De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 147: Knowledge of Universals: Confused Before Distinct

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And so you say, well, it's something to sit on, you know, there's a back and legs and so on, right? And you start to separate it and get a more distinct knowledge of it. And because the senses also go from potency to act, just as the understanding, there appears the same order of knowledge in the sense. For first, according to the sense, we judge the more common before the less common, according to place and according to time. And according to place, when we see something from a distance, first we grasp that it's a body, or apprehend that it's a body, then that it's an animal, right? And we apprehend that it's an animal before apprehend that it's a man, and it's a man before Socrates or Plato, right? You see something up in the head? I think there's something up there, yeah, yeah, there's something up there, yeah. I think it's moving, yeah, yeah, yeah. I think it's a dog, yeah. I think it's Joe's dog, you know? See, it's like going from the more universal to the less universal, right? And you see this all the time, you know, when you read the Voyages of Columbus or other stories about the sea. You're always seeing something on the horizon, but whether it's a land or a cloud or another ship or, you know? And I always quote, you know, it's a bird, it's a plane! No, it's Superman! What are you seeing at first when you say, you say it's a bird or a plane or what is it? Something flying. Something going through the sky, right? But whether it's a bird or a plane, or actually Superman, it turns out to be, you don't perceive there right away, right? And Aristotle gives the example in time. According to time, because a boy from the beginning first distinguishes man from what is not a man, before he distinguishes this man from that man, and therefore boys from the beginning call all men fathers, afterwards they determine each one. When I was first teaching this at St. Mary's, I went to the supermarket one time in the afternoon, and a mother comes by, she has a little kid in the carton, and she goes by and he says, Daddy! So I kind of started to laugh. Well, I laughed and said, he was some little daddy to some extent. But that kid was confused. Aristotle was proven right. And the reason for this is manifest, because the one who knows something indistinctly is still in potency that he might know the principle of distinction. Just as the man who knows the genus, right, is in potency that he know the, what, difference. I asked him, what is a Shakespearean sonnet? Well, usually you get somebody to say it's a poem, right? That's the genus, right? Now they've got to say, what's the difference, right? What's a poem in 14 lines? And so does the Italian sonnet. So we've got to add another difference, right? So you know the genus before you know the differences, right? And thus it is clear that indistinct knowledge knowledge is between potency, right? And act, huh? Sort of the imperfect act. It is therefore to be said that the knowledge of singularities is before, for us, than the knowledge of universals, just as sense knowledge is before, what? The knowledge of the understanding, right? But both in the senses and in the understanding, a knowledge of the more common is before a knowledge of the, what? Less common, huh? Okay? So you see the basic reason for this, huh? It's because our mind is, what? And our senses are able to know before they actually know, right? So when you go from ignorance to knowledge, you go to imperfect knowledge first, right? And to know something indistinctly is to know it, what? Imperfectly, right? To know it clearly and distinctly is to know it fully and perfectly, right? So we know things more in an indistinct way than distinctly, right? And so if you bring me in a glass of dry red wine and you say, what is this? I might say, well, it's a dry red wine. Will you be a little more precise, Mr. Berkwist? You know? I don't know. See? I think it's carboné sauvignon, but I'm not so sure about that, right? See? Carboné sauvignon from where? From Napa Valley, 1973, huh? I'm even less sure about that, right? You see? So the more precise you try to get me, or give me a glass of beer, right? What is this? Well, it's beer. I'm very sure about that, right? But it's Heineken's or Budweiser something, right? Might be more... Have to be mistaken, right? So as Pierre Duemme says, there's a kind of a balance between certitude and precision. The more precise you get, the less certain you get. I always take the example in class. The students say, let's say, pick on some student, how old am I? Well, I don't know. Am I over 20? Yeah. So you sure about that? Yeah. I say, over 30? Yeah. Over 40, right? When you get to 50 or 60, they're not too sure what to say, right? So the more precise you try to give my age, the less sure you are, right? And you'd be more able to guess my decade than my, what, exact year, right? Even if you got the exact year, there's still 365 days, so... You know? Or... I'll say, how much do I weigh? Right in the balance, yeah. But if you try to narrow it down, be more exact, you become less sure, right? And even if you weighed yourself this morning, right, your weighing machine might not be the same as