De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 135: The Irascible and Concupiscible in the Will

Transcript
================================================================================

And if somebody's, you know, if you're inflicting pain on me or something like that, and I think I can do something about it, I get kind of angry about it, and try to make me stop causing me pain, huh? Okay? So, that doesn't simply arise from the senses, the outward senses, huh? And what is agreeable or disagreeable to them. Because the fight might be, what, painful to the senses. But animals, as Aristotle says, they'll fight over, what, food and sex and so on, huh? And so the irascible is kind of the defender of the conquistable, okay? So, are there these two kinds of desiring powers in the will, you know, or in the rational part? Well, Thomas is saying no, because of the universe's health that we saw of the will that extends to all things, all good things, huh? There will be acts of the will that have some likeness to the emotions we talked about, huh? But love in the will and hope in the will will be in the same will, not two different wills. There's not one will whereby we hope, but another will by which we love, right? By the sense order, there's one group, one ability whereby we like and want what is pleasant and another one by which we are moved to, what, fight for it or to, you know, repel something that's preventing us from reading these things or, okay? So, Thomas, again, always starts from the opposite. To the fifth, thus, one proceeds. It seems that the irascible and the concubiscible ought to be distinguished in the higher desiring, in the will, which is the will. For the concubiscible power, right, is said from, and I can translate it as sense desire, right? Concupisciendo, huh? And the irascible from getting angry, right? That's the most, not the only emotion, the irascible, but the one that's most manifest, right? Interesting. We had a little text there where Shakespeare has a nice metaphor. He says, they're in the very wrath of love. Clubs cannot part them. And, you know, why does he call love metaphorically, right? Wrath, right? Well, because of very dislikedness, they're both very, what? Strong. Strong, yeah, yeah. And just as when they have the sexual, let's say, these incubicents, it's hard to separate them, right? So, likewise, when they're angry and they're fighting, it's hard to separate them. You need a club in both cases. But these two powers are named from those ones that kind of stand out, huh? And that's why the virtues that regulate these, if you look at the secundae, Thomas will take up with the cardinal virtues, the virtues that resemble them. So, when he takes up temperance, which is concerned with concupiscence, he'll take up after that mildness, which is concerned with, what? Anger. Because, in both cases, you have a strong emotion, a strong passion that needs to be, what? Restrained, huh? See? Unlike courage, where you have something that's going to, what? You've got to be kind of pushed forward, right? At least you've got to kind of be pulled back, you know? Okay? To become milder or chaste and so on, you have to pull back, right? For there are some concupiscence which cannot pertain to the sense desire, but only to the understanding desire, which is the will, just as the concupiscence of, what? Wisdom, right? About which it is said in the sixth chapter of the Book of Wisdom, concupiscentia sapientiae, right? Okay? The desire for wisdom leads one to the, what? Eternal kingdom, right? Okay? There's also an anger which cannot pertain to the sense desire, but to the understanding desire only. As when we are angry against, what? Vices, huh? Once Jerome says, his commentary on Matthew, or homily on Matthew 13, that the, what, hate of vices we possess in our, what? Irascible, huh? Therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible, right, ought to be distinguished in the sense, in the intellectual desire, just as they're in the sense ability to desire. Okay? Now, you should know, and this is very clear, what Thomas is at the end of the first book of the Summa Congentillas, that the names of the emotions, the eleven emotions that we talked about before, um, the names of the emotions are carried over, right, to the names of, what, acts of the will, or carried over to acts of the will. But when you carry them over, you drop out in this bodily aspect of the emotion, because the will is, as we saw before, something immaterial, right? And you keep just the formal aspect of it, huh? Okay? Like in the case of incubusims, it would be the desire for the good, right? Okay? But not the, what, bodily disturbance and so on, the excitement that goes with the, what, emotional desire for something. Okay? In the same way, anger, something like that, that's carried over to the will, you drop off the bodily change that takes place and you get angry. Okay? So there's a problem, then, with these words. And what's interesting, if you look at the whole picture there in the Summa Congentillas, you'll show what, how the names are carried over to the acts of the will, and then how they later on are carried over to God's will, right? And none of them can be carried over to God, of course, for a reason, the bodily aspect of them, right? Yeah. But for most of them, even the formal aspect can't be carried over. Yeah. So strictly speaking, there's no desire in God. Yeah. Because desire is for a good you don't have. You don't have, yeah. Okay? And there's no fear in God, right? Yeah. Because nothing can harm Him, right? And so on, huh? Okay. And of the 11 