De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 138: Free Choice, Divine Movement, and the Soul's Knowledge

Transcript
================================================================================

But it also points out something about the connection between our ability to choose and the fact that our judgment can be varied, because you have these universals we can apply, and you kind of see that people are in favor of abortion and so on. They can apply other universals if they want to, right? I remember when the thing came up there with Ginsburg, there when she was up for nomination there. And for her, the idea was simply, you know, well, obviously you have to have this because that's the way a woman will be equal with men, you know? That's the kind of universal she's applied. A woman should be equal with men, right? Well, obviously if they have a passing relation there, right, the woman is left unequal to the man because she's left pregnant, right? And so she's got to have the right to, you know. That says it would be like a free judgment, right? Or as soon as I'll say, you know, well, they'll do it anyway, see, so we want to have it safe and, you know. You're saying? So that's what the mind can do, right? You know, the will can take any way that something is good and take it as being good. Now, the third one was talking about what? This collatio, right? And of course, Thomas says, well, that's a collatio that pertains to what? The consul that is before the choice, huh? Okay. To third, it should be said that this collatio, which is implied in the name of choice, pertains to the preceding consul, right? Which is of what? Something of reason. For the appetite, although it is not collativus, it does not bring the other things, nevertheless, insofar as it is moved, right, by the knowing power that does bring things together, conferente, right, it has a certain, what, likeness of collation, right? Insofar as it chooses one thing before, what, another, huh? Okay. So just like if I have a headache and I want to get rid of the headache, and then I want to get rid of the headache, I want to take aspirin, and then I have to go to the drugstore to get aspirin, right? Well, then I want to go to the drugstore, right, to get aspirin, because I want to take aspirin. I want to take aspirin so I can get rid of my headache, right? So it's kind of a likeness, a discourse in my will because of my, what, reason, right? It sees the connection between going to the drugstore and getting rid of my headache through the aspirin, huh? Okay. But notice, you could say it the same way in Shakespeare's words there, huh? Since my dear soul was missed to suffer a choice, and could have been distinguished, right? So there's a distinction more of the act of what? Reason than of the will, right? But the act of reason is presupposed to the act of the will, huh? And the distinction that reason sees between Horatio and other men is behind his choice, huh? Of Horatio as a friend rather than some other man as a friend. Okay? So you make the same point that Thomas is making here, huh? But in a way, his will is acquiescing in the distinction that the reason, what, sees, huh? Okay? Well, we go on to the next one, and then if we have a little time, after we can look at the deduction to 84, you know? Mm-hmm. That's a fairly short article. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that free judgment or free choice, the ability to choose, is another power from the will. For Damascene says in the second book of the Orthodox faith that other is the laces, right? Other bulesis. That tends to, what, latinize two Greek words, right, huh? Okay? The laces over is voluntas, which means simply what? The will, right, or the act of the will that is regard to the end or the good, huh? And bulesis, which comes from the Greek word for bule, which means counsel, right? Mm-hmm. So bulesis seems to, what, be choice or arbitrium. Librium is in the word for choice, huh? Because bulesis, according to him, is the will which is about something, as it were, about one thing in comparison to, what, another, right? Mm-hmm. Therefore it seems that Librium arbitrium is another power from the, what, will. Now, I think, I think voluntas there is used maybe to name the act rather than the power, right? But we'll see what Thomas says anyway. Okay. Moreover, the powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is an act of free judgment, is other from the will, as is said in the Third Book of Nicomachean Ethics. Because the willing is of the end, choice is about those things which are for the end. Therefore, Librium arbitrium is another power from the, what, will, huh? Moreover, the will is the appetitive, is intellectual appetitive power. But on the part of the intellect, there are two powers, as we saw. The agent, right? The acting upon, right? Mm-hmm. And the possible, right? The undergoing one. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual ability to desire, there ought to be another power besides the will. And thus it does not seem to be except, and this does not seem to be any other than, free choice, huh? Or free judgment. Therefore, free judgment is another power besides the will. But against this is what Damascene says in the Third Book himself, huh? That Librium arbitrium is nothing other than the, what, than the will, huh? So Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that the appetitive powers are necessarily proportioned to the, what, grasping powers, huh? He uses that word grasping all the time for the, what, knowing powers, right? Mm-hmm. But that word grasping brings out that, what? Judgment. That the thing known is in the knower, right? Mm-hmm. See? Why, love is more in, what? More the love is in the thing loved, huh? I left my heart in San Francisco, the song says, right? Christ says, where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? What Augustine says is so is more ubi amat, quam animat, huh? It's more where it loves than where it animates, right? So the will is said to be more in love is said to be more in the thing loved than the thing loved in the love, although that's true in some way, too. And in the case of knowing, it's more what? The thing known is in the, what, knower. So grasping brings it out, right? When I grasp something with my mind, just as when I grasp something with my hand, it's contained in my hand or contained in my mind, right? See? But grasping doesn't seem to indicate the perfection of the will, huh? Grasping. Grasping sounds like being too desirous of material goods in this world, right? To be grasping, huh? See? But that's the perfection of the knowing, right? To grasp something, huh? Sometimes they distinguish between, what, grasping and judging, right? But judging presupposes grasping, huh? And that's why, you know, my complaint about the modern philosophers, you know, what does Heidegger mean by being, right? It takes us long to grasp what they mean. You have a fair little time left over to judge whether it's true or false. I always tell when I was teaching St. Mary's College there for three years before I had my doctorate, and this guy in the department there was trying to figure out what Heidegger meant by being, and I got out there in three years. When I left you, I was still trying to figure out what I meant by being. I mean, when Thales says, you know, water is the beginning of all things, that may or may not be true, but at least you know what he's saying, right? And you can examine whether this is true or not, or to what extent it's true. So the percentage is all wrong. You've got to spend most of your time trying to grasp what the guy is saying, right? And you have very little time to judge whether it's true or false. Okay, I answer, it should be said that the appetitive or desiring powers are necessarily proportioned to the grasping powers, to the knowing powers. For just as on the part of grasping, or intellectual grasping, we have the understanding and reason, so on the part of the appetitive powers we have what? Voluntas and liber arbitrium, huh? I know it's intellectus implies what? Just understanding, right, huh? But reason implies knowing one thing through another, right? That's why Shakespeare defines reason as as being discursive, right, huh? Okay? And likewise, voluntas simply refers to one's willing the good, the end, huh? But liber arbitrium is willing one thing for the sake of something else, right? So liber arbitrium, or choice, seems to be like what? Reason, right? Okay? And this is clear, he says, from the relation of the objects and the acts, huh? For intelligere, to understand, right, implies a simple what? Taking of something, right? I understand something. Once those things are said to be understood properly, which are principles, huh? Which are the beginnings, huh? And so in Greek Aristotle calls that simply nous, right? The virtue that knows the, what, principles, the axioms, like the whole is more than a part, right? In Latin they call it simply, what, intellectus, right? In English we call it simply understanding, although I tend to call it natural understanding. Which, without a bringing together of statements, right, are known through themselves, huh? But to reason is properly to arrive from knowing one thing, right, to knowledge of a, what? Of another, right? Whence properly about conclusions we reason, right? Conclusions which are made known from some kind of principles or beginnings, huh? So likewise he says on the side of the desire, of the desiring power. Vele, okay, to will, implies a simple what? Desire something, right? Whence the voluntas, the willing, is said to be about the end, right? Which is desired for its own sake. But to choose is to desire something on account of, what, getting something else, right? Whence it is properly of those things which are towards the end, right? That are means towards the end, okay? Now he goes on with the analogy here. Just however, as the principle has itself in knowing things to conclusion, to which conclusion we assent on account of the principles, right? So also in the appetitive things, the end has itself to those things which are, what? For the end, right? Which are desired for the end, huh? That's a very common proportion, right? That Aristotle uses, right? He'll say that the end is to the means, something like that, as the principles are to the, what? Conclusions, huh? Okay? See, that's a very common proportion that Aristotle has, huh? So the end is like the principle in the, the will, huh? So just as reason from knowing that a whole is larger than one of its parts, huh? It comes to know, for example, if you look at the theorem, that if these, what, angles are equal, these sides will be equal, right? We've come to know