De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 160: The Separated Soul's Knowledge and Understanding

Transcript
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You know the premises first, right? And through knowing the premises, you come to know the conclusion. Okay? But God is not in that same order, is he? No. God is not what's first known, but God is the first cause of our soul and of our ability to understand, right? Okay? He's not what's first known. Okay? So he got in trouble with the objector, right, with that little phrase, right? About understanding it, right? Okay? So if known was said of God and creatures, right? Known to us was said of God and creatures, right? But creatures are known to us because we know God, then God would be more known than creatures, right? But that isn't true, right? No. Or if it's true that God is known to us and creatures are known to us, but we know what? God, God through creatures, right? And creatures are more known to us than God. That's the way it is, huh? To the third, it should be said, this is the one from the image now, our soul being, I mean, the image of the Trinity and so on. To the third, it should be said that if in our soul there was a perfect likeness or image of God, as God the Son, right, as the perfect image of the Father, that once our mind would, what, understand God, right? It over is an imperfect image, right? Once the argument does not, what, follow, right, huh? Okay? So maybe we should stop there, huh? So we can start the question 89 and I come back. I'll be gone next week, I think. I told you, Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, drink from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, amen. So today we'll start to find out what it's going to be like after you die, huh? Your soul is there. Then we're now to consider about the knowledge of the separated soul. And about this thing, four things are asked. First, whether the soul, separated from the body, is able to understand. Secondly, whether it understands the separated substances, namely the angels. Third, whether it understands all natural things. Fourth, whether it knows singulars. Fifth, whether the habits of knowledge here acquired remain in the separated soul. Well, I still have geometry, huh? Whether one is able to use the habit of science here acquired. Seven, whether the local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul. And eight, whether the separated souls, whether the souls separated from bodies, know things which are done here, right? You know what's going on at the monastery after you leave, huh? Yeah, come. Your mother and father, you know, if they've gone on, they know what's going on with their children, right? So, to the first, one proceeds thus. It seems that the soul, separated from the body, is not able to understand anything. Actually, you see, nothing altogether is able to understand. It's all better to say it's able to understand nothing. For the philosopher says in the first book about the soul, that to understand is corrupted, huh? When something within is corrupted. But all the interior things of man are corrupted by death. Therefore, to understand itself is corrupted, huh? Second, moreover, the human soul is impeded from understanding by the binding up of the senses and by the disturbance of the imagination, like a blow in the head or something. But by death, holy sense and imagination are corrupted, as is clear from the things said before or above. Therefore, the soul after death understands nothing. Moreover, if the separated soul understands, it's necessary to understand through some forms. But it does not understand through inborn forms, because in the beginning is like, as Aristotle said, a tablet, or a table, in which nothing is, what, written, pad, nor by forms which it abstracts from things. Because it does not have the organs of sense and of imagination, by means of which understandable forms are separated from things. Nor even through forms before abstracted and conserved in the soul. Because thus, the soul of a boy would understand nothing after death, huh? One would not have enough experience, and so on, to have gotten these forms. Nor even through understandable forms poured into the soul divinely. For this knowledge would not be natural, about which now we are treating, but of grace. Therefore, the separated soul, or therefore the soul separated from the body, understands nothing, huh? But again, this is what the philosopher says in the first book about the soul. That if there's none of the operations of the soul that are proper to it, or private to it, huh? It is not able to be, what, separated. But it does happen that the soul can be separated from the body. Therefore, it has some operation of its own, and most of all, the one which is to understand. Therefore, it understands existing without the body, huh? Actually, the way the philosopher reasons is just the reverse, right? But the soul is an operation, an activity, that's not in the body, right? And therefore, its existence is not altogether in the body, right? Okay? But this argument is taking, you know, because it's said, or because it's probable, right? That the soul is immortal, right? And this condition, that it's got to have some operation, if it's acceptable. That Aristotle will begin with, right? Okay? Now, Thomas says, As I answer, it should be said that this question has difficulty, from the fact that the soul, so long as it is joined to the body, right, is not able to understand anything, huh? Except by turning itself