De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 154: Self-Knowledge of the Soul and Habits Through Acts

Transcript
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Kind of funny how to see the scientists saying that, huh? But then they realize there's a lack of certitude because of that, Heisenberg says that. He says, you know, in his Gifford lectures, the concepts of natural language, an unmathematical language, vaguely defined, so the word for confused, right, have a greater stability in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of science. He comes back to Aristotle's position, huh, that vague or confused is more certain than the precise and distinct, but Descartes had an awful lot of followers for a long time, huh? Now, there's a difference between these two knowledges, huh? For having the first knowledge about the mind, it suffices the very presence of the mind, which is the source of the act of which the mind perceives itself, and therefore it is said to know itself through its own, what, presence, right? But for the second knowledge, having the second knowledge about the mind, it does not suffice its, what, presence, but there is required a diligent and subtle inquisition or investigation. And, of course, most men have failed to understand that about the human reason, right? Whence many are ignorant of the nature of the soul, and many also are mistaken or have erred about the nature of the soul, right? Okay? You can see the same thing they've erred about the nature of their own understanding, huh? They think it's the brain, huh? Kind of funny, after Einstein died, they preserved his brain, right? Hoping they're going to find something out about it. An account of which Augustine says in the 10th book about the Trinity, about such an investigation of the mind, not, as it were, something absent, does the mind seek itself, right? But to discern what is present, it seeks, huh? That is to know its difference from other things, which is to know what it is and its nature, right? So the exhortation of the seven wise men of Greece, huh, will include Thales and Solon and Pitocles and Pryos of Pryene, you know, Bias of Pryene, I should say. Bias of Pryene is famous for saying, most men are bad. Heraclitus, you know, praises, you know, as being a wise man, huh? Yeah. It's true, though, most men are bad. So, but they said, know thyself, right, huh? So as I say, that can be applied to man, or to the soul in particular, or to reason itself, right? Know thyself, right, huh? As if, you know, this is addressed to someone that can know himself, but doesn't know himself, right? And there's required quite an investigation, right? For a reason to come to know itself, and for the soul to know itself, right? Even for man to know himself, okay? Now, the first objection was taken from the text of Augustine, right? Thomas is going to explain that now, so it won't be contradictory here. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that the mind knows itself through itself because finally it arrives at a knowledge of itself, although through its, what, act, right? It's not knowing itself through itself as if it itself was the form by which it understands itself, right? Rather, it comes to know itself through its act. It itself is what, what? What it knows because it loves itself is their subjoint. I mean, that's in the context of what, talking about the Trinity and the, what, image of the Trinity in us, right? And part of that is, is what? If our reason comes to understand itself, there proceeds from our reason a, what? A thought of itself, right? And when reason knows itself, then it begins to, what? Love itself, right? It's essentially wonderful, okay? And that's an image of the Trinity, right? The Son proceeding, you know, as the Word of the Father, and then the Holy Spirit proceeding as love from them. For something is able to be said to be known to itself in two ways. In one way, because through nothing other, does it come to a knowledge of itself, as the first principles are said to be known to themselves. Or because they are not knowable procedents, just as color is per se visible and substance procedents. So it goes back to that, what, distinction of two kinds of per se there, right? As opposed to procedents. I was reading the treatise on the Trinity the other day where Augustine got into some way of speaking that's not really too good, you know? And Thomas says, well, he's trying to emphasize this point, but he went a little bit too far in his way of speech, so one should piously expound it and not, you know, extend that way of speaking, right? You know, the way you can say in God, right, that God from God, light from light, true God from true God, right? But can you say divine nature from divine nature? That's like guessing it's into one point, see? Of course, God and his nature are the same thing, that's why I guess I'm trying to emphasize that. But in that way of speaking, it would kind of indicate that the divine nature itself, right? That there was a distinction in the divine nature, okay? And the divine nature can't signify or stand for the person, although they are the same. But the way of signifying is not the same, okay? It's a very subtle thing. Augustine is such an authority even for Thomas, right, that he has to always take into account what Augustine has said, huh? But Augustine, you know, it's amazing how far Augustine got, huh? Yeah, he didn't really have that good philosophical education, huh? He was trained in rhetorical schools. But he must have just a tremendous natural ability, right? Tremendous mind. I was thinking, who were the major influences upon Thomas, you know? You know, among the authors he's read, you know, Aristotle was only one of them, and Augustine, I think those two kind of stand out for me. Dionysius is very important too, but Augustine seems to be the one, you know. When you go to the senses of pure Lombard, you know, the teaching