emotions, Thomas will say, only two of the names, right, can finally be carried over to God, huh? And they are love and joy, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? But all those that have to do with the bad can't be carried over. Or those that deal with the good, but the good you don't have, like desire or hope, right? Mm-hmm. They can't be carried over to God. And then he'll point out how sometimes you carry over these names metaphorically, right? Mm-hmm. In fact, metaphor means carry over. Yeah. That's what it means. Yeah. Uh, the reason is some likeness, right? So God's will to punish the sinner is metaphorically called anger, right? So just as the angry man punishes out of anger, God punishes out of his will for justice on him. Okay? That's a metaphor, right? Mm-hmm. But properly, only love and joy can be said in the bad. We're going to do all the way to God here today, but I just mentioned here, right? And this is one way in which things are named where you, what, carry a name over but drop part of its meaning so it can be carried over. We saw that with the word undergoing. The first meaning of undergoing is passion where you are acted upon in a way that's, what, destructive of you, right? And then we carried over to the, what, to the senses, huh? Where undergoing is not, what, destructive, right? But there's something bodily there too, huh? But the I is being, what, perfected, right? By receiving the colors of things and so on. It's seeing now, right? And finally we carried over to the understanding, huh? Which is altogether immaterial undergoing, right? So you keep on dropping something out in order to, what, and that's only one way that would be carried over, but that's an important way, huh? But this is another example of that same way here, huh? Where the names of the emotions are carried over and placed upon the acts of the will, but you drop part of the meaning of them out of them. The whole bodily aspect of them, okay? Thomas will be pointing that out there in the thinking. So again, there's a possibility of equivocation here, right? But the words are equivocal by reason. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. And moreover, as is commonly said, charity is in the concubisable, right? Now, charity is a kind of what? Of love, right? And love was first of all the name of a what? Emotion in a concubisable appetite, huh? I love candy, you know? Remember my daughter saying, you know, I don't like this, I love it, right? But that's the first meaning of love, huh? But sometimes we get stuck on that, huh? Hope was one of the emotions that was in the, what? Irascible, spes, huh? Because hope is involving what? An effort to overcome the difficulties of getting the good, right? That's why Shakespeare says, a hope is a lover's staff. You see? So you hope to get what you love, right? But it's an effort, huh? What supports you with an effort? It's hope. That's going to be carried over eventually to the will, right? And even to, you know, a theological virtue, huh? You see? But it implies that there's a good here, difficult to what? Obtain, right, huh? You keep that idea, but you drop the bodily aspect of it, huh? So there are names that are taken from the emotions of the concubisable, right? And names that are taken from the emotions of the irascible, right? That are carried over to the will, right? But there aren't two different abilities or powers up here, because what's divided in the lower level is unified into a higher level. Moreover, in the book about the spirit and the soul, a book was falsely attributed to Augustine, right, huh? And so Thomas is always saying, that book doesn't have too much authority. It's not read by Augustine, you know? Well, but sometimes he always will try to, you know, understand it in a way that's not too critical. Moreover, in the book about the spirit and the soul, it is said that these powers, the irascible and incubisable and irrational, the soul has before it's united to the body. Well, of course, Thomas said that's a mistake right there, because the soul doesn't exist, right? Right. But God decrees the soul when the body has been prepared already. But no power of the sense part is of the soul only, but of the, what, union of body and soul, as has been said above. Therefore, the irascible and incubisable are in the will. That can be challenging in many ways. But against this is what Gregory Nyssa and some of the notes in Nenemisius, another church father, I guess, that the irrational part of the soul, right, is divided into the desiderativum, another word for the kibs appetite, and the irascible appetite. And the same Damascene says in the second book of the Orthodox faith. And the philosopher Aristotle, that's by Antonia Messia, says in the third book about the soul that the will is in reason, meaning in the rational part of the soul, the immaterial part of the soul. And in the irrational part of the soul are, in Greek would be epithumia, which they translate back to kibishensia, right, et thumas, ira, right? Now, Thomas says, I answered that it should be said that the irascible and concubisable are not parts of the intellectual ability to desire, which is called the will. Because, as has been said above, a power which is ordered to some object according to a very common notion is not diversified by differences that are special and that are contained under that common reason. Just as because sight regards the visible according to the definition of the colored, the seeing powers are now multiplied according to diverse species of colors. If, however, there was some power which was of white insofar as white and