De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 149: Understanding, Composition, Division, and Truth

Transcript
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from the idea that what there's an element of time there in the statement right past present or future but doesn't the understanding abstract from time well to the second it should be said that the understanding what abstracts from the images now that's true but nevertheless it does not understand and act except by turning back again towards the images so even after you understand what a triangle is right and it's by seeing triangles and imagining triangles they separate out what they have in common which is what a triangle is but when i think even now about what a triangle is i imagine a triangle right because what a triangle is is the what it is of that triangle i imagine and the images are in what time right huh okay so you go back to things you add time huh and from the that side huh by which it turns towards images right the understanding adds time to the composition or what the putting together or the dividing that it does it's like it's like it's returning back to things huh but the things that it knows first of all right the things that are sensible or imaginable right and they're in what time right so it adds past present or what future right okay so there's a big difference in the first act of reason you're more separated from time than in the what second act because when i understand what a man is what a man is is neither the past present or future you can't say that right when i say socrates walks or socrates walked or socrates will walk right then i have either the past or the present future of course in the in the perihemoneus the book your style wrote about the statement you start out by defining noun and verb right and the verb always signifies what with time okay incidentally just in latin huh and in greek huh you have the same word for name and for what now right huh so in latin you have nomen right okay okay and nomen in latin in the broad sense is a vocal sound right it has no parts that signify by themselves so a noun or a verb can both be a what nomen right okay but then when they distinguish between the the noun and the noun and the verb the noun keeps the name nomen and the verb gets a new name right okay nomen and verbal they have the same thing in greek right in greek you have um onoma kind of in the size of here onoma which means same as nomen and that is kept for the noun right and then you have maybe rama rama for the verb right okay and so the word onoma becomes what equivocal right because in one sense the rama the verb is a onoma in other sense it's not right okay now in english we sometimes um uh use the word name here for nomen or onoma and then we have what a separate word for the noun right and a separate word for the verb okay but if you read say you know the great commentary of ammonius or myos the teacher of boethius the teacher of thomas in a sense in alexandria huh when he's commenting on the perihermeneus of aristotle he's always pointing out in what sense he's using the word onoma in this sentence right okay and um now why is it that the verb gets a new name and the noun keeps the the name yeah yeah yeah the verb adds time right okay and so it adds something beyond the common meaning of of name right okay and so that's a very common thing as i mentioned before right you know this is my standard example how many fingers do i have five fingers right and then sometimes we say i have what four fingers and a thumb right so this gets a new name and these keep the the old name finger right why does this get the new name see well there's something about it that makes it stand out yeah and you hold a glass or something right thumb stands out so um i sometimes go back to this you know when people talk about man woman they get all upset upset about it you know but you have another theme like that man could be said of man and what woman right but now you see latin i guess in greek they have a different name for the man and for the man who's a human being right and for the male man see so um but we don't have that right see so they're trying to change image language uh which i realize that man is equivocal by reason huh in the same way that no man is equivocal by reason why does one get the new name say well it takes measures of that and you try that explanation on campus oh yeah oh yeah i did sometimes yeah yeah yeah yeah i don't seem to find it no no that's crazy it's not that female professors would but i think and uh you see um i just think the word woman the word woman was derived from the word man in some way right and you say whoa to man right but uh but they said it's actually involved the idea of fluttering and the fact that women wore a veil right so they have something in addition they don't need a face but a veil covering the face right wow so they have something in addition to a face and therefore they get a new name that's a nice way of explaining it the other professors then they should start wearing veils yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah that's the explanation of them illogical i don't know it's kind of strange i suppose mahometans would like the explanation anyway um and therefore the human understanding knows by putting together and dividing just as it knows by what reasoning right and the summa contra gentiles when you take up the understanding of god and maybe in the summa theologiae too you have an article you know or chapter uh showing that god doesn't understand ratio sinando by reasoning right there's no reasoning in god he understands reasoning doesn't have to reason out anything and there's