that conclusion about this through the whole being larger than the part, huh? And so likewise, here, we've come to desire the means through what? Desiring the end, huh? Okay? So just as a now is the principle is a cause of our eventually coming to know the conclusion to the principles, so our desire at the end is a cause of our eventually coming to desire the means that seem to be suitable to that end, huh? Okay? Now it's going to be the same power that knows the principles and the conclusions, huh? And that's going to be the same power that's going to desire the end of the means, but let's see how Thomas develops that, huh? Let's go back to the secret there, the one we just read. Just as the beginning or the principle has itself in knowing to the conclusion, to which conclusion, right? We assent on account of the principles, right? So likewise in the matter of desire, the end has itself to those things which are towards the end, which are desired on account of the end, huh? Do you see that? Whence it is manifest that just as intellectus, understanding is to reason, so willing is to the, what? Power of choice. That is to Libra and Repitra, huh? But it's been shown above that's of the same power to understand and to reason, right? Just as it pertains to the same power to rest and to move, huh? Especially in the ancient physics, right? Where the body, right? Because if it's weight, it went down, and when it gets down to the bottom here, it's what? Rests, huh? It's the same thing. So to reason is like to move, right? To understand, as the word standing indicates, right? In English, it's like the rest, huh? So, by analogy, therefore, all sorts of the same power to will and to what? Choose, right? On account of this, the will and free judgment are not two powers, but what? One, huh? See the argument there? Going back to the fact that we said that the understanding and reason are the same thing, but we have the two names because of the two, what? Acts, huh? Okay, now, the first objection was the one based on Hulasis and Hulasis, right? As I mentioned, those words can, especially they're translated, and Voluntas and Libra Merbitrium. You might think Voluntas there is the, what? The power, right? Called the will, right? And Libra Merbitrium is something else, right? But they actually, you name, you have the same name there for the power in that act because that's a simple act of the power. Just like you have the same name for the power to understand, understanding, and the act of understanding, huh? So Thomas says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that Hulasis is distinguished from Hulasis, not on account of a diversity of powers, right? But on account of a diversity of what? Of acts, yeah. And the second objection here, more of our powers are known through acts, the second objection said, right? But choice, which is an act of free will, is other from the will, okay? And Thomas says, to the second it should be said that election and... Voluntas, id est ipsum vale, right? That's just showing these understanding in that sense of the act, right? Certain diverse acts, right? But notice, Voluntas could also be used to name the, what? The power, right? Yeah, the power. Okay, which would have both of these acts, right? Just like understanding could, right? Yeah. When Aristotle's distinguishing Elexion Voluntas there, he's taking Voluntas in the sense of the ipsum vale, right? To will, right? The end. Okay? Yeah. So Aristotle says to will the end and to choose the means for the, to achieve that end are different acts, huh? Okay? But nevertheless, these different acts pertain to the same power just as to understand and to reason belong to the same, what? Power. Now the third one, he simply points out that the intellect is compared to the will as a mover, right? And therefore, it's not necessary in the will to distinguish between the, what, agent and the, what, possible, right? Mm-hmm. But the two of them, what, are necessary for our understanding, right? Mm-hmm. But the forms were one mover of the will. Mm-hmm. Okay? Yep. Okay. Now, this here begins the third part of this, on division. If you go back here, I think, to introduction here, question 75, huh? he says, he says, after the consideration, let's go back to the 75 before we look at this again because it's the type where we are. He says, after the consideration of the spiritual creature, which would be what? This is the premium to question 75 into this whole section on the, so on. He says, yeah, question 75, you can leave a finger or marker if you got there for 84. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. So, back to 75. 