not insofar as it was colored, then it would be diversified by the power which was of black insofar as it is of black, right? Okay? But the object of the eye is what? Color, right? Color, yeah. So it sees white as a color. It sees black as a color and green and blue as colors, right? It's not limited, therefore, to seeing white, huh? Now, he says, the sense power does not regard the common, what? Definition of good. Yeah. Because the sense doesn't apprehend or grasp the universal. Yeah. Only the singular. That's why Bwaitis is always saying a thing is singular when sensed, universal when understood. And, therefore, he says, according to diverse reasons of particular goods are diversified the parts of the sensibility desire. For the concubiscible ability desire regards the proper notion of the good insofar as it is, what? Pleasing, delectable, right? Agreeable to the sense, right? And suitable to one's, what? Nature, right? That's interesting. Now, the senses don't really know the good but ultimately as what is agreeable to the senses, right? Right. Okay? And so, if you live by what is agreeable to your senses, right, then adultery would be fine, right, and fornication would be fine, and et cetera, et cetera, right, and sleeping in on Sunday morning and so on would be fine, right? Because all these things can be agreeable to your, what? Senses, right, huh? Because what is agreeable to the senses is often a reasonable thing to do, right? Mm-hmm. Ah, then there's a conflict set up in the man, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But the irascible, huh, regards a good another way according as it is, what, repulsive or attacking that infers some kind of, what, harm, right, huh? Okay? What he's saying, oh, no, no, actually, I just turned it correctly there. The irascible regards another reason of the good, right? Namely that it, what, it repulses, right, or it attacks what would infer some harm, huh? Okay? So it's a little bit of higher power in a sense, the irascible, huh? And that's all Plato in the Republic there when he divides the parts of the soul and present the parts of the city. He has the wounds of the city, the army and then the common people, right? The reason, the irascible, the inquiscible. And he kind of keep the common people in line there to the irascible, huh? Okay? You kind of see that even in the saints, right? You know, the story is always told, there's a saint Benedict, right? The patron of Europe there. He's being tempted with, what? Loose woman around the place, right? And he's supposed to have jumped into a, what? Yeah, yeah, and that's not very pleasant of the senses. But I'm sure he got his mind off the woman, huh? See, or Thomas, you know, his own flesh and blood were going to get him out of this stupid, you know, mendicant order, right? And so they had some loose woman, right? And Thomas was supposed to have picked up the poker, right? And she got out of there, and he put a cross over the door, right? You see? But there was a little bit of what? Anger on top, yeah, irascible, you see? So the irascible in some sense is a defender, you might say, the accusable, right? Okay? It's a different reason of the good, right? So the animal will fight over food, right? If there's a piece of meat between two dogs, the two dogs will be what? Fighting, huh? Well, then the meat is pleasant to eat, but the fight is not pleasant, right? And they get injured, maybe one gets killed even. But there's a different reason why they do that, right? They see this one as an enemy, right? Okay? Or the little animal may see the animal that's going to eat it, right? And it runs away, huh? It runs not because it's fun to run, maybe getting scratched as you run through the woods, but because you see this as an enemy, huh? So it involves maybe one of the internal senses, huh? And especially the one they call the estimative power, right? It's not that the color of the wolf is disagreeable to the senses of the animal that runs away. It's not like if you put your paw on something hot, you know, you see. That's disagreeable with the senses. The wolf is not like that. It's not hurting your senses. But something in the animal tells them this is, what, something to be fleed. And so it runs away, huh? And the fear tends to do that, huh? There's always a bodily change involved in this, huh? One guy had been in the Normandy landing and was saying, you know, there are two kinds of guys in Normandy landing, he says. Those who did it in their pants right then and there, and those who couldn't do it for a week. Yeah, right. But obviously your body has been, you know, affected by this horrible situation, right? But the will regards good under the common definition of good, huh? And therefore there are not diversified in it, which is, which is the, what, intellectual ability to desire, right? One doesn't distinguish in that or not diversifying. Different, what, desiring powers, right? So that in the intellectual ability to desire, there would be one power, there would be the irascible, another concubiscible. Just as it makes a comparison on the part of the understanding. There's not multiplied, what, diverse powers, although they're multiplied on the part of the, what, senses, huh? So I have one sense to know color, I have another sense to know sound, another sense to know the taste of something, right? Okay. But reason, my reason, I can talk about color, right? I can talk about painting, I can talk about color. My same reason, I can talk about sound, right? I can talk about the taste of things and so on, right? So the senses are what? The lower are divided into many, right? But