De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 140: How the Soul Knows Bodies: Against Empedocles and Plato

Transcript
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In Pedocles, however, who laid down that there were four material elements and two mervers of love and hate, from these also said that the soul was what? Constituted, huh? And thus, since things are materially, they posited things to be in the soul materially, they posited all knowledge of the soul to be material, not discerning between the understanding and what? Sense, like Plato and Aristotle were. But this opinion is disproven, huh? First, because in the material principle about which they spoke, the principled things do not exist except in potency. Just like if you knew, what, the letters of the alphabet, would you know all words? Yeah, because all letters are other words only in, what, potency, right? But something is not known as it is in potency or ability, but only as it is in act, as is clear in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, the Ninth Book of the Metaphysics. Whence neither is potency itself known except through act, huh? Thus, therefore, it is not sufficient to attribute to the soul the nature principles in order that it might know all things, unless there were within it the natures and the forms of each of the effects, for example, of bone and of flesh, huh? And others of this sort. As Aristotle argues against Empedocles in the First Book of the Soul, huh? Aristotle is saying that, yeah, if the soul is composed of earth, air, fire, and water, maybe it knows earth, air, fire, and water, but it wouldn't know flesh and blood and bones because they're composed of earth, fire, and water in certain ratios, and you have to know these ratios in which they're combined and so on to be able to know all things, huh? So Empedocles can't really explain how the soul knows flesh and blood and bones, huh? Okay. Secondly, because, and this is even more trying, I mean more powerful in some ways, if it was necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the one knowing, there would be no reason wherefore a thing which subsists materially outside the soul would, what? Black knowledge, right? For example, if the soul by fire knows fire, then the fire which is also outside the soul would know fire. Yeah. Okay? Now sometimes when you take up the position of Empedocles there we say, Empedocles has the idea that the thing known must be in the knower in order to be known. And is this true? In other words, if I recognize you people, must I not have your shape and color in my head in some way? In some way. Yeah. Okay. But the difficulty is, is it in there in a material way, huh? See? Is there a piece of flesh or blood or bone? Shes it up into a little statue of each one of you, right? Right. But if that's so, why wouldn't the statue over there know the person that it has the, what? The shape of it, right? Right, huh? You see? So, if it's not in us, but it's in us in some way, but it's not in us in a material way, then it must be in us in a what? In a material way, huh? So, it remains, therefore, it is necessary that material things known exist in the knower, but not materially, right? But rather in an immaterial way. And that's why they say sometimes, huh, that in matter, matter receives the form of another as its own, right? Right. Right. The marble would receive your shape as its own shape now. But the knower receives your shape, not as its own shape, but as your shape. Well, keeping the shape it had, huh? By the matter, this piece of marble that has an irregular shape, we're going to lose that irregular shape, right? And take on your shape. So, it's a different way that matter receives and the knower receives, huh? And the reason for this, huh? We'll read the sentence again before it again. It remains, therefore, it is necessary that material things known exist in the knower, not materially, but more immaterially. And the reason for this is because the act of knowing extends itself to those things which are outside the one knowing. For we know even those things which are outside of us. But through matter, a form of a thing is determined to something one. Whence it is manifest that the ratio, or the definition of knowing, in an opposite way has itself to the ratio of what? Materiality. In other words, through matter, receives a form as its own, right? By knowing, if I know something outside of me, I have to receive the form of another as other and not my own. So, there's an opposition between the way matter receives and the way the, what? Knower receives, yeah. And therefore, those things which do not receive forms except in a material way, in no way are knowing, as plants, as is said in the second book about the soul. But the more immaterially something has the form of the thing known, the more perfectly it, what? Knows, huh? Whence also the understanding which abstracts or separates the form, not only from matter, but also from the individuating material conditions, more perfectly knows in the sense which we see is the form of the thing known without matter, but with material conditions, and therefore a singular, right? And among the senses, sight is more knowing because it is less, what? Material. And among intellects, each one is more perfect as it is more, what? Immaterial. From these, therefore, it is clear that if there is some understanding which through its very nature knows all things, it would be necessary that its very nature have in itself immaterially all things, just as the ancients posited the essence of the soul, an act