De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 156: Eternity, Self-Knowledge, and the Infinite in the Mind

Transcript
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a life that has no limit, neither a beginning nor an end. But then some people think that that's enough to understand eternity, as if eternity was a kind of an endless time, right? You know, as if, you know, if you went back the last year and Perkwest still existed, you went back the year before that, Perkwest still existed, right? No matter how many years you went back, Perkwest still existed, or next year Perkwest exists, and the year after that exists, and so on. But even if Perkwest went on and on like that, in fact, my life, there would still be a before and after in my life, right? Because last year is a different part of my life than this year, and it's before the part of my life I have this year, and the next year will be after the life I have now, right? So that's negated, too, in the definition. In the first part of the definition, Tota Simo, right? Simo is the opposite of before and after. Now, in being Tota Simo all at once, eternity resembles the now of time, because the now of time has no before or after in it. If you take the now in a strict sense, right, what divides the past and the future, but don't include any of the past with the now, or any of the future with the now, then the now is the time, in a way, like a point is to a line. It's something indivisible. But, of course, the now is always other, isn't it? And so Boethius says that the now that flows along makes time, but the now that stands still makes eternity. And so he says, possessio. Okay? It's the Tota Simo et Perfecta possessio, vita interminables, right? Because there's no, what, otherness in the now of eternity, huh? Stand still, as it were, right? Okay? But now, if you imagine the now of time standing still, we'd have practically no life in the now of time, huh? And I always take the example from the fairy books when you're little, you know, where the terrible witch, you know, has a spell upon the court and the beautiful princess and so on. And I can still see the, you know, the pictures in some of the child books, you know, where the servant's bringing in the thing and he's got one leg up in the air and he's there for, until the prince, charming whoever it is, shows up and gives the princess a kiss and everybody comes back, right? So we'd have practically no life at all in the now. What can you do in the now? You can't eat a carrot in the now, can you? You can't think in the now, right? It takes a little time to think, right? But God, in that now that stands still, has a perfect possession of unending life, right? His perfection of life, huh? Isn't that, huh? So there's at least two negations, right, of time, of life and time, and two negations of what? Even referring to the now of time. So we have to, in a sense, know God's eternity by what the theologian calls the via negationis, or the via negativa. The same when you take up, you know, God's being simple, although grammatically speaking, simple is not negative. What you actually show, like, say, in the Summa here, is that God is not composed, huh? And what he does in the question three there is to, what, negate six different kinds of composition that are in creatures, right? And then finding the seventh article that there's no composition in God, right? But again, that's via negativa, right? Via negationis. So, so we first know that what it is is something sensed or imagined. And, especially if you take a clear example, like geometry, where you realize that you're understanding these things universally. And then that's a clue later on to the nature of our understanding, huh? It's immateriality. But you have to know the object first, right? You should have a little bit of Euclid, huh? Before you study the Deaima. So it does come under the object, right? But you've got to see a certain order, right? In which it comes under that, huh? Moreover, what is known is known by some act. If therefore the understanding knows its own act, by some act it will know it. And that again, that act by another act. This will go on forever. To the second it should be said, huh? That the very act of understanding of man is not the act in perfection of the nature understood that is material. It's unlike the angels, right, huh? The angel knows primarily his own substance, right? His own essence, his own nature. And his act of understanding is the perfection of his own substance, right? So by the same act he knows his own substance and the perfection of his own substance, which is his own act. But Berkowitz, huh? He understands what a triangle is, right? And his understanding of what a triangle is is not a perfection of what he understands. It's not a perfection of the triangle, is it? It's a perfection of me. So in understanding what a triangle is at the same time, I don't understand what? My understanding. Because it's not a perfection of what a triangle is. It's a perfection of me. You see? So it's not by the same act that I understand what a triangle is and I understand that I understand what a triangle is. You see that? But by an angel, it's the same act by which he understands what he is and his own understanding. Primarily what he understands is himself. His understanding of himself is the perfection of himself. So he understands himself and his own perfection by the same act. Just like when I listen to Mozart and I hear his music and I hear the perfection of the music, right? By the same hearing, I know Mozart's music and the perfection of his music. But when I understand what a triangle is, right, I'm not understanding what is perfection of me. Triangle is not the perfection of me. Although understanding what a triangle is some perfection of me. Not my greatest perfection but some