there's one understanding, right, that knows all these things. Well, it's like that with the desiring powers, right? There's two different desiring powers that follow upon the senses, huh? They're concubiscible and irascible, and there's only one will that follows upon, what, reason, huh? That's because of the universality, because of the immateriality. Okay? Okay, now, in the part of the first objection, Thomas is pointing out that when you use the word concubiscentia there for sapientia, or sapientiae, you're using the word in a, what, different sense, right? The word has been carried over from the emotion, right? And applied to the act of the will. But you drop out the bodily aspect of the meaning, right? And then you keep the, what, higher, right? I mean, the more formal aspect of it, right? But not the material aspect of it. So the first, therefore, it should be said that love, concubiscence, or desire, and things of this sort, are taken in two ways, huh? In one, sometimes, as there are certain, what, passions, right? With a certain, coming with a certain, what, disturbance of the soul, right, huh? Concittazione, the one meaning that they give in the dictionary would be disturbance of the soul, right, huh? With kind of a commotion of the soul, because it's a bodily thing, huh? And thus, they are commonly, what, taken, right? Because that's what's most known to you. So, like I mentioned, I teach the love and friendship course, and I sometimes come in the first day of class, and I say, what is love? And they say, what's an emotion? And I say, well, there is a love which is an emotion, yes. But, of course, anger is an emotion. If there is an emotion, you still haven't defined it for me. But that's the answer at first, that love is, say, what, emotion, right? Because that's what's more known to us, huh? Yes. And I can remember, you know, it must have been in grade school, I don't know what grade I was in, but sitting in church there and listening to the sermon on Sunday, and the priest talking about the love of God, and what love, to me, meant something, you know, had a woman or something, or a girl for an object, or something like that, or candy or something, right? And I said, it didn't seem to fit, you know, talking about the love of God. I was thinking of love in terms of what? The emotion, right? And I think a lot of people do think of that, right? But the love of God is not really an emotion. There can be sometimes an overflow from the love of God and the will that affects the emotions, right? You know, there's a famous scene there in St. Teresa of Avila there, when she came out of the cell there, right, and she started dancing. You know, there's an overflow, right? There's nothing there, but an overflow into the body, right? But the love of God itself is essentially, what? In the will, right? And it can be there even when the emotions are, what? Are kind of, what? Down, you might say, huh? Okay? Just like it can be, you know, sometimes when a man understands some truth that he's been trying to figure out for some time, the movement of the will is so strong, rejoicing, you might say, and this truth discovered that your body starts to feel, what? Better, right, huh? You see? Okay? So the will can influence the emotions, but it's not the same thing, huh? In another way, it signifies a simple affection without a passion or a disturbance of the soul. And thus, they are an act of the will, right? And in this way, it is also attributed to what? The angels and even to God, right, huh? But as they are thus taken, they do not pertain to diverse powers, but to only one power, which is called the, what? Will, right? Okay? So, you know, in some of those visions that St. Teresa of Avila or someone gets to the devil, you know, he's represented as a little man that's all angry because he can't get her to fall for his, you know, temptations that he's sending her, right? You know? But God, in a sense, represents the fact that there's something like anger in the will of the, what? The devil, right? Is it? But it's not anger in the sense that there's something bodily there, right? Yeah. And that same disturbance. But there is this frustration of the devil, right? Hmm. Okay? And you have a kind of fear, too, you know, when the devils are going to be, when Christ is going to send them out, right? You know, come before the time, they say, right? That's a lot, right? But that's a fear that is in the will rather than this bodily fear that we have when we get on the battlefield or something. Okay? And that disturbance we have with fear, you know, can't function properly, right? Because of your fear sometimes. Okay. But as they are taken thus, he says, they do not pertain to diverse powers, but to one power only, which is called the will. They say that's more explicit the way the name is carried over if you look at the last part of the first book of the Summa Kana Gentiles. Not only that there are two senses here, but the first meaning is what? The emotion, right? You see, we name things as we, what? Know them or become aware of them. And our knowledge starts with our senses, right? So the emotions or the feelings, as we call them, right, are much tied up with our senses, huh? And therefore we name the feelings, the emotions, before we name the acts of the, what? Will, huh? And of course you follow the history of human thought, you see that that same thing happens with the senses and the reason, huh? Most people have a hard time distinguishing reason from the imagination, thinking from imagining. Even John Locke, you know, and Barclay, they confuse the image with the thought, huh? You