De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 136: Free Will, Divine Causality, and the Fifth Objection

Transcript
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says you brute that's not a that's an insult huh okay sometimes we use the word in english the word beast right the beast is an you know uh animalia bruta okay it's interesting other expression we have a brute in english there we speak of brute memory okay what does brute memory mean memory sensation yeah but i think it has the idea um a distinction between brute memory and what is called uh recollection right you see when we say you know what were you doing yesterday at three o'clock or something like that right and i can't just like that remember if i can remember that would be brute memory okay if i say well let's see i have a 12 30 class yeah so i got out at 1 30 and then went back to my office and so and so showed up and had a cut oh yeah and then he went down and had a beer you know oh now i remember what's going on right see it's a little bit recalling a little bit like reasoning you see and uh so brute memory is kind of like what just a direct direct you know but not kind of i remember one thing remembering something else which resembles reasoning right and aristotle has a book on uh on memory reminiscence or memory and recalling yeah when he talks about that how you know memory is something the other animals have too right but recalling is like almost reasoning with your memory yeah you see animals don't have that no no no okay so he says some things act by judgment but not by a free judgment as the beast uh the brute animals for the ovis what's that the lamb or the yeah sheep judges seeing the what wolf right okay what's that uh was a wolf at the origin of uh rome or what yeah yeah but in rome in uh julius caesar you all remember how on the feast of luper call i thrice presented him a kingly crown huh remember that that caesar refused but luper call i wonder if that was a phase you know a feast you know celebrating the the wolf on this role so seeing the the wolf on he judges him as something to be fleed right but by a natural judgment right and not by a liberal or free right because not from what colatio colatio means literally bringing together right okay a lot of times i'll see like in Albert the Great and so on they'll speak of the reason is being colativus et discursivus right and usually there's a colatio before there's a dispersals right yeah so for example uh the two main kinds of discourse are are reasoning and calculating right now but before i calculate before i say add subtract multiply or divide i have to bring together two numbers right and that's a colatio means right before i can syllogize uh reason necessarily to conclusion i have to bring together a couple statements of which i can uh draw a conclusion on so and so i'm often comparing the cat there in the house with us you know but only the cat does that huh you know compare the cat human being because not from a colatio but from a natural what instinct right he judges this right and it's like and it's similar in each judgment of the brute animals huh yeah but man acts by judgment right huh yeah because through his knowing power he judges that something ought to be fled from or pursued right but because this judgment is not from a natural instinct in some particular thing to be done but from a certain what colatio right to bring together a reason therefore he acts by free judgment right being able to be born into diverse things huh you know part of reason is because reason is bringing together something what universal right with the singular right so you know the stock example is that of the woman there and i may bring together well adultery is a sin this is adultery therefore i'm not going to do this right but uh this is pleasant the pleasantness to be pursued therefore right you see you've got that freedom to what apply many things right and apply things imperfectly right to and judge that right okay be nice to get some more sleep so i think i'll skip mass this morning or something right right okay now he says reason about contingent things right things that can be or not be right now has a way to opposites huh and this is clear in dialectical syllogisms and in rhetorical what persuasions huh okay mean mean what the two the two persons can come to opposite conclusions based on the same well see in dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical persuasions you can argue on both sides of a question right and so um you have a certain freedom then right uh so um the dialectical ones are more in in universal matters and rhetorical in particular matters but in in politics political philosophy and so on a lot of times you can see reasons on both sides right and uh when you talk about which kind of government is better and so on and see reasons why this government is better or that kind of government is better did it be in the sense of just what we're doing here now or when he puts out the yeah yeah we saw that in the first part i mean this always gets a little bit dialectic right and you have a set contour right so you can