De Anima (On the Soul)
Lecture 162: Knowledge of Separated Souls: Habits, Acts, and Distance

Transcript
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Like, you know, St. John Bosco and this fellow seminarian of his, right? Okay. I mean, I read that sometimes in the Lies of the Saints, you know, where they would have this vision, you know, Christ is there, and he's... I don't know, was it Margaret Mariana called? Yeah, I think that was a very explicit one there, where he's Claude Cambier or something. You go up to the place, I went to the place where her body is, and there's another church just up the block where he is. I guess his body is, you know, it's interesting. But the divine ordering, you know, in that he was too, right? And he'd go over to England, I guess, he'd go to see Margaret Mariana called first, and Christ would tell Margaret Mariana what he's going to meet over there, and who he's going to run into, and who he's in contact, you know? So, I mean, there's a very particular relation in between these two saints, huh? What did St. Teresa of Avila say about St. John on the Cross? He's kind of a short guy, I guess. And of course, you know, they'd always travel in Paris. Here comes that friar and a half, she'd say. Okay, so there's... Well, St. Teresa of Avila, you know, appeared to one of her sisters after she died, you know. She says, you know, we're not really at such a different state. She says, we're both praising God. I'm praising God face to face, and you're praising God behind a veil. Kind of interesting, huh? That's what she said, yeah. So, we should save the next four articles for our next time, right? God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you've written. In the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So, we're up to Article 5 here in Question 89, huh? To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the habits of science acquired here do not remain in the separated soul. For the apostle, says in the first Corinthians, science is what? Destroyed, right? And notice that's, what, in Tono Messiah for St. Paul, huh? St. Paul and St. Peter, right, Tono Messiah, are called the apostles. Moreover, some who are less good, like Berkwist, huh, in this world, huh, flower in science. Others, what, who are better, lack science, right? So, if, therefore, the habits of science remain also after death in the soul, it would follow that some who are less good, right, in the future state, would be more potent than some ones more good, right? Which seems inconvenient, right? Doesn't seem fitting. Moreover, the separated souls have knowledge through the flowing in of the divine light. If, therefore, the science acquired in the, here, acquired, remained in the separated soul, it would follow that there would be two forms of one kind in the same subject, which is impossible. Of course, would it be, in fact, the same kind of science? I don't think so. Moreover, the philosopher says, that's another Tono Messiah there, here for Aristotle. Moreover, the philosopher says in the book of the categories, the predicaments, that habit is a quality, difficulty, what, moved or changed. But from sickness, or from something of this sort, sometimes science is corrupted. But there's no greater change in this life than the change which is through death. Therefore, it seems that the habit of science is corrupted by, what, death, huh? But against this is what St. Jerome says, huh, in the epistle to Apollina. We learn on the earth, the science of which remains with us in, what, heaven, huh? I answer, it should be said, that some, and there's a reference in the footnote here to Avicenna, laid down that the habit of science is not in the understanding itself, but in the sensing powers, the inward senses, the imagination, and the cogitative power, and the memory. And that the understandable forms are not, what, conserved in the possible understanding. And if this opinion were true, it would foul, then, that the body being destroyed, wholly the habit of science here acquired would be destroyed. But because science is in the understanding, which is the place of forms, as is said in the third book about the soul, is necessary that the habit of science here acquired is partly in the four said sensing powers, and partly in the understanding itself. And this can be considered from the very acts from which the habits of science are acquired. For habits are like the acts from which they are acquired, as is said in the second book of Nicomachian Ethics. But the acts of the understanding from which in the present life our science is acquired are by turning of the understanding towards images, which are in the four said sensing powers. Whence, through such acts, there is acquired by the possible understanding itself, a certain facility to considering through forms that it has received. And in the four said lower powers, the inward senses, in other words, are acquired a certain, what, ability, certain facility, to turn, right, that by turning towards them, the understanding is able to look upon things understandable. But just as the act of the understanding chiefly and formally is in the understanding itself, in a material way and in a disposition, in the lower powers, so it should also be said about the, what, habit, right? Okay. So my habit of geometry is primarily in my reason, huh? But there's something in my, what, imagination, when I can picture triangles and circles and so on, that, what, cooperates to this, right? That's kind of a, what, disposition for science, huh? Okay. It's my reason that understands what a triangle is, huh? When