De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 146: Intelligible Forms and the Nature of Understanding

Transcript
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Very subtle, Mr. Aristotle. So we better save the next two articles for next time? My other students meet me on Thursday night now, so I've got to take off really promptly, so I can go home and eat dinner before they arrive at 7 o'clock. What do you do with them? Well, actually, now we're doing the day-to-day. What are they, mostly from Assumption or all over? No, no, not from Assumption. If they're older today, yeah, the credits be any of TAC and so on. Oh, good. Oh, yeah, it's on the newsletter. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider it more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas and Jelly Talk. Good news, friends. And help us to understand all the children. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that the understandable forms, species is the word for form, abstracted from the images, have themselves to our understanding as what, as that which is understood, right? And Thomas is going to hold the other side, right? That they're that by which we understand, right? First objection. The understood in act is in the one understanding, because the understanding in act is the, or the understood in act is the understanding itself in act. In a sense, in a sense, knowing is what? Becoming the thing known, huh? Okay? But nothing of the thing understood is in the understanding, actually understanding, except the intelligible form abstracted. Therefore, this form is what is understood in act. Moreover, the understood in act is necessarily in something. Otherwise, it would be nothing. But it is not in the thing which is outside the soul, because since the thing outside the soul is material, nothing that is in it is able to be understood in act. In other words, it can be in the understanding, which is immaterial. It remains, therefore, that the understood in act is in the understanding. And thus, there's nothing other than the foresaid intelligible form. Moreover, the philosopher says in the first book of the Perihimeneus, that's the second book in logic, the book on what? The statement, huh? That vocal sounds are the, what? Signs of what the soul has undergone, huh? But vocal sounds signify the things understood, huh? For we signify by vocal sound, or by voice, what we understand. Therefore, those very undergoings of the soul, which are the understandable forms, are what are understood in act, huh? Now, the said contour makes use of a proportion, huh? But against this, the understandable form is to the understanding, as the sensible form is to the sense. But the sensible form is not that which is sensed, but more that by which the sense senses. Therefore, the understandable form is not what is understood in act, but that by which the understanding understands, huh? Okay? Now, let's take that contour there, because maybe that's easiest to see, huh? When I see the black of your garment, right, huh? I don't see the black of your garment until my eye has been acted upon in some way, right? Okay? And that result of your color acting on my eye, right, is what they call the sensible, what, form, right? Okay? But is that what I actually see, or do I see the black of your outfit? What do I see? The black of your outfit. Yeah, yeah. So he's saying, likewise, right, what acts upon the understanding, right, is going to be that by which it understands, huh? Not that which it understands. Mm-hmm. Okay? Yeah. Okay? But there's going to be a difference between the understanding and the senses, because what the sense knows is out there. But the universal, which is what is understood, you understand universal, what something is, which is something universal, that doesn't exist out there as universal. Mm-hmm. And therefore, to complete the understanding, you have to form a thought of universal. And in that respect, the imagination is like the understanding, because you can imagine something in its absence, right? Mm-hmm. I can imagine a gold mountain now, right? Mm-hmm. But since there's no gold mountain here, I have to form an image of the gold mountain. Mm-hmm. In the same way thought is like that, huh? Mm-hmm. Because what you understand is that what it is is something you sense or imagine, and that is something universal. But it's not universal out there. See? And therefore, you have to form a thought to complete your, what, thinking, right? Mm-hmm. So I can't really think about what a triangle is without forming some kind of a thought about what a triangle is, just as I can't imagine a gold mountain without forming some image of a gold mountain. Okay? Or I can't even remember my wife or my children without forming an image now in my memory, right? Okay? Because they're not present here, right? But you, my seeing, can terminate in you because you're here. And you're a singular, right? And the sensing is singular. Okay? I answer that it should be said that some lay down that the knowing powers which are in us know nothing except their own undergoings, huh? For example, that the sense does not sense except the undergoing of its own organ. And according to this, the understanding would understand nothing except its own, what, undergoing, huh? That is the understandable form