75. He says, after the consideration of the spiritual creature, which would be the what? Souls. The angels. Oh, right. Okay. And the copoleal creature, which would be, you know, everything below us, right? We're not to consider about man who is composed from the spiritual and the corporeal. Okay. That's kind of interesting because that's the order you have in the psalms of praise, huh? You know, in a way, you start having the angels praise God and then you have the, the, the, the, the, yeah, the beasts and, and things of that sort. And then last of all men praises God, right? Yeah. Okay. Yeah, you have that in the, in the psalm of the three young men in the furnace and you have it in the psalm like, I don't know, 147, you know? Yeah. Yeah. You see a lot in theology that division, right? Yeah. It'll go from, you know, the angels to, what? To the material that have below man and then to, to man. And that's what you have in, in Genesis too if you read it with Augustine's understanding, huh? Okay. And the consideration of the angels is much more lengthy than the consideration of proporeal, but, a substance, but nevertheless both of them are considered before you consider man who's kind of, kind of composed of the two, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And that's why man is said to be a little, what? Cosmos, a microcosm by the philosophers even, right? Yeah. And the Arabs would say that he's on the horizon between the material world and the immaterial world. Yeah. Mm-hmm. And, okay? But no, that's a theological order, right? I see. Because in, in philosophy you'd study man and the soul before you'd study the, what? Angels, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? That's why we're studying this without having studied the angels because you're doing this as kind of a follow-up for our philosophical study of, of the soul, right? Okay? And first he says about the nature of man himself, right? Secondly, about his, what? Production, right? And we're going to skip the part of his production, but we're going to talk about the nature of man, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But the nature of man, it considers or it pertains to the theologian to consider the nature of man on the part of the soul, right? Not over on the part of the, what? Body, eh? Except, according to the, what, relation which the body has to the soul, right? Yeah. Okay. Okay? So, um, you've got to be kind of careful like you're, this title given up here to this part, de homine, right? Yeah. It's really more de anima. Yeah. Right? You see? Okay? Read Thomas. Although you can say it's about man in some sense, but, but you're considering man primarily from the side of the, what? The soul, right? Sure. And the body very little. So that's why it resembles, in a way, the consideration of the soul in Aristotle's book on the soul, right? Then he goes in to talk about the body in the later books, right? But he considers the soul in a kind of, of, almost separation from the body there. And therefore, the first consideration is about the soul, right? Now he's going to divide this treatise on the soul, which goes up to, what, 89, I guess. And because according to Dionysius in the 11th chapter in the Angelic hierarchy, three things are found in spiritual substances like the soul, namely essence, right? Or in nature or what it is. The virtues or the power, right? The abilities. And the operation, right? First, we will consider those things which pertain to the essence of the soul. Okay? And that's what we did in 74 and 70, what? I mean, 75 and 76, right? Okay? Secondly, those things which pertain to its power, or powers, right? And that's what we just, what? finished today. Okay? 78 through 83. Third, those things which pertain to its operation, and that's the, what? 84. Yeah. Yeah. Okay? So notice then, huh? He's going to consider the nature of man and the protection of man, right? Okay? We're not going to talk about the protection of man in this part of our thing, right? Okay? But that first part is divided into three parts, and now we're going to begin the, what, third part, right? Yeah. But he's going to talk about just the acts in particular of the, what, intellectual part, because the acts in particular of the will and so on, and the acts of the emotion in particular pertain more to moral theology, right? Which is in the second part, right? Okay? So let's turn now with that review a little bit of where we are to the beginning now of this, what, third part of the, part of the soul here. Consequently, he says, we're not to consider about the acts of the soul. They mean the acts of the soul in particular, you could say, right? As regards the, what, understanding powers and the appetitive powers, huh? Now why those powers of the soul, right? rather than the digestive power that's there, the power to walk around or something like that, huh? Because it's not connected to the body and material. Well, I see, theology considers everything in reference to God, right? And so, it's only the intellectual powers and the will, right, that can have God as an object, huh? Yeah. Okay? But you could say, nevertheless, you could say, though, that the appetitive powers, even the lower ones, the Eraskan and Kibsabal, can be the subject of human virtue, right? Like courage and temperance and so on, right? So that's another way of saying why he talks about these. These are the subject of the, what, human virtues that you take up in moral theology, huh? Virtues of reason and the, what, moral virtues, huh? In the same way in ethics, in ethics, all the virtues the Eraskan talks about are either in the, what, the reason itself, right, the understanding, or they're in the appetitive powers, right, huh? them. And some like courage, let's say, and mildness are in the erasifal appetita. And ones like temperance and maybe antropoleia and so on are in the concisal appetita. And justice is in the will, right? And then intellectual virtues, of course, are in the understanding or in reason, huh? Okay. So he says, in theology, we have to consider then the acts of the understanding power