I imagine a triangle, huh? Okay. So it's chiefly in the, in the habit, it's chiefly in the understanding, right? So it makes a distinction there. Quantum ergo, as regards, then, that of the present, or our present science, that is had in the lower powers, that is, say, in the interior senses, that does not remain in the separated soul, huh? I don't want to have a body, imagination, there, in my separated soul. But as regards that which is had in the understanding itself, it is necessary that they, what, that it remain, huh? Because, as is said in the book on the length and shortness of life, that's one of Aristotle's little books, right? On many things. In two ways, some form is corrupted. In one way, as such, when it's corrupted by its contrary, as hot is corrupted by cold. In another way, by accident, when its subject is corrupted, huh? But it's manifest that through the corruption of the subject, being the body, the science which is in the human understanding cannot be, what, corrupted. Since the understanding itself is incorruptible, as has been shown above. Similarly, neither are the intelligible forms able to be corrupted by the contraries, which are in the possible understanding. Because, to an understandable intention, nothing is contrary. That's why we say there's the same knowledge of, what, opposites, right? So my thought of, what, sickness doesn't corrupt my thought of health, does it? No. It actually helps me when thought helps the other thought, right? Okay. And this is especially true as regards a simple understanding. So my thought of, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, by which one understands what a thing is. But as you guard the operation by which the understanding puts together and divides, making an affirmative or negative statement, or even when it reasons, there is found contrariety in understanding, according as what is false in a statement, or an argument is contrary to the what? True, right? And in this way, sometimes science is corrupted by its contrary. When someone, through some false argumentation, is led away from a knowledge of the what? Truth, eh? And therefore the philosopher, in the foresaid book, lays down two ways by which science as such is corrupted. To wit, by forgetfulness on the side of the memory, or by deception on the side of a false what? Argument, eh? But this does not have place in a separated soul. Whence it should be said that the habit of science, according as it is in the understanding, remains in the separated soul. So things are received in the understanding, right? These forms in a much more stable way than they're received in anything in the body, right? So if you have habits even in the body that are somewhat stable in this life, right? Therefore it's already these habits in the mind, eh? And the understanding are going to be, what? Permanent, eh? Okay? But you won't understand by turning to images, eh? And you said, right, so, eh? You have another way of, what? Understanding, eh? Now, as regards the text of St. Paul there, the objection, science is destroyed, right, eh? Okay. He says, To the first, therefore, it should be said that the apostle does not speak there about science as regards the very habit, but as regards the act of knowledge. Whence to the proof of this, he adduces, now I know, what? In part, eh? I know him perfectly now. He's talking about the act. And the second objection was saying, what about the, see, maybe the theologian has more of a habit of science than Mother Teresa, right? So he's going to be better off than Mother Teresa in his life, eh? That's the objection, right? Or the Pharisee, then, the woman who put her mite into the widow, right? To the second, it should be said, that just as according to the stature of the body, someone less good, right, is greater than someone more good, so nothing prevents someone less good to have some habit of science in the future which someone more good does not have, right? But nevertheless, this is of no, what? Amount or no concern, moment, in comparison to the other prerogatives which the, what? Better ones have, right, eh? So they're going to see God much more, what? Clearly, right? Than the man who has less charity, huh? The man who has less charity might have some habits that, a science, right? Some geometry habits that the Mother Teresa or someone doesn't have, but she's going to see God much more clearly, and that's going to be omni and omnibus, right? God is all in all. So it's kind of, you know, no great concern, right, huh? Now the third objection we've already solved, and Thomas solves it like we did, you want to have two sciences of the same, what? Definition of the same kind, huh? The kind that was derived from, what? Turning to images, right? And the kind that is gotten directly from God flowing into the soul, some kind of light, huh? And the fourth objection was the one who was saying that, what? It is quite a change there through death. And Thomas says, well, yeah, you'll lose what there was a science in the interior, what? Senses, huh? But you won't lose what is a science in the understanding, which is primarily in the science and in the understanding. So he says that argument proceeds about the corruption of science as regards to what is had on the side of the sense powers, huh? Now, the next article he's going to talk more about, though, is the act exactly the same kind as was in this life, right? And that's going to be in the next article. To the sixth one proceeds thus, it seems that the acts of science, or the act of science here acquired, does not remain in the separated soul. For