just see you know some parts of scripture might you know seem to indicate one thing and then the other ones the opposite of that huh okay so particular operable things are certain contingent things okay and therefore about them the judgment of reason has itself to diverse things is not determined to one right and to that extent uh is necessary to say that man is a free judgment from the fact that he is what rational right huh that he has reason uh it's universal reason huh i knows myself you know i i sit down there at the house there you know and i got a shelf full of books there right well i i've read most of the books there in the shelf huh but um they could all be reread for many reasons right and which book should i be reading right now is it why could i can see a lot of what good reasons for reading each of them right but the reasons that i have to read this book would prevent me from what reading that book right you see sure okay and uh is there you know a book in most cases here that i that i must be reading now yeah must we be studying this right now can we be studying uh logic or studying uh ethics or studying uh theology or studying scripture right or right you see there's something contingent about that right and i can see reasons for studying one you need to study the other right but maybe not a reason why um this is the only thing you should be studying right now something else you see the idea yeah maybe relax a little bit of shakespeare or something huh you see rhetoric is divided into three parts but the main parts in rhetoric are what political rhetoric and uh the courtroom rhetoric of course in the courtroom the one lawyer is trying to prove he's guilty the other guy he's not guilty right yeah and he's not guilty right he's not guilty right he's not guilty right Maybe something can be said on both sides, right? And of course in politics you usually have people for and against a particular course of action. And there's more than one way to skin a cat, as they say, right? And so there's only one way to do something, right? Which is the better way to do it. And when I come home at night, I can turn down South Street to go to my house, I can go a little further down, go up over the hill, or I can go a little further down to Water Street to come around, right? Which one should I do? Well, it's South Street there. I mean, if the light is red, I can turn in after stopping, right? If I want to go to one of the other ways, put it down, right? That way it turns green, huh? You see? Okay. Maybe one of the ways is a little shorter or something, right? Or another way is, what? It requires less turns than I can think, because I don't have too much attention to what I'm doing. Okay? So, I mean, there's all kinds of little things to consider, right? But there's only one way that I must go home. As long as you get tired of going the same way all the time, I go. Go a different way, right? That's the way these things are, right? Okay. What does he say? Well, what should we put on? What should we eat, you know? Okay. My mother always told me, you know, in the old days, you know, the wife would say, you know, oh, why don't we have a dinner? And the man says, well, can't you have meat and potatoes or, you know? There's like a contingent about these things, right, huh? Now, perhaps the most interesting thing here, though, is some of these objections, huh, that we have to take up now, huh? And let's repeat the first objection here. Whoever is, whoever has free judgment or free will, right, does what he wants, right? But the man does not, but man does not do what he wants, huh? For it is said in Romans 7, verse 15, for not the good that I wish, right, do I do that, but the bad that I hate, that I do, right, huh? Okay. Thomas says, to the first, therefore, it should be said, that it has been said above, of the sense-desiring power, right, which means the ability to feel the emotions and so on, right, although it obeys reason to some extent, right, nevertheless can, what, fight against it, right, in something, right, by desiring that against, something against that which reason, what, dictates, right, huh? Okay, so adultery, say, can be pleasant to the senses, right, huh, and therefore there can be, what, some desire for this, right, huh, and therefore one's emotions are not entirely, what, subject to his will, right, okay? The other example there is St. Benedict, right, with the loose woman around the place they're trying to drag them back, and, what, jumping in the bramble bush or something, right, to distract himself from being this temptation, right, huh? As if one doesn't have entirely control over his, what, emotions, huh, okay? And this is the good, right, Thomas says, that man does not do what he wishes. What good? To not, what? God has sense desire, but he was sharing his distinctly sense desire, to not have sense desire against reason, right, as the gloss of Augustine there says, right, the gloss that identify as the gloss of Augustine, huh, okay? There's what, what, I think it's being more clear in the text there, the context of Paul's place there, the Augustine and Thomas, see