received in it. And according to this, then, the form of this sort would be the very thing that is understood, right? But this opinion manifestly appears false from two things. First, because those are the same which are understood by us and about which the, what, sciences are. If, therefore, those things that are understood were only forms which are in the soul, it would follow that all sciences are not about things which are outside the soul, like dog and cat and tree and chair, right? But only about the understandable forms which are in the, what, soul. That's the way we want philosophers then to talk, right? Is that we don't know anything outside of ourselves, we just know what's inside of us then. Just as, according to the Platonists, all sciences are about the forms which they lay down to be understood and act. Secondly, because they would follow the mistake of the ancients saying that everything that is seen is true. And that's sometimes what you find in the moderns saying, too, right? It's true for me, and something else is true for you, right? Because what I'm knowing is the way something impressed me. And impressed you a different way, so you know something different. And mine's just as good as you, and my impression is as good as yours. Of course, true is what? It's saying what is, is, and what is not, is not. So something can't be true for me, and not true for what? You, right? Right. Okay? If I'm saying what is, is, then for you to say what is, is, would also be true, huh? You say Burkwist is sitting, you're saying now that what is, is. And you're true. You say Burkwist is standing, you're saying what is not, is. And now you're speaking falsely. You say Burkwist is standing, and you're saying you're saying, Secondly, because they would follow the error or mistake of the ancients saying that everything that is, what, seems to be so is true, right? And thus the contradictories would be, what, at the same time true. You know, it's cold here. Some of them say, no, it's warm, you know. You hear people say that sometimes, right? If a potency did not know except its own undergoing, about that alone would it, what, judge. Thus, however, it seems something to be, as the knowing power would be, what, affected, right? Always, therefore, the judgment of the knowing power would be about what it judges, namely about its own, what, undergoing, according as it is. And thus every judgment would be, what, true. If, for example, the taste did not sense except its own undergoing, when someone has a, what, healthy taste, right? He judges the honey to be, what, sweet. He truly judges, right? And likewise, the man who has a, what, a sick or infected tongue, right, judges the honey to be, what, bitter, right? Then he would be judging truly true, okay? Because both judge according as his, what, his taste is affected, right? And thus it would follow that every opinion was equally true and universally every, what, yeah, yeah, every taking, right, by the mind. Would it be that grasping or no? Yeah, grasping, you could say, yeah. So those are two things that would follow if you say that the understandable form is what is known, right? Or that the only thing you know is, what, by your senses and your reason is the undergoing of that sense, the undergoing of that reason, huh? In my opinion, everybody's opinion would be equal, like they want to say nowadays, right? And all sciences would be about, what, ideas, or something like that, huh? I mean, what's inside of us, if you know science about plants or science about dogs or anything else outside of us. And therefore it should be said that the understandable form has itself to the understanding as that by which the understanding understands, huh? Which is clear in this way, huh? Since there is a two-fold action, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics, which we'll see sometime when we go to wisdom, right? One which remains in the, what, doer, right? As example, to see and to understand. And another which goes forth to an exterior thing as to heat something or to saw or cut something, right? Now both comes to be according to some, what, form, right? And just as the form by which there comes about an action tending to an exterior thing is a likeness of the object of the action, as the heat of the one heating is a likeness of the thing heated. Likewise, the form by which there comes about an action remaining in the agent is a likeness of the, what, object, right? Okay. So when I receive the color of your garment, or I receive your shape, huh? I'm receiving a likeness of that color, right? A likeness of that shape, huh? What, um, Doctor, what, I understand that the second part of it, but I don't understand how this works, that the heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated. How is that? Well, it's going to be hot, the thing heated, right? And therefore be like the fire that heated it. A likeness of the thing heated. But then, okay, maybe it's just the way the English is. I mean, the likeness of the thing heated, I mean, won't the thing heated be a likeness of the heat in the heater? Yeah. You could say both, though. Oh, okay. I understand. Whence the likeness of the visible thing is that by which the eye sees, right? And the likeness of the thing understood, which is the understandable form, is the form by