perfection of me. So he says, ipsum intelligere humana, the very act of understanding, is not the act in perfection of the material nature understood. So that it would be by one, so it would be possible by one act, be understood both the nature of the material thing and the very act of understanding. Just as by one act is understood a thing with its own, what, perfection. Whence other is the act by which the understanding understands a stone. Much more concrete than me, right? Understanding a triangle, right? And other is the act by which it understands itself to understand a, what? Stone, right? And thus, nor is it impossible or inconvenient in the understanding for there to be the infinite in, what? Potency, right? As has been said above. Augustine, you know, when he anticipates Descartes, that's not original with Descartes, I think therefore I am. And Descartes, I mean, Augustine used it already against the academicos, the skeptics of his time, right? We say you know nothing, right? But even if you doubt everything, you can't doubt that you're, what? Thinking, you know? Because you're doubting yourself as a kind of thinking, huh? But then, you see, if I know that I'm thinking, I can also know that I know that I'm thinking. And I can know that, right? And I can know that. So there's an infinity of things I can know. Contrary to the academics, you can't know anything, right? That's one of the biggest things to know in the world, but you can now. I used to use a kind of little material like this and it's deficient like these things are, but I'd say, suppose you write a letter, right? to somebody in which you recount something that you read in a letter. written to you. Now that first letter, right, could that be about what was in a letter to that person? But could that go on forever? Or put it another way, could the first letter ever written be about what's contained in the letter? There wouldn't be any other letters put there. So the first letter cannot be about what I read in the letter. The first letter must be about something, what, that was not in the letter, right? You see the little analogy here? See? If I'm writing the first letter, I'm going to write about these things out here, right? Okay? And then I send this letter to you, and you write a letter about what I wrote in my letter to you. And then this could go on forever, right? You could write to somebody, and they could write what you wrote in the letter, right? Okay? But the original letter, which is my letter, right, was not about what was in a letter, but about something outside letters, about the world around us, huh? I write you a letter about what happened, you know, to the people around me or something like that, right? What happened to auntie and uncle and so on, right? Okay? So when my brothers and I were kind of spread around the country, we'd write to my mother, right? And then my mother would write to us, and she'd say, well, Richard said in his letter, or Marcus said in his letter, or Dwayne said in his letter, right? So she's kind of the conduit, huh, for what's in our letters to get to the other brothers, right? But the original letter would have to be something, what, that was not about what somebody written in the letter, about something that was not in the letter, and then putting it into the letter, right? Or something like that with our mind, right? The first thing we understand is not our understanding, right? If you'd be like, well, it's in a letter at first, right? But something like what a stone is, or what a triangle is, huh? But what it is is something sensed or imagined. But once you understand that, then you can understand your understanding, right? Just like once I receive a letter, now I can write that, not just about things around me, but about what are the letters you've been sent me. You see that? But notice, the mind can come back upon itself, huh? And Aristotle talks about that. There's what they call a relation of reason, huh? Where we say, um, Socrates is Socrates, right? And Socrates is the same as Socrates, right? But are there really two Socrates? But the mind takes Socrates twice. It can do that, huh? So I can always say that something is itself, right? So I could say Socrates is Socrates, and then I could say the statement Socrates is Socrates is the statement Socrates is Socrates. And I could go on multiplying, you know, this forever, right? Because the mind can come back upon itself, huh? And this is one kind of infinity that you find in the mind, huh? You can always say something is itself, so I can get as many ones as you want to, huh? Okay? Those are kind of like, what, beings of reason, right? Very strange kind of being, huh? Not too important in some ways, but it's there. Okay? But there are many Socrates only in my mind. See that? You know, Brady Russell tried to argue against the axiom that a whole was larger than a piece of part. Do you hear this argument? Well, Brady wasn't like this, he said. For every odd number, of course, for these guys, one is an odd number, huh? For every odd number, you can have a, what? Corresponding even number. Doubled, right? Two, six, ten, seven. You can go on forever, right? So for every odd number you get me, I can give you a, what? An even number, right? Okay? Well, no, excuse me, I know that's not the way I was supposed to go. Now, you take the whole numbers. One, two, three, four, five, six. And then take odd numbers for them, right? Double each of them. Okay? As you go on forever with all the whole numbers, I can go on forever with, what? Even numbers to match them, right? So therefore, the even numbers are equal to all the numbers. Therefore, the part is equal to the, what? Oh. Yeah. See? Now, it's wrong with the argument, see? Well, is this two over here the same two? Oh, okay, yes. Or is it multiplied in the way we're multiplying