that, huh? That he's talking about how the, you know, like our Lord said, the spirit is willing, but the flesh is, what, weak, right, okay? And therefore the flesh is not, what, entirely obedient to the will and the reason, right, as you would want it to be, right, huh, okay? So you don't want your emotions to be in revolt against your reason, right, and everything, but to some extent that they are, okay? And therefore, um, uh, that's what St. Paul's talking about there, huh? You see that? Okay? Yeah. Now, second objection. Whoever has free judgment or free will in him or in his power it is to do, I mean, to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not of the man, for it is said, this isn't, what, this is out in the power of man, huh? For it is said in Romans 9, verse 16, that it is not of the one willing nor of the one running, but he goes on to say, but of, what, God having mercy, right? Okay? Now, I'll just time to say on Sarah. That, huh? To the second it should be said that that word of the apostle, and notice how the word apostle is being used by Antonio Masia for what? St. Paul. Yeah. And Thomas, you know, elsewhere, you know, he's talking about scripture. He notes how, um, St. Paul and, uh, Peter identified themselves as apostles in their epistles. I guess the other ones don't. And, uh, they are, those two are called apostles, maybe, apostles by, what, by Antonio Masia. And I mentioned, you know, I noticed how our holy father, uh, John Paul II there, he often referred to, uh, uh, uh, Peter and Paul as the princes of the apostles, right, huh? Okay? So there's a certain prominence there, especially as far as going to Rome and so on. But it means Peter, of course, was the first pope, and Paul is the apostle of the Gentiles, right, huh? Okay? To second, therefore, it should be said that that word of the apostle, meaning St. Paul, should not be understood as if man does not will and does not run by free judgment, right? But, and this is something that's going to come up in a later, uh, objection, right? But because free will for this is not sufficient unless it be moved and, what, aided by God, right, huh? Okay? So this is kind of anticipating something that will be in the later objections, right, huh? Okay? That I can't use my will unless I'm aided by God and moved by God, right, huh? Yeah. But God is not going to move my will in a way that is contrary to the nature of my will, huh? So God is not going to move my will so that I would be, what, forced to will something, right? Because that would be contrary to the very nature of the will, huh? So God moves my will so that I freely will something. And that's most unusual, right? But this is the very nature of the divine providence and the power of God that not only what he wills takes place, right, but it takes place in the way he wants it to take place, right? Sometimes by necessity, sometimes by chance, sometimes freely, right, sometimes for us. But whatever he wants it to take place, takes place. But it takes place in the way he wants it to take place, too. You see? His will doesn't extend, his power is not limited to what? The thing taking place, right? But it extends also to how it takes place, huh? Whether it takes place by necessity or by chance, right, or by life. Whether it takes place naturally, by nature, or by what? Free will, right? And God moves everything in accord with his nature. And that's why wisdom is said to, you know, move from end to end sweetly, right? Because in accordance with the nature of the thing in question, huh? That's always very hard for us to understand, right, huh? People are always thinking, you know, that if God moves us to will something, that therefore we're not freely willing it, right? Okay? But he's moving the will in accordance with the nature of the will. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Freely. It's interesting, huh? But that's someone hard to understand. Okay. Now, the third objection, huh? What? Yeah. Could you hear this thing that, say, to move? Well, he's not moving us the way we would, he's not moving free will the way you or I move a ball. Yeah, because this is no freedom over it's being moved, right? Right, right. You see? So we're still not free to move. Yeah. But what you want to say is that he's moving it in accordance with his nature, right? Right. So it's the nature of the will to have this freedom, huh? Mm-hmm. And to will freely, right? Certain things. So when he moves the will to will, right, he doesn't go against that freedom. Yeah. Does he persuade us normally? Well, it's not just that, because the angels can do that, too, you know? Mm-hmm. Another man can persuade you, see? But God is moving you inwardly, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Okay. So that's something, you know, that we study when we study divine providence, huh? In fact, I was reading about this point, again, in the third book there, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? Where Thomas will point those things out. But you get the reasons why, huh? Nothing moves without God moving it, right? Okay? But his moving these things is not opposed to their