De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 134: Whether the Will Moves the Understanding

Transcript
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God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise Christ. God the Father, strengthen the hope, and God the Holy. God the Son, lighten him, and God the Holy Spirit, fill his heart with your love. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Amen. Okay, we're up to Article 4 here in Question 82. And this is whether the will moves the understanding. The fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that the will does not move the understanding. Thomas objects against what he's going to show, as usual. For the mover is more noble and before the moved. Because the mover is the one who acts upon the moved. And the one acting upon is more noble than the one, what, undergoing. It's more divine to give than to, what, receive. As Augustine says in the 12th book, upon Genesis to the letter. And the philosopher in the third book about the soul. Remember, he's acting, distinguishing between the undergoing understanding, the possible understanding, and the active understanding, or acting upon understanding. That's where he stated his principle, so that if the undergoing understanding was immaterial, even more so with this active one. But the understanding is before and more noble than the will, as has been said above in the previous article. So therefore, the will does not move the, what, understanding, huh? Okay. That's a nice argument, huh? Now, the second argument, huh? Is saying, moreover, the mover is not moved by what is moved, huh? Except perhaps accidentally. But the understanding moves the will. Because the desirable thing, when it's been grasped by the understanding, is a, what, unmoved mover, huh? But the desire is a, uh, moved mover. Therefore, the understanding is not, what, moved by the will, huh? That's what he's saying there, right? If one thing is the cause of the other, it seems the other is not its cause, right? If I'm your father, you can't be my father, right? And so, he's saying, if the, uh, understanding moves the will, well, then it seems that the will is not going to be moving the understanding, huh? Okay. But as we will see, there may be hidden here a, what, equivocation in the word mover, huh? Yeah. Absolutely. Yeah. Moreover, we are not able to wills unless something be understood, huh? Let's put that a little more better English. So, nothing, um, uh, is able to be willed unless it be understood, huh? If, therefore, to understand, um, the will moves us, huh? By willing to understand, right? It would be necessary also that that willing be preceded by some other understanding. And that understanding by some other, what? Willing. Willing. And thus, this will go on forever, which is impossible. I will see. Therefore, the will does not move the understanding, huh? Okay? The reply that's going to be very interesting. And you can kind of see, he alludes to Aristotle's argument to the deviant ethics in reply to that, huh? And it's kind of a second argument for the, what, unmoved mover, instead of based upon, you know, natural motion, like the argument in the seventh and eighth books of, uh, the physics, the natural hearing. Um, Aristotle and the deviant ethics will talk about God being behind, what? Yeah, yeah. But we'll see that when he applies to that. Um, but against this is what Damascene says, the great Saint John Damascene, huh? And this great book on the Orthodox faith, huh? That in us, uh, we are, what? We can will, right, to perceive in the art and to not receive, huh? That may not be said as well as it could be said, huh? That we can, what, think about something or not think about it when we want to, huh? Okay? My students don't want to think about some things, I think, huh? You know what's the old saying? You need a horse to water, but you can't make him drink? That's true about the students, huh? That's all right. Yeah. I came into class there, you know, after the Columbus Day, we had a day or so to go off, and I asked them, and I said, uh, what shape did Columbus think the world was? And some of them said, flat. And I said, well, when he had sailed west to get east, he thought the earth was flat. Such, such ignorance, you know? And I was driving up here. I pulled up the stop sign there, and this other car pulled up, and I could see the bumper sticker, huh? Uh-oh. And it's something about the right to be stupid. Oh, man. That's a lot of that. Yeah. Well, we had that one archbishop that was talking about a right to be wrong one year. Yeah. Yeah. A right to be wrong. These things kind of build up, too, you know. It started out like, you know, one year I'd see a whole bunch of stickers saying, challenge authority, huh? Yeah, right. And then, I don't know, but here's so later, challenge reality. Yeah. Wow. They go from one. Yeah. Yeah. So, the right to be stupid, huh? Yeah. I suppose the Supreme Court will find it in the Constitution somewhere. Okay. So, he says, I answer, it should be said that something is said to move in two ways, huh? And here he's really distinguishing two meanings of the word to move, huh? In one way, by way of the end, huh? As the end is said to move, the efficient, what? Cause, huh? And in this way, the understanding moves the will. So, it's the beauty of, what? Juliet that moved Romeo to climb over the, what? Garden wall, right? But then, her beauty is moving him not as a efficient cause, as a third kind of cause, right? But in the sense of the end of purpose, huh? It's for the sake of seeing her that he climbed over the wall, right? Right. Okay. It wasn't, but he had been lassoed and pulled over the wall. Then he would have been moved in the other central, but efficient cause, huh? Most of you use that word in English sometimes, the word attract, right? And attract means literally, from Latin there, to draw towards one, right? You see? Now, if I lasso you and draw you to