the same book, huh? Okay, if you go back to that part of book five, it says, this is my footnote. Okay, so Augustine was not deceived by this, right? Mm-hmm. But others are, right? Okay? You see, someone hears about us having free will, right? And they can think, well, free is opposed to the necessary, isn't it? And therefore, right? I think I spoke before of how the distinction between the will and nature, or the distinction between the reason and nature is like the distinction between two and three or one and two. In three, there is two. But three is not just a two. So in reason and will, there is nature. There's something natural. But it's not just a nature. It's a very subtle distinction, huh? The same way you could say, man, you know, I just quote my mother there, you know, she liked me saying man's an animal, right? And I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. Well, that's better, she says. See? Because I just say man's an animal, I might be thinking he's just an animal, right? And so when Shakespeare, you know, says, what is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep but beast no more? That no more is kind of, going back to that likeness of natures of things to numbers, right? And so I say to the students, it's like if Shakespeare was arguing like this, he'd say, what is a three if it be half a four? A two no more, right? But in a way, there is a two in three. What's that third one that makes it to be three? It's something like that here, right? With nature and reason and will. Nature is determined to one, huh? So there's something of nature in the will and the reason when they naturally understand something or naturally will something. When they character things down the road, right? Reason is able to what? Reason to both sides. And the will is able to what? Will more than one means. Huh? Okay. So I want to be wise, but there are many things I can read to be wise, right? To explain to the student that I had there in the office the differences, I'll say, between the two things, right? And so the two divisions, right? The editorial reference. And I took the example of Matthew, so I'll find today. So I think I'll just download the, you know, I have the division of Matthew there in my thing, you know, I won't put the whole thing in all the subdivisions, but I get it all on one page, you know? So I find that to get it on one page, you know, without subdividing the certain amount, right? But I'll just give a little example of how it proceeds, you know? Yeah. And do you want a copy there for the matter or not? Yeah, we have it. I hear it. We went over, Matt. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, you did that request. I'd love that a copy. Yeah. I'd copy it off the menu. You know, I said the second page you have to subdivide the certain amount, but I was trying to put it on one page, so you'd kind of see. We could copy the whole thing if you want for him. If you want to copy, we could make the full. Yeah, no, I had no problem. I just dig a machine and score and print it out and then I just want to put the whole thing in there so I don't get mistaken for him tomorrow. I'm going to machine to put page one there and then do the pages. Okay? Thank you. It's probably easy enough, you know? It's probably down to the chapters, you know, Thomas's commentary would subdivide all the time. I mean, if I want to be wise, should I read the Gospel of St. Matthew tonight, you see? Well, for some reason, that's a clear example, you know, somebody's, you know, a little bit in the division of St. John, you know? But that illustrates it too, but this is very well, so I repeatedly said, no, I'm thinking of St. Matthew now tonight and start reading with the division of mine, you know? Because you tend to forget these things, you've got to look at them. Wow, you see, even I do. And so you can see there, there's kind of a freedom I have there, right? Yeah. I've been reading that, you know, people thing on the Eucharist there, but that's because I subscribe to the Pope Speaks, and three or four months after the thing comes out, the issue arrives, and I read it, you know. So you can see something contingent there about my will, even though I try to read good things. I'm reading the plays of Sophocles now, right? I think it's a Greek edition, because you wonder about some of the words, but the translation is just, you know, the characters are warped past care, you know. I don't know if it was in the Greek, you know, but it's kind of interesting. One thing is warped, it's really kind of ruined, you know. Here's a human being who's warped now, you know, his fortunes are. The way, there was at the one place, at the beginning, our happiness depends on wisdom all the way. That's kind of the chorusing at the end. It's beautiful things. Sure, yeah. I cannot love a friend who's a lover's words. I wonder how it said it in the Greek, you know, but it comes out pretty good, even in the translation. I mean, if Sophocles is that good in translation, what would it be if you were at home with him in Greek, you know? Do you know this, if he's translating it, do you remember? It's actually the one, the big four-volume thing that came up, being with Chicago, you know? Oh, yeah, okay. Yeah. Different translators, but... Excuse me, Dr. Berkowitz. Yeah. I'm just kind of slow on this. Okay, so I'm looking at, this is the Gospel of Matthew, the outline according to... Well, let's look at it just when I finish this article. Oh, okay, sorry. Yeah, just finished what we're doing here. All right. Especially for being taped here. Don't be too sore later. Okay. So, Augustine himself, he says, if you look at the whole text, he distinguishes the two senses. Necessity here, right, huh? Natural necessity, right? And the necessity of, what, force, right? So, one kind of necessity is opposed to the will, right? Yeah. Because, notice, it's opposed to the inclination of the will itself. You're being forced from the outside, right? Sure. But this natural necessity is this. Reason is naturally, I mean, excuse me, the will is naturally inclined in this way, right? Well, that's