which the understanding, what, understands. But because the understanding can come back upon itself, huh? Can reflect upon itself, huh? And according to the same coming back upon itself, it understands its own, what, understanding, right? So I understand what a triangle is, and I understand that I understand what a triangle is, right? Yes. And I understand that, too. Right. Okay. And the form by which it understands, right? And thus the understandable form secondarily is that which is understood, right? That's by kind of a reflection coming back upon your understanding and the form by which you understand, huh? Right. But that which is understood first is the thing of which the understandable form is a, what, likeness? Maybe the blackness in blue or what it is of a triangle or something. And this is clear also from the opinion of the ancients who laid down that like is known by, what? Like, huh? For they laid down that the soul through the earth which is in it, new earth, right? So the pedicly said, which is outside of it and thus about the others. If, therefore, we take the form of the earth in place of the earth, according to the teaching of Aristotle, who says that the stone is not in the soul, right? What's his name? We just had that David there. I don't know if you're, you know, we just had Samuel there. Right. David. Goliath. Yeah. So once he gets that stone in his head, does that help him to know what a stone is? No. No. No. No. It's the end of his thinking, right? If he would have lived to think about it. So the stone is not itself in the mind, right? But the likeness of the stone, right? The form, in that sense, of the stone, right? Okay. If, therefore, we take the form of the earth in place of the earth, according to the teaching of Aristotle, who says that the stone is not in the soul, but the form of the stone, it follows that the soul, through the understandable forms, knows things which are, what? Outside the soul, right? The manual contest says it's a scandal that philosophers have not been able to prove the existence of external things. But I say the scandal is that they should try to prove the existence of external things, huh? And if you're in doubt about there being things outside of you, it's only through your senses that you're going to be convinced that you're in contact with these things outside of yourself, right? Right. So, when I was in the modern philosophy class, we have all these modern philosophers who say these things, right? So, somebody asked my old teacher, Kasurik, how do you argue with somebody, you know, who denies the existence of external things, huh? And his answer was, kick him in the ass, I said. And because, notice, huh? That was not a jocular reply. It was a very accurate reply, right? Yeah. Because if your senses don't convince you, and the sense that has the greatest certitude, the sense of touch, you know, or you're more in contact with things, then reason is further away, right? Reason knows about the things outside of us through the senses, huh? So, if the senses don't know the exterior of things, then reason suddenly has no way to know them. Just like, you know, about my brother Mark, maybe, or my brother Richard or something like that, only through me telling you about him, let's say, right? So, if I'm not sure that I have a brother Richard, you certainly can't have any way of being sure that I have a brother Richard, can you? You see? And, actually, they have an interesting fragment of Democritus, right? Which is in the form of a little dialogue between the senses and the reason. And reason is trying to convince the senses that they don't really know anything. And the senses are replying, our overthrow is your overthrow. and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, and the senses are replying, Yeah. And you know, people who do attack, you know, the senses, which are a perfect means of knowing in many ways, right? But they do so on the basis of something else they got from the senses. You know how when you look over a radiator sometimes, you know, that the things look wobbly and so on, right? How do you know they're not really wobbly and that you're being, you know, kind of deceived there, right? Well, it's because you rely upon some other sensation that you have, right? All besides sight. Yeah, or you go and, you know, look at it some other way, you know? Okay. Okay? You know how on the highway, you drive along the highway, you kind of, in the summer, you see kind of like a puddle there, and there's a puddle there, right? You see? Mm-hmm. And, but if you say you were deceived and you're thinking there's a puddle there, well, how did you know that there wasn't a puddle there then? To know that you had been deceived and you thought there was a puddle there. Okay. Well, it must be some other sensation, right, that you trust, huh? Okay. And the most stock example is, of course, when a stick is stuck in the water, so it's partly in the water, partly outside the water, and the stick looks, what? Bent. Bent, yeah. But you've got to trust your, maybe your hand going down the stick. You've got to trust some sensation in order to criticize other senses, huh? Mm-hmm. Descartes says in his work, you know, our senses have deceived us, huh? Mm-hmm. That's true sometimes, your senses deceive you, right? Mm-hmm. And he