there is based, according to the fact of church fathers, but it's almost always Augustine, right? You know? And even if you look at the catechism of the Catholic Church, right, Augustine, I mean, you just, a number of references to Augustine is amazing, right? There's quite a few to Thomas too, but even more to Augustine. Augustine is quite an authority, you know? It seems like he may not present himself logically as well. He's a more difficult read to understand, and is that because you think of him? Well, he can be misunderstood more easily than Thomas, you know, because his way of speaking is a little bit, lends itself to misunderstanding, you know? Less ordered, maybe? Yeah, he's not as precise as the way of speaking, but that's probably because of his background, right? You know? But it's a more rhetorical style too, I mean. So, I mean, if you read Augustine in Latin, these are very beautifully said, you know. You know, say this, the soul is more ubi amat quam ubi animat. You couldn't really translate that very well, right? The soul is more where it loves than where it animates, right? Where it's, where it's the king of life. There's so much in Augustine, huh? It's amazing. Father Boulet used to use sometimes the letters of Augustine that kind of interesting things. I don't know what letter he was using. time where the correspondent asked him, you know, is there an opposition between faith and reason? And Augustine's answer was, there can't be because we're capable of faith because we have reason. And you know, Augustine, you know, begins. You see Augustine's, you know, homilies are in St. John, right? If you read Thomas's commentary on St. John, you know, which is very important, huh? And Pius XII, they remember saying, no one can really be a follower of Thomas without knowing the commentary on John. But on almost every passage, you're using what Chrysostom and Augustine, those two, what they're saying, right? Okay. Of course, the anecdote of Thomas, you know, talking about Chrysostom, you know, where they came upon the city of Paris and they looked down from the hills on the city of Paris and a wonderful city laid out there. And someone said to Thomas, would you like to be master of the city or something, you know? And he said, I'd rather have a copy of Chrysostom's homilies, I don't know, on Matthew or John, one of the things. He had a hard time getting a hold of it one time or something. So you'd rather have this book of Chrysostom. But Augustine, he had a beautiful understanding there of that. Was it the eighth chapter of John? He has a beautiful understanding of that in the Confessions, too, huh? The idea that knowledge is a common good, huh? And that the man who's attached to a truth because he discovered it or he thought of it, right? You know? That this is a perverse attitude, right? You know? And you can see in yourself sometimes, you discover something by yourself, you know, and you're kind of attached to it, you know, because, okay? But it may be a very piddling truth compared to what truth you can learn from Thomas or from Aristotle or somebody else, right, huh? As long as I discover a little geometrical theorem that's not explicit there in Euclid, you know? But it's nothing compared to Euclid, right? And the things he discovered, right, or things that these geometries discovered, you know? I never in a million years discovered some of those things by myself, you know? But you see, if I'm attached to this truth because I found it, right, or I thought it up by myself, you know, even if it's true, I'm attached to it because it's mine, not because it's true. And therefore not be loving truth the way you should love truth, huh? And Augustine says you're driven from that then to err. You're attached to it because it's yours. But if you're attached to it because it's true, it doesn't make any difference whether I discovered it or you discovered it. We love it because it's true. Okay, to the second, huh? And those things which are without matter, the same is the understanding and what is understood. But the human mind is without matter, huh? He says to the second, it should be said that the essence of the angel is as act in the genus of things understandable. And therefore it has itself both as the understanding and as he understood. Whence the angel understands his own nature to himself, but not the human understanding, which is entirely in ability in respect to understandable things, as a possible understanding is. Or it is the act of understandables which are abstracted from the images as each intellect. Now because you're going to apply that, you know, it's a little different there about the soul. Because so long as the soul is in the body, right, it's not separated from matter entirely, right? So the soul would be what? That which understands itself. But once your soul is separated from your body, then you're a little like the angel, so. Then the soul will be what? Actually understandable. And then it'll understand itself, itself. I think so, but we'll have to wait to see what Thomas says. Okay, but he's just applying it to the power itself, right? Which is like prime matter in the world of understandables. So that's why you know that our understanding is the lowest possible understanding. Just like prime matter is the least actual, I mean the least, has the least being of anything, huh? That's what Thomas describes or takes up the opinion of Dave Ludinat, who taught that God is first matter, right? And Thomas says, who most stupidly taught. It's not just, you know, being gratuitous insult there and there. But you couldn't take anything further away from God's pure act than matter which is considered by itself, the first matter, is pure ability, pure potency, right? If you'd said God is a stone, that would have been closer to the truth. See, most stupidly taught that. It sounds so good in Latin. Yeah, yeah. But, you know, you could paraphrase Thomas there and say