De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 153: The Soul's Self-Knowledge Through Acts, Not Essence

Transcript
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We have to wait until we study Galo, but we'll know more about eternity. What's interesting now, when he begins the fifth book, Poethius of the Constellation of Philosophy, it's written in the form of a dialogue, right? And of course he identifies himself as a member of the academy, which is Plato's school. And of course he's writing in a kind of platonic way, insofar as he's writing in the form of a conversation. But instead of a Socratic conversation, he doesn't have a conversation with Socrates. But Lady Wisdom comes down, right? Now Sapientia in Latin is what? Feminine, right? So Lady Wisdom comes down to console him in prison there. And so there's a conversation between Poethius and Lady Wisdom, but she's leading the conversation. Well, when she gets to the fifth book, Lady Wisdom introduces Aristotle as her true follower. And here, Lady Wisdom is going to follow Aristotle as opposed to what? Plato, because he's going back to that central question of philosophy that we talked about, that does truth require, right, that the way we know be the way things are? And Aristotle answers to that question, what? Plato seems to answer yes, right? Well, this is necessary before you can talk about God's knowledge, right? God knows the future now. They say in his eternal now, right? And he knows time, in other words, eternally. But when you say he knows time eternally, you don't mean he knows time to be eternal, no. But the eternity is on the side of his knowing, right? So the way he knows is not the way things are, right? But he knows things as they are. He knows them truly, right? That's an amazing thing to see, right? But you have to begin to see a little bit, even in our own knowledge, that the way we know things, the way in which we know things, and the way in which we truly know things, can be different than the way things are. What we say about things has to agree with them, right? And you can see a little bit of this in our knowledge of the past, right? We could talk about last week's class now, couldn't we? Maybe you can remember it. So you talk about the past, and you think about the past now, right? Is that a contradiction there? To think about the past now, because the past is not now, see? But the now is in your knowing, right? But you don't know the past to be now. You don't attribute the presence of your knowledge to the past. We talk about the future, although we don't really know it that way, but we talk about what we're going to do this evening or something, right? So we talk about the future now, but we don't think the future is now, do we? But, you know, the more common things Aristotle talks about is how the order in our knowing is even, what, contrary to the order of things, huh? So we tend to know the effect before the cause, even though in things the cause is before the effect. But there's no falsity in knowing the effect before the cause unless you were to say that the order in my knowing is the order in things. As I say to the students, I know you before your parents, huh? But in reality, your parents came before you. But am I false in knowing you before your parents? No. The falsity would come if I say, because I know you before your parents, therefore you are in reality before your parents. See? But you have to distinguish the order in our knowing and the way we know from the order in things. Not the same thing, huh? So, God knows the, what, future things in themselves. That's because of his knowledge being eternal. To whom also, he says, are present, right? Things which in the course of things are future, right? Insofar as his eternal insight is at the same time over the whole course of time, huh? As has been said above when we tweeted the science of God, right? So you see the tweets in store for you when you come to study God? St. Thomas says, I study the body so I can study the soul. I study the soul so I can study the angels. I study the angels so I can study God. But insofar as these future things are in their causes, they are also able to know, be known by us, right? And if they are in their causes from which something takes place by necessity, right, then they are known by the certitude of science as the astronomer foreknows the future, what? Eclipse, right? If, however, they are in their causes so that from them something comes to be for the most part, thus they are able to be known to a certain, what? Conjecturum, which means a guess, right? Either more or less, what? Certain, right? According as the causes are more or less inclined to their, what? Effects, huh? Okay? Do you see the distinction he's making between knowing the future in itself, right? Knowing that God knows the future in itself, and not even the angels know the future in itself. But it could be revealed, as you were talking earlier in the break there, to the prophets, huh? Sure. Okay, maybe some special illumination from God, huh? But we can know the future insofar as, what? It has a root in causes, right? And if those causes produce the effect by necessity, then you could be certain about the future, right? That's mainly in astronomy. But if you cannot, if you're only for the most part, right? Well, then you have to, what? Guess more. All the way down to the weatherman, right? Yeah. But, you know, we have a number of arts of guessing, right? And to some extent, even the, what, the economists say, and the weatherman both have an art of guessing, huh? They have some reason for their guess, but still guess. Barring unforeseen circumstances, the economy will pick up, right? Jobs will pick up, yes. So, okay. Now, the first objection is talking about how our mind transcends time, in a way, in its knowledge. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that reason proceeds about the knowledge, which is through universal reasons of causes, from which future things are able to be known according to the order of the effects to the cause. Now, what he just brought out in the solution there, the response. They could say, sequindum quid, we know every man that'll come up, be born in the future, right? Sequindum quid. Because I know a man, right? I always pick up on some, I'll say that, I always pick up on some grill and I'm in my class, and I'll say, you know my brother Mark? And she'll say no. And I'll say, they all heard what you said. She'll look at her to yourself in a moment. And I said, you know what a man is? Yeah, what a brother is? That's what my brother Mark is. See, you don't know my brother Mark. Don't you? See? But notice, in some way, she knows every man, every brother in the world, doesn't she? In some way. The other favorite example, though, is see, there's a knock on the door over there, right? And I said, you know who's at the door? You see. And you don't know who's knocking at the door? You say no. You open the door, and it's your mother. Don't you even know your mother? Huh? You see? You said you didn't know the person knocking at the door, who was knocking at the door, and it's your mother knocking at the door, therefore you don't know your mother. Right? Don't see, you know, what's wrong with that argument? Two different senses of it. Yeah. But, you see, in this case, you're reasoning for what? You're not... You're not... You're not... You're not... You're not... You're not knowing your mother in some way. You're not knowing your mother as the person knocking at the door. You know your mother, but you don't know her as the person knocking at the door, right? So in some way, your mother is unknown to you, right? But that's not a reason to say that, simply speaking, you don't know your mother. Do you see that? On Thanksgiving there, President Bush went down to the turkey dinner with the soldiers, right? The guy came out, you know, and said, you need something more important to read this. So they didn't know who was going to come out if the President of the United States was coming out, right? So, is that why they didn't know the President? And they recognized and immediately came out, right? So they knew the President, but they didn't know him as a man who's about to come out here. If President Bush knocked on that door right now, I wouldn't know who was knocking at the door, would I? Even though I know President Bush. He's making a retreat. What? He's making a retreat, yeah. He might be doing that, yeah. Was it Bing Crosby, or I guess his wife used to go up to that? Not in the Cistercian monastery, right? Was it Bing Crosby's wife? Second objection, huh? Talking about those who are asleep and alienated from the senses, huh? To the second it should be said, There's Augustine says now in the Twelfth Book of the Confessions, The soul has a certain power of what? Divination, you might say, huh? That from its nature is able to know future things. And therefore, when it is withdrawn from the, what? Bodily senses, And in some way returns to itself, right? It becomes partaker of a knowledge of the future, so. And this opinion is what? Reasonable if we lay down that the soul got its knowledge of things by partaking of the forms, as a patroness laid down. Because thus the soul, from its own nature, would know the universal causes of all effects. But it would be impeded by the body, right? Whence, when it is, what? Separated from the senses of the body, it knows future things, huh? But because this way of knowing is not connatural to our understanding, but more that we get our knowledge from the senses. Therefore, it is not according to the very nature of the soul that it knows future things when it is alienated from the senses. But more through the, what? Being acted upon by some superior causes, whether they be bodily causes, right? Or what? Spiritual causes, huh? You know, it's, um, you know, it's opinion of the ancients, like Aristotle and Thomas, but also the moderns, that the, what? Tides and so on are influenced by the, what? Moon, right? Sure. So it's not absurd to say that the sun or the moon or other bodies, right, might be influencing things down here, right? And when you're alienated from your senses, maybe these things can, what? Act upon you, right? And since they cause things down here, there's maybe some kind of knowledge of the future. You see? At least in their causes, huh? Yeah. Okay? But also, when St. Paul was carried up to the third heaven, huh, whether in his body or not, he did not know, right? But his soul was certainly alienated from his senses, and therefore it's kind of open to the influence of, what? Spiritual things, right? Okay? Of spiritual things, and spiritually I mean simply immaterial things, right? As when by divine power, by the ministering of the angels, the human understanding is, what? Illuminated, huh? And the images are ordered to knowing some future things, huh? What about the dreams there, the, what? The pharaoh, right? And sometimes, you know, the man who has a dream is given the illumination to understand the dream, but sometimes he's not, and you have to go to Daniel, or you have to go to Joseph or somebody, right? Okay? And the images are ordered to knowing some future things. Or also when through the operation of the demons, right? There comes about some commotion in the imagination to fore-signaling some future things which the demons know, right? Because they know more about the causes, right? Than we do. And these impressions of the spiritual causes, the soul is more apt to receive when it is alienated from the senses, huh? Because through this, it is nearer to the, what? Spiritual substances, huh? And more free from