natural way of operating. He moves all things in accordance with their nature. In fact, he's given them the nature that they have, right? So he moves them in accordance with their nature. And so he moves the will in accordance with the nature of the will. So he moves it, what? To freely choose something, right? Okay. That's very, very, you know, I think, you know, apart from God himself, obviously, huh? You know, divine providence is going to be a very, what, splendid thing to understand much more than we do understand right now, huh? You see? And how dependent we are upon God, yeah. Could you say, like, this is not a clear question, but it seems maybe like a difference with, again, it's part of the unclarity of this question, but if we were to move a ball or push something or flip this table over, you know, that's more like a co-action, whereas God moving us, you know, that's not a case of co-action, obviously. He's moving us, but it seems like a different kind of movement where it's not a violence, you know, form. It's not a violence, no, no. Right, so we're always free. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, what you have to remember is, you see, that God is the source of our very existence, right? Sure. And so God is more within me, in a sense, than I am within myself, right? And that's why he can move things inwardly, right? And not, what, force them, right? Because he's himself the source of that very inward power that we have, right? Whether you're talking about, you know, the nature of the thing, or talking about the will within, right? And God is within the nature, he's a source of the nature, he's a source of the will, right? So he can move these things inwardly, right? Which is not, force is always an exterior thing, you know? Yeah. Will he speak of different ways, different types of movement, being moved, or moving something? Instead of some aggression, do you like that? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But the thing I want to say is, you know, you can use the word movement in general, but not limited to that, you know, one particular kind, right? Sure, yeah. Because, I mean, some things are moved by something outside of them, sometimes things are moved by something inside of them, right? And God is more inside these things than, what? They are inside themselves, huh? Okay? And so God can move these things, even nature, and will, right? Because it's inward, and not simply extrinsic, okay? Okay, let's look at Thomas' words here now, the third objection. Morbidly free is what is a cause of itself, huh? It is said in the first book of metaphysics. But what is moved by another is not free, right? Like, I see that kind of diction there, right, huh? Okay? If I'm free, right, I move myself, right, to choose this, or not this, right? But what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, right? For it is said, and he has a text in the Old Testament, the heart of the king is in the hand of God, and wherever he wishes, he, what? Turns it, right? So you're going to have to thank God for moving you to freely choose him. Right? And as it's said in the Epistle to the Philippians, it is God who, what, does in us, or operates in us, accomplishes in us, to will, and to, what, perfecta, what we will. Therefore, man is not a free judgment, right? Let's look at Thomas' reply here, right? To the third, it should be said that free will is the cause of its own motion, right? Because man, through free will, moves himself to, what, doing something, right? It is not, however, of the necessity of liberty, that it be the very first cause of itself, that what is free be the very, what, first cause of itself, right? It has to be, in some sense, a cause, causasui, a cause of itself, right? Of what it does, right? But it doesn't have to be the, what, first cause, yeah. Just as neither, in order that something might be the cause of another, right, is it required that it be the first, its first cause, huh? Okay? But let's make an analogy there, right? It's something easier to see, right? So, if I'm, is this, well, let's start with it. If this paper is moving the book, right, it truly is pushing the book, isn't it? It sure is. Yeah. And it's not opposed to us pushing the book that is being moved by, what, me. That's not the first mover, right? Okay? We're saying the same thing now. Even though the, what, of free will is moving itself, right, huh? That doesn't mean it has to be, what, the first mover of itself, right? Okay? For God, he says, is the first cause moving both natural causes and voluntary causes, huh? Okay? And he can be that because he's a source of both of their, what, even being, right? Okay? And he's a source of what they are, right? Okay? And he's conserving them in existence, right? And so on. And thus, and just as, he says, then, in natural causes, by moving them, right, God does not take away from them that their acts be, what, natural, right? They're still from an intrinsic cause. So in moving voluntary causes, or wills, he does not take away, but that their actions be, what, voluntary, huh? But rather he makes this in them. Okay? And that's