see? But the thought is a bit, is something like the image, huh? And sometimes the Arab philosophers will say, you know, thinking is imagining to the intellect. You see? But then you're using the word imagine or the word image in a different meaning, right? But just as the image is a likeness of something singular, so the thought is a likeness of something universal. Yeah. So there's a likeness there between the image and the thought. They're not the same thing. But Locke and Barclay and other famous philosophers, they mix up the two. Thinks in Aristotle or Thomas, you really see clearly the difference between the two. The same way here, right? People are often mixing up the love, which is an emotion, with the love, which is an act of the, what? Well, will. People get married sometimes, it's just a love that is an emotion. They don't really have that love which they need, and they need that love which is in the will, right? It might start with the emotion, but that's not enough to get married, huh? You know, you're not, as I say, the kids are, I say the priest doesn't say, you know, do you have wonderful feelings about her? And do you have wonderful feelings? I can carry a man away. No. No. You're choosing each other. I can carry a man away. Okay. I was at that funeral before I went out, and the guy was talking to one priest there. No, no, it was one of the sermons, yeah, one of the sermons in the church, one of the visiting priests, but he was talking about, he had a couple there he was preparing for marriage, right? He had come for a marriage preparation, so he asked the usual questions, right? And he says, do you think marriage is until death, right? And the girl said, yeah. Okay, he says, no. He said, do you think you should be faithful? She said, yeah. No, no. He said, well, so the guy finally realized he used his way out, and he says, well, give me another paper he says, and I'll sign whatever you want. He says, no, I want, he says. So he obviously refused to marry them, right? Can you imagine that kind of attitude, huh? Because she still wants to marry him after hearing that. Yeah, but he prays to, right? He said, yes. But people marry, you know, they've got to really have good will. You've got to really will this other person's good, right? Right. And that's really something that the will does. Emotions as such don't do that, because emotions really know, or the senses, which are the basic emotions. Immediate. They only know the good as what's agreeable to the senses, huh? Yeah. See? And that's really, you know, what's agreeable to my senses is my private good. You see? It's not the good of my spouse or my friend, you know? You see? Yeah. So this love of your neighbor has to be really an act of the will. It's interesting, you know, if you read some of those who are, you may have their life there to speak of the sacred heart, right? You know? Kind of interesting what they say, huh? They say that you're supposed to start with the physical heart, the body heart of Christ, right? That's where you begin, you know? That's why, you know, they represent the heart, the physical heart itself. And from there, you're supposed to go to the love, which is an emotion, right? The body love that Christ has, huh? Yes. And then from there, you're supposed to ascend to the love, which is in his human will. And from there, you're supposed to ascend to the love, which is in his, what? To the divine will, right? Well, notice those four things there, right, huh? The physical heart, then the love which is an emotion, then the love which is an act of the, what? Will, but of his human will, right? And find the love which is in his divine will. But it's just following the order, in which, what? From the sensible, right? To what cannot be sensed, right? Okay. Because as I was mentioning, at the end of the Summa Congenitida, it talked about how the name of this emotion can be carried over to the act of, what? The human will. And sometimes, all the way over to the, what? Act of the divine will, right? But they can never be carried over with the bodily aspect, huh? Only because of the formal aspect. But only two of the eleven emotions as a formal aspect can be carried over to God's will. And they are love and, what? Joy. Joy, yeah. Aristotle speaks of God as giving a simple joy, right? What's that? Aristotle speaks of the joy of God, yeah. He's in the eighth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, huh? But it's a simple, pure joy God has, right? Amazing to see that he sees that. Is this other thing, this Udymian Ethics, that's something different from the... Nicomachean Ethics, yeah, yeah. And there's some overlap because some of the books are common, you know, to both. But there's, you know, some things in one that's not in the other, you know. The Nicomachean Ethics is the more famous one. Okay. Thomas wrote a comment on Nicomachean Ethics, you know, book by book, all ten books. He doesn't have a commentary on the Edemian Ethics, but, you know, he knows it because he refers to it a number of times. There's some interesting things in there that aren't the Nicomachean Ethics, but Nicomachean Ethics is a basic one to really study. You have a commentary, too, of Thomas on it. Okay. Now, the second objection now, right? Yes. Okay, it's talking about charity being the incubusable, hope in the irascible. Well, that's in the original what? Names, right? Love names an emotion in the incubusable, hope names an emotion in the irascible, right? Well, in those names that are carried over to the will, you not only drop out the bodily aspect, but you also drop out the idea that these