that Vorabach most stupidly taught that the human mind was the divine mind, right? Because the divine mind is as pure act in the order of understandables. Understanding. And our minds begin with like pure ability, right? So, I mean, if you'd said the divine mind is, is an angelic mind, then that would have been closer to the truth, right? What to say the human mind was the divine mind was, uh, yeah, most stupidly taught by Vorabach, huh? Oh, okay. I misread the objection there was two. The angel of the human soul come together in the genus of intellectual substance, but the angel understands himself, whose own essence, therefore the human soul. And he answers that in the second objection, okay? The third one is about those things which are without matter. To the third, it should be said that that word of the philosopher is universally true in every understanding. For just as the sense in act is a sensible, on account of the likeness of the sensible, which is the form of the sense in act, so the understanding in act is the understood in act, huh? On account of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the understanding in act, huh? That knows. When I define, right, what a triangle is, right? That definition is in my mind, right? But the definition of triangle, in a way, contains the nature of triangle, right? So in a way, I become a triangle when I understand what a triangle is, because I have the nature of triangle, right? Okay? But not really in the sense that I am a triangle. And I have the nature of triangle in a different way than the triangle has its own nature, right? Okay? And therefore, the human understanding, which comes to be an act through the form of the thing understood, through the same form is understood, as through its own form. For it is the same thing to say that in those things which are without matter, the same is the understanding of what is understood, as if to say that in those things which are understood in act, the same is the understanding of what is understood, huh? That's another way of solving the difficulty, huh? To this that something is understood in act that is without matter. But in this, there is a difference, because the essence is that some things are without matter, as we say that the angels are what? Separated substances, huh? Of course, it's the philosophers who call the angels separated substances, right? And we Christians call them angels because they become known to us in the Bible, right? Where they're sent as messengers, huh? That's where you get the name angels, huh? But you don't find the name angel in Aristotle, right? But they do talk about separated substances, huh? Philosophers. Separated meaning from matter. As the separated substances, which we call the angels, huh? Of which each is both, what? Understood and understanding. But some things there are whose essences are not without matter, like the material things we know, but only their likenesses are extracted from matter. Whence the commentator says in the third book about the soul, that the induced statement does not have truth except in separated substances. For it is verified in some way in them that is not verified in us, as has been said, huh? Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. In other words, in the angels, because the angelic substance is entirely separated from matter, it's actually understandable, right? And so the angel, because his mind is joined to his substance, he understands his substance through itself, right? Our soul doesn't understand itself through itself because our soul is, what, the first act of a natural body. It's the substantial form of a natural body. And so long as it's in the body, then it's not really, what, fully understandable, right? It has to be understood through other things, huh? But when the soul is separated from the body, we'll find out about that later on. It's one of the articles coming up later on. And maybe they'll know, in a way, something like the angels know themselves, huh? A little break now. We're doing it next time. Kind of interesting. You know, when Thomas speaks of, when someone's divided into questions, you say, well, gee whiz, there's actually many questions under each question, right? Okay? But I like to say that Thomas knows how to articulate the question, right? Make it distinct, huh? That's what he does in each question. He articulates it. But it actually gets a number of little questions. To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that the understanding knows the habits of the soul through their very, what, essence or nature. For here, here's that guy, that troublesome guy again here, Augustine, huh? For Augustine says, in the 13th book about the Trinity, huh? Not thus is seen faith in the heart in which it is, as the soul of another man, right, is seen from the movements of his body. But one holds it by the most certain science, huh? And the conscience cries out, huh? Thomas will say, by the way, you can know, huh, in the strict sense, that you have faith, huh? But you can't know in the strict sense, huh, that you have charity, huh? Although you can have, you know, probable conjecture, he says, right? Okay. Augustine seems to be saying the same thing here. Therefore, the habits of the soul are not known through their acts, but through themselves. Moreover, material things which are outside the soul are known through their likenesses of them which are present in the soul. And therefore, they are said to be known through the likenesses. But the habits of the soul are already present through their very nature in the soul. Therefore, through their own nature or essence, they are, what? Known, right? You don't need it like this. The objection is saying, huh? Because the habit is right there. Moreover, this is the famous thing. Proctor quad unum quad quae tale et illud magisa. An account of which, that more so. Okay, you've heard me expand on that. That principle, huh? When