somebody else's weighing machine, right? So if my weighing machine said 174 and your weighing machine says 175, well, one of them is wrong. See? So I'm more sure that I'm between 170 and 180 than that I'm 174, right? Okay? The same way, you know, if I ask, you know, which is longer, you know, like this way or that way? Well, you're very sure it's longer this way, right? Than that way, okay? Now, if you got out, and I say, now, but how much longer is it that way than that way? Not so sure, right? Even if you got out and measured, you say, well, it's 7 feet 3 inches longer, you know? Would you be more sure that it's 7 feet 3 inches longer than it's longer? No. In fact, different people might get a little different measurement, right? And besides that, the measurement doesn't go down except to a certain thing. So maybe it's actually 7 feet 3 inches and 1 hundredth of an inch. So 7 feet 3 inches is actually wrong. See? It's actually 7 feet 3 inches and 1 tenth of an inch or something. So you're still more sure, even after you measure it, that it's longer than that it's 7 feet 3 inches longer. You see the idea? Okay. Same way for my age, right? They're not sure. You say, well, we'll go look it up in the county records there in Minnesota, right? Okay, get my birthday now. I know when my father died, there were certain records that had two different birthdays for him. I mean, two different years. You know, was it 1891 or was it 1892, you know? You see? Of course, the newspaper had it really wrong because my father was 65. The newspaper said 55. I can see all his business friends coming down saying, you know, I can see the question coming, you know, is he really? So you're more sure about the confused than the distinct, right? And therefore, you're more sure about the more universal than the what? Less universal. Now let's go back to the first objection about the universal as being before and being because they can be without the particulars and so on. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the universal is able to be considered in two ways. In one way, according as the nature, the universal nature is considered together with the intention of universality, which belongs to the mind, right? And since the intention of universality as one and the same thing having a, what, relation to many things, insofar as that comes about through the abstraction of the understanding, right? Mind separately. Mind separately. Mind separately. Mind separately. Mind separately. out what many things have in common, right? It's necessary that in this way the universe will be, what, posterior, right? Once in the first book about the soul it is said that animal universally is either nothing or it's after these singulars, huh? So to begin with there were individual men out there or individual dogs and then your mind compared these and separated out what they have in common and then the universal begin to be, right? In your mind, right? After the singulars, right? Already were. But according to Plato, who laid down that the universals subsisted by themselves in a world of their own, the world of forms, right? According to that, this consideration, the universal would be before the particulars, right? Which according to him do not exist except by partaking of these universals that subsist, which are called the, what, forms, huh? In another way, one can consider the universal as regards the nature itself, the nature of animality or of humanity, insofar as it's found in particular. And thus it should be said that there is a two-fold order of nature. One according to the way of generation and time, according to which way those things which are imperfect and in potency are before. And in this way the more common is before according to nature, which manifestly appears in the generation of man and animal. For first is generated an animal than man, as is said in the book of the generation of animals. So notice, huh? You know, if you take the fertilized egg, right? The human being, fertilized egg. What first appears in the fertilized egg? The life of a man, thinking, reasoning? The life of an animal, sensing, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, touch. What first appears? The growth? Yeah. Cell division, growth, right? What we have in common, not just with the animals, but with all the plants, right? Okay. And then starts to appear the, what? A sensation. Yeah. And finally the understanding, right? Yes. Okay. So in the order of generation, the imperfect and the more common comes first, right? Okay. But there's another order, which is the order of what? Being better or being more perfect, right? The order of perfection of the intention of nature. And this way, act, being actual, is before, according to nature, potency. And the perfect before the, what? Imperfect, right? And in this way, the less common is before, according to nature, than the more common, as man before animal. Where the intention of nature does not stop in the generation of animal, but intends to generate eventually, what? A man, huh? Okay. So it makes one sense of being before by nature, right? The way in which some things are before according to matter, right? And therefore they're before in what? Generation, right? I forget how much we did back there in, we studied the definition of nature, didn't we? Sure. And Aristotle