no what putting together right and dividing and statements by god although he understands all statements the divine understanding and the angelic understanding they know to be sure composition and division and reasoning but not by putting together and dividing and by reasoning but by an understanding of a simple what it is so what a mind they have right you see it all at once okay and you can see that as i say in the simplest science of all like geometry right that when you understand what a triangle is you don't see if those angles are equal to right angles at the same time right away do you no but you got to put together a lot of things and then uh reason from them and then oh yeah oh yeah yeah and uh let's look at the replies now to the objections here and the first objection was saying aren't you understanding many things when you make a statement thomas says yes but it's one one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said one right to the first it should be said that the putting together and dividing of the understanding, an affirmative or negative statement that means, comes about by a certain, what? Comparison or difference, huh? Whence the understanding thus knows many things by putting together, dividing them, just as it knows, what? The difference of things or the comparison of things, huh? They've been made one in some way, right? Okay. Now, the second objection. It should be said that the understanding both abstracts some images and nevertheless it does not understand and act except by turning itself to the images, huh? As has been said above. And from that side, or on the side of the fact that it turns to the images, the understanding joins time to what? Composition and division. Because the images are what? Continuous and with time, right? And therefore, we have a hard time speaking about God, right? You know? Before Abraham was, I am, right? And it seems almost ungrammatical, right? So here we say, God knew before I did it, right? You know? But strictly speaking, you can't apply time to what? But God's knowledge, which is eternal, huh? So he says, Christ says then, before Abraham was, meaning in his divine nature, I am. He doesn't say before Abraham was, I was. Before Abraham was, I am. Touching upon his eternity there, huh? Of course, we'll partake of eternity when we see God as he is, huh? There'll be no before and after in the vision of God, right? It'll be all at once. Now the third right here, here's the objection. How is this assimilating the mind to things, right? To the third it should be said that the likeness of the thing is received in the understanding, in the way of the understanding itself, and not in the way of the, what, thing, right? You see that even in the first act there, when the thing that is sensed is singular, but when understood, it's, what, universal. Whence to the composition and division of the understanding, there responds or corresponds something on the side of the thing. Nevertheless, it does not have itself in the same way in the thing as in the understanding. For the human understanding's own object, huh? Is the what it is of a material thing, which falls under the sense and the imagination, right? Okay, and you heard me say that before, right? That our reason's own object is the what it is of a thing sensed or imagined, huh? Okay? Now he says there's found a two-fold composition in the material thing. First, a form to matter, right? And to this corresponds the composition of the understanding by which the universal whole is said of its own part, huh? For the genus is taken from the, what, common matter, and the difference that is completing the species is taken more from, what, the form, right? The particular, meaning the individual, from the individual matter, huh? The second composition is of accident to subject, and to this real composition corresponds the composition of the understanding by which it predicates the accident of the subject as when it says man is, what, white, huh? Nevertheless, the putting together the understanding differs from the, what, putting together the thing. For those things which are put together in the thing are diverse, huh? But the putting together the understanding is a sign of the identity or the sameness of those things which are, what, put together. So we're saying the man is white, huh? Right? We're saying one is the other, right? Okay? I am healthy, even though me and my health are not the same thing, right? But the way it's expressed in the form of a statement is a kind of identity. I am healthy, right? Now, me and healthy are not as much the same as I am I, okay? But if I say Socrates is Socrates, Socrates appears twice, doesn't he? But only in the, what, mind, huh? Quite different, huh? Because there aren't two things in the reality that you're talking about there, right? You say Socrates is Socrates. Wait, it says nothing is more true than when you say that Socrates is Socrates. A rose is a rose. You know, a thing is itself, right? But nevertheless, when you think that, you form a statement where that thing appears, what, twice. But that's in the mind, right? There's only one Socrates out there. A dollar is a dollar. Now I get two dollars, right? A dollar is a dollar is a dollar, right? Now I get four dollars. I'm getting rich. It's funny in my mind that I'm about to find the dollars, right? See how different it is, huh? So he says this is the difference, huh? Nevertheless, the composition of putting together the understanding differs from the putting together in the thing, right? For those things that you put together in the thing are really diverse, right? But the putting together the understanding is a sign of the, what? Identity of