and of the powers of desire, right? But the acts of the appetitive power pertain to the consideration of what? Moral science, huh? And therefore, in the second part of this work, we will treat of them, right? In which we consider about moral matter, what we call moral theology in some cases. Okay. So now it remains to talk about the, what, acts of the intellectual power, huh? Okay. And you'll see he's going to be more complete in a way than Aristotle is, and he talks about the acts of the intellectual powers, right? Okay. So we're going to meet what he meant in Aristotle, but some other things besides that, right? Okay. Now, in the consideration of these acts, we will proceed in this way. For first, we will consider in what way the soul understands when it's joined to the body, right? When it's in the body, right, huh? In this life, in other words, right? Secondly, in what way it understands, what? Separated from the body, huh? Okay. Okay. And that's going to be in question, what? 89, it says, huh? Okay. So 84 and 85 and 86 and 87 and 88, right, are going to be dealing with the soul's knowledge while it's in the body, right? In 89, the knowledge when separated from the body. Aristotle doesn't talk about that second, does he, in the Dianima? And if he's going to talk about that, the place to talk about it would be in the, what, metaphysics. Okay? In wisdom, right? But in theology, there, you don't have that distinction, right? Now, the first consideration will be what? Yeah. Most of all, you usually divide into two or into, what, three, right, huh? For first, he will consider in what way the soul understands bodily things which are below itself, right? Secondly, in what way it understands itself and the things which are in it, huh? And that's in question 87, I tell you, okay? Third, in what way it understands the immaterial substances which are above it? And that's in question 88, right? Okay? That's pretty clear now, huh? So in 84, in 85, in 86, in those three questions, you're going to consider how the soul knows things that are below it, huh? Bodily things, right? And then in 87, how it knows what? Itself, huh? And then 88, how it knows the things that are above it, huh? Like the immaterial substances, like the angels. Okay? But all of that is in this life, huh? Yeah. See? And then all of that was divided originally against, what, 89, which is about its knowledge separated from the body. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, concerning the knowledge of corporeal things, right, to which these first three articles or first three questions are addressed, three things occur that should be considered, right? First, by what it knows them, right? Or through what it knows them, right? Okay? A pair can be through or by. Mm-hmm. Secondly, in what way and in what order, right? And that's question 85. Question 84 is, by what it knows them, right? Third, what it knows in them, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Mm-hmm. I'm pleased with what he's going to talk about there, right? Mm-hmm. Pretty much covers it. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now, let's look just at the first eight questions here, huh? So, you've got a sense of what he's doing here. Mm-hmm. Whether, the first article is going to be whether the soul knows bodies through the understanding, right? Mm-hmm. The second is whether it understands them through its own nature or through some, what, species or forms, huh? Mm-hmm. And if, through some forms, which he must be going to answer in the second article, whether the species or forms of all understandable things are naturally innate in it, in the way that Plato thought, right? Mm-hmm. And some other moderns thought, too. Okay? And if they're not innate, as he's going to probably conclude there, whether they flow into it from some, what, separated immaterial forms, like Plato thought, from the forms, themselves, maybe, or Avicenna thought from the angels and so on, huh? Okay. Then, fifth is undoubtedly something suggested by texts of Augustine, right? Mm-hmm. Whether our soul knows all things which it understands, whether it sees them in the, what, eternal reasons, huh? Because Augustine says that, right? And people say, what does he mean by this, huh? Is this the illumination of ideas? Mm-hmm. Well, it's almost like he sees them in God himself, right, huh? Okay. And that's not really what Augustine means, according to Thomas, but people sometimes, you know, take it that way, huh? Now, the next three articles here are much more close to what Aristotle would, and what we learned in Aristotle, right? Whether it acquires the understandable knowledge from sensation, right? Okay? And, of course, Aristotle talks about that in the Premium to Wisdom, right? How sensing comes first, and then memory of what we sense, and then the collection of many memories, which is experience. And then we separate out the universal, and that's the way our understanding begins, huh? The seventh one, now, whether the intellect is able and act to understand through intelligible forms, which it has within itself, by not converting itself to, what, phantasm, huh? And, of course, you remember what Aristotle said, huh? That the soul, even after it has the understandable form, which it understands, it turns to the images, right, to consider what it wants to consider, right? So even after I know what