towards the, what, images, huh? So right now, if I want to understand what a triangle is, I have to form an image of a triangle, right? Because what a triangle is, is something of what I've imagined, right? Okay? And that doesn't mean that the thinking or the understanding is in the imagination, right? But going back to Aristotle's proportion there, right? That the images are to the understanding, like the exterior color in your clothing, let's say, is to my eye, right? And I can't see the blackness of your robes without your robes being there, right? So I can't understand what it is of something imagined, like what a triangle is, without imagining a triangle, right? So we saw that earlier in there, our discussion of how the soul moves, huh? That not only does it get its thoughts, in some sense, from the images, right? But even after it has the thoughts, in order to use them, it's got to turn back towards the images. So how can it understand then, right? Separate it from the soul, right? What's going to understand in another way, huh? Well, let's let Thomas explain this to us. If, however, this was not from the very nature of the soul, that it turns towards the images, right? But it just happened, huh? From the fact that it's joined to the body, right? As a patronist laid down, huh? The question... would be easily, what? Solved, right? For the impediment of the body being removed, the soul would come back to its own nature, so that it might, what? Understand. Understandable simply. Not by turning itself towards images, just as in the other separated substances they don't turn towards images, huh? So you have this idea, huh, in Platonists and to some extent in the, what, origin and so on, right? That this is kind of a punishment, the soul being put into the body, sort of imprisoned in the soul, right? Or the soul, rather, kind of being imprisoned in the body, and that it's impeded by the, what, body, right? Like putting you or me into a dark room or something, right? Gets in the way of our sensing, right? So that the soul being immersed in the body there is in a prison, is what? Distracted from its own nature, right? And those only turning towards the body at first. But that's not what the soul is, right? The soul is the first act of a natural body, huh? Composed of tools. So the union of the soul and the body is something natural. But according to this opinion of the Platonists, the soul would not be united to the body for the good or the better of the soul, huh? If it understood, worse, in a worse way, right? Joined to the body than when it was, what? Separated, huh? But this would be only for the better of the body, which is unreasonable, right? Since matter is for the sake of form and not the, what, reverse, huh? Did you ever see the way Aristotle shows in a simple way that matters for the sake of form? Well, he goes to the practical arts, right? And he compares three arts. The art that prepares the raw materials and the art that forms the product and the art that uses the formed product, huh? And those three arts are connected, aren't they? And which art commands which art? Yeah. The art that uses the product commands the art that forms the product, and the art that forms the product tells those who prepare the materials how they should be prepared, right? Now, why is it that the art that uses the product commands the art that forms the product? Because obviously the use of the product is the purpose of the product, right? So if in the use of the automobile on the highway, defects show up, you know, like, from time to time happens, right? Then they recall the cars and, what, reform them in some way, huh? Okay? But the, just as the art that uses the product commands the art that forms it, so the art that forms it commands the art that repairs the raw material. So the relation of the art that prepares the matter is like, right, that of the art that uses it to the foreign product. So just as it uses the end of the, what, foreign product, so the foreign product is the end of the raw materials that are being prepared. Okay? So my father's engineer would say, um, we've got some interesting ideas, we've got to make something according to these ideas, but then they take it out to the farm and they test it, you see? And if in the use of the product there appears suited in what? Defects, then they'd go back to the boards, right? But my father's company that would make the foreign product, they would tell the steel people or the lumber people what kind of steel they want, or what shape they wanted, or what size they wanted, in the same way for the, what? Wood, right? Okay? That's where Aristotle shows it, in a very simple way, that form is the end of matter, because of the order of those three arts, right? You can see it very clearly in all the arts, huh? In that sense, the connoisseur is the judge of whether the cook has done a good job, right? But the cook tells, you know, he goes out to the market or something, right? And tells him he doesn't want this, he wants that, right? Or he tells the potato peeler how to cut the potatoes this time, how to prepare the raw materials, right? Okay? Okay? But the raw materials are for the sake of the finished dinner, and the finished dinner is for the sake of the, what? Eating, right? If the man's got a good sense of taste, he's the, what? He commands, huh? You see? Send this back to the kitchen, right? Okay, so it doesn't make sense to say that the soul is joined to the body just for the good of the body, because then the lower would, what, be the end or