those things which are put together, huh? For the understanding does not thus put together that it says that man is whiteness, huh? Because they're not the same thing, right? But it says that man is what? White, huh? Meaning he has whiteness, right? Okay? That is having whiteness, huh? In the same way you don't say Berkwist is health. You say Berkwist is what? Healthy. That is to say he is having health, right? For it is the same in subject, what is a man, and what is having whiteness, huh? Okay? And likewise it is about the composition of form and matter. For animal signifies that which has a nature such that it senses, right? Rational, that it has a, what? Nature that understands. But man has both, right? And Socrates has all of these things along with his individual, what? Matter, right? And according to this notion of identity, our understanding composes one thing with another by saying it of the other, right? That's kind of an unusual thing that our mind does there, right? There's my body out there, and there's what? Health in my body, right? But instead of saying health, I say what? Healthy, right? And then I can say that my body is healthy, right? Okay. That's the thing that's why it's difficult to talk about God, right? That's the thing that's why it's difficult to talk about God, right? Because whatever God has, He is. Really. But we have these two ways of speaking, right? We can say God is good, or we can say God is goodness itself, right? That goes back to our way of understanding, huh? Taken from material things, in a way. Can we take a little break before we do the sixth article? We can do one more article of these today. The sixth article is still fairly short. We were talking in the beginning about purgatory. To the sixth one who sees thus, it seems that the understanding is able to be false. For the philosopher, meaning Aristotle, of course, in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, says that true and false are in the, what? Mind. And that the mind and the understanding are the same, as has been said above. Therefore, there is falsity in the, what? Understanding, right? Moreover, opinion and reasoning belong to the understanding. But in both of these is found, what? Falsity, right? Therefore, there can be falsity in the understanding, huh? Kind of strange that Thomas should be arguing the way he does on that side, right? He's a student of Aristotle, the most humble student of Aristotle, and teaches the same thing, huh? Morver, pecatum. Now, pecatum, we translate as sin, but in Latin and in Greek, it's used not only for moral sin, but for a mistake of the mind. And if a baby is born without an arm or a leg, that's called a pecatum naturae, huh? Sin of nature. Sin of nature? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I would use the word sin in a more narrow way, right? Just for, you know, moral effect. What does Aristotle use sin as? For all those, yeah. See? Any type of? Yeah, defect in your operation, yeah. So like if this chair were missing a leg, that would be a sin according to Aristotle? Well, no, I mean, if the artist overcooked the meat, that would be a sin. See? Okay? If you added up the numbers wrong, yeah, okay? It has a sense of a defect, huh? But for us, the word sin is much more narrow, but pecatum is the word, you know, in Latin, huh? Morver, there's pecatum in the understanding part. But sin is with falsity, for they are mistaken who do evil, as is said in the book of Proverbs in the Old Testament, huh? Because, no, since someone does what is bad, his reason has to be saying it's good in some way, right? So his reason is what? Mistaken. Okay? Therefore, there can be falsity in the understanding, right? People obviously do sin. But against all this is what Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions, that everyone who, what, fails or is mistaken, in that which he fails, does not, what, understand, right? And the philosopher says in the book about the soul that understanding is always right, huh? Aristotle's referring to the natural understanding of the mind, right? But not to the other. I answer, it should be said, huh? And that the philosopher in the third book about the souls compares, as regards this matter, the understanding to the, what? Senses, right? For the sense is not deceived about its own, what? Object, huh? Unless the organ is diseased, right? As sight is not deceived about the color of a thing, except perhaps by accident, from the impediment happening about the organ, as when the tongue of someone's sick, right, judges sweet things to be, what? Bitter, huh? You know that you just have to eat something very salty or something and things don't taste right, huh? On account of this, that the tongue is filled with, what? Bad humors, huh? My mother always told me to eat the orange before the candy, right? If you eat the candy first, the orange tastes, what? Bitter, huh? But about the common sensibles, the sense is deceived, right? As in judging about the, what? Size or the shape of an object, right? As when it judges the sun to be foot length, right? When the sun, nevertheless, is greater than the, what? Earth, right? Now, if you want to, you know, understand that, just think of what we call optical illusions, right, huh? And we were one time at assumption there, the psychology department put on a little thing in the class, cages there, you know, these various forms of, you know, diluting the eye, you see, ways of making lines seem longer than they are, or shorter than they are, or making a straight line seem bent, and so on, right, you know? And a lot of these are kind of clever, but I always remember the simplest example, you know. You take two lines that are making