a triangle is, when I think of what a triangle is, I will imagine a triangle, right? And so I will consider what a triangle is in that image, so to speak, that I have of a triangle, right? And then whether the judgment of the understanding is impeded through the impediments in the sensitive powers, right? Okay, so if I, you know, can't remember what a triangle looks like, can I understand what a triangle is? Or if I can't imagine a good decahedron, can I understand what it is? But they're more serious, you know, in Jews, right? That can happen, huh? Let's look a little bit just at the articles in 85. I won't go into the articles today, but... Notice that first question was about that by which the soul understands, right? Okay? Now, the second one here is about the... order way and the order of understanding right i'm sorry i lost you we're just right here at the beginning of 85 now 85 yeah yeah then he says we're not to consider about the way and order of understanding and about this eight things are asked first whether our understanding understands by abstracting forms from phantasms secondly whether the understandable forms abstracted from phantasms have themselves to our understanding as what is understood or as that by which it understands and thomas is going to say as that by which it understands third whether our understanding naturally understands before the more universal fourth whether our understanding is able to understand many things at once fifth whether understanding understands by putting together dividing and there's thinking of the statement right where you put together things in an affirmative statement or you divide them in a what negative statement six when the understanding is able to uh yeah well it does know how to her but um and this is for you brother right now say whether one is able to understand the same thing better than another one understands it right okay and eight with their understanding uh knows before the indivisible than the divisible right of course you see even in geometry they know the what indivisible by the negation of the divisible right well we say you know the body has length and width and depth right what is the surface what's got length and width but no depth so there's one negation there right what about a line what has length but no width or depth two negations right and then a point has neither length nor width nor depth than so um or even the way you could define its point which has no parts right yeah yeah but that's because our knowledge starts with our senses our senses know things that are composed so something that's all together is simple we know by the negation of uh yeah transition so just to give you the idea of what these first three articles or questions are on right yeah yeah now question 86 here then ought to be considered what our understanding knows in material things and first of all does it know singular so well you know braithius says a thing is singular when sensed but universal and understood when i see this glass here and i feel this glass it's a singular glass right but i understand what this is that's a glass of understanding something universal the question is does the reason know the singular whether it knows infinite things huh whether it knows things that are what contingent huh things that are not necessary and whether it knows the future huh okay okay now in 88 is the second part of the what knowledge of the soul in this life right but the knowledge of the soul with respect to what itself right so notice it was in question 88 excuse me 87 then it went out to consider in what way the understanding soul knows itself and the things which are in itself and about this four things are sought first whether it knows itself through its own what nature which is the way the angel knows himself right but not the way our soul knows itself in this life secondly in what way it knows habits existing in it how do you know you have geometry you know how do you know you have um actual understanding how do you know you have the knowledge of the soul uh in what way the understanding knows its own what act i understand what a triangle is and i know that i understand what a triangle is i know that i know that i know what a triangle is i know that too but how do i know it and in what way it knows what the act of the will okay now 88 would be what how it knows things above itself right but in this life then he considers in what way the human soul knows those things which are above itself named the immaterial substances huh and about this he asked three things or three things asked whether the human soul in the state of the present life right is able to understand the immaterial substances which are called angels to themselves huh and thomas will say no whether it is able to arrive at some knowledge of them through a knowledge of material things and thomas will answer yes of course the churches said even you know we can know god to some extent through what material things right okay and then it's very strange opinion you have in the middle ages whether god is that which is first known by us and thomas will say no but there are those who are saying that right as soon as you'll meet even today you know franciscan he'll say that it's kind of starting position now okay now all that was divided against what all that that we just went through is what the soul in this