will go on to say that nature is said of both matter and form, right? So sometimes what is before by nature is taken according to matter, and that can sense the imperfect, right? Right? And the more common would be before by nature, right? And then sometimes by form, and then the perfect or the complete is before by nature. So he seems to be admitting in one sense it's before by nature, right? But not in the other sense, huh? And what is before in the sense of what? More actual, more distinct is after in our knowledge, isn't it? Of course, Aristotle argues that form is more nature than what? Matter. Because by matter you have a natural thing and ability. But by form you have actually a natural thing. Okay. So if nature is that by which something is natural, form is more nature. Just like you could say in art, right? The statue is more its shape than it is the marble or the wood. Okay? So what is before according to form, what is more perfect, more complete, is posterior for us, huh? And therefore we know the confused before the distinct, right? Which is more actual than before according to nature. Nature meaning form, huh? Very subtle, huh? Not to think about here. That's what he means by the intention of nature? The objection is going back to what Aristotle said, see? Let's go back to Aristotle here and try to do it a pretty simple way here. Aristotle distinguishes between what is more known to us and what is more known simply. He has several expressions, more known simply, more known by nature, right? But it means more perfectly known, huh? More fully known. And he says not the same thing, what's more known to us and what is more known. So, now, let's give a simple way of seeing that, huh? You give me this glass of dry red wine to drink, and you say, what are you drinking, Mr. Berkowitz, right? Now, when it's known to be Carbonet Sauvignon from Napa Valley, 1973, right? The wine is more known, isn't it? Now, it's known to be a dry red wine, right? Which is more known to me? It's a dry red wine or this Carbonet Sauvignon from Napa Valley, 1973. Yeah. It's more known to me, and I'm more certain about that, than I am that it's that, right? But when it's known to be Carbonet Sauvignon from Napa Valley, 1973, then the wine is more known, right? More fully known, more perfectly known. So, what is more known, more fully, more perfectly known, is less known to me. You see? And so, they really differ the two, huh? Now, perhaps the simplest way to see the reason why they should be, right? Why what is more known to us is less known, and what is more known is less known to us. Well, the reason for that is that we go from ignorance to what? Imperfect knowledge. And from there, towards a more perfect knowledge, right? So, for us, the imperfect comes before the perfect. Now, knowledge and known are relative to each other, aren't they? So, what corresponds to imperfect knowledge is something less known, that is to say, imperfectly known. What corresponds to perfect knowledge is something more known, perfectly known, right? So, since imperfect knowledge comes for us before perfect knowledge, what is more known to us is really less known. And what is less known to us is really more known, huh? Okay? Aristotle will apply this to two main things. We know things more in a confused way than we know them, what, distinctly. But they are more known when they're known distinctly than when they're known in a confused way. But they're more known to us in a, what, confused way. I'm more sure that I'm drinking red wine than I'm drinking carbonated, so we know. And if I'm, uh, if I know that, that's more known. To me, then, that it's from Napa Valley, 1973. You see? Okay. And the other thing it applies it to is the fact that we tend to know the effect before the cause, right? And so every time we ask why, we know the effect without the cause. But is the effect fully known when it's known without the cause? Well, we know the effect more by itself than in the light of the cause. But it's fully known only in the light of its cause. So we go from darkness to light, huh? Okay? And therefore, as thou compares us to the bat, and he thought that the bat flew at nighttime because the light of the day was too bright for him. But things are more visible in the daylight, right? But to a man coming out of a dark room, the things that are more visible are less visible. He can see better with not so much light. Can you lay that out more? I never could understand that one. So he has the proportion as what now? The bat, what? Well, it says, as the eyes of the bat are at the light of day, assuming that the bat flies at night because the light of the day is too bright for it, so is our mind to the things which are, what? The most understandable of all. It's like what in Scripture, you know, where it says that God dwells in light in acceptance. He's too bright for us. He's too understandable. So this is the reason he gives why we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. And that's the reason why we know them in general before we know them in particular. We know the more universal, the less universal. But if you take particular in the sense of singular, which I know by the senses, then singulars come before any universals, huh? But among universals, the more universal before the less universal. So I say to