them the same length, right? And to your eyes, they look at the same length, and they are, right? And then you do like this, right? It's just one way. Now, this here, from here to here, looks shorter than from here to here. But notice, you're being deceived by about a common sensible, right? You're not being deceived as to the color of these lines, are you? So this is what Aristotle's point, huh? The eye is not deceived about its private object, which is color, but it's easily deceived by, what? The common object, right? Into thinking that something has greater magnitude than it does, or that it has a different shape, and so on. And it's also even more deceived about the, what? Sensible procidance, huh? As one judges, what is it, bile, I guess, huh? To be honey, on account of the likeness of the, what? Color, right? So if someone puts sugar, I mean salt in the sugar bowl, or vice versa, right? Then one is easily deceived because of, what? But he doesn't sense the sweetness as such, or the saltiness as such, but one just sees the, what? Color, right? Okay? And the reason for this, huh? This is a matter of experience, right? But the reason for this is evident because each power, per se, as such, right? Is ordered to its private object, huh? Like the eye to color, and the ear to sound, huh? As such, it's ordered to that, right? And things which are of this sort always have themselves in the same, what? Way, huh? Whence the power remaining, its judgment does not fail about its own, what? Object, right? Okay, now he's going to carry this over by analogy to the, what? Understanding, right? The understanding's own object is the what it is of a thing, right? Whence about the what it is of a thing, as such, speaking as such, the understanding is not, what? Deceived, right? But concerning those things which stand around the nature of a thing or what it is, right? The understanding can be, what? Deceived, huh? When it orders one to another, either putting together or dividing, or also by, what? Reasoning, huh? And an account to this, huh? It's like, it's like the senses, huh? Knowing one thing to another, right? That's when you can get into, what? Mistakes, right? And this one is ordered to another, this is a example. Well, in a sense, I know shape... by, what, how far the color extends, right? So I know one, in a sense, through the other, it seems. It's like that a little bit, huh? It's not strictly speaking, you know, that you're reasoning from one to another, right? It's at the same time, but... Or I know, you know, the shape here because of how the hardness gives off, you know? Okay, with my hand, huh? Okay. Okay, and an account of this also, about those statements, it cannot err, which are known at once when their, what, terms are known, as happens with the first, what, principles. These are the statements known to themselves by all men. Like that the whole is more than a part, right? Okay? Everybody understands what a whole is, right? And you understand what a part is. And if you understand both of those, you see right away that the whole is more than one of its parts, right? Okay? And to some extent, that's true even in the private principles of the science. If you understand what an odd number is and what an even number is, right away, you see that an odd number, no odd number is an even number, right? Or if you know what an obtuse angle is and what an acute angle is, it's not hard to see that they're different and that an obtuse angle is more than an acute angle, huh? The definition of obtuse angle is an angle greater than a right angle. An acute angle, an angle, what? Less, right? But all right angles are equal. So if an obtuse angle is an angle greater than a right angle, an acute one less, obviously an obtuse angle is greater than an acute angle, right? So those are obvious, right? Okay? To understanding what an obtuse angle is and what an acute angle is. And from this, he says, happens the infallibility of what? Truth, huh? The non-feelingness of truth. Truth, according to the certitude of science about conclusions, right? So if you syllogize some things like the whole is more than a part, or all right angles are equal, and a syllogism of conclusion follows necessarily, then you're sure about the conclusion because it follows necessarily from statements that you were, what? Sure about, huh? And sure about knowing what it is. But by accident, he says, prachidens, it can happen that the understanding is deceived about what it is in composed things. Not on the side of the organ, because the understanding is not a power of what? Using an organ. But on the part of the composition intervening about the definition. When either the definition of one thing is false about another, right? It has a definition of circle about the triangle, right? Or when some definition in itself is false, implying a composition of impossible things. As if one should take this as a definition of something, let's say, rational animal with what? Winged? Okay. When some simple things, in whose definition no composition can intervene, we cannot be deceived. But we fail either in wholly non-attainment at all, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics. Okay? So he's admitting in some way there can be, what? Even a mistake in understanding what a thing is, right? Insofar as you have to put together things, right? And you might put them together wrongly. Okay? So, interestingly, Thomas has arranged this, isn't it? But in simple apprehension, there's no error to the sin. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay? Now, to the first, it should be said, and the one with the objection to Aristotle, that the philosopher says there's falsity in the mind according to its what? Putting together, or its dividing, huh? Okay? And likewise, it should be said to the second about the opinion and reasoning, and to the third about the error of those sinning, which consists in the application of something to the desirable. But in the absolute consideration of the what it is of a thing, and of those things which are known through it, the understanding is never deceived. And thus speak the authorities induced in the, what? Contrarium. Okay? Keep a little sophisticated argument here and see what you do with it. Okay? I'm going to maintain that the mind is never mistaken, huh? Okay? Now, if the mind is mistaken, huh? And we'll just kind of tell you like this. If it says A is B, right? And A is not B, right? Okay? If it's mistaken in saying that A is B, it's because A is not B, right? Do you agree? Yeah. Okay? Okay. Now, obviously, therefore, when the mind says that A is B, it doesn't see the difference between A and B, right? Okay? It's mistaken because they're really different, but it doesn't see that they're different, right? But notice, huh? Before I conform the statement A is B, I have to understand what A is, and I have to understand what B is. Otherwise, I couldn't say A is B, right? Right. Okay? So, if I'm going to make the mistake of saying, say that a man is a stone, I think we'll agree that's a mistake, right? Before I conform the statement saying that man is a stone, I have to understand what a man is, and I have to understand what a stone is, right? Okay? Now, in understanding what a man is, and understanding what a stone is, do I understand the differences between man and stone? Let me take a little different example, and make it a little clearer. Suppose I make the mistake of saying that a dog is a cat. Okay? You have dogs and cats around here, so one of the brothers says a dog is a cat, okay? Now, if he's mistaken about this, right, and he's formed this statement here, which he thinks is so, he must have understood what a dog is and what a cat is before he made the statement, right? Now, are you understanding what a dog is and what a cat is if all you understand what they have in common, like both are an animal, or both are a four-footed animal? If all you understand about a dog is a four-footed animal, right, and all you understand by a cat is a four-footed animal, right? Then you say a dog is a cat, you're saying a four-footed animal is a four-footed animal, which is true. Right? Okay? But if you're apprehending some difference in addition to a four-footed animal, like a dog is a four-footed animal that barks, and a cat is a four-footed animal that meows, if you're really understanding dog and cat and not just animal, right, then you must be seeing their difference, right? If you didn't see any difference between dog and cat, what are you understanding? Dog and cat? Or are you understanding what they have in common, a four-footed animal? They have what they have in common. Yeah. But if what you're understanding when you say a dog is a cat, is it a four-footed animal, is it a four-footed animal? That's true. In the mind of the speaker, it's true, but as it is expressed, it's false. Right, yeah. It's in the words, though. You see, someone would say, can a man really think that a dog is a cat, right? Well, you say, well, if he thinks a dog is a cat, he doesn't see any difference between a dog and a cat. Right? Now, if you understand no difference between a dog and a cat, you're not understanding dog and cat at all, in which case you can't. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. You know, make the false statement. Or else what you're understanding is what dog and cat have in common without their differences, right? In that case, you're not really understanding dog and cat as such, except in general, you're understanding quadruped, four-footed animal, right? And so you'd say then that a four-footed animal is a four-footed animal, which is true. That makes you think of certain propositions of theology that the Church over the centuries have had to condemn. Sometimes, you know, they will use that statement. This proposition is false, at least in the ways it's expressed. Yeah. He may have some correct understanding in his mind, but really it expresses false. Yeah. Correct his tongue, yeah. Okay. So that's an explanation that there is no fault in the intellect. Well, it's kind of an objection, yeah, to say that the mind can be false, right? It has a lot to do with the likeness being a cause of error, doesn't it? Because in this one, it's likeness. Yeah, yeah. It's like, you know, I hear people sometimes, you know, who aren't very experienced at the wine, right? Well, they all taste the same. Okay. Well, the man's got a good sense of taste and smell, right? And experience in wine would say, no, they don't taste the same. No. I can't taste any difference. One is the other, right? Okay. So, um, uh, the Carbonet Sauvignon he drank yesterday, he's saying, is the same as the Pinot Noir he's drinking today. Ah. So he's mistaken, right? Well, someone might say, well, all he tastes is a dry red wine. He doesn't taste Carbonet Sauvignon, really. See? His knowledge is not that distinct. Mm-hmm. So he's saying a dry red wine is a dry red wine. Okay. He's not mistaken, right? You see, my, you know, this story they say, right, these old friends of mine are sitting around drinking beer, right? And one of them was talking about what a great beer Heineken is, right? And he's drinking Heinekens. And then, you had to go to the bathroom, like happens, you know? And he was in the bathroom, someone took an empty bottle of Heinekens, kind of swished it out, washed it out, and put it in some cheaper beer, right? The