says, it's the mark of a prudent man not to trust someone who has deceived him. Mm-hmm. Okay? But my argument against Descartes is that, as he admits elsewhere, even in mathematics sometimes, one is deceived, so sometimes your reason deceives you. Oh, yeah. But, as Descartes says, it's the mark of a prudent man not to trust someone who has deceived him. So he can't trust his reason either. Mm-hmm. So he can't trust, what? Anything. There's nothing more to say, huh? Mm-hmm. But, you know, the man who says that reason is not trustworthy, it's his reason saying this, so he, right, you know, it's self-defeating what he's saying, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, the first objection says, the understood in act is in the one understanding, because the understood in act is the understanding in act, huh? We've talked before a little bit about knowing, how knowing is said to be becoming, and other as other, right? How are you obtaining your own, okay? So this is taking an idea there. But nothing of the thing understood is in the understanding, understanding in act, except the understandable, except the understandable form abstracted. Therefore, this is what's understood. And Thomas says to the first, therefore, it should be said that the understood is in the one understanding through its, what, likeness, right? Mm-hmm. And in this way, it is said that the understood in act is the understanding in act, insofar as, what, the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the understanding, huh? Just as the likeness of the sensible thing is the form of the sense in act, whence it does not follow that the understandable form abstracted is that which is in act understood, but rather that of which it is the, what, likeness, huh? In other words, having received, in some sense, the likeness of the thing out there, right, the thing in the imagination, having received the likeness of that, then I'm able to understand it, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Yeah. So, sometimes Thomas will say that when I kick you, right, my kicking is between you and me. Mm-hmm. But when I understand something, right, that thing is already in some way joined to my understanding by its likeness, huh? Mm-hmm. Before I, what, understand, not in time, but before, as a cause, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? What enables you to understand it? Okay? It's because I received in some way a likeness of what's in your garment out there, my eyes have, right, that I'm now, as a result of that, able to actually see. The color of your garment, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Because I received your shape in some way, right? Mm-hmm. I like to see your shape in my eye. I can actually see what shape you have. The second objection was talking about the fact that the thing out there was, what, material, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? It says you understood an act necessarily is in something. Otherwise, it would be nothing. But it is not in the thing which is outside the soul, because the thing outside the soul is material, right? And nothing that is material can be, what, understood an act, huh? It can be the understanding. It remains, therefore, that the understood an act is in the understanding. And this, therefore, is nothing other than the understandable form that we have spoken about. But Thomas says, to the second it should be said that this phrase, understood in act, right, implies two things. The thing which is understood, right? And this that it is, what, understood, right? And likewise, when one speaks of the universal abstracted, two things understood, namely the very nature of the thing and the, what, separation or abstraction of it or its universality, huh? Now, the very nature to which it happens to be understood or to be abstracted or to which happens the intention of universality does not exist except in the singulars, right? But for it to be understood or to be abstracted or to be universal is only in the, what, understanding. And this we are able to see through a likeness or something similar in the sense. For sight sees the color of the apple. I guess that's apple, isn't it, Paul? I think it's just generic fruit. Oh, fruit, okay. Sight sees the color of the fruit without its, what, smell, right? If, therefore, it be asked, where is the color which is seen without smell? Well, it's manifest that the color which is seen is not anywhere except in the, what, fruit. But that it be perceived without the odor, right? This is something that happens to the color on the side of the, what, sight, huh? Because sight is not able to receive the odor of the fruit, is it? But only the color, right? And this happens to the sight, insofar as in sight, there's a likeness of color, but no likeness of, what, smell. It would have to be in the nose, right? Likewise, the human nature, which is understood, does not exist except in this or in that man, right? But that human nature is grasped without the individual conditions of this man and that man, right? Which is for it to be abstract, to which follows the, what, intention of universality. This happens to humanity according as it is perceived by understanding, in which there is a likeness of the nature of the species and not of the individual, what, differences or