to be composed in the principles of all material things that might know all things. But this, he says, is proper to God, whose nature, whose essence is immaterially, in an immaterial way, comprehensive of all things, huh? Insofar as effects exist in the power of their cause. God alone, therefore, to his own essence, understands all things. Not, however, the human soul, nor even the, what, angel understands everything and understands through its own, what, nature, right? Because its nature is not comprehensive of all things, huh? Now, what's this objection from Augustine, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine there speaks of imaginary vision, which comes about through the images of bodies, huh? To which images forming, the soul gives something of its substance, just as a subject is given that it might be informed through some form. And thus, of itself, it makes these what images. Not that the soul or something of the soul is changed into these, right? Not that it be this or that image, but just as of the body, something is said to be, what, colored. insofar as it is informed by color. And what he means there is that it's what? It's receiving partly in itself, right? The forms of these things, right? What's received is received according to the move of the receiver. So in that sense, it contributes something of itself, right? Okay. And this sense appears from those things which follow. For he says that it reserves something to it not formed by such an image and that it might freely judge of the form of such images. And this he says to be the mind of the intellect. But the part which is informed by these images, namely imagination, he says to be common to the beasts and to what? Us, huh? So Thomas really has to stretch there, right? To get Augustine in line, huh? Because Augustine is not as careful, right? Right here, right here, as Thomas is, huh? And people can just understand Augustine, right? Okay. But you know, in a set of content there, Augustine clearly is speaking like Aristotle there, right? Now the second objection was that Aristotle says that the soul is in some way all things, right? But Aristotle said the soul is in some way all things in what? In ability, right? Not in act. To the second it should be said that Aristotle did not posit the soul to be an act composed of all things as the ancient naturalists had said, right? But he said in some way the soul is all things insofar as it is in what? Potency to all things, huh? To the sense, to all sensible things. To the understanding, to understandable things, huh? So he says it's like a, what, blank tablet on which nothing is written, huh? That's where our mind is in the beginning, huh? So obviously through itself, it doesn't know all things, huh? But through itself, it's able to receive the natures of things, huh? And you can see that when you get to know the definitions of different things, right? Then you have the natures of these things, right? In your mind. The definition expresses, right? Contains the nature of the thing. Now the third objection is that the soul in some ways is a superior thing and therefore it should contain the lower in it. And Thomas says, to the third it should be said that each creature has a limited, huh? and determined being. Whence the essence of a superior creature, although it has some likeness of the lower creature insofar as they communicate in some genus. It does not however completely have the likeness of that thing because it itself is determined to some species outside of which is the species of the lower creature. But the essence of God is a perfect likeness of all things, huh? Which regards all things which are found in things as being God being the universal, what? The beginning or source of all things, huh? But you know, the pantheists, they don't want to imagine God to be, what? Imposed of everything, right? Because they can't understand the way in which God in a simple way would contain all things. We don't have to worry about God right now. But just see that the creature is limited, right? And determined in kind. And outside of the kind of thing he is is the kind of thing something else is. So he doesn't, in knowing himself, have an adequate knowledge of other kinds of things. And therefore he needs something to complete his knowledge. We're going to see what that is in the third article, huh? Okay. You want to do a third article or what is that? I read it. What? What? Sure. Do you want to go to the third article? I don't know. What? I don't know if you had a chance to read it or not. Do you want to read it? No, but I... You read it? Well, I would. I didn't read it, but I'm sure I don't want to see how it goes. Would we think about it? I mean, I don't... Go ahead, Dr. Hayes. What? Go ahead. Okay. Be here later. Okay. Whither the soul understands all things through forms naturally found within it, huh? To the third, thus it proceeds. One proceeds thus. It seems that the soul understands all things through species naturally, what? And found within it, right? For Gregorius, huh? Gregory the Great. In the homily of the ascension, right? It says that man has in common with the angels to, what? Understand, right? But the angels understand all things through forms naturally found in them, right? Whence in the book de Causis, it is said that every intelligence is full of, what? Forms. Therefore, the soul has species of things naturally found in it, but which it understands bodily things. And there you can see, you're talking about likeness being a cause of deception, right? Well, you're seeing the likeness there of man to