purpose of the higher, right? So if the soul being joined to the body was impeded in its understanding, like the Pilates said, right, then it could be natural, the union of the soul to the body would be some kind of punishment, as they say, huh? Okay? So let's read the sense I just stopped on. But according to this, the soul would not be joined to the body for the better of the soul if it understood worse, right, united to the body, then separated. But this would be only for the better of the body, which is unreasonable, since matter is for the sake of form and not the reverse. If, however, we lay down that the soul, by its very nature, has, that it understands, by turning itself towards the images, since the nature of the soul by the death of the body is not changed, huh? It seems, right, at first, huh, that the soul naturally is able to understand nothing, since there are not, what, present to it images to which it might, what, turn, right? Okay? And therefore, to taking away this difficulty, it should be considered that since nothing acts except insofar as it is an act, I think, therefore, I am, right? I have to be, actually, right, before I can do something. Then he says, the way of doing of each thing follows the way of being of each thing, huh? But the soul has another way of being when united to the body and when it is, what, separated from the body, but the same nature, what, of the soul remaining, huh? Not in the sense that to be united to the body is to it accidental, but by reason of its very nature, it is united to a body, huh? That's the definition of the soul, right? It's the first act of a natural body composed of tools. Just as what, whose nature is to be, what, light, huh? Is not changed when it's in its own place, which is natural to it, huh? And when it is outside its own place, huh? Which is, what, besides its nature, right? So, to the soul, according to that way of being in which it is united to the body, there belongs a way of understanding by turning towards the, what, images of the body. Which are in body organs. So, so long as the soul is in the body, right, huh? And its existence is, what, shared in by the body, it's naturally turning towards the body, right? And it doesn't naturally understand except by turning, then, towards the body images. But when it is separated from the body, huh? There belongs to it the way of understanding by turning itself towards those things that are, what, understandable simply. That are actually understandable, as opposed to material things, which are understandable only in ability, right? And have to be made actually understandable by the agent intellect, huh? Just as for the other separated substances. Whence the way of understanding by turning itself to images is natural to the soul, just as to be united to the body is natural to it. But to be separated from the body is, what, outside the definition of its nature. And similarly to understand without turning towards images is outside its nature. Not opposed to its nature, but outside its nature. And therefore, for this reason, is united to the body, that it might operate according to its own nature. But this, again, has a doubt about it. For since nature is always ordered to that which is better, but is a better way of understanding by turning one's self to those things that are understandable simply. When he says understandable simply, he means the things that are understandable in act. As opposed to the things that are material that are understandable only in ability, and are made actually understandable through the agent, what, intellect that we talked about. And notice how that takes place, right? I see that cat, and I remember that cat, and then I see another cat, and I remember that cat, right? Before you know it, I have an experience of cat, right? And then I compare my images of cats, right? And then I start to separate out what they have in common. And when I separate out what they have in common, I have something actually understandable. And so as Boethius says, the thing is singular when sensed or imagined, but universal when what? Understood, huh? So it's the acting upon understanding, the active, the agent, like this Thomas calls it, that makes what? What is understandable only in ability, actually understandable. But the angels and separate substances are what? Actually understandable. Especially, of course, God. Okay, since nature is always ordered to that which is better, right? But it's a better way of understanding by turning towards things that are understandable simply, than by turning to images. It is, God thus ought to have, what? Institute the nature of the soul, that the way of understanding that is more noble would have been natural to it. And it would not need to be united to a body, right? That's the question, right? Okay? And it's a less serious objection to the Platonists, right? The Platonists are saying, what? That this is actually impeding the operation of understanding, right? And Thomas says, well, no, no. This is a natural way of understanding, right? But there's another objection to that, right? That the way of understanding by turning towards things that are understandable simply, that is to say, understandable in act, is a more noble way of understanding, and to turn towards images that are understandable only in ability that have to be made more actual. So why is it that we have that way of knowing naturally, when it seems to be inferior, obviously, to the way of knowing of, what? The angels, and the way of knowing even of the separated