Socrates in there to go? As a being of reason, right? Yeah. Yeah. See? So, if I say that two is two, I've got two twos now, right? And if I say two is two is two is two, I've got four now, right? And if I say this whole thing is itself, I'm going to have eight, and I can get as many twos as I want to, right? So Charles of Panic said, huh? That's no big thing. I can do that with just two. I don't know, right? Right? Because you can multiply as many twos as you want to, right? But it's just the same two as that one. Yeah. It is. I mean, ultimately, right? I mean, there's only... Or you're multiplying them like this, huh? See? In other words, there's a mental multiplication of things, right? So it's not really the same two as the one you have over here. And this is not the same as that two, is it? Unless you have two twos, you can't put this over here, right? Oh, okay. But because of that, you have as many twos as you want to, right? Okay? But then you're talking to me about this mental being, right? It's usually two kinds of being, huh? The being maybe of the real numbers and this mental being, huh? And this multiplicity here. I'd be like saying, you know, Socrates is as much as you people, right? I can have Socrates by doing this thing over here, right? I got Socrates for you, and a Socrates for you, and a Socrates for you, and Socrates. So Socrates is as much as all of you, or I'm as much as all of you, right? Because burquist is burquist, and burquist is burquist, and burquist is burquist, right? And all of that is itself, right? So I get more than enough burquist to handle all of you, and anybody else who's in this building, right? See? Does that make one man as much and even more than all of you? This is what a sophist does, though, right? He attacks an axiom like the whole is large in one of its parts, right? And the average people can't, what, solve that, right? I told you the example, the sophistical one on the same thing that I give in class to see if they can solve it. I say, now, what is a man, huh? Well, he's an animal, right? But he's not just an animal. He's more than that. He's an animal who has reason, right? Okay? So animal's only a part of what man is. So they all agree to that, right? And then I say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on, right? So what is only a part of man includes much more than man. Therefore, the part is sometimes not less than the whole, but even more than the whole. Yeah, yeah, they're all sitting here. See? What's wrong with that? What's wrong with that? Yeah, yeah. Because when I say man is an animal that has reason, that's a definition of man, and a definition is a composed whole, composed of the genus, which in this case is animal, and the difference, which is reason. And the definition of man is always more than just the genus of man, or always more than just the difference of man, right? Okay? But when I say animal includes besides man, dog, cat, and horse. I'm considering animal now as a universal whole, set of man, dog, and cat. And it's always set of more than man is set of, or it's always set of more than animal is set of, right? So if you take each kind of whole and part, the whole always contains more or is set of more, right? Which makes me have two different senses here, right? And the students can't, what, see the distinction of the senses, huh? And so when Aristotle said that, you know, the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up different senses of the same word. You can see that all the time with the students, huh? They think the argument is good at first, huh? Just like I, you know, the word general in particular, you know, it's something like this. When I teach the beginning of the Aristotle's physics there, Aristotle shows that we know things in general before in particular. And it shows it by the fact that we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. And to know something in general is not to know as distinctly as known in particular. And like to know this is a liquid is not to know it as well as to know it's water, right? And to know this is a theology book is more distinct than to just know it's a book, right? But then I argue and I say, but Aristotle says that our knowledge begins in our senses. And the senses know particulars. And it's reason that knows the general or generalizes. So don't we know the particular before the general? Has an Aristotle contradicted himself? Yeah, yeah, yeah, he's contradicted himself. Well, they can't untie it, I said. But they're mixing up two meanings of the word particular and two meanings of the word general, right? Sometimes the word particular means a singular. Like if I say that you are a particular man. But sometimes the word particular doesn't mean singular at all. It means among universals, the less universal. So I might say the dog is a particular kind of animal, right? But their particular doesn't mean an individual, right? That's when I say Socrates is a particular man, right? So when you say the particular comes before the generals, Aristotle, or we will say sometimes, we mean singulars come before universals in our knowledge. Just as the senses come before understanding, huh? The thing is singular when sensitive, the way it says, but universal when understood. But when he says at the beginning of the physics that the general is before the particular, general means the more universal, and particular means the what? Less universal, huh? Okay? So he's not contradicting himself, right? He's saying the singular comes first, and then the more universal, and then the less universal. But because the singular and the less universal are both called, what? Particular, and they can't see that difference, then they are deceived by the sophist, huh? Sometimes they give a, you know, second objection, you know. Okay, you got out of that, but