the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. Maybe expound that? I think so. Yeah. Okay. Well, I always start with very simple examples. If sweet is said of sugar and my coffee, but of my coffee because of the sugar, which is sweeter? The sugar. Yeah. And if wet is said of water and the dishcloth, but the dishcloth's because of the water, which is wetter? Water. Yeah. Okay? Yeah. And if salty is said of salt and your French fries. I don't have any more, but of the French fries because of the salt, which is saltier. The salt. Yeah. Okay. Then you see we go into these more interesting applications of that in philosophy, huh? If the conclusion of an argument is known, right? The conclusion of a syllogism, say, is known, and the premises of the syllogism are known, right? But the conclusion is known because of the premises, right? Yeah. Which is more known to us, yeah. Of course, if the premises were not more known than the conclusion, you wouldn't try to prove the conclusion through the premises. Or what about end and means, huh? If the end is desired and the means are desired, but the means are desired because of the end, which is more desired? Really? Yeah. So if I desire, say, medicine for the sake of health, so I desire both medicine and health, but I desire the medicine for the sake or because of the health, right? Which do I desire more? Yeah. Yeah, it would be really crazy to desire medicine. Okay. And there's a famous application of it by Aristotle there in the second book of wisdom, huh? He says, if true, he's said of the cause and of the effect, but of the effect because of the cause, which is more true? Cause, yeah. It's interesting, right? And therefore, the first cause would be most true, right? Which is God, right? Yeah. Amazing. You saw that, huh? Okay. Now, the guy's trying to argue from that principle here, but he misapplies it, as we'll see in the reply to the objection. But other things are known by the soul on account of the, what? Habit, right? In the understandable forms. Therefore, these are known more by themselves, by the soul. Okay. But against all this is that habits are, what? The beginnings of the sources of acts, just as powers are the beginnings of the source of acts. That has been said in the second book about the soul. Before the abilities or powers, by reason, are the acts and their operations. It goes back to the principle you had there, right? We had to investigate the operation before the, what? Power, right? Because the operation is known before, right? And the object before the act. Therefore, for the same reason, they are before the habits, son. And thus, the habits are known to their acts, just as their powers, son. So, how do you know that guy's got the habit of playing the piano? He's acquired this habitual state, huh? Getting him to sit down and play the piano, right? Okay. All right. I've got the habit of speaking English. Not too much speaking Latin, but a little bit of that, too. I answered, ought to be said, that habits are, in a way, a middle between pure ability and pure act. But it has been said before that nothing is known except according as it is an act. Thus, therefore, insofar as the habit falls short of perfect act, it falls short from this that it be known to itself, but it is necessary that it be known to its own, what? Act, huh? Whether someone perceives himself to have a habit, through this that he perceives himself to produce, what? The act which is proper to that habit. Or when someone inquires the nature and the, what? Reason for the habit from a consideration of its act. That same distinction he made before in talking about the soul knowing itself or knowing the understanding knowing itself, right? You can know that it has this understanding, but can also investigate the nature of the understanding through the act, okay? And the first knowledge of a habit comes about through the presence itself of the habit. But now, notice that he's going into what that means. Because from this fact that it is present, right, it causes the act, right? In which it itself is immediately, what? Preceived, right? So, now it's in Quebec, they said, you're not really learning French until you dream in French. Once you start dreaming in French, then you know you picked up some French, right? Well, I never dreamt in French, though. But the second knowledge of the habit is through a, what? So, now it's in Quebec. Luteous investigation. Just as has been said above about the mind in the first article, right? Okay? So you can know that you have a habit, right? Because you experience the act. But to know the nature of that habit would require you to make a careful investigation of it, starting from examining the act. Just as we were saying about the understanding, right? That I have a mind, an understanding, a reason, right? I know because of my thinking, right? But in order to know the nature, really, of my reason, I'd have to make a careful investigation of the nature of thinking, huh? What kind of a power it is that understands something universal? Or what kind of a power it is that understands something immaterial, like truth? Is that a body that understands what truth is? Is it a body that, you know, receives something universally? Does quantity receive something universally? So you take a studious investigation, starting from the act to know the nature of the power, right? But to know that you have such a power, right, you perceive when you perceive the act in yourself, right? Even Descartes knew he had the ability to think, but didn't know really what thinking was as much as he thought he knew what it was. Now, to the first, huh? They replied to Augustine's text there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although faith is not known through the exterior emotions of the body, right? In other words, if you see somebody genuflecting and so on, you might assume that he has faith, but he might be doing this in bad faith, right? Not