like I was saying, for he does in each thing according to what is, it's what? Yeah, what is proper to it, huh? Approprietata, right, huh? Yeah, he moves each thing in the way that's appropriate to it, that fits what it is, right? So he moves the natures of things, right, to cause something naturally, right? And he moves the wills to cause something, what, voluntarily or even freely, right? Okay? That's really kind of marvelous that God's power extends there, you know? Yeah. So he's not only responsible for something taking place, but that it takes place naturally or voluntarily, or that takes place by... So... necessity, or by chance, or by, you know, and his causality is that Putin, right? It's hard to understand, right? But see, this comes under the more general, you know, consideration that you have, like in the Summa Conrad Gentiles, even earlier here, when you take up divine providence, right? Okay? Now, let's look at the fourth objection. Whoever has free will is the Lord of his own acts, but man, it seems, is not the Lord of his own acts, because, as is said in Jeremiah 10, verse 23, the way of a man is not in his power, nor is it in the power of a man that he directs his own steps. Okay? To the fourth, he says it should be said that the way of a man is said not to be in his to be in the man, to be in his power, that is to say, as far as the carrying out of his, what, choices, huh? Okay? There's a word for choice there in Latin, Alexio. That's how you get the word election in English, huh? Some people say they don't have a choice, but that's what it means, election, right? Yeah. But Shakespeare used that word there, right? You know, since my dear soul was mistrissa for choice, and could have been distinguished for election, hath sealed thee for herself, right? Yeah. Still saying choice again, he used the Latin word for choice, huh? So, what about that? So, you're talking about the carrying out of what one has chosen, right, huh? Okay. And that's often said by Shakespeare, too, right, huh? That the beginning of our action is in our own power, but the ends are not, right, huh? And I'm sure everybody has seen that, right? The best laid plans of men and mice, huh? Mm-hmm. Oft go astray, huh? Okay. Yes. In which a man is able to be impeded, right, huh? Willy-nilly, right? Is that what it means? Huh. Della, don't let, huh? That's fine. That's how they translate it, I think, isn't it? Yeah, yeah, willy-nilly, yeah? Well, that's so cool. You can do this willy-nilly, whether you want to or don't want to, right? All those bones. Yeah. But, no, she goes on, huh? Choices, however, are in us, right, huh? Nevertheless, supposing the divine, what? Aid, right, huh? Okay? Because our will has to be moved, right, to choose, right, huh? But it's moved by God to choose. See? So he's not taking away choice. See? He's not moving us to necessarily will something. He's moving us to choose something, huh? Okay? But the carrying out of what we choose is not in our power, right, huh? Okay? So what's, then, when he uses this free judgment, could he have used the word free choice? Alexia? Well, let's say that the next article, because I think the next article, you're going to do something of the way of naming, right, huh? Okay. Okay. And it always starts when you first come, you know, because a lot of times I'll translate Librium Arbitrium as free will, right, in English, right? Uh-huh, right. But it's not really the Latin words, right? Right. Librium is more of the idea of judgment, right? Yeah. It's like when you go to arbitration, as we say, right? You can, somebody's going to judge now between the parties. But free will presupposes, right, that use of reason, right, whereby you have not only judgment, but a certain freedom in your judgment, right? Now, you go back to those words of Hamlet there, right, here's what he says, since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, her election has sealed thee for herself, right? Now, what does he mean there, huh? When was his soul mistress of her choice? Using him as friend? No. No. Yeah. When he had the use of reason, right? Whereby he could distinguish between men, right? And he goes on to give the reasons why he chose Horatio as his friend, right? Right. Give me that man that is not passion slave, right? Okay. Okay? So he can distinguish between the man who's a slave of some passion, and this man Horatio who's not the slave of any passion, right? The man who's fortune, you know, who's taking good and bad fortune with an even keel, right? You know, many things he says about him, right? So, but notice the way Hamlet speaks. Since my dear soul is mistress of her choice, and could have been distinguished, right? That's when her soul became mistress of her choice, when he had the use of reason to the extent that he could, what? Distinguish among men and see that this man would be better to have as a friend than that man, right? Or maybe this man would be good to have a friend, that man would be bad to have as a friend, right? You see? Or do you want a coward as a friend? See? You want Don Johnny as a friend? You can't trust him with your wife, your