principles, okay? So when I see a number of men and I remember them and I have an experience of men and then I separate out what they have in common, right, huh? And I understand what they have in common, right? But it's common to them only in the mind, right? What is common to them is something they all have, right? But understood without their individual... Differences, huh? Okay. In the same way I understand what a cat is or what a dog is, right? Okay. So the universality is something that happens to what a man is when it's understood. Because it's understood without the individual differences among the men. Animals and men, yeah. Okay. But the human nature I'm understanding is the nature of these things outside of me. But understood without their, what, individual differences, huh? Just as the color of the fruit is known by the eye, without, what, the smell of the fruit, huh? Or even the feel of the fruit. The fuzz of the peach or something, right? Well, that's the color of the fruit out there that has an odor as well and a feel and so on. Okay. The third objection I was talking about. Vocal sounds are, according to the philosopher Aristotle, signs of those things that are undergoing in the soul and so on. But our vocal sounds signify the things understood and so on. Therefore, the undergoings of the soul are what are being signified by them. And he says, To the third it should be said that in the sensing part of man is found a two-fold operation. One according to only, what? A change. And thus is perfected the operation of the sense through this that is changed by the sensible. Another operation is, what? Formazio, right? According as the imaginative power forms for itself an idol or an image, right, of the absent thing. Or even of something never seen, like the gold mountain or the glass mountain. And both operations are joined in the understanding, right? For first we consider the undergoing of the possible understanding, that's the one that understands, according as it is, what? Informed by an understandable form. But being formed by this, it then, what? Is able to form, secondly, either a definition or a division, right? Or a composition statement, which is signified through the, what? Voice. Once the thought which the name signifies is a definition, and the statement signifies the composition, that is a affirmative statement, and the division, that is to say the negative statement of the understanding. You'll see that in the premium to logic there, right? You'll use the word composizio, divisio, in a special way to talk about the second act, right? Because in the second act, which I tend to call understanding the true or the false, right? But in the second act, you either put together two things, like you say man is an animal, right? Or you divide two things and say man is not a stone, right? So he speaks of composition, division, although those words can have other meanings, you know, or can be applied to other things. Of course, it's very clear in the case of the enunciation of the statement that what it signifies is something that our mind has put together in the affirmative statement, or that it's separated in the negative statement. Are there statements out there that are acting upon us? I might read somebody's statement, right? Yeah. But there aren't statements out there like they're, you know, dogs and cats and so on, right? So what our thoughts, what our vocal sounds, what our words are signifying are the thoughts we form, right? A thought about what something is, or a thought about what is or is not in things. Okay? Rather than that by which we're able to think. But the, what, thought we form in thinking about something, right? Okay? As I say, think about that. Sometimes Thomas in the premium, he's talking about the first act, you know, of reason there. He'll call it imaginations per intellectum, the era of philosophers call it, right? Because there's a likeness there, huh? See? And it actually has something in my imagination by which I can imagine a gold mountain, right? Okay. But when I imagine a gold mountain, then I form an image of a gold mountain. Sure. Okay? And there must be something in the understanding by which I'm able to think about something, right? Okay. But when I think about what a triangle is, I form a thought about the triangle. It may be as explicit as a definition, maybe even more vague, you know? And that's what I signify by my words, right? Okay? So what my words signify is what I form when I think. Not that by which I think, which is the understandable what? Yeah. Form, yeah. Now, is this thought what, I was surprised you didn't use this term here, but maybe it's insignificant, but verbum? Is that just a more generic name? Well, you could say that, yeah. Because that would come up again when you're in the beginning of St. John's Gospel, right? Right. Because Thomas would go back, you know, to what takes place in us, right? That when we understand something, we form a thought. Yes. Because it's a thought that proceeds from the one who understands, right? Right. And so, when God understands himself, right? Right. There's something like that, and there proceeds a thought. Right. And this is called the Logos, huh? Okay. In the beginning of John's Gospel, right? So, it's like, in a sense, when Augustine, when St. John says, in the