the angels, but not the, what? Difference, right? The likeness consists in the fact that we can understand just as the angels understand, right? But the difference is that the angel understands through forms that are innate, that he's created with, huh? Where we have to, what? Acquire the forms through our senses by which we understand them. So, things are like in this way, you're saying are like in what? No, they're not, right? Okay? You'd say, you know, is likeness the cause of deception, right? We can say, seeing the likeness of things without seeing their difference, right? Is a, what? Of course it is. Yeah, yeah. It's interesting, huh, in dialectic, when Aristotle gives the tools of dialectic, and the first, you know, tool is a selection of probable premises, so much doubt take reasons. The second tool is the tool of distinguishing the senses of a word. The third tool is a tool of finding differences. And the fourth tool is a tool of consideration of likeness. And I remember years ago, I suggested, I said to Monsignor Dion, I said, it gives a tool of difference before the tool of likeness, right? Yeah. Because to see the likeness without the difference would be a source of, what? Here. Uh-huh. And he sort of, you know, agrees as much as Dion would agree with you, you know? You know? But I mean, it's kind of interesting, right? Uh-huh. Because, you know, when you use the third and fourth tools, say, for a definition, right? Yes. Usually you begin a definition by the, what they call the genus, huh? Right. And then you see the likeness between this and other things, right? And then you add differences to complete the thing, right? Yeah. So you'd expect the tool of likeness in that sense to come before the tool of difference, huh? But Aristotle gives a tool of difference before the tool of likeness, huh? As if he wants to remind you that to see the likeness of things without seeing their difference is aptly dare, right? Well, in English it's called The Topics, huh? But it's in the first book where he talks about the four tools, huh? What were the first two tools? The first tools, this is the tools of the dialectician, right? So the first tool is the selection of probable opinions, huh? There's more to it than that, but I mean that's the basic idea. Okay? And the second tool is the tool of distinguishing the senses of a word, huh? The third tool is the tool of finding differences. And the fourth tool is the consideration of differences, I mean of likeness, huh? It's interesting, he uses the word, I think, a humane for differences, right? But then it gets to likeness, it doesn't say speak. The final likeness, the consideration, the skeptics. It's a word skeptic. The skeptics of likeness because you've got to see, especially in the primary thing in that tool where you see a likeness that's analogous, right? You've got to see in what way the things are alike, right? And, you know, you're trying to understand a proportion. You've got to see in what way A is to B like X is to Y. So the choice of this word is interesting there, skeptics. It's the idea, you know, of kind of a digestive consideration of the thing, huh? By difference, there's a difference, right? And once you see a difference between two things, you can reason right away from that that they're not the same, right? Any difference. When you'll be able to say two things are not the same, right? But if you see a likeness between two things, you've got to be careful, huh? And the way you proceed from that. Okay. The second objection, Morver. And the understanding soul is more noble than the first matter, first matter of body, so the first corporeal matter. But first matter is created by God under forms to which it is in potency, huh? Therefore, much more should the understanding soul be created by God under what? Intelligible forms, huh? And thus the soul understands bodily things through forms naturally, what? Yeah, yeah. Again, there, in a way, it's a question of lightness, too, because even Thomas, you know, is famous for comparing our intellect to prime matter. And our intellect is in the order of understandable things, right? What prime matter is in the order of being, huh? That prime matter in the order of being is being only in potency. And our understanding is like what? In the order of being understandable, it's understandable only in potency. But here you're kind of, you know, assimilating these two in ways that they are not alike in, because the understanding is a power of the soul, which is a substance, right? But the first matter is substance and ability, and therefore it couldn't be at all unless it had a form. Why the understanding is, what, not a substance, but a power of the soul, which is in the genus of substance. So it doesn't have to have a form to begin with. We'll see how he answers it, but it occurs to me right away. Now, the third one has taken from the famous dialogue called the Mino, where Peter tries to show that the slave boy, who's never studied geometry in his life, right, has already within himself geometry, huh? He says, no one, moreover, no one is able to answer the truth except about that which he knows. But someone, even an idiot, right? Not an idiot man, not maybe their full sense. Not having any acquired science, we spawns the truth about individual things, if only he is orderly, what, questioned, right? As is narrated in the dialogue, the Mino of Plato, about someone, about the slave boy of Mino, right? Therefore, before someone acquires knowledge, he has knowledge of things, which would not be unless the soul had species naturally innate. The