sister, your daughter, right? You want a thief for a friend, right? You know? There's this thing there in Basel's life with Johnson, you know, where they have some dinner guests, you know, and he's got these, you know, free-thinking ideas, you know? There's nothing wrong with stealing, you know, and Johnson's saying, you know, well, after he leaves, he says, well, count our spoons, he says. In those days, you know, it's where it was kind of expensive, you know? It's going to run off one of your spoons or forks or something, right? So, that's why, you know, before the so-called age of reason, whatever that is, right? You used to say seven when I was a kid, you know, but it's kind of arbitrary in a sense. Because some people maybe developed a little bit faster. But we don't speak of the little child as, what? Maybe, you know, two or three as fit to go to confession, right? No. See? It's just not really, what? You don't yet have choice in the full sense, right? See? So, that's what Hammond is saying there. Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice, right? As if his soul was not mistress of her choice, would be, what? Very small, right? And that was before he could have been distinguished, right? But once he got to the point that his reason developed, he could see the differences among men, right? And see what's good and what's bad and what's better and worse, right? Then he has, what? You know? Able to choose, right? Then his soul was mistress of her choice, right? Then it was Kauza Sui, right? And mistress, I mean, he used mistress because the soul was feminine, right? You know, Latin, right? She's very close to that. But as he speaks of being the dominos, right? Right? Being the master, so to speak, of your choice, huh? Yeah. But you have to have the use of reason, right? And so, if I go crazy one of these days, right? You know? Lose my mind, so to speak, right? Then I'm no longer, what? Responsible, right? What I'm doing, right? You see? Yeah. Then what I'm doing, right? I don't, I'm no longer master of my choice or mistress of my choice. My soul is no longer, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Okay. So, it may be that that free will would be there only, I mean, free will means what? The ability to choose, right? But you don't really have that ability until you have Libra Revitria. Until you have the use of reason, whereby you can, what, make some kind of a judgment, right? As to what is good or bad or better, right? In pure things, huh? Students are selecting their courses for next semester, right? So, I have to advise a few students, you know, they don't know anything what they want. But, you see the kind of contingency, right? You know? Student, you know, first he's thinking, maybe take this course and then something else occurs to him, you know, he doesn't want to take that course, you know, or that sort of thing. Okay. Okay, now the fifth objection, huh? He's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? It's got a long reply to the fifth objection, huh? Mormon the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that such as each one is, so does the end seem to him, right? But such as I am is partly what? Determined by nature, right? Now this is a very important thing in Ethics as well as this thing here. To the fifth it should be said that the quality of man, it's referred to when you talk about such as a man is, so does the end appear to him, right? To the fifth it should be said that the quality of man is twofold, right? One quality is natural, right? Inborn maybe. And the other coming upon the man, right? Okay, not inborn. Now the natural quality can be taken either concerning the intellective part or concerning the body and the powers that are joined to the body. Now from this, that man is such by a natural quality, which is on the side of his intellectual part, man naturally desires the last end, which is what? Beatitude, right? Which desire is natural and is not subject to what? Free judgment, right? I naturally want to be happy, I naturally want to be blessed, right? Okay? I naturally want to what? Live well and do well. Okay? And I really choose to live well and do well rather than to live badly and do badly, right? Okay? On the side of the body, and of the powers joined to the body, A man can be such by a natural quality, according as he's of such a, what? A makeup, right? Such a complexion, right? Or such a disposition, right? Which is from a certain impression of bodily causes, huh? Okay? So some men are disposed to anger and others to concubisence and others to, what? Fear, right? Some men are more timid than others, right? Okay? So we see this even in children, right? Some children are more shy than others, right? And so on, right? So their body, in a sense, disposes them to certain emotions, huh? Some children are more apt to, what? Get angry about things, right? Others are more apt to, what? Be fearful or something, right? Others, you know, may have more of a witness for candy or something than others, huh? Okay? But that's in the body, right? And the body doesn't, what? Press upon the intellectual part, though it has some