exterior, what? Things that make us unquiet. And this also could happen through the impression of the upper bodily causes, huh? For it manifests that the higher bodies act upon the lower bodies. When, since the sensitive powers are acts of body organs, consequently, from the impression of the celestial bodies, there is in some way changed a, what? Imagination. When, since the celestial bodies are the causes of many future things, there come about in the imagination some signs of some future things. And these signs are more perceived at night by those sleeping, then in the day, and by those awake. You know how sometimes people, you know, feel, you know, pressure on their chest in a dream or something like that, right? And they wake up and maybe the blankets have been kind of bunched up there or something, right? But they seem to sense or be impressed more of certain things than they would if they were actually using their senses. Right? That's kind of unusual, huh? And he quotes something from Aristotle's book on sleep and being awake. The things that are carried for the day are dissolved more. And more without disturbance is the air of the night. And the nights are more silent. And in the body, they make sense and account of sleep. Because even little motions inside, right, are more sensed by those sleeping than by those, what, awake. And these motions make, what, images from which future things are foreseen, right? This is a very obscure thing, right, huh? But Aristotle talks about it and many others talk about it, huh? Whereas I was reading, you know, the other day there, you read about occasionally one of these accounts, you know, where a cat is left, you know, and taken, you know, hundreds of miles away from its house and finds its way back. Yeah. And it's kind of amazing, you know? And they don't really know how this is done at all, right? But it's absolutely incredible, you know, that these things are, apparently they're true, you know? That pets have been known to go hundreds of miles to get back to their original home or something. How can they do that? And of course, the birds are quite the navigators. It's kind of more amazing. The cat is kind of used to the birds, you know, going south and so on. So Thomas is not denying that sort of knowledge of the future might come in dreams, huh? Would it be through the influence of the bodily causes, right? Or due to what? Divine illumination, huh? And of course, when the saints go into ecstasy, they are, what? Not aware of their senses, right? And you could wave your hands in front of their eyes and they wouldn't be aware of you, right? They're being drawn to some higher kind of knowledge, right? Than the knowledge we get through our senses. And of course, Okay, now this is the last objection, this is taken from, not from human beings, but from the brood animals, right? Why should they have some knowledge we don't have, right? To the third, it should be said that the brood animals do not have anything about imagination that orders the images, right, as men have reason. And therefore, the images, or the imagination of the brood animals, is totalitaire, right, wholly follows the what? Celestial influence, huh? Now, we're always imagining at the command of our reason, right? We're always imagining at the command of our reason. Right. Okay? Like I was saying in geometry, huh? So our reason is always coming in there and messing up the images, right? And memorizing things and other things like that, okay? But the animals, right, their image is kind of, what, free, right? And more, therefore, able to be influenced by these heavenly bodies, huh? And therefore, from the motions of these sort, of the animals, the future things are able to be known as rain and things of this sort. Then from the motions of men who are moved too much by the counsel of reason. And that's why I made the frenetic people, they talked about, you know, the future more. Because they're more subject to these things, huh? At least that's the origin of the word lunatic, right? Yeah. Lunatic is more influenced by Luna, the moon, than we are, right? And I guess there are more murders or something committed under the full moon, aren't they say that? That's what they're saying. And more people jump off the bridge in the spring, you know? So it's much more difficult than, like, mental institutions and rehabs and stuff like that. Yeah. Call it a big old game about the full moon, right? Interesting, when you read about the Indians, you know, the Indians always thought someone who was kind of out of his mind had some kind of, you know, superior knowledge, huh? They had a certain respect for people out of their mind, right? Whence the philosopher Aristotle, right, says in the book on sleep and being awake, that some most, what, imprudent people, right, are most foreseeing, right? For their understanding is not affected with cares, right? It's like a desert and, what, empty, right, from all things. And they are moved according as the mover is led, huh? There's some words missing here, huh? At the end, the mota. But they're more like the animals in that sense. They're more like the, what? In other words, not the most intelligent people that seem to have this kind of foreign knowledge, right? It's the brutes and these people who are kind of empty-minded, right? Now, next time, we start to do at least, the first article's kind of long, but do at least two articles, maybe more, of this next question, which is how the soul knows itself, the things which are in it, right? We get to that, we'll know how it knows the things above it. You know, talk about knowing God. Now it's a separated soul, right? You always say, what's your soul's going to, you like knowing then, huh? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So now we're up to the question on how the soul knows not what is below it, but knows itself, right? And the things that are in it. The next question will be knowing the things above it. Then he says it ought to be considered in what way the soul, the understanding soul, knows itself, right? And those things which are in it. And about this four things are asked. First, whether it knows itself through its own what? Essence, right? And that incidentally is the way the angels know themselves, and the way God knows himself. And so a lot of times, you know, I take the seven wise men of Greece, I was supposed to have met at the oracle at Delphi, and they put up two exhortations that people would see who come from over Greece to consult the oracle. And one of the exhortations was, know thyself, right? Know thyself, right? So they say, to whom is that addressed, know thyself? Well, it's addressed to someone who can know himself, but doesn't know himself. Right? So it's not addressed to the angels and to God because they know themselves. It's not addressed to the beasts because they can't really know themselves. It's addressed to man, right? The one who can know himself but doesn't know himself. But then you could say, in a special way, it's addressed to our soul. Because the soul can know what a soul is, but the body doesn't know what a body is. And finally, it's addressed in a very special way to your reason. Because your reason is the only part of your soul that can know itself. Okay? You're taking less liberties than Plato does than the Karmites, right? Because he applies it even to what? A knowledge of knowledge, right? There's not really the one knowing himself, right? Okay? Secondly, in what way it knows habits existing in it, huh? Third, in what way the understanding knows its own act, huh? I understand what a triangle is. And I know that I understand what a triangle is. And I know that I know that I know that. And so on. And fourth, in what way it knows the act of the, what? Will. I know I love candy, or I love food, or I know I love wisdom, huh? Okay? I would say you can't know that you love God, huh? You can conjecture that you love God, huh? Okay? They always quote that texture. A man doesn't know whether he'd be worthy of love or hate, right? Okay? You can't have some probability that he loves God, right? But he can't be altogether certain, huh? Okay? That's a particular question he takes up sometimes. Okay. To the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that the understanding soul knows itself to its own essence, to its own nature, right? For Augustine says in the ninth book about the Trinity that the mind, which is, again, meaning the soul in a sense, knows itself to itself because it is, what? Bodiless, right? Right, huh? Okay. Morver. The angel and the human soul come together in the genus of an understanding substance. But the angel understands itself through its own nature. Therefore, also the human soul does, huh? Morver. In those things which are without matter, the same is the understanding or the intellect and what is understood, as has been said in the third book about the soul. So Aristotle knew that about the angels and God, right? They know themselves to themselves. But he didn't think that our soul knew itself to itself, huh? But you have to investigate the soul through its powers, right? And the powers of the soul through the acts and the acts through their objects, right? So we come to know our soul not through itself but through other things, huh? But against this is what is said in the third book about the soul, that the understanding understands itself just as it understands other things. The other things it does not understand through their essences or natures but through their likenesses. Therefore, neither does it understand itself to its own essence or nature. I answer that each thing is knowable according as it is an act and not according as it is an ability, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics. The ninth book of the metaphysics is about what? Act and potency or act and ability, right? Okay? But, you know, if you stop and think, huh? Do you know any ability? Say, how do you know that I have the ability to talk or I have the ability to walk? Yeah. But if I'm not walking or talking, for all you know, I might be a mute or I might be crippled or something, right? And not have the ability to walk or talk, huh? So you know the ability only through the act for which it is an ability, okay? So something is knowable as it is an act and not as it's in, what, ability. And that's why, as Heisenberg says and Aristotle says, we know matter, which is ability for form, only through its forms it takes on. We never know ability by itself, huh? For thus something is being and true that it comes under knowledge insofar as it is an act, huh? And this manifestly appears in sensible things. For the sight does not perceive the colored inability, but only what is colored in, what? Act, right? And likewise, the understanding is manifest insofar as it is, what, knowing material things, does not know these things except according as they are an act. And hence it is that one does not know first matter, which is pure ability for substance, except by its, what, relation to what form. It is said in the first book of Aristotle's physics. Aristotle says, the first matter is to man and dog as clay is to sphere and cube. He knows it by proportion, right? Okay? And the likeness consists that just as the clay is able to be a sphere or able to be a cube, but not at the same time, right? But when it's actually a sphere, it retains the ability to become a cube, right? But if it did become a cube, it would cease to be a sphere, huh? So the first matter, right, is able to be a man or a dog, huh? But not at the same time. But when it's a man, it retains the ability to be a dog, right? And when it's a dog, you're