soul, right? Well, you're going to see how Thomas answers that, right? It should be considered, therefore, that although to understand by turning towards higher things is simply more noble, right? Than to understand by turning towards images. In other words, if I turn myself towards my guardian angel, right? Or towards God, that's a better way of understanding than to turn my way towards these bodily images, right? Nevertheless, that way of understanding, insofar as it is possible for the soul, would be more imperfect, huh? Now, why is that so? Well, in this way it can become clear. In all understanding substances, there is found a power of understanding by the influx of the divine light, huh? Like we see in the Gospel of St. John, right? This is the light that enlightens every man, right? But also every angel, right? Which, in the first beginning, is one and simple, huh? I can say, now this is prayer of communion there, right? Lux vera. One and simple, huh? But the more understanding intellectual creatures are distant from the first beginning, namely God, the more that light is what? Divided and what? Diversified, huh? Just as happens in lines going forth from the center. Hence it is that God, through his one nature or essence, understands all things. The higher among the intellectual substances, although they understand through many forms, nevertheless they understand through fewer ones, and ones that are more, what? Universal and more powerful for the comprehension of things, on account of the efficacy of the power of understanding, which is in them. But in the lower intellectual creatures, there are more forms, and less universal, and less efficacious to, what? The comprehension of things, huh? Insofar as they fall short from the, what? Power of understanding of the ones that are above, right? So you heard my little poem there about God the Father and God the Son, right? God the Father said it all in one word. I wonder when the Lord became a man. He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was a brevity and soul of it. Okay? But notice, huh? God says everything that could be said, right? In one word, huh? He expresses everything that could be understood in one thought perfectly, right? And as you descend from God to the angels, and from the higher to the lower, it takes more and more thoughts to express, right? Until you get down to the very bottom, which is our mind. You need like a separate thought for everything. A separate thought for the cat, a separate thought for the dog, a separate thought for the elf, a separate thought for the ant, right? You see? And if we try to understand dog and cat with one thought, it's kind of confused, like four-footed animals or something like that, right? You see? So to know distinctly as opposed to confusedly, we need to, what? Multiply our thoughts more. As you go down, right? From God, you get more multiplicity. And Thomas will say, you can see that with the student, even a little bit of human beings, right? That you need more words and more examples to get the idea across to the less intelligent student, right? For a few words or one example or something, well, to the superior mind, we'll get the idea right away. I remember, like, in grade school, you know, and when you do math, you know, it used to be explaining the principle, right? And they give you some examples, you know, we've got to work it out, right? And then there'd be another section called Extra Help for Those Who Need It. I guess I remember that. I don't say I need that. I wouldn't say that. But I remember that the way it was set up, right? In other words, you have to work through many more, some people, right? And they end up still knowing the principle not as well as a person who uses just a couple examples, right? And so, as a teacher, you see that, right? You know, you're trying to, you know, get two or three students to understand the same thing. One student understands it with just a few things you say right away. And the other ones, you have to say many more things and many more examples, and they still don't understand as well as the first guy did, you see? Right? Okay? And you see the parallel that I make there to my, one of my favorite theorems are number five, right? Remember that proportion I gave you? In book two of Euclid? What you can show from the two of Euclid is that of all rectangles, right, the simplest one, the square, contains more area for the same, what, perimeter. And Euclid shows that the difference in area will be the square of the difference in the sides, huh? Without trying to prove it here, just to exemplify it again, huh? If you had a square that's five by five, you had a perimeter of what? Twenty, right? If you had one that was four by six, not as simple because they're not all the same length, right? You'd still have a perimeter of twenty, right? If you had three by seven, you'd still have a perimeter of twenty, right? But notice, huh? The area of five by five is twenty-five, the area of four by six is twenty-four, three by seven is twenty-one, right? Now the difference between five and seven, or five is twenty-one, right? The area of five is twenty-one, right? The area of five is twenty-one, right? The area of five is twenty-one, right? The area of five is twenty-one, right? The area of five is twenty-one, right? and 3 is 2, and 2 squared is 4, and that's the difference between the 2, right? Okay? So, at the same perimeter, with the same amount of fence, you might say, a square is going to contain more land than one that departs. And the more you