students, you know, if you're going to classify the vegetation on campus, all your knowledge would start with your senses and with a knowledge, therefore, of this individual tree, this individual bush, this individual blades of grass and so on, right? But as you started to classify it to get the universals on, who would come first, the difference between Kentucky bluegrass and other kinds of grass or the difference between tree and grass, let's say. Yeah. You'd see the difference between tree and grass before you see the difference between different kinds of tree or different kinds of grass, right? You'd see the difference between wine and beer before different kinds of wine, different kinds of beer. And, of course, another reason for that is that the difference between wine and beer is greater than between different beers. And so it's easier to see, right? What you see is more universal when you see wine and beer than when you see carbonate, sauvignon, you know, noir or something like that. Do you see? So, he's talking here about actuality in your knowledge, right? And, therefore, it's posterior, right, in our knowledge, the more actual. And, of course, that's what you usually mean when you say, according to nature, because nature is more form than matter. So you're speaking more of actuality, right? We are now just going from ability to act. You find out later on that something is knowable to the extent it is an act. And God is pure act. So God is most knowable, but not to us. You see something like that, especially at the beginning of our life, in regard to love, right? Something is lovable because it's good, right? And so the better something is, the more lovable it is. But to us, the sensible good is more lovable in the beginning than the understandable good, right? So I love candy before I love wisdom, right? But is candy more lovable than wisdom? No. Wisdom is a much greater good, right? Or I love the private good before I love the common good. But the common good being the good of the whole, and the whole is greater than the part, common good is a much greater good than the private good, right? So what's more lovable to me in the beginning is the less lovable. You see? The child might like the little drawing in his child's book more than that great painting on the wall. But there's really more to be seen in that painting on the wall, isn't there? So what is more seen by the child has less to be seen. There's less to see in it. Okay? That's true of any kind of education because you're, what, developing something from the imperfect to the perfect, huh? You know, when you go to the 5BX plan there, the Royal Canadian Air Force 5BX plan, and I was in Canada. Well, you've got to start at your own level, right? Now, if I can do five push-ups and no more, I start at five push-ups, right? Okay? But is five push-ups as productive of strength as 20 would be? No. No. But I can't start with 20 because of the weakness of my body, right? It's the same way in lifting weights, right? And if you try to lift a weight that's too much, you could actually harm yourself, right? So though the heavier weight is productive of more strength, it's not for you. You see? You've got to build up to that, right? So what is more knowable is less knowable to you. And in the beginning of the education of your heart, what is more lovable is less lovable to you. What is it, St. Bernard of Clairvaux there? The four stages of love. And he said the first stage, you know, you don't love God at all, you know? And then you, what? Love God for your sake? Then you begin to love God for his sake and finally you love yourself for the sake of God. Which is hard to realize, he says, in this life, you know? You see, first I just love myself, right? I don't love God at all. And then I run into problems and difficulties, right? So I turn to God, but not loving God for my sake. But then as I turn to God, and many times I help, I get a little bit of familiarity with God, and I say, hey, he's something lovable apart from what he does for me, right? And then I finally realize that I'm only lovable. For the sake of God. So my love is growing, right? When I love God for the sake of me, I'm not very lovable compared to God, right? But he's lovable because of my lovableness. I turn to him in desperation, right? You know? You know? I remember as a child there, the man across the street there, you know, he was diagnosed with cancer, you know? And also in the whole family is going to daily mass. You know, just like that, you know? So it's kind of natural turning towards God when misfortune strikes you of some sort of other, right? Notice in that case, God becomes lovable because you are lovable, right? Of course, you're the less lovable. Much less lovable than God, right? So you're more lovable to yourself than God in the beginning, right? If you're loving God for your sake. So what is less lovable is more lovable to you. That's because of the defect, the weakness of your heart, right? So you have to develop this. The more broadies, you can see that too, that we love the sensible good before the understandable good, huh? I love the girl for her looks because she's a good person, right? But she's more lovable for being a good person than she is for her looks. But to me in the beginning, because of my starting with my senses, she's