beginning, you know, we translated, the beginning was the Word, right? Right. Right. And the Word was, actually, Greek says, towards God, right? Right. And the Word was God, right? Mm-hmm. The Greek word is Logos, right? Right. But Logos in Greek means first word, and that's why we translated it by word in English. Right. But then, secondly, it means the thought that the Word signifies, right? Mm-hmm. So, really, the sense of John would be to say, in the beginning was the thought, and the thought was towards God, and the thought was God, you see? Mm-hmm. And I mentioned, I was going to give maybe a talk, eventually, on Antonia Masia, right? Mm-hmm. That figure of speech in the sacred scripture, right? Mm-hmm. And Antonia Masia is where you give the name of the general thing to the particular that stands out, or vice versa, right? See? Instead of calling him a lover, a romantic lover, I might say, he's a Romeo. Oh, right. Okay? But then, vice versa, right? I might call the place where the president lives, the White House, even though my house is white. Mm-hmm. Okay? And, of course, Christ is named, what? The Anointed. Yeah, the Anointed. Now, kings and priests and prophets were anointed in the Old Testament. Mm-hmm. Saul, I guess, was anointed, right? Mm-hmm. And, but among all those who are anointed, he is, he stands out, right? So he's called the Anointed, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, you find an awful lot of this. Well, see, when St. John says, in the beginning was the thought, how is he speaking? With that figure of speech. No? Yeah. By Antonio Messiah, right? And, of course, that makes you stop and think, why is this the thought? Mm-hmm. Well, to begin with, this is the only thought that is, what? A substance, right? Oh, yeah. This is the only thought that is a person. And this is the only thought that is God. And this is the only thought that expresses God perfectly. And this is the only thought that, um... And this is the only thought that is the only thought that is the only thought that is the only thought that is the only thought that is the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought that was the only thought What do you want? Stop there, right? But in other words, this is the thought. I see the thought in my mind, and of course there are many thoughts in my mind, right? But they're not substances, are they? They're accidents, huh? They exist only in the mind. You can't put them by themselves, right? They're not a substance, and therefore they can't be a person who's an individual substance, right? And they're obviously not God, right? And even if it's a thought about God, it's in no way adequate expression of God, huh? So I think St. John is speaking, but by Antonio Messia there, right? He's saying, of all the thoughts that there are that men have had in the beginning of the world, of all the thoughts that angels have had, right? This is the thought. Why? Well, it's because it's a substance. It's the only thought that is a substance, huh? It's the only thought that is a person. It's the only thought that is God himself. It's the only thought that expresses God fully. It's the only thought which says, in a way, everything. Because God, in understanding himself, understands everything else. So he only has that one... Yeah, yeah. You've heard by a little playful poem, kind of a poem, God the Father said it all in one word. No wonder when that word became a man, he said so much... He said so little and spoke so much, something like that. He was a brevity and soul wit. Well, I got to borrow that from Shakespeare. Okay. But, you know, Thomas, sometimes when he's talking about the creed and so on, he'll quote scripture, you know, God made a verbum of bibliatum, huh? I know. You know, it's in scripture. And it was appropriate, huh? You've read my little one there where I take it from... I take the analogy from geometry. Remember that theorem I like so much? The fifth theorem of book two. I was asking the students about it yesterday because we had time to jump to it. I said, can you have a rectangle with less perimeter but more area? Oh. Remember that? The theorem in book two, number five, enables you to see that the square for the same perimeter has always more area, right? Yeah. Than a rectangle with the same perimeter, like four and six, huh? But the perimeter is still 20, right? But the area has now dropped to 24, right? And as you depart from this more, like let's say you have three and seven, you still have the same perimeter, which is 20, right? But now the area has dropped to 21, right? And of course, if you go back to the theorem in book two of Euclid, the difference in area will always be the square of the difference between the sides. So one squared, of course, is one. Two squared is four, and that's the difference, right? And if you go, let's say, down to, let's say, two by eight, the perimeter is still 20, right? But the area is dropped to 16, and the difference between five and eight is what? Or five and two, the one is three, and the square of three is nine, and that's the difference, right? But then you see it's possible to have, let's say, one with even more perimeter, like say here you've got a perimeter of, what, 24, and less, what? Area, right? That's strange. They say the crooked geometers in ancient times