soul understands, therefore, bodily things through species naturally innate. But against all this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the soul, speaking about the understanding that is like a tablet in which nothing is written. To begin with, right? Okay, so Thomas says, I answer, it should be said, that since form is the principle of action, huh? It is necessary in that way that some, it is necessary that in the way in which something has itself to form, which is the principle of action, in that same way it has itself to that, what, action, huh? He gives an example from the older physics. Just as if to be moved upwards is from lightness, huh? It is necessary that something in potency only is born upward. It is necessary that something that is only in potency born upwards is light only in potency, huh? But what is in act born upwards is what? Light in act, huh? Just like in chemistry when you have precipitation, right? So they acquire some weight, huh? Then it goes down, right? Okay, once it actually has that form. Now he says, We see, however, that man is at some time knowing only in potency, both according to sense as according to understanding, and that from such a potency is reduced in act that it senses through the actions of sensible things in the sense and that it understands through, what, either learning from another, disciplinum, or what? Discovery, right? Invincio, huh? There's two ways of coming to know, right? One is to discover it yourself, right? Other is to learn it from a teacher. Whence is necessary to say that the knowing soul is in potency both to the likenesses, which are the beginnings of sensing, as well as to the likenesses, which are the, what, beginnings of understanding, huh? And in account of this, Aristotle laid down, that the understanding by which the soul understands does not have any species naturally innate or in the end, but it is in the beginning in potency to all forms of this sort, huh? He's saying in the beginning, then, our senses, what? Know only an ability, right? When they're acted upon, right? And they know and act, huh? And likewise, our understanding in the beginning knows only an ability, right? And through sensation and memory and experience, it comes to understand what something is, right? Okay? But now an objection. But because that which has an active form sometimes is not able to act according to that form on account of some impediment, right? Just as the light, if it's impeded from going upwards. On account of this, Plato laid down that the understanding of man naturally is filled with all, what, understandable forms, right? But through the union of the body, it's impeded, lest it, what, go and act, right? Quite a shock you're stuck in the body, right, huh? Okay. Oh, I'm sorry, can you? Yeah. Plato's saying, you know, that our soul existed before it was in the body, right? And the soul was filled with these forms, right? Okay. But when the soul is put in the body, it's such a shock, right, that it's temporarily impeded, right, from using the forms it already has. But through an effort of recalling, right, it can call back these forms eventually, and then it knows them, right? Okay. It's a little bit like, you know, when you're at a party or something, and someone says, who's that? Well, I know this person's name, but I can't come up with it. And I work at it. Yeah. And I work at it, and then eventually I recall it, right? So I did know the name, but I was impeded from, what, using it or bringing it out, right? Right. And so it's not like I'm learning it for the first time, right? I already had the name in there, so. And Aristotle, Thomas says, this does not seem, though, to be. suitably said right first because if the soul had a natural knowledge of all things it does not seem possible that so great a what oblivion or forgetfulness of this natural knowledge it would what have right so that it would not know itself to have science for he says no man forgets those things which he naturally knows just like he naturally knows that every hole is greater than its part and as of this sort and especially does this seem inconvenient if we lay down that the soul is uh naturally joined to the body right as has been said above for it is inconvenient that the natural operation of something be totally impeded through that which is uh natural to it secondly manifestly the falsity of this position appears from this that when one sense is failing there also fails to be a knowledge of those things which apprehended according to that sense just as a blind man in no way is able to have a knowledge of what colors as such which would not be if um the reasons of definitions of all things understandable were naturally in the soul and therefore it ought to be said that the soul does not know bodily things through species naturally what innate huh you see the objection to what plato is saying huh angels can't forget no they don't but you know with an angel i was reading today just about about the fall of the angels you know and thomas there in the question 110 there in the summa conti gentilis and uh what the sin of the angels was the original sin of the angels was pride right and not referring their own what excellence back to god's glory huh so when you ask for your own beatitude right huh your own supreme perfection right you should ask for it i think it seems to me um uh with the also request that may my beatitude give glory to you right may my beatitude glorify you god so he wants you beatitude huh it's natural to want you beatitude huh but may my beatitude glorify you god you know