life yeah and that's divided against 89 right which is knowledge of the soul separated from the body after death right huh okay and notice how that's last huh because that's that's known to us right okay then we ought to consider about the knowledge of the separated soul and the first thing one asks or the eight things one asks is whether the separated soul with the the soul separated from the body is able to understand right it's going to understand in a different way we'll see huh secondly whether it's going to understand separated substances and understand your guardian angel right my teacher kasirik used to say you know when you first understand your angel you're going to say oh this is god you know yes no no i'm not god he's not much higher than me but i mean he's going to be so terrific you know huh you know so this must be god i mean you've never seen anything that's magnificent as as as your guardian angel whether it understands all natural things huh whether it knows singular things huh that's a problem there because you don't have the senses anymore right see and what's something thomas is very much interested in knowing whether the habits of science here acquired remains in the separated soul some people thought you'd at least it's gone you know so whether one can use the habit of science here acquired see seven where their local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul right okay what does he mean local distance well the fact that uh you know something might be at a distance from you okay but notice that the soul is not in place maybe the local distance will make no difference huh and whether these separated souls or the soul separated from the body know those things which are what are done here right okay and what he doesn't take up here of course is the big vision right because that's taken up in a different place you know now it's your god but these are things you all want to know about right can you just watch touch by an angel and find it all out what there's a stupid show to touch me yeah so as long as you sit back You see, how is this whole treatise divided here? This whole treatise on man, chiefly from the point of view of his soul. How is this whole treatise divided? Into two or three parts, the whole treatise. Let's close your book and see if you can see. He's just divided into two or three, right? And the treatise as a whole is divided into what? Three, we saw. No, the treatise as a whole is divided into two, but we're not going to do the second part. Oh, my God. Yeah. The first is on the nature of man, right, or the nature of the soul, right? And that takes up to 89, as we saw. And then the production of man, right, the first man. Okay? That's question 90. Okay? So that was into two, right? Okay? Now the first part was divided into what? Three. Three. According to what Dinesha said, right? You can see the nature, the power, and the operations, right? Now again, you've got to be careful about that, because you can't understand the nature without understanding the powers in some way, and the powers without the acts, right? So there are maybe more details, you might say, about the powers and details about the acts that come in the second and the third part there, right? Okay? And we've just completed how many of these parts? Two. Yeah. Because questions 75 and 76 were on the nature of the soul itself, right? And then 77 through, what, 83, was it today we did? We're about the, what, powers of the soul. And now 84 through 89 will be about the acts. But he points out that the only acts we ought to talk about in detail in theology are the acts of the intellectual powers and the appetitive powers, right? Because these are the powers in which the virtues or the vices are found. Okay? But the appetitive powers, the acts of the appetitive powers in particular will be considered in the second part because they pertain more to moral theology than to, you know, speculative theology. So he's going to take up just the acts and the, what, understanding in particular, right? Okay? In these 84 through, what, 89, right? Now how is that divided? 84 through 89 into two or three. Two parts, yeah. Because he's going to divide them into the acts of reason or the understanding in this life, right? And then, that 89, I guess it is, huh? The acts in other life, right? When the soul is separated from the body, right? You know, the first part is divided into two or three. Yeah. Yeah. And it's kind of easy to see because he's talking about what is below the soul, right? Material things. And that's, what, three questions we saw. And then... In itself. And what is in itself, yeah. And then, out understands what is above it, right? Okay? And it's just the first one, I think, that has three, one, one question, you know? I mean, you know, questions, I mean, questions of articles, but I'm talking questions, you use the term, right? But there are three questions for the first one, right? And so you may expect that it's going to be divided into three. And it is into three, right? So what's that first division? 84, 85, 86. How it knows corporal of the body? Yeah, by what it knows, right? By what? Okay. And then, that's 84, I guess, right? That 85 would be... What it knows singleness? Well, I don't get lots of details, but that's a breakdown of the third one, what it knows, right? See? But then, in what... The way and the order in which it knows, right? Would be the middle question, what? 85. 