they sold and bought land by perimeter rather than, you know? So I give you more perimeter, less what? Area, right? And, but notice, you know, another practical thing there, if you're going to fence in an area, I could fence in more area with less fence. And, you know, the famous Russian story about the guy could have all the land you could run around, right? One day. Well, I mean, it makes some difference to what kind of a, of a path you take, right? I could run less here and get more land, huh? You ran 24, whatever it was, I ran only 20, and I got more land. But it doesn't seem like Euclid would be with less fence and closed more area, did it? Well, then I make an analogy here, see? And one analogy, of course, is to modern science, to what the father of modern physics, Max Planck, said that the more universal a theory is in physics, right, the simpler it is. We see something like that here, right? Because the square is the simplest of the rectangles. And it has more area for the same perimeter, right? And even more area for less perimeter than the other rectangles, huh? But always more area. And then I make the comparison to words and I say, words are to what you say as the perimeter is to the, what? Area, right? So just as with less perimeter, I can impose more area, so Aristotle or Thomas with less words says more, okay? But then the supreme example of that is that God said it all in one word, in one thought. When you study the angels, you see, the higher you go up in the angels, the less thoughts they have, but the more they understand by them. So the higher angel by less thoughts understands more things and understands better than the lower angel with more thoughts. But, you see, the all fall short of God who understands everything perfectly with one thought and expresses everything perfectly in one thought. That's part of the Antonimusia, this being the thought, right? Apart from it being a substance and a person, God himself, right? This thought most perfectly expresses everything, not only God, but everything that could be understood by understanding God, right? But in one thought. It is the thought. Wow! I'm going to have one thought tomorrow that's going to express everything that could be understood by anybody. Anyway, I'm not going to have that kind of thought tomorrow. But God has that thought always, huh? It's kind of a really marvelous thing when you think about it, huh? Okay, so we got through the third objection, I guess, huh? Okay. Thomas will be talking in that premium to logic about those two acts, understanding what a thing is whereby you form a definition, right? And understanding the true or the false, bring together separating things whereby you form a statement, right? And then, you know, speak of a third act whereby you, what, reason from statements you form to another statement. But in the notes there, I especially developed the logic of definition there, right? Okay. Can you show you that a little break here? Okay. It means that the more universals are not before in our knowledge because those things which are before and more known by nature are posterior and less known by us. That's a famous thing that Aristotle points out in the beginning of the physics. Do you remember that? Mm-hmm. But the universals are before by nature where the before is that from which is not converted the consequences existence or subsistence. That's the second sense of before in the category, right? If A can be without B but not vice versa, then A is before B, right? What's going on, dude? First dog gives example, one can be without two, but two cannot be without one, right? So someone might say, well, you can have an animal without a dog. You can't have a dog without having an animal. So animal is before and being, right? Dog, right? And therefore, likewise, the more universal, right, is before the less universal in that same way. But what is more known to us is not more known by nature or before by nature. Okay? Okay. Moreover, composed things are before towards us than simple things. That's where you define the point is that which has no parts, right? But universals are more simple. Therefore, they come afterwards as far as we are concerned. And notice when you study the simplicity of God, you show that he's not composed in any way, right? So you know the composed before you know the simple, right? This guy is saying universal is simpler, right? Animal is simpler than dog. Dog involves more things than just animal, right? Moreover, the philosopher says in the beginning of the physics that the defined comes in our knowledge before the part of the definition. We name a thing and know it in a kind of a vague way before we can define it, right? But the more universals are parts of the definition of the less universal, just as animal is a part of the definition of what? Man. Therefore, the universals are after, as far as we are concerned, huh? Moreover, through effects we come to causes and principles. But the universals are certain principles, beginnings. Therefore, the universals come afterwards, or are known afterwards by us. But against all this is what Aristotle says in the first bigot of physics, that from the universal to the singular, actually from the more universal to the less universal, is what the Greek text means. In Greek you have a word, a little