more lovable for her looks than for her good character. So I love more, but it's less lovable in her in the beginning, right? I love candy before I love wisdom. Better now, because it's this diet I'm off. The last time I came up, I was a little sleepy on the way up. I said, yeah, I'll stop getting some candy just to kind of perk myself up. I resisted the temptation. I think it all worked up to me when I teach, so it makes me up. But as a child, I love candy and didn't love wisdom, right? So what was less lovable? Maybe candy was more lovable to me. I've gone a long way, huh? You see, a businessman, too, he may start to do things, get on committees and do things in the city, right? And at first he finds it helpful for his business because he becomes known and respected for what he does. But you see, these businessmen, they acquire a taste of doing good for the city, and even when they retire sometimes, they continue to do things for the city, right? So they now acquire a love of the common good, right? So the heart has been, what, educated, right, huh? To love what is more lovable. Let's look at the second objection here now about the composed things, right? To the second it should be said that the universal that is more common is compared to the less common as a whole and as a part, right? And this goes back to the fact that the word whole and part are, what, equivocal, right? Okay. And you've heard my semestical argument, haven't you? No. So I say, what does a man say? Well, a man's an animal, right? But he's not just an animal, right? He's an animal that has reason, right? So animal is only a part of what a man is. Okay, they all agree to that, right? And they say, yeah, but animal includes, besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? Therefore what you said is only a part of man includes more than man. So sometimes the whole, the part is more than the whole, see? I'm playing in two different senses of the word whole, right? And if you stick with one kind of whole and its part, the whole is always more. The universal whole is always said of more than one of the particulars under it, right? And the composed whole always is composed of more than one of its parts. Okay? So notice, when I say animal is a part of man, I mean animal is a part of the definition of man. And the definition is a composed whole. But animal is not the whole definition of man. Something more has reason, right? But when I say animal includes, besides man, dog, horse, and so on, I'm thinking of animal now as universal whole. And it's said of more than man is said of, it's said of more than dog is said of, right? Okay? Okay? So the universal whole is said of more, right? Than one of its parts. And the composed whole is put together for more than one of its parts. So Thomas is pointing out here how the universal can be a whole and a part. As a whole, according as in the more universal, not only is contained in the, what? In potency, the less universal, but other things, right? As under animal is not only man, but also what? Horse and dog and elephant, right? As a part, according as the less common, contains in its definition, right? Not only the more common, but also what? Others, right? As man is not only an animal, but also what? Rational is my example there. Thus, therefore, animal considered by itself is before in our knowledge than man. But man, at least in a confused way, is before in our knowledge than that animal is a part of his, what? Definition, right? Okay? That's a very subtle thing. He makes that same point in the commentary on the beginning of the physics, right? And the way he puts it there is, he says, animal is known before man, right? But man is known in some way before animal is known to be part of man's definition. Okay? But then he's thinking of animal as a part of man's definition, and man is known in a confused way before the parts are spelled out. All right? In one way, absolutely, according as it is by itself, and thus nothing prevents one to know before the parts and the whole, as stones before knowing a house, right? In another way, as they are parts of some whole. And thus it is necessary that before we know the whole, then the parts. For before we know the house in a certain, for before we know the house in a certain confusion, before we distinguish its, what? Particular parts. You see the distinction he's making there, right? I might, you know, you've got a horn, right? Or you've got a clarinet, whatever it is. And you play your horn for me or clarinet for me, right? Okay? And then I go and I hear the symphony orchestra playing, right? I don't recognize that among the instruments playing is a, what? Clarinet, right? You see the difference there? One case I'm knowing clarinet, I could know clarinet all by itself, right? Without hearing every symphony, right? Okay? But when I hear a symphony, I hear it as kind of a confused thing before I distinguish the actual instruments being, what? Used, right? Do you see that? See that? Okay? You might taste some herb, right? By itself, right? And then someone uses it in some recipe, and when you're trying to know the ingredients in the recipe, right? In that salad dressing where it is, right? You might not recognize that that herb is in that salad dressing, right? Because that would be a more distinct knowledge of the