85, you know? Okay? So, I mean, I remember this always, but when you read it again, you know, you can review it and know it at least for the time being, right? Yeah. I noticed myself, you know, when you go through some of these divisions, and then you turn, you have to write something yourself, right? You know how you tend to be more orderly in the way you write it? Yeah. I was mentioning that treatise on the Eucharist, you know, that the pseudo-Thomas, huh? Oh. And he takes the words, you know, that our Lord says, huh? Take and eat, right? And this is my bias and my blood and so on. And he divides it into three purposes, right? And, you know, one is do this in memory of me, right? Another is a sacrifice, right? This is my body, this is my blood, right? It's an offer for you and so on. Yeah. And then take and eat, that it's food, right? Uh-huh. So he divides it into three, right? I think it's kind of interesting, huh? The way he divides it and then, you know, he'll elaborate each one of those, you know, but it's always usually end at two or three, right? Yeah. Do we have that in our lives? We've never heard of it before. No, I'm going to prepare a text for you of that, you know? The pseudo-Thomas, yeah. But it's kind of interesting, you know, but it takes a long time to do it because when you get it from those machines, you know, it's all broken up, you know, with those terrible things, you know? Those lines and then nothing's capitalized and, you know, so it takes a long time to work on it, but, you know, maybe at the end of this year I'll have it ready for you. Okay, I don't know, often I get a little time, you know? But it's a nice little text, you know? Does it seem like a sermon? Well, I think it was like conferences or something like that. There's about 32 of them, you know? So maybe they were conferences or, you know, like a, you know, not a retreat exactly, but something like that, you know? But I don't know who it would be. It might be, you know, Thomas of Anglia. Do they think it might be a Dominican, or they're not even sure of that? I don't know what they think of it exactly, you know? But, I mean, it's in that, you know, the one that my son-in-law had, you know, but they had the text of Thomas, right? It's on there, that CD, if you have that. Oh, the other of Anglia? Yeah, yeah. It would be in the V-Viz edition. I used to call it the blue edition. It used to always be blue in the library, and I'd see it, but it's in there, you know? They have some of the ones in there, you know, too, on the canonical epistles, you know, but they're not considered by Thomas. The only ones we have by Thomas are on the epistles of St. Paul. But people, you know, who are, you know, good scholastics and who have read Augustine and so on, and who have just thought it's a set about these things, right? So, but anyway, here at the Order, it's pretty simple to see, right? Isn't it? You come right down to it, huh? I think if you bear in mind a little bit the order that he's proceeding in, then you, it's more interesting, huh? Yeah. And you can kind of see the whole context, you know? Yeah. So, we'll try to do the first two articles, at least, of this question 84, right? The ones that we have today, you know? I'm being sure, but I suppose since I've gone and interrupted, what might we be doing for Thanksgiving week since it's two weeks from today? I'm going to be there on Thursday. Yeah, we can't read me on Thursday. I'll be having Turkey, Turkey, Turkey. I'll be out to choose between you and Turkey, you know? No, my son and Paul's come up with his wife, and there are four little ones, right? I got to bring in the little announcement they sent out, you know? Like, the last one born was Lucy Marie, right? The kind of announcement of her birth and her baptism. I'll show you how. We do a nice job of it, you know? I mean, much more artistic than anything I ever did, you know? Yeah. They were, I remember when Paul himself was born, but, I mean, you know, it's really nice to all, I recognize it's really really nice to all, I think that they have, they have pictures of St. Lucie, you know? Oh, neat. You know? They have a picture of the children, you know, with the baby and so on. And they have a little prayer. Yeah, you'll see it. It's a very nice thing that they did. So it's kind of sitting there on the outside, like, that's really nice, you know. I don't know, you have to get all this artistic ability, you know. You must have to know our computer and so on. They did that on it themselves. They must have done something like that, yeah. Do you want to meet that week at all, or just? Yeah, we can't meet that week, I don't think. We'll meet next week. Okay. Yeah, but two weeks from now would be Thanksgiving, I think, right? Yeah, and then we'll take up the Thursday after that, too. Okay. Yeah. After the exam schedule, that doesn't come until December, you know. Okay. I mean, it's a lot of part of it. I think December 10th or 11th is the last day of class, but, you know. December 4th. Yeah. December 4th is Thursday. Yeah. But, you know, if I happen to have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't, but we'll see. But, you know, if I happen to have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time, you probably don't have an exam schedule at that time.