bit like I've missed the word particular. And particular has two meanings in English. Particular can mean, what, the individual, like you're a particular man, right? It can also mean the less universal. Like we can say that the dog is a particular kind of animal, right? Oh, yeah. Okay? And so particulars in the sense of individuals come first in our knowledge because of our senses. But then Aristotle is saying that among the universals, the more universal comes before the, what, less universal, okay? And Aristotle uses that, the Greek word ka-hekostatic, or two words actually. Like we use the word particulars, right? And sometimes he's using it for singular, sometimes he's using it for the less universal. I answer it should be said that in the knowledge of our understanding, there are two things that are necessary to consider. First, that the knowledge of our understanding in some way takes its origin from the, what, senses of them. And because senses of the singulars, understanding of the universals, is necessary that a knowledge of the singulars, as far as we're concerned, is before a knowledge of, what, universals, huh? Secondly, it is necessary to consider that our understanding proceeds from potency to act, right? We're able to understand before we actually understand, right? So we go from ability to act. But everything that proceeds from potency to act first arrives at an incomplete act, which is in between potency and act, before it arrives at a, what, perfect act, right? But the perfect act to which the understanding arrives is complete science by which things are known distinctly and in a determined way. But an incomplete act is imperfect knowledge by which things are known, what, indistinctly, right, under a certain confusion. For what is thus known in some ways known in act and in some way, what, in potency, huh? Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the physics that what are first known to us or manifest and more certain for us are the confused. Afterwards, we know by distinguishing distinctly the principles and elements. For it is manifest that to know something in which many things are contained, without this that one has knowledge of each one of them which are contained in it is to know something under a certain, what, confusion, right? Like when I know animal, right? I don't distinguish dog and cat and horse, huh? Now, in this way can be known both a universal whole, right, in which the parts are contained in potency as also the, what, integral whole. The whole is put together from its parts. For both holes can be known in a certain confusion without this that the parts are distinctly, what, known, huh? Now, to know distinctly that which is contained in the universal whole is to have a knowledge of a thing which is less common, right? Just as to know animal distinctly is to know animal insofar as it is animal. But to know animal distinctly is to know animal insofar as there's a rational animal or irrational animal, which is to know man or to know the lion, huh? First, therefore, there occurs to our understanding to know animal than to know man. And the same reason if we compare anything more universal to something, what, less universal. Now, he was saying that, right? We're able to know something before we, what, actually know it, right? And so, when you go from ability to act, like when you fill the glass of water, right? It doesn't go from empty to full at once, right? But it's partly filled, right? And then gradually it's completely filled, huh? And so, likewise, when our mind goes from ignorance, from being a blank tablet, as he says, now, Pana Tati is written. It doesn't go to a full knowledge at once, right? But an imperfect knowledge, huh? And to know something in an indistinct way is in between not knowing it at all and knowing it fully and perfectly, right? And to know the more universal is more indistinct than to know the, what, less universal. To know that my pet is an animal, right, is not to know as distinctly what my pet is as to know that my pet is a cat or a dog or whatever it might be, right? Okay? So if we know things in an indistinct way before we know them distinctly, then we know the more universal before the, what, less universal, huh? Okay? For at first, there occurs to our understanding to know animal than to know man, and there's the same reason if we compare anything more universal to something less universal. That's going to enter into your study of definition there, right? Because the first part of the definition is what they call the genus, huh? And the genus is something more universal than the, what, species being defined. Now, if you ask a kid in class, you know, what is a dog, they'll naturally say it's an animal first, right? And then they have to distinguish it from other animals if they can, right? But they begin with something more universal than dog, namely animal. And you ask them, what does it share? And they'll say something to sit on. And I say, well, so is a bench, so is a saddle. You see? So they're starting with something more universal than chair, and they have to add differences to make more particular and more distinct exactly what a chair is. Okay? A chair is something to sit on for one person. Well, that separates it from a bench or a sofa, maybe, but not from a saddle. That's one person.