depart from the simplicity of the, what? Square, the less, what? There you have, right? And then you see the possibility that you could have actually more perimeter than less area. And let's take an example. Suppose you had one 2 by 10. Well, the perimeter here would now be 24, which is more than 20, right? But the area is only, uh, 20, huh? So, with less perimeter, I could contain more area. That's kind of an amazing thing, right? That's right. But another thing you see about this is that the one that contains the most area is the simplest, right? And see, that's a very interesting thing, okay? Now, sometimes I compare this to modern physics, where the father of modern physics, Max Planck, is it, right? They call him the father of modern physics, the physics of the 20th century, right? Because in December of 1900, he proposed the quantum hypothesis, huh? Okay? And five years later, Einstein showed you couldn't understand light without the quantum. And 13 years later, Bohr showed you couldn't understand the atom without the quantum. And the quantum physics led to the greatest change in physics since Newton and Galileo and Kepler, huh? The greatest change that ever took place in Monsanto. But anyway, Max Planck says, when he made his discovery, he thought that the more universal theory was in, what, physics, the simplest it is. Okay? And he still thought that, you know, you're there. You see, there's another great physicist, right? That the simpler the theory, the more universal theory, the more facts, so to speak, it covers, the simpler is his form. Okay? And then I can compare it to what we learned here in the beginning of the Summa. In question two of the Summa, we show that God exists, that God is the first cause, right? Now, what is question three of the Summa? Simplicity, yeah. You see? We show that God, who is the most universal cause, whose causality stems to all things in some way, right? He's the simplest of all. But it's kind of just a picture of that here, right? That the simpler figure, which is a square, right? Contains more area for the same, what? A perimeter. And even more area for less perimeter. That seems amazing, right? You see? And when Aristotle is comparing tragedy and epic, right? He says that they have a similar, you know, effect upon the audience, right? But the tragedy does it with, what? Fewer words and fewer means, huh? So it's a more powerful, more perfect form of fiction, the tragedy, than the epic, huh? Epictics, you know? An awful lot of words, to accomplish what the tragedy does with much less, huh? Okay? And, you know, when they compare Mozart and Haydn, right? Haydn is always going to know the key, you know, for varieties of spice of life, you know? But in Mozart, close in one to another, there's always some significance to it, you know? So Mozart, you know, in some sense is simpler, far more compelling than Haydn, right? But then I make this other thing, you know, I'll quote Polonius there, where he says, Brevity is a soul of wit, huh? And wit there is used in the older sense of wisdom, right? If you're saying, Brevity, which means shortness, right? Shortness is a soul of wisdom. Brevity is a soul of wit. You say, how can the wise man be characterized by shortness when he knows more than everybody else, right? You see? But the point is that the wiser man, he says more with, what? Fewer words. It's like the Pope said about, you can learn more from a year of studying Thomas than from a lifetime of studying the Church Fathers. Thomas can say more with, what? Fewer words. And, right, the Bible says, the fool, who's the ups of the wise man, by the way, he says, the fool multiplieth his words. That's the old saying. Oh, what a complicated web we weave, let's just do practice to deceive. When you lie about something, you know, you know, the kid coming back, you know, where you been, you know, and you lie, and then, you know, you've got to, it's more complicated to try to explain your absence, huh? Um, so I make this proportion sometimes, I'll say, um, as area is too perimeter, if you want to do it that way, so is, uh, what you said to the, what, words, right? And so just as it's possible, although it might seem impossible at first, just as it's possible with less perimeter to contain more area, right? So it's possible with fewer words to say more, right? The content that you're saying, huh? Okay? So I notice a lot of times, even with somebody as good as Shakespeare, I'll find a passage and say, gee, that's marvelous, you know, I'll see something marvelous in the passage, and I'll write it down, or try to memorize it, and it would fit this course or something I'm thinking about. And then all of a sudden I start to see all kinds of other things that I didn't see before, right? You know? Just in the act of writing it down mechanically, I said, oh, oh, and then I get talking about it in class, and then all of a sudden it comes to my mind, another class, and it's got another application there, you know? All these things that come from it, huh? And, uh, so, it's kind of funny, huh? In the text of metaphysics here at one point, you know, in the Latin text of Thomas, Um, Aristotle says, well, that's a brevet, that's a brevet. Of course, Thomas, you know, stops, you know, what does Aristotle mean? That's a brevet. It means it's something small in size, he says, but great in its power, he means. But it's almost like the same word that Shakespeare uses. Brevity is the soul of wit, huh? But you see that, you know, in a very clear way in those universal equations in