the philosopher says in the first book about the soul, that the body being corrupted, the soul neither, what? Recalls nor, what? Loves, right? But to consider those things which one knows before is to recall. Therefore, the separated soul is not able to have the act of science which it here acquired. Moreover, the understandable forms are not more potent in the separated soul than they are in the soul united to the body. But to understand the forms, we are not able to understand here, now, except by turning upon the phantasms or images. So I want to understand what a triangle is. I can't just use my understandable form. I have to form an image of what? A triangle, right? And then I turn towards that and I understand what it is of that thing I've imagined. The proper object of the reason is that what it is is something sensed or imagined. So I sense or imagine when I, what, try to understand them what a triangle is, what a circle is. So if I can't in this life do it, you know, the forms are no more powerful than they were in this life, right? How can I do, how can I understand anything by them in the next life? That's an interesting objection. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of ethics that habits are like the acts or the habits render acts like the acts by which they are acquired. Because that's something said about even the moral virtues, right? And Aristotle gives a kind of paradox there. By doing just things, we become just, right? And by doing courageous things, we become courageous. And by doing temperate things, we become temperate. And then Aristotle raises an objection. Well, how can we become just by doing just things? Aren't we already just if we do just things? But the point is there's a struggle, huh? And some, what, special attention necessary to do something just before you've acquired the habit, huh? But after you acquire the habit, you do it in a stable way and with ease compared to what you did before you had the habit. And of course, you learn to play the piano by playing the piano, right? Well, how can you learn to play the piano by playing the piano? Does it know how to play the piano if you play the piano again? Well, I'm just sitting, what, struggling there, right? I go through the, go by the rules sometimes in the bottom of my building there where they have some of the practice rules. I hear somebody practicing some piano piece. Sometimes recognize the piece, you know, but they're making mistakes and then, you know, repeating themselves and so on. But that's the way you acquire a habit, right? Okay? And of course, once you acquire the habit then you, what, produce acts like the acts that you began with, right? From which you acquired the habit in the first place. But the habit of sciences are here acquired by the act of the understanding turning itself upon the images. Therefore, they cannot render any other act but that. But such acts obviously cannot belong to a separated soul that doesn't have those inward senses anymore. Therefore, the separated soul does not have some act of science here acquired. But against all this is what is said in the Gospel of St. Luke, the 16th chapter, where it's said to the wealthy man put down into hell, right? Remember that you receive good things in this life, right? Cordari, right? We call that you receive good things in this life and that the other guy receive bad things and so on. Now it's the reverse. I answer it should be said that in an act there are two things to consider. One is the form of the act and the other is the way of it. And the form of the act is considered from its object to which the act of the knowing power is directed by the form, which is a likeness of the, what, object, right? But the mode or way of the act is measured from the power of the agent. Just as if someone sees a stone happens from the fact that the form of the stone is in the eye. But then he sees the, what, stone sharply happens from the, what, seeing power of the eye. Since, therefore, the understandable forms remain the separated soul, as has been said in the previous article, but the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is now. It follows, then, that by the understandable forms here acquired, the separated soul is able to understand the things that understood before, but not in the same way. That is not by turning towards images, right? But in a way suitable to the separated soul. And therefore the remains in the soul separated, the act of science here acquired with the same object, but not in the same way, not by turning towards what? An image, huh? Okay? Now in the first objection from Aristotle about not recalling, he says that the philosopher speaks there about reminiscence or recalling, according as memory pertains to the, what, sensing power, right? Okay? Not, however, as memory is in a certain way in the understanding. Okay? So we distinguish between, what, the memory and the understanding, which is the retaining of the forms, right? And the sense memory, which is tied to the singular. Now the second objection was saying that these understandable forms are the same, and how can they be more potent there than they were in this life. And he says, to the second it should be said that the diverse way of understanding of the separated soul as opposed to the soul in the body does not come about from a diverse power of the forms, right? But rather from a diverse state of the, what? Soul understanding. Okay? Uh, it would look like saying, you know, uh, uh, can you walk faster in air or in water? Hm? Well, in the air, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, um, you