first, right? And of course, when we eat things or eat it ourselves, right, you find out how true this is, huh? So there's something in me that's able to be a dog, kind of an enemy within me. Something within me able to be a lion. Something in me able to be worms, right? Okay? Something in me able to be dust, right? Yeah. But that ability is only known by its relation to act, huh? Okay? That's why God, whose pure act is, what, most knowable, most understandable, huh? As Aristotle points out at the beginning of the physics, what's most knowable is least knowable to us. Because of the weakness of our mind, huh? And when he comes back to that in the second book of wisdom, he says... is that the chief difficulty in knowing is the weakness of our mind, although some things are difficult to know because they're hardly actual. Whence also in the immaterial substances, according as each of them has itself to this that it be an act to its own essence, so it has itself to this that to its own essence it be understandable. Now the essence of God, the nature of God, the substance of God, who is what? Pure act, right? Pure act and perfect act is simply without qualification and perfectly, completely in himself understandable. Whence God, through his own essence, not only understands himself, but also other things. In understanding himself perfectly, he understands everything that's in effect of him. Everything is in effect of him. So by knowing the cause perfectly, he knows the effect. So God doesn't get his knowledge from things. He gets all his knowledge, or he has all his knowledge in knowing himself. He doesn't have to reason from himself to things like we do, one thing to another. Yeah? His knowledge from things. All things get their existence from God's knowledge. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The universe, the planets, and the stars, and the same thing. Yeah. Thomas has an interesting three-fold distinction. You know, knowing takes place by reason of some kind of likeness, between the knower and the known. And he says, now two things are alike. If something is like something else, it can be because it's a cause of that other thing, right? Or because it's an effect of that other thing, right? Or because the third thing is a cause of both of them. And God's knowing is characterized by what? His being the cause of everything else. Our knowledge is characterized more by the reverse. It's an effect of things. Things act upon our senses and act upon our mind. The angel is what? In between. God in what? Understanding how to make things. Makes things, and then he infuses in the angels thoughts, whereby they know all those things. So the thoughts, the likeness between things and the thoughts of the angels is because they're both an effect of what? Of God. It's kind of interesting. I'm at Plato with his theory of the forms, right? He had an idea of something like that, huh? Because material things partake of the forms, and then we, through our understanding, partake of the forms, and therefore we know material things. That's really the way, not the way we are, huh? I guess I understood that. But that's the way the angels are, huh? So their thoughts about things are not derived from things, but when things become like their ideas, they know them. But their ideas are derived from God. And when the angel is created, his mind is filled. All his natural ability to understand is completely formed. My little son, Marcus, well, he's not little anymore, but when he was little, he says, why can't we be born knowing everything, you know, maybe getting a little tired of going to school and having to learn something. And I said, you want to be an angel, I said. Because that's the way the angel was created, right? His mind is completely formed. Nice, nice way to be, huh? Yeah. Now, the angel's essence, huh? Is in the genus of understandable things as act, but nevertheless not as pure act, right? Because in the angel, his substance and his existence are not the same thing as they are in God, huh? Who is I am, who am? So, whence his understanding is not completed, huh, by his nature, huh? Although through his essence or nature, the angel understands himself, right? But in understanding himself, he doesn't understand everything else he can understand, okay? That's the way God understands everything else, right? By understanding himself. The angel, by understanding himself through himself, doesn't know other things entirely, huh? And therefore he has to have certain, what, added forms, right? And these are, in his very creation, he has these forms in his mind, okay? But he has to have other forms besides his own essence or nature, okay? Because his own essence or nature is not infinite, it's not a likeness or everything, like the divine nature is, okay? Interesting to study the angels someday, huh? Remember saying to Kassirkin, I want to study the angels, he says, any time, he says, okay? But you've got to understand your own soul first, your own understanding, before you can know the angels. Whence his understanding is not completed by his nature, although through his nature or essence, the angel understands himself. But nevertheless, he's not able to know all things through his nature, substance, essence. But he knows other things through their, what, likenesses, huh? But the human understanding now, we're way, way down at the bottom, right? We're like prime matter in the order of understandables. But the human understanding has itself in the genus of understandable things as a being in ability only, just as, and this is a beautiful portion, as matter, as the first matter has itself in the genus of sensible things. Whence it's called, what? The possible, right? The potential understanding. In Latin, you use the term, what? Intellectus possibilis, huh? And then intellectus