physics, because you can deduce infinity things from one equation, right? Force equals mass times acceleration. There's an infinity of masses you can calculate from that, or an infinity of forces, huh? So in something one, you can get infinity of things. So, um, I used to have some, I have them somewhere, uh, Plutarch's there in the lies, describing some of the rhetoricians there, you know, and they're really good speakers, huh? And the one guy's about to give a speech, and he's kind of walking back and forth there, you know, refining it, and are you expanding on your speech? No, it says I'm shortening it. And, but I, I know as a professor, you know, in colleges you often have two sections of the same course, right? And so you're going to be, you've got to keep them in parallel, because I always get mixed up with what you said and didn't say, you know, last time, right? But you'll find very often as a professor that the second time you lecture on the same material, unless you're, unless you're tired, uh, you find that you think you're saying the same things better and more clearly, right? And then you've got some time left over. I said it better than I said it the first time, and, uh, more clearly and more understandably, and, uh, it took me less time. How did I do that? I would say I'm improving just as I go from, one lecture on the same subject to the second one, right? You know, you lecture, you know, on the same things year after year sometimes. I mean, there's certain courses that you teach very regularly, you know? You keep on seeing more in these things, huh? And he had Deconic dealing with the physics there. It evolved there. He'd been teaching it since 1935 or something like that, right? He still saw more in it every time he taught it, huh? I can remember him stopping in the hall there, you know, looking up into my eyes and saying, you know, isn't this wonderful, you know? He's felt wonderful. I wonder, anybody else in the class. But he's taught this thing, you know, many more times than the, than, uh, you know, you think, but, um, but that's what you see doing somebody like Aristotle or Thomas. I don't want to assume. I don't want to assume. I don't want to assume. I don't want to assume. I don't want to assume. like that, huh? They say so much and so few words, but you keep on seeing more in them, huh? And that's true about, you know, Shakespeare too, huh? Modern philosophers, you see less and less each time. It's interesting, even understanding, John Locke apologizes for the length of the work, but he's too lazy so he has to go back and bear it down. That's one of my favorite things they teach is the fragments of the Greek philosophers, huh? Because they say so much and so few words, huh? Nature loves to hide, says Heraclitus, huh? They say so much and so few words, and you just, you know, have a few words there and talk about it, huh? They gave a whole lecture one time out at TAC and just one fragment of Heraclitus, huh? So much and it's amazing. Moderation is the greatest virtue. Wisdom is to speak the truth, to act in accordance with nature, giving here and there too. A whole lecture on that one. So what Thomas is saying here, huh? That's kind of, you know, something like that as you go from God down, what, from the seraphim to the cherubim all the way down to the angels and then fighting at the very bottom, man, you require more and more, what, thoughts to understand less and less. Unless not as well, right? Okay? So the lower you go down, as you depart from God and go down the ring of angels, with more thoughts you don't understand as well as the one above you with less thoughts. This is part of the reason why our soul is joined into the body, because we're at the bottom there, right? And we need this multiplication of thoughts that we get through sensible things, huh? Let's watch Thomas expand on that a little bit. So he's been saying, huh, how everything comes in some way from what God, huh? And hence it is that God, through his one nature, right, understands all things. I'm repeating myself here, but I forget to talk. The higher among the intellectual substances, although they understand through many forms, right? Nevertheless, they understand through fewer than the ones down below, right? And forms that are more universal in their power, huh? And more powerful for the comprehension of things, on account of the efficacy of the intellectual power which is in them. But in lower ones, there are, what, many forms, right? And they are less universal and less efficacious for the comprehension of things, insofar as they, what, fall short from the power of understanding of the higher ones. If, therefore, the lower substances were to have forms in that universality in which the higher ones have, because they are not of such efficacy and understanding, they would not get through them a perfect knowledge about things, but in a kind of commonness and confusion, right? Which, to some extent, appears also in men, right? For those who are weaker understanding, through universal concepts of those understanding more, they do not get a more perfect knowledge, unless things are, what, broken down in particular for them, huh? And see, you find that, you know, if you teach philosophy, you know, they just say, oh, this is so abstract, right? I said, they, but I think what they mean when they say it's so abstract is it's something very, what, universal, right? And they want something that is very particular and concrete, huh? So they have a difficulty understanding those universals, huh? Now, it