are acts of two different powers, right? Okay. They're now acts of one power, namely the will. The second, it should be said that the will can be called irascible, right? Being like irascible, insofar as it fights against the bad, right? But not from the impetus of passion, right? But from the judgment of what? Reason. Reason, right? And the same way it can be called in incubusable on account of the, what? Desire for the good, right? Not because of the bodily aspect. And thus, in the irascible, in incubusable, we say, are charity and hope. That is in, they are in the will, according as, as an order to acts of this sort. And then he applies that to that apocryphal book on the spirit and the soul, right? Thus also, one can understand what is said in the book about the spirit and the soul, that the irascible and the incubusable are of the soul, before it's not the body, that we ever understand by this, the order of nature, he says, and not of time, right? Because the soul doesn't exist. Although he says it's not necessary to, what, give much faith to the words of that book, because many things in there are not correct, right? But apparently it's a book that people thought belonged to Augustine, right? And therefore it had authority because it was thought to be a book of Augustine, but they gradually realized it didn't. Just like there were some books they thought were of Aristotle, you know, which they gradually realized were not by Aristotle. So we have to the Bibero or Arbiturial, right? So we've got to go through that question and then we'll get to that more detailed question on the understanding. Yeah. Second question 84. It takes a couple sessions to get up to the Bibero or Arbiturial, free judgment. We usually call it free will, but Thomas Lewis uses that term free judgment, huh? Interesting, Because unless you were free in your judgment, your will would not be free. If the judgment was simply, you know, determined by nature, right, then the desiring power would not be free. Isn't that from St. Justin? Isn't that what they call the will be free? Yeah, yeah. It's something that you find in the Latin, you know. In English, we never seem to use that, you know, but sometimes they, you know, they'll translate free will, but that's not really the translation I'd say. Arbiturial means judgment, right? And there's a point that Thomas is making with the words that are used in Latin, you know, do with the words free will. That's pretty important. Yeah. But part of this free judgment goes back to the fact of the complete universality of reason, huh? And there's nothing, you know, however bad in this world, right, huh? That reason couldn't see something good in it, huh? See? If you annoy me, let's say, right, huh? And getting rid of you, I can see some good in that, right? See, even things as horrible as murder, right? I can see something good in it, right? Sure. I can see something good in robbing the bank of money, right? I can see something good in adultery, right? You see? I can see something good in sleeping in on Sunday morning. It's so funny when I was in Quebec, you know, in the old days. You should go to an early mass, right? And then say, you go and have breakfast someplace and you want to look at the newspaper or buy a magazine or something, you know, if you're by yourself or something, and you weren't allowed to buy a magazine there on Sunday morning until afternoon. I said, well, if anybody's kept from going to... to mass because of uh you can buy a magazine you know it's kind of silly thing i thought at the time you know but that was the idea you know interesting it's like sometimes you can't buy alcohol in some place on sunday you know you couldn't buy a newspaper or magazine there in the restaurant or you know until 12 o'clock or one o'clock or whatever it was and some people got eight o'clock mass you can't buy a sunday newspaper at nine o'clock or something it's kind of silly but uh so i mean there's nothing you know that you know obviously going to mass is going to prevent me from being newspaper at eight o'clock right right so there's nothing so bad that i can't see something good in it right and and even you know the famous like crabbing punishment right isn't in dostoevsky's famous novel the man is going to murder an old lady not that he didn't even be against her she's not knowing him or spending him he wants to simply show that he's above the law right well if everybody else is under the law and above the law then above everybody else right so i see in a perverted way there something good right you know the red light there is for you uh to stop not for me i go right through you heard that joke about the red light there where the the guy gets in the car with this other guy and they drive along and close the red light did you you know you went to red light goes on another red light he goes to that and uh he said uh who taught you to drive he said oh my uncle taught me to drive so he goes driving along also he comes to a green light it comes to a stop what are you stopping for i mean my uncle might be coming through he said i remember one time when i was in a movie or a sketch something like that where a guy had invented something you know you press it and the red light turns green right you see oh so you try you know you drive along yeah yeah right i said it turns green you go right through right you know they probably could make some machine that would do that but the guy invented that thing see so i can you know take just about anything right because the universe solved every reason now yeah pop and even the worst things i can see something what good