me, that's obviously different than when you say there's a performer down at the centrum down there, who's a big attraction, and he's drawing in all kinds of people, right? Okay? But he's moving them in the sense that it's for the sake of hearing him or seeing him, right? That they're coming there, right? Okay? And it's different from, you know, when you lasso the animal and you pull the animal towards you and the animal is moved in that way, huh? Or you tie a rope around something and you pull it towards you, huh? Now, it's true that we sometimes use the words that are tied up with that third kind of clause, huh? Which is called the mover, the maker. We talked about the four kinds of clause before, isn't it, in here? Mm-hmm. The first kind of clause we talk about is matter, and the second is form, and the third is called the mover or maker. And then finally the cause, in the sense, of end, hein, finis there. But sometimes we transfer the words from this clause to one of the other causes, huh? So sometimes we speak of the end as your motive, right? The motive. And motive comes from the word to move, huh? So sometimes we take the word to move, huh? So sometimes we take the word to move, huh? So sometimes we take the word to move, huh? But it's not what is meant by this third kind of cause, okay? And sometimes we use the word make even for some of these other ones, huh? Like we'll speak of the spherical shape in the rubber, whatever it might be, makes it to be a ball, right? Okay? Okay. And my, what, now it's a geometry, makes me to be a geometer. Or my health makes me to be, what, healthy, right? Is that making in this sense this third cause? No. No, see. So you've got to realize that the word mover or maker, or to move or to make, are sometimes used, what, equivocally, huh? Okay? Not the same word, meaning. And for different kinds of cause. So he says in one way something is said to move by way of an end, huh? As we said that the end moves the efficient cause. Efficient, of course, comes in a lot of the word for what? For maker there. And in this way, huh? The understanding moves the will. Because the good understood is the object of the will, right? And the good, in the primary sense, is the end, huh? So when the understanding proposes this end and sees this end as good, right, huh? Then the will is moved to, what, desire it, right? Or to love it, huh? But in another way, something is said to move by way of being a, what, agent, right? Just as the one altering moves the thing that is altered, right? So the fire softens the wax or softens the butter, right? Or the fire there on the grill there, huh? Alters the meat, right? Okay. And the one pushing or impelling moves the thing that is pushed or impelled, right? And in this way, the will moves the, what? Understanding, yeah. And all the powers of the soul, although Thomas would exclude there on the vegetative powers, right? As Anselm, huh, St. Anselm says in the book about likenesses, huh? About similitudes, huh? Okay. So notice, huh? This is a corollary that Aristotle would give after he's talked about the four kinds of causes. You know, he gives the first corollary that there could be many kinds of causes of the same thing. But then he points out that things can be causes of each other, but in different ways, huh? It wouldn't make any sense of me to be your father and you to be my father, right? Right. Okay. But exercise, say, the typical example. Exercise is a cause of health or strength, right? Mm-hmm. But health or strength might be the cause of exercise, too. But health would be a cause of what? Of exercise in the sense of the yin. It's for the sake of your health that you exercise. Right. But vice versa, exercise is a cause of health in the sense of the, what? Make it, make it, makes you healthy, right? Okay. Or I say to the students, you know, do you know because you studied or did you study in order to know? Which was it? Both, yeah. But according to different kinds of causes, right? You studied for the sake of knowing, right? Therefore, knowing is a cause in the sense of that for the sake of which, which is the definition of end, huh? But you're studying, what? Produced, you might say, right? It's a knowledge in you that wasn't there before. Now, if you want to know the area of this table, right? Well, you could multiply the length by the width, right? Okay. Now, is multiplying the length by the width the cause of you knowing the area? Or is knowing the area the cause of you multiplying the length by the width? Oh, it's okay. Both in different ways. Yeah, yeah. But multiplying the length by the width would be a cause of you knowing the area. In what sense are the four causes? Yeah. Yeah. But knowing the area would be the cause of you multiplying the length by the width in the sense of what? End. The end, yeah, yeah. And the same in the syllogism, right? In the syllogism, you put together two statements and you're able to draw a conclusion from them, right? Okay. So do you know the conclusion because you put the two premises together? Or is knowing the conclusion why you put the two premises together? Well, as Aristotle points out, they can both be, right, responsible for the other, but not in the same sense of responsible. Okay. So it's like that with the reason and the will. The will is a cause of understanding in the sense that it moves us to understand something, right? But the good is what? Understood, right? Is the end. And therefore it moves the will as an end, huh? Now, the reason for all this, Thomas says, huh? Is because in active powers that are ordered, right, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard the particular ends. And this appears both in natural things as well as in political things. So it takes an example from the ancient science, huh? For the heavens, right, that act for the universal conservation of things generable and corruptible moves all the inferior bodies, right, huh? Of which each one acts for the