if you start the singular, shouldn't the less universal come before the more universal, because it's closer to the singular, right? I start with Socrates, should I come to man before animal? But you're forgetting about the fact that our mind knows things in a confused way before it knows them distinctly. And so I take the simple example. If you went out on the campus, on the grounds here, and you're going to classify the kinds of plant life here, okay? And not take anybody's word for it, right? Well, all your knowledge of the plants on this campus or on this grounds would start with your senses, and therefore with singular as your individuals, right? But now as you begin to arrive at the universals from the singularism, would you arrive at the different kinds of grass, the different kinds of pine tree, or would you arrive at the difference between grass and tree first? Difference between grass and tree. Yeah, yeah. So you'd see the more universal before the, what, less universal, huh? And it makes sense, too, for another reason, that the difference between a grass and trees are much greater than between different kinds of grass, huh? And I know myself, and there are between different kinds of trees. And I know, just if you take trees in particular, when I was in a botany class, we had to walk around campus with a chart, you know, and trying to classify the trees, huh? Well, the basic distinction among trees was between those that were needled, pine trees, so to speak, and the broadleaf tree, right? And no one ever confused those two, in my experience. But whether it was a Norway pine, or whatever the particular pine was, I don't think I ever did learn the differences between different trees, right? So, I know the more universals, needle and flatleaf thing, before I know the difference between oak and maple and so on, or between Norway pine and other kinds of pines, you see? Now, another example is that of alcoholic beverages, right? See? And if you're going to take nobody's word for that, but just sample them yourself, right? All your knowledge would begin with the individual glasses of beer or wine or whiskey that you drank, right? Okay? But now as you begin to classify these things and to arrive at universals, would you see the difference between Budweiser and Miller first, or between beer and wine first? Would you see the difference between Carbonet Sauvignon and Pinot Noir, you know? Or the difference between red, between wine and beer first? What did you see first? See? Yeah. So, although you do start with the singulars, because of our potency and our knowing things in a confused way first, we tend to know the more universal before the, what? Less universal, huh? We're going to know the difference between a dog and a cat before the difference of different kinds of dogs, right? Different kinds of cats, huh? Okay. So, all that's just kind of an aside here, and this is probably the second objection though, right? What's interesting, huh? That the first thing we can't, we understand cannot be our own act of understanding. But the angel in his first act of understanding understands what? His own substance, and therefore the perfection of his own substance, which is his own understanding of his own substance. But what I first understand, as Thomas says, is a stone, or a triangle, or something like that. And my understanding what a stone is, is not a perfection of what a stone is. And my understanding what a triangle is, is not a perfection of what? Triangle, right? If what I first understood was my soul, or what I first understood was my mind, maybe the first thing I could understand would be my understanding. Because that's a perfection of my mind and of my soul. But it's not a perfection of the stone, it's not a perfection of the triangle. Okay. That's a very interesting point he makes there, huh? Okay. And that's why the wise men are right in saying, know thyself, right? Because the words, if it's a reasonable exhortation, it must be dressed to someone who both can know himself, right? Unlike the animals, and therefore it's the plants and so on. But doesn't know himself, or know himself very well anyway, huh? Unlike the angels, know themselves perfectly, right away. Okay, now the third objection here was taken from the senses again, that the senses, I don't know their own act, but another power knows this, huh? To the third, it should be said, huh? That the private sense senses according to the change of a material organ from the exterior sensible thing. But it's not however possible that something material, what? Change itself, right? But one is changed, what? By another, right? And therefore the act of the private sense is perceived or known by the common sense. But the understanding does not understand by a material change of the organ. And therefore it is not, what? Similar to the two, huh? Okay. In case of material material organ, you have a real, what? acting upon, right? And what acts upon something and what undergoes are not, what? The same, yeah. But I can, what? Understand my understanding and my will can love its, what? Loving, right? That's an article, that we treat this on charity, right? Whether by charity you can love not only God and your neighbor, but also love your loving of them. Right? Some people are in love with love, too. Okay. Should we go on or take a break here before we do the next article? Just a short break. What are whistles here? Shat to the Thales. To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the understanding does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is understood by the understanding except what is in some way present in the understanding itself. But the act of the will is not present in the understanding, since they are other powers. Diverse powers. Therefore, the act of the will is not known by the, what? Understanding, right? So