say, well, I got the same muscles, the same, when I was in the water, how can I walk, you know? Well, it's not that the muscles are different, right? But the, the soul, I mean, the body is now in the air rather than in the water, right? So when the soul is in the body, its existence is communicated to the body and its operation, therefore, naturally is turned towards the body. But when the soul is separated from the body, then it's naturally turned towards the immaterial world, huh? That's going to be kind of quite a shock to us, I think. To be turned upwards, right? Instead of having our heads down towards the material world, right? And towards images, huh? So it's because, not that the forms are different, right? Or more potent or something, you know, in the separated soul, but because the state of the soul itself is different now, right? It's not in the body anymore, okay? A little different, huh? Yeah. I think maybe that's probably why we didn't get used to it. Our purgatory is going to be like, uh, like correcting exams, you know? Your attention is riveted as something beneath your dignity. That's the worst thing about being a teacher is correcting exams and correcting papers, you know. I remember our fathers pretend, you know, it doesn't get any easier, you know, he says. You know, 20 years more than me, you know, it's like that. It doesn't get any easier, he says. Because the students usually don't say anything very interesting, even on a paper, right? You know, you just got to go do it, though, to see how they grade the darn thing and so on. So, that's kind of a standing joke, you know, that when you get to purgatory, they'll say. Yeah, you can get out of purgatory, Percos, but you get all these exams, you get out of purgatory, you get out of purgatory, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it. You get out of it, you get out of it. You get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it. You get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it and you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it, you get out of it. To the third, it should be said that the acts through which habits are acquired are like the acts which the habits cause, as regards the species of the act, not over as regards the way of acting, for to do just things, but not justly, that is pleasantly, causes the habit of political justice. But once you have that habit, then you can what? Do the same thing, what? Delectability, huh? Delectability, huh? Okay. So when you're acquiring a habit, it's a difficulty that you do the operation you're supposed to do, right? And, you know, if you watch somebody being taught to play the piano, right, something like that, it's a difficulty, right? Once they acquire the habit, then they can do this, and it's pleasant to do it, right? There's a certain instability, you know, if you do it with, you know, freedom from mistakes, huh? Okay. Now the seventh objection, our seventh article. Whether local distance, huh, impedes the knowledge of a separated soul. For Augustine says in the book about care for the dead, huh, giving care about the dead, that the souls of the dead are there where the things that take place here, they cannot know, right? Okay. The souls of the dead, huh, are there where they are not able to know the things which take place here. But they do know some of the things which are done by us. Therefore, local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul. Moreover, Augustine says in the book on divining by the demons, that the demons, on account of the swiftness of the motion, announce some things unknown to us. But the agility of motion would make nothing of this sort if the local distance did not impede the knowledge of the demon. Much more, therefore, does local distance impede the knowledge of the separated soul, which is inferior in nature to the demon, huh? Moreover, just as one can be distant by place, so by time. But the distance of time... impedes the knowledge of the separated soul, for they do not know future things. Therefore it seems that also distance by place impedes the knowledge of the separated soul. But against this is what is said in Luke, the Gospel of St. Luke, chapter 16. Did you read the Gospel of St. Luke today? Did you celebrate the Annunciation today? Yeah. So the reading was from Luke, wasn't it? That's for the Annunciation. The Annunciation is not given in Matthew, I don't think, is it? No. No, so just in Luke, huh? This is really the day when God became man, too, huh? We have the text in Emmanuel, huh? So it's really the Feast of the Incarnation as well as the Feast of the Annunciation. That's why it's nine months before Christmas, huh? According to the thought that it takes nine months, huh? The old professor, German professor, he's dead now, but he used to say, his brother-in-law says, the first baby can come any time. After that it takes nine months. That was kind of funny. See, after that it takes nine months, anyway. So, I guess this is what is said in the Gospel of St. Luke, the 16th chapter, that the rich man, when he was in torments, looking up his eyes, or raising up his eyes, saw Abraham at a distance. Therefore, local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated soul. I answer it should be said that some have laid down that the separated soul would know singulars by abstracting from, what? Sensible things. Which, if this were true, he says, it could be said that local distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul. For it would be required, either that sensible things would act upon the separated