have the faith, not have the faith, huh? But it is perceived, nevertheless, by the one in whom it is, right? Through the interior act of his heart, huh? For no one knows himself to have faith, except through this, that he receives himself to, what? Believe, right, huh? Okay? So you find this strange, what? Ascent of your mind to things that you don't fully, what? Understand, right? So you ascent to there being three persons in God, right? Even though natural reason cannot, what? Reason this out, huh? Okay? So you perceive that firmness of your own ascent to these things, huh? And that's how you know you have faith. They kind of give a very good explanation of faith there, you know. His own faith, in a sense, that he had it when he was giving a course in the five ways, you know, the five ways in the proof of existence of God. But he gave us kind of a fatherly talk, you know, before he went into the five ways. He was talking about the difficulty of understanding the five ways, huh? And we saw that as the course went on, you know. But he says he believes in God's existence more from what his mother told him than from his study of the five ways, right? And although he thinks he could demonstrate the essence of God, right, he would not be so presumptuous as to say so, you know. But in terms of himself having the faith, and his certitude that he did have the faith, right, was because he saw the firmness of his own ascent to these things the Church teaches. Even though he doesn't have evidence for them, right? Like he had for the, you know, right triangle or something. And, okay, he couldn't explain the firmness of that ascent in the other way. They say that he had the virtue of faith. Okay. In the case of church, it's harder to do because I can be a friendly guy, you know. I'm like other people, you know. And be very social, right? And therefore not be, oh, I get assured whether my love of other people is something natural or something, what, supernatural, right? Now, the second objection was saying, hey, we have to have a likeness of these things outside the soul in order for them to be in the soul, right? But the habits are already in the soul, right? Okay. But, and this is going to be in both the second and the third objection, this distinction he makes here. To the second, it should be said that the habits are present in our understanding, not as objects of understanding, right? Why? Because the object of our understanding, according to the status of the present life, is the nature of a material thing, as has been said above. That the object of our understanding is the what it is of something sensed or imagined. If the object was not the what it is of something sensed or imagined, then interfering with the imagination, with the brain, would not interfere with what? Thinking, would it? Okay. That's a sign, right? That it's the what it is of something sensed or imagined. But they are present in the understanding as that by which the understanding understands. Okay. That's important to see, right? They can become an object for understanding, right? But then they have to be, what, investigated through their act and so on, and come to know them by a discourse. Okay? So something can be present in the understanding as that by which it understands, right? Without being yet the object of understanding, right? Because it isn't the what it is of something sensed or imagined, and it has to be investigated from those things. You see, I'm convinced from my study of geometry that I understand universally what a triangle is. And then I can reason from that that what understands universally what a triangle is is not the imagination, which knows only singular triangles that I picture in my imagination, still with the conditions of quantity in the body, right? Even if you say, you know, I know my reason or my habit as the beginning, the principium, as he says in Latin here, the beginning of this act, right, the source of this act. The act proceeds from it in some way, right? Okay? My playing the piano, I don't, that's not an example of me, but my playing the piano proceeds from this habit I've acquired, right, huh? Or am I speaking English, huh? Which seats in this habit, ritual knowledge that I have of English, I guess. But even the idea of a beginning, huh? And Aristotle takes up the word beginning there in the beginning of the Fifth Book of Wisdom. The first meaning of beginning is, here's the beginning of the desk. And the sense in which my reason is the beginning of my thinking, right, or the source of my thinking, is a much later sense of beginning, right? And I have to see that later sense of beginning by kind of, what, likeness and yet difference from the sense in which this is the beginning of the desk. I remember a guy coming up to me when I was in college, purpose, what do they mean by first principles? Of course, principle is just a Latin word for beginning, huh? It's the first beginnings of right art. Oh, okay. But this is the first meaning of the beginning, huh? Beginning of the desk. Beginning of your property out there, where the curb is or something, right? And later on, you have the sense in which the foundation of the house is the beginning of the house. Then you come to the sense in which, you know, the agent is the beginning of things. It's only gradually you've come to see this sense of beginning, right, in which we would say that my understanding is the beginning of my thinking. But you first get the idea of beginning as that from which something proceeds, huh? A point is the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. It's the beginning of a line. So, to the third it should be said, that when it is said, on account of which each that more, see how brief Ian Aristotle are, that's what Aristotle says in the postuletics, that on account of which each that more. So as the saxophonist said, when the same is said of two things, but of one because of the other, it belongs