conservation of its own kind or even of the individual, right? But you see something that even today when the sun is a kind of universal, what, cause extending to all plants, huh? And to all of us to some extent, huh? For the king also who intends the common good of the whole kingdom, he moves through his own command, right? The individuals that are, what, set up in command, right? You might say over the cities, right, who give the care of the regime to the singular cities. And that's a common thing developed by Aristotle in the, what, began to come walking in ethics, too, where he talks about how one art or one science comes under another one, right? And so the medical art might command the art of the pharmacist because medicine is subordinated to, what, health, which is the end that the medical doctor is aiming at, huh, okay? Or in our government, the president, right, commands all the heads of all the departments because he's intending the common good of the whole city, right? And they're intending some particular good, huh? So he's the commander-in-chief, too, right? Because the victory of the army, the defense of the country is owing to the good of the country, huh? Okay? Now he says the object of the will, he's going to apply this principle to the will. The object of the will is the good and the end in general, right? Okay, it's completely universal. And notice how, like Aristotle before him, he couples good and what? What, end, huh, as if they're basically the same thing, huh? And notice, just to recall a public moment, huh, the definition of in, as you mentioned a minute ago, is that for the sake of which, huh, okay? The definition of good is what all want or what all desire. Well, obviously those two are going to go together, right? Because if something is wanted, people will, what, aim at it, right? And therefore it becomes an indoor goal. And vice versa, if people are aiming at something, you can be sure that they think there's something good, right? And so these two go together, the good and the end, huh? Now sometimes we say the means are good, too, but the means are good because they lead to the end. And studying is good because knowing... is good or medicine is good because health is good and so on okay now each power is compared to its own good that is suitable to it and that's some particular good right as sight for example to the what sensing or perceiving of color right the understanding to the knowledge of what is true and therefore the will in the way of an agent or by way of an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their acts right with the exception of the what natural powers of the vegetative part which are not subject to our what judgment right okay so i fall asleep at night i guess you digest your food at night uh partly right without by even saying not digest okay so what he's pointing out there is that the will as its object the end of the good in general right and so the particular good of any part of us right can come under the what command of the will yeah okay it's more universal you might say okay now there's my my eyes is concerned with seeing or seeing well right my stomach with digesting or digesting well right now but the will has its object not just some particular good but good in what in general right and i can even aim at the what common good of the city what my family or even more so the common good of the city right or i can go all the way to god right with my will and he's the common good of the whole universe huh he's the good of every good as augustine says huh so in that sense uh the will commands right reason to what understand right huh but also commands me to what look very closely at the painting over there or something else right okay or to listen to mozart very very carefully huh yeah now let's go back to the first objection right first objection was saying wasn't what we learned before in the previous article that the understanding is before and more noble than the will and the agent and the mover is more noble right okay okay well thomas is going to point out some very interesting things here to the first therefore it should be said that the understanding can be considered in two ways huh in one way as the understanding is able to grasp being and true universally huh okay notice how universal it is huh the greek philosophy is to say you can't get something out of nothing and we understand what that means right you can't get something out of nothing huh and and how universal is something yeah the only thing outside of something is nothing right right so the same way with being or true right now they extend to everything right okay okay and therefore there's a complete universality there okay so in one way you can stop and consider that the understanding has as its object something that covers everything and therefore the understanding is in some way what infinite right but in another way we can look at the understanding as it is a certain particular thing right okay just like my sense of sight is one particular thing my ability to digest is another particular thing right and so on it's just one of many powers that i have right okay and he says likewise the will is able to be considered in two ways in one way according to the commonness of its object right in so far as it is desirable or desiring good in what in general right okay in another way as it is a certain determined power of the soul having a determined act right okay that's kind of interesting there's two ways of looking at it right you can say well you know i want to get so excited about about the understanding of your philosophers right it's just one of many powers you have the power to digest the power to grow the power to see you know the power to walk the power to get angry and so on right you know you see yeah but there's something about this particular power right if you look at it another way its object is something that extends to everything huh see why my eye extends