not contrary to the inclination of the will, is it? No. No, no. Okay, now, the second objection goes back to the text of Aristotle there in the ninth book of Wisdom, right? Where Aristotle makes a distinction between the rational powers and the, what, natural powers, right? And he says, to the second it should be said that the will, according as it naturally wills something, more corresponds to the understanding of natural principles or natural beginnings, what I call natural understanding, right? Then to reason, which has itself to, what, opposite, son. Whence, according to this, it is more intellectual power than a rational power. That's another way of solving it, right? But, no, it's an intellectual saying. It's talking about what reason naturally understands, right? So, in other passages, Thomas will say, you know, reason as a nature, right? Make a distinction between, what, reason as a nature, what am I going to speak of it, and reason as, what? Reason, huh? Okay? A little bit like what I said, you know, the number three, let's think about the two and three, right? Okay? And then you're thinking about three as three? No. When you're thinking about three as two, or three insofar as it includes two, right? Sure. Okay? And when you say that three is half a six, and two is not half a six, or that two is half a four, and three is not half a four, then you're thinking of three as three. You're not thinking of the two in three, because the two in three is half a four. But it's not, you know? No. Okay? Well, you have another thing. So the same way here, if you consider a reason as naturally understanding some things, right? Then you're considering reason as a kind of nature. Considering reason now as not actually knowing some things, but having to investigate them, right? And maybe having reasons to think, you know, maybe it is so, maybe it isn't so, right? Then you're talking about reason as reason, right? Okay? But here he speaks in a little different way. He says reason as reason, and reason as an understanding, right? Okay? But he often uses understanding there for what I call natural understanding. Yeah. Okay? Yeah. Because natural understanding is about those things you understand without having to reason them out. Okay? I often call, you know, episteme, following the Greek etymology there, reasoned out understanding. You understand you have afterwards, right? Okay? But Thomas won't use that. He uses, you know, shentia for reasoned out understanding, and intellect is just for the natural understanding, huh? Okay. Okay, so it's the same distinction, but a little different way it's expressed here. I can show you other texts where Thomas would say, you know, that it's more nature than a reason, right? Okay? The third objection now is saying that we're lords of our acts, yeah. To the third it should be said that we are lords of our acts according as we're able to, what, choose this or that. As Aristotle teaches in the third book in the ethics, where he takes up the beginning of book three. Choice, right? Because in the second book, you see, he's defined a moral virtue as a habit with choice. Existing in the middle towards us is determined by right reason. Or it's a habit of choosing, right? What is in the middle towards us, huh? As determined by right reason, huh? So he's put choice in the very definition of moral virtue, so he has to take up now what choice is, huh? And he does that in the beginning of book three. And he takes up in book six what right reason is, what foresight or prudence is, practical wisdom is, huh? Okay. As Aristotle points out there, choice is not about the end, but about those things which are towards the end, huh? Whence the desire of the last end is not of those things of which we are the lords to do this or not, huh? Okay? Because when you study God's will, huh, when God necessarily wills himself, huh? God necessarily loves himself, huh? He doesn't necessarily love us, huh? He freely loves us, huh? And his love is in no way caused by any goodness in us. But any goodness in us is in some way caused by his will, huh? So it's kind of interesting, huh? That way, huh? Now, you know, you realize how gratuitous this is. You know, Thomas quotes the other senator, the great Arab philosopher, who says, God alone is liberal, you know? Because the liberal man gives without expecting any return, right? And this is, only God really gets nothing out of his giving, right? And we get everything. See, but nothing is added to God by his giving us something. And of course, you realize that your parents, if your mother could have married somebody else, your father, or your father could have married somebody else, and then neither you or your brother fathers or sisters, if you have them, right? None of you would have been, right? And was there some reason why those who would be generated by your father and mother meeting should be, they had a right to be more than those that if your father met somebody else? I don't think so. And even, you know, the biologists say, you know, in the male mission, right? They tell me there's, what, millions of sperm, right? Okay? So even one act there, you know, there's some reason why you had a right to be more than those other millions, you know? But see, but God's providence extends all the way down to you're getting your parents meeting and you're generating, you know? I know my mother taught me the day she met my father and how she almost didn't go to the place where she happened to meet him. You know? But God's providence, you would say God's providence, you know, extends all the way down to these chance events, huh? You see? You see? You realize that there's so many others that could have been instead of you, you know? You realize that it wasn't because of some excellence of me that I was generated with somebody else, right? It was altogether free and liberal that he decided that I would be. You know? That's amazing, that, you know? I think... It's pretty humbling. What? It's pretty humbling. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And then, of course, you realize that you had nothing to God's goodness.