more to the cause, right? When it's said, has truth, if it is understood in those things which are of one order, as in one Janus of cause. For example, if it be said that health is an account of life, right? It follows that life is more, what? Desirable, right? I want my health so I can live, right? Well, then I must want to live even more than to be healthy, right? But if one takes things which are of diverse orders, it would not be true, huh? Would not have the truth. If I say, for example, that health is an account of what? Medicine. Now, medicine is a cause now, not in the sense of what? Of the good, of end. When I say, I'm healthy because of medicine, I'm talking about the efficient cause, right? The mover, right? And that doesn't have to be better, does it? Okay? It does not, therefore, follow that medicine is more desirable, right? Because health is in the order of ends, medicine is in the order of what? Efficient causes, huh? But if you wanted to put them in the same order, you'd say, hey, medicine is a means to health, right? And then it's clear that health is more desirable than what? Medicine, right? Okay? But when you say that medicine is a cause of health, it's not the cause of health being desirable, is it? Rather, health is a cause of medicine being desirable, right? But medicine might be a cause in some other sense of health, namely efficient or mover, right? Producer. Thus, therefore, if we take two things of which both are as such in the order of objects of knowledge, then that on account of which another is known will be more known, as the principles of the premises are more known than the conclusions. Like I was saying earlier, right? If I know the premises, right, and through them I prove the conclusion, right, then the conclusion is also known. But the conclusion is known as an object because the premises are known as an object. Therefore, the premises must be even more known than the conclusion. Okay? But then it's in the same order, right? What about that coffee and the sugar? The sugar and the coffee, is it because of all the sugar? Is that also an exemplary cause or something? I mean, because sugar causes... Well, I was saying that they're both sweet, see? The coffee and the sugar are both sweet, so they both have that quality, that object, right? But one of them has the sweetness because of the other. Therefore, the other must be more sweet. But they're in the same order of... Yeah, of sweet. They're both sweet. Oh, in sweetness. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So see, you're changing the order because the habit of... Like I said, the habit of geometry, right? The habit of geometry is not what I know, but that by which I know, right? Okay? But in the case of premises and a conclusion, both the premises and the conclusion of what I know, okay? Although I could also add to that that I know the conclusion by the premises, right? But the premises themselves are also known, see? If I know something by my habit of geometry, it's not by knowing what that habit of geometry is that I know this, you see? Okay? In fact, the average person who knows some geometry doesn't know what the habit of geometry is, you see? Thomas would say that the habit of geometry is an order of understandable forms. Oh? It's not by knowing that geometry is an order of understandable forms that one knows the conclusions of geometry. No. One knows the conclusions of geometry is ultimately through the postulates and the axioms, right? So the postulates and axioms are more known than the conclusions of geometry. And the earlier theorems are more known than the later theorems because the later theorems are known through the earlier theorems being known first, right? Okay? But we don't, in that sense, know by the habit of geometry the theorems. That is to say, we don't know the theorems by knowing what the habit of geometry is. So it's not in the same order, is it? Okay? Do you see that? Yeah. That's a good point to see. So the guy's misapplying the principle, right? Poucter quat unum quat quai ilud majis, right? You're talking about things in the same order, right? Okay? But a habit is not in the order of objects insofar as it's a habit, huh? Nor an account of the habit do we know things as an account of a, what? Object known, right? But rather as an account of a disposition or a form by which the knower knows. And therefore the ratio does not, what? Argument does not follow. You see what the problem is? Take Thomas' example there, the medicine and the health, right? And the guy says, well, you are healthy because of the medicine you took, huh? Okay? But an account of which more so, right? Right? Therefore medicine being the cause is more desirable than what? Healthy, right? Okay? But, I've mixed up two different orders, haven't I? In the order of in, in the order of desirable, health is before medicine, right? Okay? In the order of mover or maker, in this case, let's say I have to take a medicine to restore my health, right? Okay? So, I take the medicine before I'm healthy, right? Again, right? Before I become healthy. So, in that order, the medicine is before the health, but before in the sense that I'm making, right? Okay? But he's trying to argue here that the medicine is more desirable than health, right? Okay? Now, if you put them both in the order of healthy, I mean, excuse me, of desirable things, right? Okay? You say, my health is desirable and taking this medicine is desirable, right? But why is taking the medicine desirable? Well, then it's because of the health, right? So, health is the cause of the medicine being desirable. The medicine might be the cause of your being healthy, but the medicine now makes the healthy, to be healthy, desirable. Right? See? So, you see, you're in two different orders there, right? The order of efficient cause and the order of end are desirable. Well, now, in this article, he's talking about an order in objects known. You're welcome.