in them right in something as terrible as say suicide you know say euthanasia all these things that go on like that but one can see oh yeah i'm leaving them in their suffering or something right you see okay so you see that the ability right the freedom of the judgment right that if i want something bad enough uh my will can't what move my reason to find something good in it right murdering you when you lose an annoyance or my field or you stand between me and a promotion let's say are you you are or if you're out of the way you know you don't know enough to retire or something or get out of my way so i eliminate you and then i move up right you know so i can always find something some some good right even the most terrible acts and how many reasons can a student find for not studying well there's a party or there's a nice weather or this right reason they talk things are free it's just cost impressive but it doesn't mean to do that you know it's just cost impressive it doesn't work well none of those things seem to work you know so we're all set to go so from the father to the son and the holy spirit god our enlightenment guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds warden aluminum images and arouse us to consider more correctly saint thomas aquinas and john doctor very close we hope we still understand all that you've written surprisingly it's a tickle in my throat i get i did my medical checkup last week so you know it was any problem that i was going with a stuck nose and i wake up a little night so i'll give you some other stuff here i get you doing some good i guess but that's what you recommend it no not this this is on my own just from the store but but some kind of stronger pill i don't know and then one asks about free judgment free will and about this four things are asked first whether man is a free judgment secondly what is librium arbitrium whether it is a ability of power or an act or a what habitum it's like when you talk about conscience on tamil side it's the same question right is conscience the name of the of a reason or is it a name of an act of reason conscientia and third if it is a power which is going to conclude from the second article whether it's an appetitive power or a knowing power right and of course he's going to conclude it's an appetitive power even though that way of naming it might seem kind of strange right because judgment is obviously an act of the reason and fourth if it's an appetitive power whether it is the same power as the will or some other power okay so we better get the first two articles this this day of grace to the first thus one proceeds it seems that man is not of free judgment or free will for whoever is of free judgment or free will does what he wants to do right that man does not do what he wants for it is said in the epistle to the Romans chapter 7 verse 15 and this is St. Paul himself speaking now right not the good that I will do I do that right but the evil right the bad thing that I hate that's what I do right well that's St. Paul himself saying that right therefore man is not a free judgment huh that's a kind of interesting text huh just the way it is therefore man is is is not neither yeah he doesn't have free will yeah it's actually in the genitive there huh yeah okay he's not possessive you might say of free judgment right yeah okay okay a man of power right what does that mean man of wealth huh it's a man who has power and wealth right so a man of free judgment yeah yeah the genitive is kind of interesting it has a lot of different meanings and of you know his house moreover and this is kind of definition that Aristotle gives a liberum there in the first book of metaphysics the free is what is a cause of itself right sui causa well Aristotle's kind of contrasting there the what free man with the slave right and the free man is for his own sake right and the slave is for the sake of the master right okay so this is often quoted as definition what therefore is moved by another is not free but God moves the will huh this is a very interesting thing huh for it is said in the book of Proverbs chapter 21 the first verse the heart of the king is in the hand of God in the power of God and wherever he wills he what turns the heart of the king huh okay I can see how someone could you know say hey that means you're not free right my heart is in the hand of God turn it to good or to bad, right? So am I really free, huh? And then this text from the Epistle to the Philippians, chapter 2, verse 13. It is God who, what, operates in us both to will and to perfect what we will, huh? Therefore man is not a free, what, judgment, huh? Did you forget the second one or do you have a different order? Oh, I forget the second one? Okay. Okay. Okay. Excuse me. Moreover, whoever is or has free judgment, right, free will, belongs to him to will and not to will, right? It's in his power to will, right, and not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not true of man, right? For it is said in the Epistle to the Romans, the 9th chapter, verse 16, It is not of the one willing, to will, that is to say, nor the one running to it to run. Therefore man is not a free, what, judgment, huh? Okay. So the second one is saying that the man doesn't have this freedom, right? Apparently. And the third one is saying it's in the hands of God, right, huh? Okay. Moreover, whoever has free judgment or free will is the lord of his own acts, huh? But man is not the lord of his own acts, because as is said in the 10th chapter of the prophet Jeremiah's, the way of a man is not in its power, right? Nor of a man that he, what, in the