agens, huh? Thus, therefore, considered in its very essence or nature, it has itself as understanding only in ability. Whence from itself it has power that it might understand, but not, however, that it might be understood, except according as it comes to be an act. Thus also the Platonists lay down an order of understandable beings above the order of understandings, because the understanding does not understand except by partaking of the understandable. But the one partaking is below what he partakes of, according to them. If, therefore, the human understanding came to be an act through partaking of separated understandable forms, as a Platonist laid down, through partaking of these bodiless things, our understanding would understand itself. But because it's connatural to our understanding, according to the status of the present life, that it turns towards, what? Material and sensible things, as has been said above. That's why we say the proper object of our reason is that what it is is something you can sense or imagine. And so we try to understand something you can't sense or imagine, we have to understand it by likeness of what we can sense or imagine, or by negation of what we can. So we say God is incorporeal, right? We say the angels are separated substances. Separated meaning from what? Matter, right? But because it is connatural to our understanding, according to the status of the present life, that it regard or be turned towards material and sensible things, as has been said above, it follows that it understands itself, our understanding, according as it comes to be an act, through forms abstracted from sensible things. and abstracted from sensible things by the light of the agent understanding, the acting upon understanding, which is the act of those understandables. And by means of those, the possible understanding. Therefore, it does not understand through its own nature, but through its own act, our understanding knows itself. I'm the ability to understand, it says, right? So it's knowing, what? Itself is the ability to understand through that act of understanding. Where Shakespeare says, I'm the ability for large discourse, looking before and after. Shakespeare's definition of reason as reason. Now, and it does this in two ways. I don't know, this takes me a long time. place in two ways. In one way in particular, according as, say, an individual like Socrates or Plato, perceives himself to have an understanding soul, from this that he perceives himself to understand. So I know I have an understanding soul and not just a sensing soul, like the cats in the round area have. Not just a living soul like the plants have, right? I'm not really alive, not only sense, but I understand, at least what I try and go with, nothing else. But in another way, right, it understands in universal, according as we consider the nature of the human mind from the act of what? The understanding, huh? Okay? But it is true that the judgment and the efficacy of this knowledge, through which the nature of our soul, we know, belongs to us, according as the derivation of our, what, light, huh? The light of our understanding, the agent intellect, comes from the, what, divine truth, in which the reasons of all things are contained, as has been said above. When Augustine says in the ninth book about the Trinity, we, what, look upon an unchangeable or inviolable truth, from which perfectly, as far as we're able, we define, not of what sort is the mind of each man, but how it ought to be according to these eternal reasons. Now, a lot of times Augustine speaks, you know, he'll say we see the truth in the eternal reasons, right? But it's really he's seeing the truth in, what, an actual understanding, which is a, what, likeness of the eternal truths, huh? We're not seeing it in God, right? Well, Augustine's words sometimes, you know, give you that impression, huh? Okay? So he's distinguishing two knowing, huh? It's one thing for me to know that I'm understanding, and that I've got an intellectual soul and so on. It's another thing for me to know what is the nature of that soul, what is the nature of that understanding, right? And the man in the street might know that he understands. He might think his brain is his reason, huh? And doesn't know that his reason doesn't have a bodily organ, huh? Okay? Maybe many natural scientists think that too, or psychologists think that the brain is the organ of thought, huh? Okay? You know, I was telling you, you know, how people conclude, you know, that because a blow in the brain interferes with thinking, or drug, alcohol, or something going to the brain, or drugs going to the brain interfere with thinking, that therefore the brain must be the organ of thought, right? And it does show a connection between the two, right? But it doesn't show whether the brain is to the universal understanding as organ, right? Or whether it's in some way as object, see? Because the object of the universal reason is that what it is is something sensed or imagined. And as we saw in a previous article, even after you understand what these things are, when you want to actually understand them again, you form an image of them, right? Okay? So you understand what it is of that thing imagined. So when I want to understand what a triangle is, I imagine a triangle, right? But that's a singular individual triangle that I imagine. But I understand what it is of that, right? And by analogy, it's like, you know, I'm seeing right now the color of your clothes, right? Okay? Now, can I see the color of your robes without your robes being there? No, I see the blackness of your robes, right? Now, can I see the blackness of your robes with my eyes without your robe being there? Okay? Now, if you left the room, that would interfere with my seeing the blackness of your robe, right? But would it be interfering with the