how can I know that I love wisdom, right? I don't know the act of my will, huh? Moreover, an act has its, what? Species from its object. But the object of the will is different from the object of the understanding. Because the object of the will is the, what? Good, right? The object of the understanding is the truth. Therefore, the act of the will has a different species or form from the object of the understanding. Therefore, it's not known by the understanding. Moreover, Augustine in the 10th book of the Confessions attributes to the affections of the soul, the acts of the appetitive power, that they are known neither by images as bodies, nor by their presence as the arts are known, but by certain notions, huh? It does not seem, however, that there can be other notions of things in the soul except the natures of the things known or the likenesses. Therefore, it seems impossible that the understanding knows the affections of the soul, which are the acts of the will. But against this is what Augustine says in the 10th book about the Trinity. I understand me to will. Okay. I don't know if that's correct English, but that's what the Latin says, right? I always say in English, I understand myself to will. I understand that I will. Yeah, yeah. I have a lot of time. I answer, it ought to be said, as has been said above, that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain, what? Inclination fouling upon the form understood, just as natural desire is an inclination following upon the natural, what? Form. So once you acquire, what, a certain nature, you have a certain inclination following upon that nature, right? In the case of, what, sense desire and the intellectual desire, which is will, it follows not upon a natural form, but a form sensed or a form, what, understood, huh? Okay. But the inclination of each thing is in that thing in its own way, huh? Once the natural inclination inclination is naturally in a natural thing. And the inclination, which is the, what, sensible desire, is sensibly in the one sensing, huh? I wonder if that's the reason why we call our emotions sometimes feelings, right? Because a feeling, what, implies there's something sensible about your feelings, right? Mm. A feeling of anger, a feeling of sadness, right? You hurt my feelings, okay? But it's just something, what? But my emotions are sensibly, as he's saying here, right, sensibilitare, in the one sensing, right? Do you feel, in a sense, your emotions? Yeah. So I feel sad, I feel angry, right? The anger or the sadness is there in a kind of sensible way, right? And likewise, the understandable inclination, which is the act of the will, is understandably in the one understanding, as in a beginning, and as in its own, what? Subject, right? Whence the philosopher uses this way of speaking in the third book about the soul, that the will is in, what? Reason, right? Now, sometimes Thomas will qualify that and say, you know, in the rational part of man, right? The immaterial part, huh? But what is understandably in the one understanding, is consequently understood by him? Whence the act of the will is understood by the understanding, and insofar as someone perceives himself to will, and insofar as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently the nature of its source, which is the habit for the, what? Power, right, huh? So do you know your friendship for somebody? And a friendship is a habit, right? But you know the friendship through the, what? Knowing your good will that you have towards this person, right? So that reason, and knowing that good will that you have towards somebody recognizes your, what? Friendship for that person, right? Now, the first objection says, hey, these two things, huh? They're two different powers, right, huh? And you can't know the act of the will unless it was in the, what? The intellect, but it's not in intellect, it's in the will. Right? The first objection, right? Nothing is known by the understanding except it be present in some way in the understanding. But the act of the will is not present in the understanding, right? Say, diverse powers, huh? But they're very much connected, as Tommy says. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that reason proceeds as if the understanding and the will, just as they are diverse, what powers, right? So also they differ in, what? Subject, huh? For thus what is in the will would be absent from the understanding, huh? But now, since both are rooted in the one substance of the soul, and one is in a way a beginning of the other, huh? Because it's the good as understood that is will, huh? Just as it's the good as sense that is what arouses our feelings, right? So they're rooted in one substance of the soul, and one of these is in a way the beginning of the other. Consequently, what is in the will is also in a way in the, what? Understanding, huh? It's what a sense of memories of each other, right? And not only are they rooted in the soul, but in that, what, part of the soul which arises above, what? Matter, right? That part of the soul that is not, what, immersed in matter, okay? Kind of interesting, the word that Thomas uses there, right? You know, he speaks of the soul of a, even of a dog, let alone the soul of a plant, is being immersed in matter, right? It's like thinking of, what, the water, right, huh? And something immersed in the water is entirely under the water, right? Okay? But then there's something else that is, what, floating in the water and partially immersed, but part of it rises above the water, right? And this is the way our soul is in the body, right? It's not entirely immersed in the body. Now, how do we know that, huh? Because it has acts like understanding and willing that are not in the body. So that shows that the soul is not entirely immersed in the body. So we're kind of...