soul, right? Or that the separated soul would act upon, what? Sensible things, huh? And as regards both of these, there would be required some determined distance. But the foresaid position is, what? Impossible, right? Because the separation of forms from sensible things comes to be through the senses, huh? And the other sense powers, huh? Which do not remain in act in the separated soul, huh? The root of them is there, but not the actuality of them, huh? The separated soul, however, understands singular things through the, what? Inflowing of forms of the divine light. Which light equally has itself to what is near and what is, what? Distant, right? Once local distance in no way impedes the knowledge of the separated soul. So watch out for me, right? I'm gone. Okay. Now, to the first, which is an objection from Augustine, Augustine does not say that on account of this, that the souls there of the dead are not able to see the things which are done here, and that local distance is believed to be the cause of the ignorance. But this can happen on account of something else, as will be said below, right? So he's not, Augustine is not denying, is not asserting that the cause that they don't know what's going on here is what? They're too far away, right? In place, huh? But there are other reasons why they don't really know these things. Now, in the book on the divination of, uh, by demons, which is saying, hey, there it seems to be saying that the angels, uh, the demons anyway, right, uh, can go more swiftly from one place to another, and therefore they can more know things at a distance than we can, and so on. To the second it should be said that Augustine there speaks according to that opinion by which some lay down that the demons had bodies naturally, what? United to them, right? By which position also they would be able to have, what? Sense powers. For the knowledge of which is required to determine distance. In this opinion, also in the same book, Augustine expressly touches upon. Although he more, what? Seems to touch upon it, reciting it, then asserting it to be, what? The truth, right? As is clear through those things which he says in the 21st book of the City of God. So, go to the 21st book of the City of God to see maybe what Augustine's real position may be, right? But Augustine's not as clear, say, as Dionysius says about the angels having no, what? Body, right, huh? Okay. But Thomas is very clear about the angels having no body. Now, the third objection is talking about our not knowing what? What is distant in time, meaning the future. That's a lot different from place, isn't it? To the third, it should be said that future things which are distant in time are not beings in act, right? They don't actually exist yet, huh? Whence in themselves they're not knowable. Because something is knowable because it, what? Isn't somewhere, right? Because just as something is deficient from being, so it's deficient from what? Nobility, huh? But those things which are distant in place are beings in act, and in this way, and are knowable in themselves. Whence there is not the same reason about local distance and about distance in what? Time, right? Do you see the ways you're applying to that? People over there in Iraq or over there in Rome or over there in Paris, right? They actually exist as much as you and I do, right? But my great-grandchildren don't actually exist at all yet, do they? So, the people in Paris that are more, right now, are more knowable to me, right? Than my great-grandchildren in the future only. I assume I have some great-grandchildren in the future, but they're not knowable to me now, right? Okay. Now, the thing that he left undetermined there will come up in the next article, right? Why don't we know, why don't the separated souls know everything that's going on here, right? Some things they know and some they don't know, right? It's not because some are closer to them, right? In distance and some further away, right? Okay. That's going to be in the next article where he takes up the question now. Okay. To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that the separated soul know the things which are done here. For unless they knew them, they would not have any care about them. But they do have care about the things which are here done, according to that in Luke 16, 28, where the man in hell there says, right? I have five brothers, right? And he wants somebody to witness to them, right? Tell them to not get to this place I'm at, right? Lest they come to this place of torment, huh? Therefore the separated souls know the things which are, what? Done here, right? Okay. Moreover, frequently the dead appear to the, what? Living, huh? Either when they're sleeping or even when they are awake, right? And admonish them about the things which are here done. As Samuel appears to Saul, as is had in the first book of Kings, chapter 28. But this would not be if they did not know the things which are here, right? Therefore the things which are here done, they, what? Know, huh? Moreover, the separated souls So know the things which are done here. Excuse me, they know the things which are done among them, right? If therefore the things which are done among us they did not know, their knowledge would be impeded by, what, local distance, which has been denied above. But against this is what is said in the book of Job, chapter 14. Whether his sons are noble or ignobel, he does not know, right? That would do his sons. After he's died, somebody apparently. I answer it should be said that by natural knowledge now, right? Those forms that are