influence over it, huh? In that the intellectual part is not the act of some body. Thus, therefore, such as each one is according to a bodily quality, so the end seems to him, right? Because from such a disposition, a man is inclined to choosing something or reputuating something, right? But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of what? Reason, right? To which, to some extent, as we saw before, the lower desire, the sense desire, obeys, right? Whence through this, nothing is prejudicial or going against free judgment, right? Okay? I don't have to give in to my anger or my concupiscence or my, what? Fear, right? And so one can, by his intellect or reason and his will, oppose, right, his own fear, right? Resist his fear and not run away when he should stay and fight or whatever it is. Or he can resist his concupiscence, right? Like St. Benedict's supposed to be jumping in the bush with a lot of prickly things in it, huh? Or you can see St. Francis de Sales are resisting his inclination to anger, right, huh? Okay? So you may know people who had to fight all their life against, you know, tendency to anger, right, huh? You see, and other people don't have that particular problem, right? Other people, though, are naturally kind of timid and they have to kind of push themselves, right? You see, into, I remember a student years ago, you know, who was shy to get up and speak in public or something, you know? So he took some kind of a speech class. He had to get up and speak in the class spontaneously, you know? And the professor called you today, he could have to give a speech on citizen's topic, you know, and so on. But pretty soon, you know, he was running for office and getting elected, right? You know, he was in office, you know? But when he started off, I mean, you know, just, you know, you know, couldn't speak up at all, just too shy or timid, huh? So you can resist, to some extent, the, what? The passion or the emotion to which you are, what? Subject, right, huh? Okay? Obviously, I call it anonymous or something like that, right? You know, they fight this tendency that they have to want to, what? Drink or something, right, huh? Okay? So, what we in, what does Shakespeare say? What we in passion to ourselves propose, the passion ending doth the purpose lose. I've got it exactly quoted there. But in Hamlet there in the play within the play, right? What to ourselves in passion we propose, right? The passion ending doth the purpose lose. So, when I'm angry, it seems, you know, a suitable goal to hit you, right? You see? When I'm concubines, you know, to eat the candy or whatever it is, right? Or pursue the woman, right, huh? Okay? Or if I'm under this feeling of fear, right? The goal seems to be to escape from this situation, right? Run off, right? Okay? But I can resist those passions to some extent, right? Okay? But he says, the qualities supervenientes, the ones that come upon us, right? Through our own actions, right? Are as the habits and passions by which someone is more inclined to one thing than another, huh? Nevertheless, these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. And qualities of this sort are subject to it insofar as in us it belongs, as in our power, to acquire such qualities, right? What I was thinking of, what Thomas was thinking of there, what you learn a lot in ethics, is that the so-called moral virtues, and actually, they used to speak before of moral virtues and moral vices, right? Because moral comes from the word masque, custom, right? So there are certain dispositions and even habits that are acquired by repeated acts, right? So, if I have repeatedly given in to this desire to eat candy, and now I've become a glutton, right? Okay? Or if I have given in to my anger so much that I'm an irascible person now, right? I'm habitually of this sort, then I'm responsible for that habit, right? That quality whereby it seems suitable for me to do what I, what? Do, right, huh? Okay? And so, you know, in the famous play there is Shakespeare, Coriolanus, right, huh? Coriolanus is by nature inclined to anger, but he hasn't, what, fought that inclination, right? And therefore, he, what, acts for an end to what fits his anger, right? And since Rome has treated him rather shabbily, right, he's now going to, what, destroy Rome, right? Yeah. And Don Giovanni's been giving in to another passion, right, all his life, and then when the commandant takes him by the stony hand, he can't say what? And he can't repent, right? And down he goes to hell, right? Did you ever see the movie version of that? The one that, the one that Chesor Siopi did, and it was taken right from the stage there, to the United States Opera, you know, because the flames are bursting out, you know, they really do it well, you know, huh? And of course he goes down, ah! Once it's got in D minor, you know. So, but Thomas, you know, when he talks about these habits that we form by repeated acts, when we die, right, huh? Yeah. Those habits remain, see? Yeah. And, um, uh, but we're no longer in time like we are now, right? And then there's kind of a permanence about those habits. Yeah. And, uh...