so when burkowitz is enjoying this vision of god as he is in himself right he's in god face to face wow see you know but that god should you know be so generous says to give me this uh vision of him face to face huh that is what something that should you know be glorifying him huh there's a kind of interesting vision there where uh saint teresa d'avila appeared to one of her her uh sisters in her in her order right and she's not so different she says you know you're praising god there god behind the veil right we're praising god up here face to face but you know that's kind of interesting so in a sense huh um uh that's kind of a subtle thing about the sin of the angels huh they couldn't but but want their own beatitude their own excellence right but um it's not natural to refer this back to god right huh um as it is natural to what desire to be added to your own excellence huh hmm so it has to be chosen yeah yeah interesting yeah and then he says from that proceeded then hatred of god is opposing their will right and envy of man right yeah he says in the book of wisdom you know for the envy of the devil sin i mean death came into this world right so uh envy and hatred of god are not the original sins but they proceed from god resisting the because thomas takes as being probable you don't know the devil was the highest of all the angels unless he was very excellent he would not have what been tempted you might say to what rest in his own excellence so your supreme perfection is to see god as he is face to face in which you have to i think the latin word is retool it now bring back to right uh to god that uh perfection that you have and seeing him face to face huh which you do naturally when you see him face to face but i mean um in this life you've got to do that you know you could ask for that beatitude but you've got to ask for that beatitude would glorify him right in other words i want to mean purposes being supremely happy to glorify god okay now the first objection is yeah right up to the fifth objection now right that's the one that compared us with the angels right and thomas is going to point out the difference right between us and the angels to the first therefore it should be said that man indeed comes together with the angels and understanding right but nevertheless he falls short of the what eminence of their understanding right just as inferior bodies which only exist according to gregorius and gregory falls short from the existence of the superior bodies now this is an analogy here that we probably not accept you know okay but the likeness there is perfectly good for the matter of inferior bodies is not completely what completed totally through form but it is in potency to the forms which it does not have the matter of celestial bodies that they thought was what incorruptible bodies right is totally completed by form thus that is not in potency to another form therefore it is not corruptible right but that's the likeness there that is something that we don't think is the case and similarly the intellect of the angel is perfect to intelligible species according to its nature the intellect the human intellect is in potency to these what species species huh well Thomas makes this comparison in other places comparison as you were mentioning before between being and the understandable right and being you have God's pure act and then the first matter that's pure what ability in the passive sense and then everything in between is what a mixture of act and ability right okay okay okay put that mixture of act and ability okay okay okay put that mixture of act and ability But you and I, right? We're actually something. We're actually a man, and we're actually a geometer and a few other things. But we're also many things in what? Ability, right? Even the things we know, we're not actually thinking about them all the time, right? But God is pure act, okay? Well, then, in the order of the what? Understandable, right? God is what? Pure act, right? The angels are here, and our mind is what? The lowest. So our mind, our understanding, is like what? The first matter, in a certain way, right? It's pure ability in the order of the what? Understandable. God is pure act in the understandable. The angels are what? In between, right? Some more in act than others. So that's another comparison that he makes. Here's a more simple comparison. Now, the second objection is making use of this comparison between matter and our understanding. But matter is never found without some form that it has. And so, the objection is saying, well, then, our understanding should also always have some form and innate, right? And he says, to the second it should be said that the first matter has substantial being through form, right? And therefore, it's necessary that it should be created under some form, otherwise it wouldn't actually be. But under one form existing, it is in potency to others. But our understanding does not have substantial being through a, what, intelligible form, huh? And therefore, it is not similar, right? The understandable form is joined to our understanding in order that we might understand something, right? Right. Not that our, what, understanding might be, but that it might actually, what, understand, huh? So, he's pointing out the difference here between the two, right? But at other times, like I put on the board here, he makes use of the likeness between the two, right? Okay, but you have to see at the same time the difference, huh? So, that's in a sense the universal cause of deception, isn't it? Seeing the likeness of things without