left, right? In the mind, naturally, right? By natural knowledge about which now we are treating, the souls of the dead do not know the things that are done here. And the reason of this can be gotten from the things already said. Because the separated soul knows singular things through this, that in some way it is, what, determined to them, right? Either through the, what, footprint, the vestige, right? Of some preceding knowledge, or, what, affection, right? Or it could be through the, what, divine ordering, right? But the souls of the dead, according to the, what, divine ordering, and according to the way of being, are separated from the, what, association with the living, and are joined to the association of the, what, spiritual substances, meaning angels, right? Which are separated from bodies, huh? So I naturally be turned, my separated soul would naturally be turned towards, what? The immaterial world, right? And to the angels, huh? Whom I'll be wishing things if they were God, right? Whence the things that are done among us, they are, what? Ignorant of those things, right? And this reason, Gregory, that's Gregory the Great, I assume, right? The Pope, St. Gregory the Great. And this reason is assigned by Gregory in the twelfth book of the Moralia, saying, huh? That the dead, right, do not know, huh? Those still living in the flesh, right? How they are disposed, right? Because the life of the spirit is much different from the life of the flesh, right? Just as bodies, bodily things, and bodiless or incorporeal things are diverse in kind, so they are also distinct in knowledge, right? So that means if you pray for a soul in purgatory, that soul in purgatory is not going to know that we're praying for them. Well, he's talking about natural knowledge here, right? But let's read the whole body, because he's got to talk about other kinds of knowledge, right? Okay. But as regards the souls of the blessed now, right? Oh, excuse me, I skipped over that. And this Augustine also seems to touch upon in the book about a care for the dead, saying that the souls of the dead, right, do not mix among the things of the living, right? But as regards the souls of the blessed, there seems to be a difference between Gregory and what? What? Augustine, right? For Gregory there joins, this offer ought not to be, what? Thought about the souls, the holy souls, right? Because those that inwardly see the clarity, the splendor of the dependent God, right? In no way should have believed that that which is outside, they're ignorant of, huh? Once they see the splendor of God, right? They know everything, so to speak, right? They often quote Gregory, you know, saying, what does the soul that sees God, what doesn't know that, right? Augustine, however, in the book about taking care for the dead, expressly says that the dead don't know, even the saints, what the living do, right? And what their own sons do, right? As is had in the gloss upon that, Abraham did not know a son, Isaiah 63, which he confirms through this, that he was not, what, visited by his own mother, nor was he consoled in sadnesses, right? As when he lived, huh? Nor is it probable that the life was made more cruel than a happy life, huh? And through this that the Lord promised to Josiah the king that before he died, he would not see the evils which would come upon his people, as is had in the fourth book of Kings. But Augustine says this, what? Doubting, right? Whence he prefaces, as one wishes, huh? Take, one may take what has been said, huh? But Gregory speaks, what? Well, he's a pope, huh, Gregory? Which is clear through this that he says, in no way should it be believed, right? That they are, what? Ignorant, huh? Okay. It seems more then, he says, according to the judgment of Gregory, that the souls of the saints seeing God know all things that are present, huh? Which I hear done, right? For they are equal to the angels, about whom Augustine asserts that they are not ignorant of those things which are done among the living. But because the souls of the saints are joined most perfectly to the divine justice, neither are they saddened, right? Nor do they get involved in the things of the living, except according as the disposition of the divine justice, what? Requires them. Okay. So it would be contrary to their blessedness to be saddened by the mess down here, right? But that they would know these things, huh? Okay. Now he doesn't seem to be speaking here explicitly about the souls and what purgatory it is. The first one is about the one having five brothers and so on, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the souls of the dead are able to have care about the things of the living even if they are ignorant of their status, huh? Just as we have care about the dead, huh? Saying prayers to them and so on. Although we don't know their what state, right? Okay. So I remember Father Steiner saying to my mother if my father died, you know, well, never stop praying for him, you know? We don't know when you get out of purgatory, you know, and so on. So you never stop praying for, you know, someone who's died, right? You know? Okay, so you pray for them not knowing whether they're still in, what, purgatory or not, right? But your prayers are not wasted, right? I mean, if you're saying too many prayers to somebody, they'll pass them on to somebody else, right? Or God will pass them on to somebody else, huh? But they are able, right, to know the doings of those living not to themselves, right? But either through the souls of those who, what, come to them, right, huh? Or through the souls of those who,