salad dressing to be able to pick out the ingredients that are inside of it, huh? Okay? Thus, therefore, it should be said, huh? That the things defining something, absolutely considered, are known before the thing defined. Otherwise, one would not make known the thing defined through them. But according as they are parts of the definition, thus they are what? Known afterwards, huh? For first we know man in a certain confusion before we're able to distinguish all the things which are the definition of man, huh? Okay? So I ask the students, what is a perfect number in arithmetic? Six is a perfect number. Eight, 28 is a perfect number. What's a perfect number? They can't define a perfect number, can they? Okay? Now, eventually we, we, we break perfect number down into the parts of its definition, huh? It's a number equal to the sum of everything that measures it. Everything that measures it evenly, right? Okay? So six is measured by one, two, and three. Not by four or five. And one, two, and three add up to six. Four is measured by one and two. They don't add up to four, right? Okay? Now, did the student before, I gave the definition, did he know what it means to be a number? Yeah. And he knew what it meant for somebody to measure something evenly, right? He knew what it meant to add up numbers and so on, right? He knew all those things by themselves, right? Otherwise, I couldn't have used those to make known what a perfect number is. But he might have known in some imperfect way what a perfect number is before he could spell out the definition, before he knew these were parts of the definition. Okay? Thus, therefore, he says, the things defining absolutely considered are known before than the thing defined. Otherwise, the thing defined would not be made known through them. But according as they are parts of the definition, thus they are known afterwards, right? For first we know man in a certain confusion, before we know how to distinguish all the things which are the definition of man. Okay? I've got these different kinds of tea, and I might recognize one tea and another tea a little bit, right? You make some combination of those teas, and I might not be able to pick out those. So that combination of them, I would not be able to know distinctly right away, would I? So in that sense, the combination is known in a confused way before its parts are distinguished. Even though the parts might be known absolutely by themselves before I made the combination. Same with wine. Sometimes they combine different grapes. You might know these grapes individually by themselves, and not recognize them in this combination. Or the fourth objection about them being principles, right? The universal, according as it is taken with the intention of universality, is in some way a principle of knowing, insofar as the intention of universality follows the mode of understanding which is by abstraction from the singulars. But it is not, however, necessary that everything which is a principle of knowing be a principle of what? Being, as Plato estimated. Since sometimes we know the cause through the effect, and sometimes we know the substance through its what? Accidents, right? So the effect is the beginning of our knowing the cause, but it's not the beginning of the cause. It's the cause that's the beginning of the effect, the origin of the effect, right? Okay, that's the way we know God, right? We know him through his effects, right? Okay? So the effects are the beginning for our knowing God, but they're not the beginning of God. God is their beginning. The same with substance and accidents, huh? Whence the universal thus taken, according to the position of Aristotle, is not the beginning of being, nor substance, as is clear in the seventh book of metaphysics. If, however, we consider the nature of the genus of the species, insofar as it is in the singulars, thus, in some way, it has the notion of a formal principle, right? With respect to singulars. It's by human nature that I am a man, right? Right? For the singular, for it is singular on account of matter, but the definition of the species is taken from the form. But the nature of the genus is compared to the nature of the species more in the way of a material principle, because matter is what's common, right? And form is what distinguishes. Because the nature of the genus is taken from what is material in a thing, but the definition of the species from what is formal. Just as the ratio of animal from being, having senses, the ratio of man from, what? Understanding. And hence it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species, not to the individual, nor to the genus, because the form is the end of generation, matter, however, is an account of the form. It is not, however, necessary that the knowledge of just any cause or principle be posterior quad nos, since sometimes through sensible causes, we know what unknown effects, sometimes the reverse, right? Sometimes you do know the cause, right? But for the most part, we know the effect before the cause. The main science where we don't is in, what? Mathematics, right? Okay? Obviously, this is an example in class. Straight lines intersect, right? You know that these are straight lines intersecting, although before you know that these angles must be, what? Equal, right? Now, why must those