only one. So you want it, yeah. So you want another Heinekens? so he's gone raving about what a great beer Heinekens is. See? So, um, this is kind of funny, right? So, he's mistaken, right? He's thinking that the Millers, or whatever it is, is Heinekens, right? He's an beer connoisseur, then. Well, it depends on how many he has. Exactly. Yeah. That's a good point. He saved the best beer for last. Hey, if I was stolen drunk, I would tell him there was a few notes for beers. But that's what's interesting about this direction, too. You know? Um, you say, it's in terms of understanding, right? If you don't understand the difference between a dog and a cat, then are you really understanding dog and cat? Aren't you understanding what they have in common and not dog and cat, right? What's that system that says that you can't, like for example, dog and cat, you can't know what a dog or a cat is. You can only know the term that you sort of arbitrarily apply to them. In other words, that's a dog, but as I say, it's a dog. Someone else can use, you know, perhaps a different term. In other words, you can only understand the term you use. You can't understand the thing in itself. Well, the point is, the thing in itself, I might not know its essential nature, right? But, um, like you say, if you ask me what the difference between a dog and a cat is, I'd probably say a dog is a four-footed animal that barks. And a cat is a four-footed animal that meows. And Socrates might say, well, is it a cat because it meows, or does it meow because it is a cat? See? Is meowing what makes a cat to be a cat? Or is meowing something that results in the fact that you are a cat? Well, I think meowing is something that results in the fact that you are a cat. So, I'm really defining it by a property rather than by a species making a difference. Yes. Okay? And we tend to do that because the property is more sensible, and the species making difference is hidden from us. And so we use, for an imperfect definition, which is more, we call it encircling, than a definition of full sense, we use the property in place of the species making difference. But sometimes we can investigate the species making difference from the property. So Aristotel, Nicomachean Ethics, when he first takes out virtue, he'll speak of virtue as a praiseworthy quality, right? But that's giving a property of it, right? But then he starts to investigate it who is praised, right? See? And if you take, say, money, for example, right, you know? Is the man who spends less than he should, is the stingy man praised for being stingy? See? No. But is the man who's extravagant? You know, I got, someone gave me for my birthday this biography of John Adams by my colleague. I don't know if you've seen it. Actually, I'd read it before because I'd given a copy of it to my son, Paul, and, you know, I'd read it before I gave it to him. But I got a copy of it myself. But Jefferson is kind of that way, huh? Jefferson comes up a lot in there because of the association with Adams. But Jefferson was always buying things, you know, and always going into debt and so he ended up in debt and had to sell things and, you know, it's really kind of a terrible mess he was in, right? It's just something about Jefferson, right? But people are spending beyond their means, right? Adams would never do that, see? You know, Adams would go without rather than, you know. But Jefferson, you know, was like a woman. He had to have these things, right? He kept on buying and pulling up these terrible debts that he could never get. get his way out of it. So, Aristotle investigates, son, from virtue being appraised with equality. Who is praised, right? Well, it's a man who's in the mean, right? Between the two extremes, huh? He doesn't spend less money than the occasion demands, right? This is my 25th wedding anniversary. We're going to McDonald's, you know. Well, if that's all I could afford, that's okay, right? But if I could afford more than that, you'd go to a nice place in McDonald's, right? But then, you know, I could buy a hundred dollar bottles of wine. It's very easy to find them. But that would be, what? You know, wrecking the family budget and wrecking, you know. I mean, spending more than it's suitable for me to spend on these sort of things. So what's praiseworthy is to spend the amount that's right for you and right for the circumstances, huh? And to spend less or to spend more than that. Now you try to see what's more essential to virtue, right? That it observes the golden mean, right? Getting more inside the thing, huh? So, it's like when you ask what wisdom is, you know. So wisdom names the yin knowledge, the best knowledge, right? That doesn't even tell you what's the knowledge of, right? And then you say, well, now, what is the best knowledge? What makes one knowledge better than another, right? And you might figure that knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, right? So if wisdom is the best knowledge, it must be a knowledge of what? The best thing. Now if the best thing is what? The universe, which as a whole is better than the part, right? Then a knowledge of the universe must be wisdom, right? But if the universe had a maker, he's even better, right? Okay? So you're kind of reasoning your way to the fact that the best knowledge is the knowledge of God, right? So you're starting out with kind of, best almost means what? Better than all the rest, right? But therefore you're kind of comparing it to the rest of knowledge. And you're starting to get a more intrinsic idea of what wisdom is. it's the knowledge of the first cause, knowledge of God. But you can reason from one to the other, right? Okay. But we're nice.