seeing their difference, huh? And sometimes the good resembles the bad, right? And sometimes the bad resembles the good, right? So, we can think that fair is foul when foul is fair. Hobber through the fog and filthy air. But the fog there, right, the confused knowledge there where you don't have a distinct knowledge. A lot of times Thomas will say, you know, that some deception comes from their not seeing some distinction. But that amounts to the same thing, doesn't it? Yeah. Because distinction is the broadest word, right? Distinction is even broader in a sense of indifference, right? Although we sometimes use them as being a change. How many are they distinct? Yeah. But not seeing any distinction at all, right? The one is not the other in some way, right? Yeah. Is going to be a cause of deception, right? Not seeing this distinction between us and the angels, right? Or between us and what? Prime matter in this analogy we make here, huh? Now, to the third it should be said, and this is the one from the Mino, that an ordered interrogation proceeds from the common principles, per se known, to the, what? Proper, right? Now, take an example of that, huh? Some example I've given you before. You're taking geometry, say. One example of a, of a, of a, what are the exact words he uses there? Common principles, per se known, right? Now, sometimes he says that these are the principles known to themselves by all men, right? Sometimes he says that the principles known to themselves that are common sources of every science, right? And in geometry we give them a name, which is axioms, right? Now, take the standard example of an axiom. A whole is more than a part. And you get down to the proper principles, huh? The private principles. The principles that are private to geometry. So this is common to every science. But say, all right angles are equal, right? Okay? Now those are known to themselves by, what? Men who have a little bit of learning, right? Everybody who knows what a right angle is, maybe would see that all right angles are equal, right? But, but in a way do you see that all right angles are equal? In a way, through the whole is more than a part. Well, the definition of right angle is that when a straight line meets a, what? Straight line. And makes equal angles, we call those, what? Right angles, right? Mm-hmm. Now, how do you know that when another straight line meets another straight line and makes equal angles, but not only are these two angles equal, but this one and this one are equal, and this one and this one, or this one and this one are equal. How do you know that? Well, you probably imagine one of these as laid on the other, right? Okay? Now, you laid this straight line upon this straight line and at that point, right? Now, if these two lines coincide, well then it's obvious that they're equal, right? But, if they don't coincide, one is going to fall to the right or the left of the one. Okay? Now, let's give a name here, huh? AB, which means AB. We'll call this C and we'll call this, what? D, okay? So, you've got AB, and you've got C and D, right? Why couldn't that happen? Okay? Well, if C, right, is making A, C, I've got to use my thing here, right? A, X, C equal, right, to C, X, B, right? Can you give them that, right? Then, C, X, B is going to be more than B, X, B, because the whole is not going to be the prime, right? Right? Okay? Right? If C, X, B is greater than B, X, B, right? Then, A, X, D will be much greater than D, X, B, right? But, since D divided into equal ones, they have to be equal. So, you've got a contradiction there, right? So, notice, in a way, you see the truth of this through contradiction, and in this case, also through the whole being more than A, what? A part, right, huh? Okay? So, he says, An ordered interrogation, an orderly questioning, proceeds from common principles known to themselves to private ones, huh? To proper, private. And through such a process, to such a going forward, such a proceeding, reason out knowledge is caused in the soul the one learning. Whence, since, when he responds to the truth about those things about which he was secondly interrogated, this is not because he knew them before, but because then, what, de novo, newly, he learns them, right? And in no way differs, he says, whether the one who teaches by proposing or by questioning, right? In either case, he proceeds from common principles, right, to conclusions. And in both cases, the soul of the one hearing is made certain about the, what, things that come afterwards through the things that are prior, that come before, right? Okay? So when Socrates asks the questions in the proper order, the slave boy, what? comes to see for the first time, right? See, you know, if you know the dialogue, huh? Socrates asks the slave boy, if you have a square, and you want to find the side of the square twice as big, what would that be? The slave boy says, well, you double the side. And of course, when you figure that out, he finds out that it's, what, four times as big and not that, right? Okay? So now the slave boy knows that he doesn't know, right? And then Socrates says, well, suppose this is the original square. And suppose you draw another one exactly like that, right next to it. And then below that one, another one, just like the original one, right? And you fill out the square here, and the fourth one, huh? Now you get a bigger square that's how much bigger than the original one. More time. Yeah. So he can answer it to exactly his questions. And then he takes the diagonals, right? And this diagonal gives you, what? Twice. Four halves