two angles be equal? No. It's because, and because means the cause being, right? Because the lines are straight. Let's give these a name, you see? Because this is a straight line meeting a straight line, right? A plus X must equal two right angles, right? Because this is a straight line, it is a straight line. B plus X must equal two angles, huh? And the rest is just the axioms. Quantity is equal to the same, equal to each other. And it equals as attractive, and its results are equal. But it all follows from the fact that the lines intersecting are straight. So I'm going here from the cause, the straightness of the line, to the effect of that, the quality of those angles, right? Okay? But everything's on the surface here, and this is superficial geometry, plain geometry. What superficial means is what on the surface, right? But when you see a tree growing, right, it's hidden to us, right? Why it grows, right? Okay? When you see things, stone falling to the ground, right? It's hidden to us why it falls to the ground. So the effect is usually more known to us, huh? It's more known to us what somebody does and why they did it, right? And so we often maybe misjudge, you know, why people did something, right? Sometimes they don't know themselves why they did it. We certainly don't know why they did this. So you said in mathematics, as an exception, that the cause is more known? Yeah. That has a very bad effect upon Descartes and Spinoza, right? Oh, yes. And later on Hegel. Oh, yeah. Because they're so impressed with mathematics, right? And they're so accustomed to mathematics, maybe they have, you know, somewhat, you know, a good imagination for mathematics, that they want to proceed everywhere like you do in mathematics. And therefore, Descartes wants to proceed from the cause to the effect. You see that when he tries to prove that nature exists because God exists. But just the reverse, right? It's the existence of nature that is obvious to us. And through nature we have to prove that God exists. He wants to take God's existence as being obvious and use that to prove that nature exists. And Spinoza goes even further, right? Spinoza's great work there is called Ethica, but it's about the whole universe, not just ethics. But the actual title of the work is Ethica Mori Geometrica Demonstrata. And he says in there, one of his axioms, is that the order in thoughts is the same as the order in things. Now, to some extent there's some truth in there, right? That my thought about the cause here, I think that those lines are straight before I think that the, what, angle are equal, right? So I go from the cause to the effect, the thought of the cause is before the thought of the effect, just as in reality the cause is before the effect. But is that true usually in our knowledge? No. Usually we're asking why, because we know the effect, we don't know the cause. And therefore we're reasoning back. as far as the order of what cause and effect is concerned. And even Schock Holmes says that to Watson, right? We have to reason backwards. And Watson says to Holmes, what do you mean? We have to reason from the effect back to the cause. So it's just the reverse of what Spinoza says, right? I think a very great mistake, huh? But in a sense, he's trying to generalize what we saw in this example here, those kind of examples, where you can go from cause to effect, right? The same when you make a triangle, right? It's more known to me that I've made a triangle here than that I've made angles equal to right angles. And so I go from the cause to the what? Effect, right? Okay. But that doesn't characterize our knowledge as a whole. That's really contrary to what our knowledge is usually. Now, you see, Spinoza is followed then by Hegel, right? And so Hegel takes the most confused notion in our mind, the most general knowledge, the most general notion in our mind, which is what? Being. Being. And He identifies this being, which is said of everything, being which is said of everything that is, anyone that's ever, with the one who said in Scripture, I am who am. He identifies the most confused, in a sense, imperfect thought of our mind, the most universal thought of our mind, right, with God. He's identifying what is first in our mind with what is first in reality, following what? The influence there in Spinoza, right? So it starts at Descartes, and then Spinoza, you know, gets even more, makes an act to rule it, you know. And then the rationalist Hegel picks up on that. Now, as I mentioned, Thomas, I've mentioned many times when I came here, after Thomas shows that God is I am who am, right, he has a chapter devoted to refuting the idea that the common being, right, is what we mean by God, right? There's a chapter in this Summa Conjentilis, in the first book, precisely refuting that mistake, right? And, of course, one argument is that the being that is common to all things, that is set of all things, exists only in the mind, right? It's only in the mind that it's separated and common to all things, huh? So it's obviously not God, right? And, of course, the being that's common to all is divided into being a substance, a big accident, and he shows he's not God, too. But that's a mistake that Spinoza and especially Hegel's making on. So he did Hegel's so-called logic, right? Mm-hmm. But for Aristotle, the order