organ of sight? No. In this case, it would be interfering with the object, right? Because the object of sight is the color of something out there. Or the sound of something out there, the telephone or whatever it is, right? Okay? Or the smell of something out there, the smell of the wine in the glass, right? Okay? So, to say that a blow on the brain or alcohol going to the brain or drugs going to the brain interferes with thinking, does indeed show a connection between thinking and the brain, right? But it doesn't tell you that whether it's on the side of the object, like the example I gave, right? Or whether it's because it's the organ of understanding, right? But by a separate argument, we show that the universal reason cannot be a body, huh? That a likeness that's received in this universal way as it is in the understanding can't be in the continuous, because any triangle in the continuous would be here or there and therefore be singular. So, we can show by separate argument that the understanding is immaterial. And therefore, this interference with thinking by injury to the brain must be on the side of the object. And when we study the universal understanding, we find out that its own object is the what it is or something sense to imagine that, then we see the connection between the two. So, we know why interfering with the brain interferes with thinking, but just because you know what the object of the understanding is, huh? But because we know that object enough to know that it can't be received in a material organ, universally, huh? Anything is received in quantity, right? And according to additional quantities, individualize that very reason that it's here or there, huh? Then we know it's on the side of the object, huh? The interference. Okay? So, there's two ways then, huh? That we're aware of it, huh? One is that we are thinking, right? I think, therefore I am, as Descartes thought, right? And you're very sure about that. But that doesn't mean you're very sure about what actually is the nature of thinking, right? Is it something material or immaterial, right? And Descartes made the mistake again, you know, because you're very sure that you're thinking, and he thinks you must have a clear and distinct knowledge of thinking because they go together, right? But we see back in the beginning of the physics where Aristotle shows that the confused is more known to us than the distinct. And so, I'm more sure of the confused than the distinct. So, the fact that I'm very sure that I'm thinking is in no way a sign that I know really distinctly what thinking is. And that was a very tremendous mistake than Descartes' part of it. Well, I think what happened was, he's very much influenced by mathematics, right? And because mathematics is more certain than the other sciences for us, right? And because these mathematical things are more clear and distinct, he concluded, well, they go together then, don't they? Certitude and clarity and distinction. And actually, logically speaking, if you analyze it, Descartes said we don't need logic, right? Well, Descartes' argument, insofar as he has an argument, is what we classify in logic as a third-figure anthemy. And the example Aristotle gives of a third-figure anthemy is, Socrates is just, but Socrates is a philosopher, therefore philosophers are just. Not a very strong argument, is it? That's using rhetoric, right? Yeah, but it's a kind of argument, see? Okay. But, is that a very strong argument? No. No, it's like saying, you know, Berkowitz is Swedish, half Swedish, you know what? Berkowitz is a philosopher, therefore philosophers are Swedish, right? So it's a very weak argument, right? In a sense, what he's saying here is, mathematics is what? More precise and distinct than the others, right? It's more certain, right? Therefore, the more certain is the more precise, huh? Aristotle's syllogism is that the, what? Confused is more known to us than the distinct, right? And what is born known to us than the distinct, right? to us, we're more certain of. So our style's argument is a syllogism. Of course, it follows necessarily if the confused is more known to us, right? And what is more known to us is more certain for us, right? Then it follows necessarily that the confused is more what? Certain for us, huh? Confused now in the sense of indistinct, not confused in the sense of mistaken, huh? Okay. Dekar may have been influenced too by the equivocation of the word confused, right? You know, if I think... You know, two senses are confused, right? If I think that a dog is a cat, I would say I'm confused, right? I'm mixed up. Now, confused in that sense means what? Mistaken, right? Now, if I say a dog is an animal, does animal distinguish between dog and cat? No. But am I mistaken when I say a dog is an animal? No, see? So here you can say my knowledge is, what, indistinct to the dog, right? But it's not the same thing as being mistaken. It's not up here, right? Okay. So I think usually when we speak of the word confused or mixed up, if it's the early English, we're usually thinking of this thing up here, right? Okay? When Aristotle says the confused is more known to us, he means simply the, what, indistinct, right? Okay? And you can see that, right? Anywhere, you know. If I need a glass of dry red wine to drink, right? So what is this? Well, you're more sure that it's a dry red wine than that it's carboné sauvignon. It's more known to you, right? And if you know it's carboné sauvignon, is it from California or Australia or France or where, right? The more particular and the more distinct you try to get, the less sure you'll be, right? I'm always asking my students, how old am I? You see? But the more precise you try to give my age, right, the less what? Yeah, see? You say, well, Mr. Hercet, you're between 50 and 100. You might be kind of sure about that, right? You see? But usually, again, I say, you think of over 20? Oh, yeah, yeah, you're over 20. Over 30? Yeah. Over 40? Yeah. Over 50? Yeah. You see? I mean, I'm pretty sure I'm over 60. I know I am. But, you see, the more precise you try to get, the less sure you are, right? And I ask them, how much do I weigh? You know, they kind of hesitate to say, you know? But I say, you know, the more precise you try to get, the less sure you are. Okay? When did I weigh this morning? 