is manifest that among the understanding substances, according to the order of nature, the lowest are the human souls, huh? Okay? For this, the perfection of the universe requires that there be diverse, what, grades and things, huh? As Thomas will say, the difference in kind is more important for the perfect universe than the individual differences among things, huh? Because it's a more formal diversity, huh? If, therefore, the human souls were thus instituted by God, so that they would understand that the way which belongs to separate substances, they would not have a perfect knowledge, but a very confused one in general, huh? For this, therefore, that they might have a perfect and proper knowledge, you know, particular knowledge, you might say, of things, thus they are naturally instituted that they would be, what, united to bodies, so that from sensible things, they might take a particular knowledge of things, huh? Okay? Just as, what? Rude men, huh? Imperfect men, right? Rough men, right? Cannot be led to science except through, what? Sensible examples, huh? Something very particular. Now, just leave your finger on this page here and just show what Thomas says here about the teacher in question 117, article 1. I have a connection now thinking. This is the first article in question 117, okay? And look at the last paragraph, this last paragraph is in my last text, of the body of the article, right? Where he says, the teacher leads the student, right, from things he already knows, to acknowledge the things unknown in two ways, huh? In one way, by proposing to him some aids or tools which his understanding uses to acquire knowledge, as when he proposes to him, what, some statements that are less universal, right? You see what I mean? He's proportioning something that's very universal. Ah. Which, nevertheless, from the things he knows already, the student is able to, what? Judge, huh? Or when he proposes to him some kind of sensible examples, huh? That's very particular, right? Or similitudes, or opposites, or other things of this sort, from which the understanding of the one learning, right, is led by the hand, okay? So, Monsignor Dian would call this manudexial, a leading by the hand, huh? To a knowledge of the unknown truth, right? And then, another way, he strengthens the understanding of the learner, when he proposes to him the order of principles or premises to conclusions, right? Okay? So, Monsignor Dian gave a course on the manudexial appropriate to logic, right? And the manudexial appropriate to, uh, wisdom, right, huh? Um, you have to study the more particular sciences before you can study wisdom, which has got this complete universality to it. But, you'll see, as a teacher, huh, you know, like, uh, when I touch upon the central question of philosophy, right? What's the central question of philosophy? Well, does truth require, right, that the way we know be the way things are, right? And the answer to that question is no. Okay? But that's an extremely universal proposition, as I call it the central question, right? It influences everything else. And, uh, the first time in my courses, at least, when we touch upon this, is, um, in the second book of the physics, when Aristotle was distinguishing between mathematics and natural philosophy. And he's pointing out that in mathematics, we consider sphere and number in separation from what? Sensible matter, right? So that the geometry, say, considers cube in separation from ice cube, and those wooden cubes you probably played with as a child, right? In separation from that plastic cube I have on my desk there as a paperweight, and any kind of material cube, right, huh? And, uh, is the mind false, knowing cube in separation from ice and wood and plastic and anything else? No. Even though it doesn't exist that way, does it? Exists only in wood or plastic or something. ...some other kind of material, huh? So it's what we can kind of see to that to some extent, right? Or I take, you know, Thomas' example, you know. You can know Berkowitz to be a, what, philosopher in separation from his being a grandfather, right? Or vice versa, you can know him to be a grandfather in separation from his being a philosopher. Now, in these two cases, your knowledge of Berkowitz is incomplete, right? But are you mistaken in saying Berkowitz is a philosopher, leaving out, he's a grandfather, or vice versa? Well, they can see that, right? But notice, this is a particular statement, isn't it? We're saying, our mind can know in separation, truly, right? Things that don't exist in separation. You see that? And then I'll take another one, where, can we know things, truly, in the reverse order that they are in reality? See, see? And I always take with students, I say, I know you, you are before your parents in my knowledge, right? I know you before I know your parents. And I might know your parents before I know your grandparents. See? But in reality, your grandparents came before your parents, and your parents came before you, right? So is my mind false in knowing, in the reverse order of reality? No. Or, we tend to know the effect before the cause, right? So every time we ask why, the effect is before the cause, in our knowledge, right? But in reality, it's the cause that gives rise to the effect. So Sherlock Holmes said, we have to reason backwards, he says. And Holmes and Watson said, what do you mean? We're from the effect to the cause, he says. You see? But is the mind false in knowing the effect before the cause? No. The mistake would come if you said that because