in our knowledge, you see, and the order in things is, for the most part, contrary. And the effect is usually before in our knowledge and the cause afterwards. And therefore, the cause of the cause is even afterwards, right? And therefore, the first cause is the last known, right? And so the whole philosophy is ordered to knowing, at the end, the first cause, which turns out to be God, right? But Aristotle comes to the first cause God there by reason in the last books of the, what, the twelfth book of wisdom. So what is the beginning of things is the last thing we learn in philosophy. Heisenberg, the great physicist, says, when we study reality, he says we never start at the beginning. That's well said, right? In other words, where we start is not the beginning of things. And in the ethics and Aristotle recalls these things here because in ethics we know more that something is so than why it's so. He had to find out why it's so. But Aristotle says, Plato was right, he says, to ask, are we on the way from the beginning, he says, or are we on the way to the beginning? You know? And in geometry we might be on the way from the beginning, right? But usually we're on the way to the beginning, huh? You see? And notice, water, in our knowledge, for example, comes before hydrogen. That's why we name hydrogen from water, hydrogen, huh? It generates water, right? But hydrogen is, in our knowledge, before proton. And proton got its name for the Greek word for what? First. It was not first in our knowledge. Of these three, hydrogen, I mean water, hydrogen, and proton, water is first in our knowledge, proton is last in our knowledge. But they called proton first because that was the first material particle because it had most of the mass of the atom. But it's not first in our knowledge, it's last in our knowledge. You see? So it's just the reverse, huh? That's reflected, I say, in other kinds of knowing a bit, right? What does Augustine say, huh? Too late have I come to know thee, you know? Too late has he come to really love God, right, huh? So he's come to love late, last. What's most lovable, right? You realize that, right? He's loved things that are far less lovable, infinitely less lovable, right, before he's loved God. There's a lot to think about this little thing here. Descartes, you see, got mixed up in this business of confused and distinct, huh? Because he identifies, look at the rules, Descartes has the four rules to direct in the mind. He identifies certitude, sureness, with what is clear and distinct. Right. And Aristotle would say, no. What's sure for us is more the confused than the distinct, huh? Now, having made identification of Descartes, making that fundamental mistake, kind of identifying a certitude with clarity and distinction, then, as I think I've pointed out before, Descartes gets into two kinds of mistakes. Sometimes when he's very certain about something, he thinks, I must know it clearly and distinctly. Everybody's heard of the Kogito, right? Okay? And it goes back, actually, to Augustine, Descartes. He says, I can't doubt that I'm, what, thinking, right? Okay, and then, I think, therefore I am, right? So he's very sure that he's thinking, right? But does that mean he knows clearly and distinctly what thinking really is? I'm very sure that I'm alive. Does that mean I know clearly and distinctly what it is to be alive? See? So that's one mistake he makes, right? When he's sure about something, he thinks he must know clearly and distinctly what it is. Whereas God would say, no, you're more sure about the, what? Confused. Okay? Then, the other mistake he makes is that when he has something clear and distinct, like something mathematical, right? A mathematical picture of the natural world, it must be, what? The truth is so clear and distinct. Louis de Broglie there, the father of way mechanics, saw the mistake of Descartes. He says, nothing is more misleading than a clear and distinct idea. One example I saw is just a student says, Everybody is sure, I think, that there's a difference between men and women. You really are different. But now when you try to say exactly what the difference is, you know, you find some difficulty, you're more sure in your vague knowledge, right, your confused knowledge, right, that they are different than others. exactly, distinctly what the difference is, okay? And people would disagree as to exactly what the difference is, but agree that they're different. They certainly are different, that's for sure. Even grandchildren used to do it, the little boys and the little girls, they're different creatures. I don't know if I want to try to, you know, but it would be difficult to spell out exactly what the difference is. It is quite different. It's amazing how soon these little girls, you know, want to decide what they're going to wear every day. You can't dictate what they're going to put on today. I don't think the men care that much, the little boys care that much what they put on, you know? It's almost our girl. Yeah, yeah. I never tell my wife what to wear, but she's always told me what to wear, what to put on. It goes to our life. This doesn't go with that. This doesn't go with that. He's got a rest of the better daddy. He's got a rest of the better daddy. He's got a rest of the better daddy. He's got a rest of the better daddy.