power of a man that he directs his own, what, steps, huh? Therefore a man is not a free judgment, huh? So there you have the first four objections, at least one, sometimes two texts from Scripture, huh? Yeah. In each one of them, huh? What did the other 13th say? The reading of the sacred page is the soul of theology? Okay. Now, the fifth objection is taken from Aristotle, whom he calls by Antonia Messia, the philosopher. More of what the philosopher says in the third book of the, that's Nicomachean Ethics, such as each one is, so does the end seem to him, huh? But it is not in our power to be such, huh? But this is something in us from, what, nature or by nature, right? Therefore it is natural to us that we follow some end, huh? And therefore it's not from free, what, will or free judgment, right? Now, as by nature, the objection is saying, by nature I am disposed a certain way, right? Yes. And therefore this seems desirable to me. You're by nature disposed in other ways, so something else seems desirable to you. And therefore I'm not free. But now against all of this is what is said in the book of Ecclesiasticus, huh? I guess they call it Serac now sometimes, don't they? God from the beginning constituted man and left him, meaning man, in the hand of his own, what? Consul, right? And the gloss, huh? Says that is in the freedom of his own, what? Judgment, right? So there, you're using that word in man, right? Man, you know, is left in his own hand, right? Rather than in the hand of God, like up in the third objection there, that the heart of the king is in the hand of God, right? And Aristotle distinguishes the eight senses of him. The seventh sense of him is, I've got you in my power. And sometimes we'll say a little more picturesquely that it's out of my hands, right? Okay. Okay? Which would mean it's not in my, what? Hour. Hour, yeah, yeah. So, the sincantra is again from scripture, right? Saying that what man does and so on is in his hands, right? But up in the third objection, seeing it's in the hand of God, right? Yeah. You know, just glosa interviniaris, what is that again that they're referring to? Well, it must be a famous, what they had, I guess, with the Bible would be, what, little excerpts of the church fathers, right? Oh, okay. And these became, had considerable authority, you know? And sometimes they're identified, you know, the glosa of St. Augustine, right? Okay. Maybe in some cases they weren't fully, what, identified, right? Or they lost, you know, who the regional one was. So, it was a very common thing, you know, to have the glos who was kind of explaining the text on. Okay? Something like you have in the later Catena Aurea, you know, the golden chain. Yeah. Where Thomas is supposed to take, consider, what, little nuggets from the church fathers, you know, that illuminate that passage. And all you really need sometimes is a couple sentences, huh? You have the same thing like in Cornelius Lapidae. It's not as good as Catena Aurea, but Cornelius Lapidae, you know, it's kind of a nice thing to have if you have a set of that, huh? I do, yeah. Because then if you, you know, you're puzzling about the passage from Isaiahs or somebody else in the Mass today or something like that, then you can go to Cornelius Lapidae and maybe hear a little bit of what the church fathers say. I wish that they have all these different, you know, places where the church fathers might have touched upon that, huh? And so you just need a couple of things, you know, that they say that kind of illuminate the text and satisfy to some extent your desire to understand that text, huh? Thank you. Now, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that man is a free, what, judgment, huh, or free will. Otherwise, in vain would be counsels, right? Exhortations, right? Exhortation comes on to urge, right? We urge somebody to do something. I give the students the introduction to philosophy, what I call Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason. What is a man, his chief good, in market of his time be but to sleep and feed, a beast no more? Sure, he, it means this large discourse, looking before and after, gave us not that capability and godlike reason to fuss in us and use. To me, that's the best expectation, you know, to use your reason, right? But with the seven wise men, we, according to legend, there, met at the Oracle of Delphine, he put up the words, you could note thee sauton, know thyself, and what, nothing too much, huh? Those were, what, brief exhortations, huh? Of course, a very common scripture, you have exhortations in many books, huh? Precepts or commands, right, huh, to do something, I suppose. Prohibitions, right, huh? And awards and punishments, right? All these things would be out the window, in a sense, if man was not a free judgment, huh? Okay. So, kind of starting from that as a sign that it is so, right, huh? Okay. That man does have this. But then he's going to go on to show how this is. So, he says, for the evidence of this, it should be considered that some things act without judgment, right? As the stone moves downward, huh? Mm-hmm. And likewise, all things, what, lacking knowledge, huh? Mm-hmm. So, the tree grows without judging that it should grow, right, huh? Mm-hmm. And the leaves grow, and the branches up towards the sun, and the roots down towards the, what, water, and so on, right? But it doesn't have any judgment about these things, huh? Mm-hmm. Then some things act by judgment, but not by a, what, free judgment, huh? Mm-hmm. As the, what? Oh, yeah, the root dog. Yeah. That's the irrational animals, right, huh? Okay. So, no one's...