the effect is before the cause in our knowledge, therefore, in reality, the effect is for the cause. Then you'd be identifying the order in which we know what the order in things, huh? But notice what I'm doing here, right? These are particular, right? You're showing that our reason can know things in separation, truly, in separation, that don't exist in separation, right? Our mind can truly know things in the reverse order that they come. And when we study history, you know, we tend to go back in history, right? And the further we get away from our own time, that maybe the more obscure things become, right? But is the mind false in doing that? Okay. But those are particular, what? Less universal statements, right? In which some particular way in which we know things is not the way in which those things are. Right? You see? So I'm showing you the more universal statement, the statement slash universal, Thomas says in question 117, article 1. And when you go from the particular sciences to wisdom, which is completely universal, things that you saw in a kind of particular way, partly in this science and another particular way or in this science and this one, they're seen in a, what? Complete universal way, finding wisdom. That's kind of strikingly, but what do you do there? But that's because it shows the weakness of our mind, right? And the more, the weaker the mind that you're trying to teach, the more mannyadaksyu you'd have to teach, yeah? But even as a teacher, you'd see that the weaker student, even with more mannyadaksyu, doesn't understand it as well as the better student, right? With a much shorter mannyadaksyu. You see that? Yeah. In fact, there's a little bit of a likeness there to what takes place here as you go up the scale or down the scale of the angels, huh? A distance from God, huh? So we'd be very confused if we didn't have very particular ideas. And the senses are useful for getting very particular ideas, huh? Right now we're into these cats and I come up here, right? Nice contact with the cat in particular, right? It's not animal in general, it's the cat. And I find that myself sometimes, you know, that there used to be kind of a famous edition of Aristotle's Poetics, huh? And Butcher edition, I can get it from Dover Books. And it has the Greek text of Aristotle's Poetics and English translation, opposite pages. And then it has all Butcher's essays, you know, he's kind of a famous critic. And then usually I'll stick in a preface there by some modern critic, you know, talking about tragedy all over the place, right? But I found that if you want to study this thing, you've got to kind of narrow yourself down, right? It makes, it makes more, you can understand better what Shakespearean tragedy is. And what tragedy is is common to all the authors might be called tragedians, right? See? That there's some confusion when you try to put it all together. You can take a particular one. So, you see the reason why the soul then is naturally joined to the body? To get particular thoughts. Kind of the weakness of our mind. Okay? Now they say when the upper angel talks to a lower angel, he what? Divides his thought with the lower angel, proportions it to the lower angel. But the human teacher does something like that with the student when he kind of divides the thing up and gives less universal statements or sensible examples. concrete things, huh? Okay? Thus, therefore, it is clear that it's an account of the better and the good of the soul that be united to the body and that it understands by turning towards images. And nevertheless, it is able to be separated, right? And to have another way of what? Understanding, right? Okay? So, you see, when the soul is separated from the body, it naturally turns towards the things that are, what, actually understandable. As long as the soul is in the body, it naturally turns towards the body and the things that are understandable own inability and not actually understandable until the acting upon understanding, the agent intellect, acts upon images, huh? Okay? And separates out what they have in common. Now, the first objection was based in a text of Aristotle. What does he mean, huh? Thomas gives two explanations of this text of Aristotle in the first book. To the first, therefore, it should be said that if the words of the philosopher are diligently discussed, the philosopher says this from a certain supposition, right, previously made, to wit, that to understand is a motion of the, what, conjunction of soul and body, just as to sense is. For he has not yet shown the difference between the understanding and sense. Now, that might seem kind of gratuitous at this point here, but as Thomas points out in other works of Aristotle, Aristotle will sometimes speak according to the opinions of his contemporaries until he's shown that this is not the truth, right? Okay? And so, he may be in book one there, right, where he's talking about the early Greeks and so on, and where the common opinion is that understanding like sensing is something, what, bodily, right? Okay? Just like I sometimes speak about my brain, right, being my reason, right, even though I don't think that the brain is my reason. I sometimes speak according to the opinion of people with whom I live, right? And I remember the first time I noticed Aristotle pointing, or Thomas V. pointing this out. In the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, right, Aristotle was talking about how different arts and sciences aim at different, what, goods, right? things. Okay. Okay. Okay.