1.76. No? One what? You're in the wrong decade now. 1.76. 1.90. That's the 6th. What? Yeah, 1.66.8, see? Digital. This point. So, the more precise you do I get about my weight, but I assure you are, right? Yeah. Okay. Now, sometimes people say, well, we can be scientific. We can get out, and we can get Purpose's birth certificate, right? Okay? We can't say this point, even if we can anyone. You see that? Yeah. Or a lot of times, I'll take this example in class, and we have one wall that's obviously longer than the other, right? I say, now, which of these walls is longer? And they'll say, well, this wall here is longer than this one here, right? Okay? Now, I say, let's be the more precise. How much longer is that wall? See? And, of course, they're just going to be guessing at that point, right? Sure. See? So, they're more sure that it's longer than that it's 7 feet 3 inches longer. All right? But even if you get that scientific, you know, and you measured that wall, and you measured this wall, and you came to the conclusion that that wall is 7 feet 3 inches longer, right? Maybe somebody else measuring that wall would get 7 feet 2 inches, right? Or maybe it's actually 7 feet 3 inches and one-tenth of an inch, but your ruler doesn't give you that accurate measurement, right? So, it's actually not 7 feet 3 inches longer, is it? It's 7 feet 3 inches and one-tenth of an inch. See? So, you're actually mistaken when you're going to be, you know, thick about it, right? But you're not mistaken in saying even at that point that it's longer, right? So, you can never be more sure that it's 7 feet 3 inches longer than that it's longer, could you? All right. No. Let's say with a weight machine, you might weight me on some other machine and get a little different weight, right? Maybe I'm not really 666.8, it's 0.81, you know? Big it is, right? Okay. See what I mean? And the machine can't read my weight, read the accurately, you know? When I was in college, it used to be kind of one of these weight machines in the gym there or one of the rooms near that. People used to go through there when they'd go to the dances, you know? So, the guys would put their drill on the weight machine and a guy would stand around and, you know, pull some lower back there, sort of way up, you know, trying to embarrass the girls by making that way more than they really did. But, as you know, these weight machines are not very accurate, huh? A lot of things we know of Paul, yeah. So, Aristotle, by a perfectly good syllogism, right? The confused is more known to us. What is more known to us is more certain. Reasons that the confused is, what? More certain, right? That's a syllogism, huh? In the first figure, huh? But Descartes got nothing but a, what? Third figure, Anthony, to back him up, huh? But once he made that mistake, huh, then he gets two mistakes for that. Because sometimes when he's very sure about something, he thinks he must know it clearly and distinctly. I think, therefore I am. Well, he's very sure he's thinking. Can't doubt that, right? And therefore he thinks he must know clearly and distinctly what thought is. Doesn't follow at all, does it? And notice the distinction Thomas is making here between knowing that you're thinking, right? That you have intellectual soul, and knowing the very nature of these things, right? Okay? And in both cases, you know it through your act, right? But you have to go through a long investigation, as we did through the act to come to know the nature of the understanding, huh? See, materiality and so on. The other mistake you get, if something is very clear and distinct, you think it must be true. It's so clear. And, of course, Louis de Broglie there, the French physicist there, a father of a mechanic said. You have no desire to be paradoxical, but contrary to Descartes, nothing is more misleading than a clear and distinct idea. Because he's talking there partly upon the fact that they get this clarity and distinction in science by what is called idealization. Okay? Idealization involves going into your imagination and rounding things off. Because the numbers they get in the lab don't fit the equations, but there's an acceptable margin of error. So you kind of round it off, right? And you get that clarity and distinction, right? But idealization is going out of reality. It's going into the imagination. And all the great scientists of the 20th century have talked about the fact that they were doing this by idealization. Einstein gives us the first example of idealization, the law of inertia, which talks about a body in the absence of external forces. And Einstein says there's not one example of such a body in our experience. So we're going into the imagination, right? And imagine what we would do under these circumstances, huh? But then that's how the clarity and distinction you get there in science. But there's a lack of certitude there, huh? Because you've lost, as Heisenberg says, the great physicist, the immediate connection with reality, okay? Kind of amazing, huh? Heisenberg even, you know, carving an aristocracy critique of the Pythagoreans who are trying to force the experience to fit their theories, right? Rather than adapting their theories to experience. But Heisenberg says, but you've got to force the facts. That's how science, otherwise science is possible, by forcing the facts.