only to what color see it doesn't take to everything right and my ability to digest extends just to food and maybe not all foods is it but you know i can think about food i can think about color i can think about sound i can think about anything huh i'm open to everything okay i mean i get very far in knowing everything but my mind is open to everything huh so in some way it's it's very universal that's where aristotle said in the third book about the soul that the soul is in some way all things and in that way it's in the image of god right you see okay you know i've often quote those words you know god says to uh i think both abraham and to moses but you know i'll follow me and i will show you every good and thomas says that is myself there's a sense every good is found in god right okay but you can see that our soul in so far as it is understanding and will um is made in the image of god right because in some way the soul is open to what knowing and loving right all things huh so once you realize that you can look at these in these two ways right the understanding and the will he says therefore if one compares the understanding and the will according to the what reason of the commonness of their objects right then as has been said above in the previous article the understanding is simply higher and more noble than the will because its object is more simple right than what it is right all these things if ever we consider the understanding by the commonness of its object and the will now according as it is a certain determined powers thus again the understanding is higher and before the will why because under the notion of being and the true which the understanding grasps is contained the will and its act and its object right in other words my reason can know the truth about all kinds of things right and one particular uh group of truths that it could know is the truth about the will right and the truth about the object of the will and so on right but it can know the truth about the eye you know the truth about the the horse and the dog and the cat and the stars even to some extent right huh okay so that sense uh the will considered as a particular what power with a particular act right and a particular object right it's just one of many things that the reason is able to know the truth about right okay just one of many things is able to know what they are okay um once the understanding he says understands the will and its act and its object just as other particular things understood as a stone he says or a piece of wood right right because all of these are contained under the common definition of being and of what true okay if however right this is the reverse now right if one considers the will according to the common uh definition or notion of its object which is good then the understanding according as it is a particular thing and a particular power it comes thus under the common notion of good it's contained under the common notion of good right okay so the what i can say that the understanding is one of our goods huh and it's knowing the truth is one of our goods right okay and then we have other goods besides that so the will you know extends down to the good of the understanding but the good of all the parts of man and maybe the good of my family or the good of my country or the good of the whole universe in some way right you see okay so um the psalms there and so on bless the lord all your works of the lord praise and exalt above all forever right well then you're extending to the good of the whole universe so the will in that sense is more universal and the reason looks like something just you know particular right underneath it okay just to repeat myself a little bit if therefore one considers the will according to the common definition of its object which is the good the understanding according as is a certain thing and a special power thus is contained under the common notion of good as something what special or particular right the understanding itself and its what active understanding and its object right which is the true right the two is is one of many goods the understanding and its act okay of which each one is its own special good and in this way the will is higher than the understanding and is able to what move it huh has to remind a little bit of one of the arguments thomas is giving in the summa kind of gentiles when he's reasoning that the understanding um is not a body right okay and he says um i can in a way what in my mind contain your mind right i can grasp your mind in some way by my mind right but vice versa you can grasp my mind by your mind right okay so that my mind is in your mind and your mind is in my mind now is that possible with two bodies no no see if my body is inside this room can this room be inside my body no see but the fact that um my mind can be in your mind when you know purpose is mine so to speak right and vice versa is a sign that our minds are not what two bodies right but the same you know in a way applies here to the what a little bit to the understanding of the will right that the understanding in a way because the universality of its object in a way finds the will and its act and object just a particular thing under its universal object right okay um so just as my understanding can know the truth about many other things it could also know the truth about the will and its act and its object uh just a particular truth and the many truths that i open to by my mind but then vice versa the understanding seems to be contained under the will and its object because that's just one good right they have an understanding and to understand and and the truth right and uh so good in that sense is more universal than these particular goods so they kind of contain each other right in their object then that's kind of unusual right see you don't find it if you take like you know like my senses for example um uh my eyes know only colors or or what can be known