of four. So this square in here is going to be half of four. And what's half of four? Twice. So the square in the diagonal square will be twice as big, you see? But you can answer each step along there, because it's not too big a step, right? Sure. That's it. So it's not really, the way double square is not coming out of what he knows already, in the sense that he already actually had it among his knowledge, right? Right. But he was able to know it from what went before, right? Just like, you know, if we say that if we knew the length of this table, and we know the width of this table, but we never multiplied the length by the width, do we know the area? Inability. Inability, yeah. But that's not the same thing as to actually know, is it? But if you know the length, and you know the width, and you know how to multiply, then you know the area in ability, right? But it's not until you actually multiply the length by the width that you'd actually know the area. And so the slave boy, huh? He knows the statements, which when put together will enable him to see that the diagonal is the way to double the square, right? But he's never put them together until this time. And when he puts them together, then he sees what follows, and then he knows for the first time. And therefore he's not recalling something he knew already, but he's seeing it for the first time. But notice how Plato there is making the mistake of, or Socrates is, or Mino is, the mistake of thinking that if you get something out of something, it's got to be actually in there. And he doesn't realize that it may be actually in there, or it may be in there only in ability. But Socrates, you know, claims that the slave boy, what, already knew it, because it came out of what he knew. See? And I say to the students, they say, you know, if we were short of chairs in this room, we could get some out of the next room, right? But you'd also get them out of the trees out there on the campus. It would take a little bit longer to get them out of the trees, huh? Sure. But there's something in the tree that's able to be a chair. So Socrates is not really seeing what it is to be in something in, what, ability, huh? So, better stop there, huh? It's a nice, nice, long... Here, or... Just wait a minute. Oh, yeah, give a... That's right, yeah. Prayer. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, you're enlightened. Guardian angels, stream from the lights of our minds, board, and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Praise to you, Christ. Help us to understand all that you have written. In the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Would you celebrate St. John Damascene today, or do your calendars differently, I guess? We have St. Barbara. Yeah, St. Barbara, she's a military woman. Yeah, that's right. Yeah, to the animal Sunday, we can celebrate that, yeah. The artillery, I guess. Yeah. I was looking in this account of Shakespeare's play there, The Merchant of Venice, huh? Mm-hmm. They're talking about the predecessors, you know, the three caskets. You know, you have to choose one of the caskets in order to get the lady. You choose wrongly, you have to be a bachelor the rest of your life. Oh, my God. And, but they trace it back, went back to John Damascene, Damascus, huh? I think it must be St. John Damascene, so it's kind of interesting that he had that, huh? You have to make a choice, huh? And you have, there's a gold and a silver and a lead casket, and each of them has got a writing on it, and you've got to choose the right one, huh? Of course, in the play, you know, somebody chooses the gold, and then someone chooses the silver, and then finally the right man, Bassanio, chooses the lead. But the reasoning that they went to when they decided to choose this rather than that, huh? It comes from... Yeah, it's interesting, you know. All the glycerous is not gold, you've heard it said. All the glycerous is not gold. People choosing for the outside of things rather than the inside. Okay, we're up to Article 4 here, I guess, huh? And this is dealing with the opinion of the great Arab philosopher Avicenna, right? And just as Plato was saying, right, that our soul knows material things, looking at these forms, huh? Well, Avicenna gives up that idea, but he has the idea of a superior mind, right, that flows into our mind, right? Understandable forms. They don't stay in our mind, though. Just what we're thinking about. Okay? So this is dealing with that opinion, that's why it comes up in these things. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that intelligible forms flow into the soul from some separated forms, from some separated substances, right? And this is a very famous statement here. Everything that is such by partaking is caused by that which is such, essentially. Just as what is ignited or fired is reduced as a cause to, what? Fire, huh? Just like in the case of human virtue, right? The moral virtues partake of, what? Reason, right? And therefore they depend upon what is essentially, what? Rational. Okay? So, the irascible appetite, right? Which has anger and things of this sort. And the incubus appetite, which has hunger and thirst and sexual desire and so on. These things are moderated and ordered by reason. Not that they are essentially reason, but they have reason. But they can, what? Partake of reason. Okay? So, if something partakes, it presupposes something. So, if something partakes, if something partakes, if something partakes, if something partakes, if something partakes, if something partakes, if something partakes, if something partakes,