through colors and the ear knows sound huh but sound doesn't point the color right it's a particular kind of color sound is it in order does color come under sound as a particular kind of what sound yeah yeah see but that's the way the understanding and the will are right yeah the object of the understanding is not color but the true understandable huh is understandable in a sense and the will is among many things that are understandable to some extent okay but likewise the object of the will is the good and the understanding is a particular good and it's an active understanding and its object truth is a particular good huh you see is that uh is that because ultimately truth and good are convertible i mean yeah yeah yeah yeah but it's also the fact that these are are immaterial powers huh and uh therefore they're not they have a certain what infinity to them huh see you gotta be careful there you know if you read um uh what's his name uh four block right the uh figure that comes between hegel and marx and engels right yeah he has a perverse little book there called the essence of christianity yeah but where he tries to show that um uh man is god right yeah you see and that um not that god became man but the man himself is god you know that incarnation is just just a a mythical way of saying that man is god see but his middle term is you know man's mind is infinite the infinite is god therefore a man's mind is god right yeah see but of course the word infinite is the word that's very often what it's very equivocal yeah that's kind of interesting you read aristotle the first book there in natural philosophy there that in the so-called physics first book of physics there he's refuting melises who mixes up two meanings of the word infinite now now back in the you know it was the 19th century i guess you find for a block you know confusing two other senses of infinite huh you know because when you say god is infinite you mean he's what universally perfect huh there's no what limit to his perfection huh when you say man's mind is infinite you know it's like aristotle said there it's a blank tablet to begin with right so it's very imperfect right and it's constantly what able to learn more which means that it's always imperfect in some way it's always incomplete so it's quite different with god but forbach and and i mean the marks and angles when they read this they were convinced by it right but it seems like it takes a little bit of pride would help there to be convinced by this too you know but it is the most common mistake in thinking the mistake from mixing up different senses of the same word right and uh but anyway the element of truth that that is in their position is that there is something infinite right about the even the human understanding and the human will okay now from these things it appears the reason wherefore these powers by their acts in a way include each other right because the understanding understands the will to will right okay now it's by my understanding i understand that my will wills right okay and the will will wills that the understanding understand okay and for like reason if you take the objects of these two powers the good is contained under the true insofar as it is a what certain true thing understood right and vice versa the true is contained on the good insofar as it is a certain good that is what desired right now okay so in one way the reason is what superior to the will in these distinctions he's making right and more universal power right if you look at the will simply as what not in terms of the community of its object in terms of being a what um one particular truth you can know about right but vice versa right the will seems to be more universal right than the reason or the understanding consider the understanding as being a particular what good right and its act and its object is one among other goods right so in one way one is superior in the other way the what other is superior right that's why he's solving the objection right now he's not denying that the mover in some sense is what superior or universal right see okay but you have to see those distinctions right two ways of considering that now the second objection is saying that the the mover is not moved by the moved but the understanding moves the will okay he says to the second it should be said that the understanding in another way moves the will than the will the understanding as has been said now that's referring back the by the article we made the distinction that we're pointing out right but sometimes the images said to what to move us right so um now they asked the famous bank You know, why he robbed banks? That's what the money is, right? But still the question that was. But notice, the money that is in the bank or the large amount of money that's in the bank is what moves him to, what? Rob banks rather than to rob you or me. That's what the money is. But notice, that's in a sense of an end, right? That's the sake of which, yeah? Okay, it's for the sake of money, right? That he robs banks, huh? Okay? So, the understanding moves the will in the sense of a, what? End, right? It's said to move, huh? But the will moves the, what? Understanding in the sense in which an agent is said to move, right? Okay? So, there's an equivocation there in the word, what? Move, right? So, it's not really the same kind of clause. That's what I was pointing out, see? Because, you know, there's an old axiom, huh? That nothing is before or after itself, right? But notice the word before and after, like all the words in the axioms, they're equivocal by reason, huh? They have many meanings, right? And nothing prevents one thing being before a second thing in one way, and that second thing being before the first thing in another way. So, Chaucer is before Shakespeare in time, right? What's the first sense of before? But all the critics put Shakespeare before Chaucer. That's another sense of before, meaning better, right? Yeah. See? Now, there's no problem in Chaucer being before Shakespeare in time, and Shakespeare being before Chaucer in, what? Excellence. Excellence, yeah. Goodness, huh? Sure. But it wouldn't make any sense if it was the same sense of before. If Chaucer was before Shakespeare in time, and Shakespeare also being before Chaucer in time, that wouldn't make any sense, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Well, the same way here, see? You see, a cause is before the effect. You see? So, you know, if you say that A and B are causes of each other, if you say A is a cause of B, but B is also a cause of A, then if A is before B, A is before whatever B is before, therefore A is before A, and now you've denied one of the axioms that all I think is based on. Nothing is before or after itself. Today can be before tomorrow, and after yesterday, but can today be before today? No. Or be after today? No. But notice, huh? If A is before B in one sense, as an end, and B is before A in the sense of a mover or maker, then you have two different senses, really, huh? You have two different senses of the word cause here. So, not only is the cause before the effect one's sense of before, but since there are four meanings of the word cause, there's even four meanings of before into that. You see? You see, it wouldn't make much sense to say, I'm your father, and you're my father, right? Because then we'd be causes of each other in the same way, right? Okay? Now, the third objection was saying, hey, if the will is always moved by some good understood, right, there's always an act of the understanding before any act of the, what? Will. But if you understand because you will to understand, then it seems you're going to have an infinite, what? Regress, right? Notice Thomas' answer, huh? And to the third, it should be said that it's not necessary to proceed infinitely, but one stands in the understanding, right? One stops in the understanding, as in something, what? First, altogether. For it is necessary that some grasping, some knowing, huh, precedes every, what? Motion of the will, huh? But a motion of the will does not precede every, what? Grasping or knowing, huh? But the beginning of, what? Taking counsel and of understanding is some, what? Principle of understanding higher than our understanding, right? Which is God, as Aristotle also says in the seventh book of the Edemian Ethics, huh? That's really amazing that Aristotle saw that. I was just thinking about that. Yeah. I know one of my cousins there, she was, what do they call it, a blue baby, you know? I forget what exactly that means, you know, but she wasn't expected to live, right? Okay. But she lived, you know, into her 40s, 50s, huh? Mm-hmm. But she, you know, she had to take great, good care of her health, right? Mm-hmm. I remember, but she never had a chance to go to college or anything like that, you know? Mm-hmm. She worked as a secretary, I think. But she took one of these, you know, miniature great books things. Mm-hmm. And being a Catholic, you know, of course, when they did a little bit of reading of Aristotle, she was kind of amazed because things that you think only a believer, right, Yeah. would know Aristotle was talking about, huh? Sure. I remember her just remarking, you know? Sure. Just, you know, the little miniature slacks that they give him in those short things, but enough to kind of impress her, right? Yeah. But this is very impressive, you know, when Aristotle says that, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. And in this way, he shows that what does not proceed in infinitum, huh? But it's like a second argument for the unmoved, what? Mover, right? Yeah. Another argument for God. A lot of interesting things, the Aedemian ethics there. So, I want to get a little break between the first and the second article. That's what we can actually do so that people don't get it. Okay, Article 5 now. Now, when we talked about the sense desire, huh? The desire that follows upon the senses, and by the senses, I mean not only the outward senses, sight, you know, hearing and the rest of them, but also the inward senses, right? We distinguish between the concubisable and the irascible, okay? And the concubisable was concerned with what is pleasant or agreeable to the senses, and what is painful or disagreeable to the senses, okay? And if something is agreeable to my senses, I like it, huh? So, if candy is agreeable to my senses, I like candy, okay? That's the first emotion there. I think I add to what is agreeable to the senses. And if I don't have what I like, then I want some of it, right? That's the second one. But if I get the candy or whatever it is I like, then I have joy or pleasure, right? And you have the same three similar ones with regard to what is disagreeable, right? I find salmon disagreeable to my sense of taste, right? It doesn't please my sense of taste, huh? You know, the only good fish I see is a disguised fish. You get disguised salmon. So I dislike or hate salmon, so you know, okay? And therefore, I, what, turn away from it, huh? When it's on the menu, huh? But if I go to somebody's house and they serve salmon and I'm forced to eat it, then I'm sad, huh? And I try to keep a cheerful face, but I'm sad, see? But then, sometimes a difficulty arises, huh? In getting what you want, right? You may have to make an effort, right? Or sometimes a difficulty in avoiding something you want to avoid, huh? Okay? Or sometimes a difficulty in getting rid of something that's causing you pain, huh? Okay? So there can arise the hope of overcoming the difficulties of the good, right? But if you don't think you can, then it falls into despair, right? Or there can be fear, huh? In regard to the difficulties of avoiding something bad, right? But if you think you can overcome them, then you get a kind of boldness, you know, and confidence. And if you don't think you can you can overcome them, and you can overcome them, and you can overcome them,