Love & Friendship
Lecture 4: The Nature and Division of Love: Friendship and Wanting

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A man that fortunes, buffets, and rewards has stained with equal thanks. Some people, you know, when they win the lottery, they go crazy, right? They made a study, you know, of people who won the lottery in Canada, and they're all, almost all of them, less happy than they were before they won it. They went crazy, right? They got divorces and all kinds of crazy things, you know? Now they're more miserable than they were before they won, right? So, men cannot, what? But be reasonable when bad things happen or when even good things happen to them. They go crazy, huh? You see? But here's a man that fortunes, buffets, and rewards, right? The good things, right? Has stained with equal thanks. And blessed are those whose blood and judgment Now, blood could refer back to the emotions, right? But judgment to the reason, right? Whose blood and judgment are so welcoming In other words, that they have, what? Their blood is moderated by their reason, right? And they partake in their reason and their emotions. That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger To sound what stops you please, huh? So the man that good or bad fortune greatly changes, right? And for the bad, usually, Is a man who's, what? Ruled by his emotions, huh? And the buffet, the rewards of fortune will go crazy in different ways But it's crazy in either case Now, give me that man that is not passion-slave Now, that's almost a negative way there of speaking of a man who has what? Virtue Because some men are a passion of their desire to eat, huh? Some are a passion of their desire to drink, right? Some are a slave of their sexual desire, right? Some are a slave of what? Their fear, like the coward, right? Some are a slave of their anger like the irascible man, and so on So a man who's not the slave of his hunger, his thirst his sexual desire his fear, his anger, right? Even his sadness, right? He's not a slave of any of these passions That's almost a negative way of describing a man who's virtuous, right? Who has the virtues of temperance and mildness and courage and the best of them, right? And I will wear them in my heart's core A, in my heart of heart, right? So, as I do thee And he says something too much of this, huh? Because usually we don't like to talk too much about our love, right? Even our friends, right? Okay? As usual, see, you know that people want to show their love more about what they do than what they say, right? But Hamlet is going to ask Horatio, you know to watch a king and this is a very important thing, right? And it's a question of whether Hamlet's going to act or something Well, here you have an example of what? A chosen love, right? Now, the word philosopher means what? Love or wisdom Yeah, yeah And what kind of a love is that, say? Is that a chosen love or a sense love? A chosen love Yeah, because the senses don't know what wisdom is do they? And when your soul is able to see the difference between wisdom and other kinds of knowledge, right? And you start to love wisdom seeing as excellence, right? That's a love that's following upon what? Reason, right? So you might call that a dalexio in Latin but to make one word into two words in English a chosen love, right? Okay? As opposed to what they might call in Latin amor, right? The sense love or eros in Greek or something, right? But a love that falls upon the senses so I translate that sense love, huh? Because the English word love is kind of ambiguous, right? I mean, or not definitely one or the other but usually in daily life it's used for the emotional love, right? A lot of sexual love, too, you know? So, this is the distinction Thomas is going to make now in the body of the article, between these two kinds of what? Love. And I got in the, I left the Latin in there, in the article, whether amor, which I translate as love, in the properties of the word, right? Or sense love, right? Is the same as dilexio, chosen love, right? It's not really one word to translate dilexio by, but as I say, it comes from the word elexio. So, we get the word election in English, right? Election is where they choose your representative or your president or everybody is, right? And Shakespeare uses it up there too, right? Her election, right? And there's this sin play in the use of these words, and we'll see that perhaps in the text here. For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names, that amor, which probably in his text is Greek, could be what? Eros, right? And dilexio, right? Which might be, what, philia, or it might be even agape, if he's talking about charity, right? But dilexio, in Thomas' text here, chosen love. Art to each other, just as four and twice two. It's the same thing, right? Or rectilineal and having straight lines, huh? Okay? That's what Dionysius says. But these signify the same thing, right? Therefore, amor and dilexio signify the same. Moreover, the motions of the desiring power differ by their objects. But there is the same object of dilexio and amor, namely the good, right? Therefore, they are the same. Moreover, if dilexio and amor differ in something, they would seem most of all to differ in this. That dilexio should be taken in the good, but amor in the what? Bad, right? That's interesting, huh? Because if you take amor in the sense of eros, especially, right, huh? It's such a strong emotion that men are usually led astray by them. But it's interesting how the other emotion is very strong. Anger, right? Usually takes some kind of a bad sense, right? And when they give the capital vices, right? Sometimes anger is given as one of the capital vices. And you can say, well, you know, anger doesn't mean something necessarily bad. I mean, our Lord is angry when he, what, chases the money changes on the temple, right? And there's a passage in one of the Gospels where he's angry with the Pharisees and so on and how stubborn they are, right? And how high-hearted they are and so on, huh? And, you know, he works a miracle, you know, and he does it by a guzzle bulb, you know? I mean, so there can be a reasonable anger, right? And Christ is a witness to that fact, right? But you could say, for the most part, human beings, anger, what, is excessive or leading them to do things that are not quite reasonable, right? You would get a little angry at somebody, you know, every day at somebody we tend to say something kind of stupid and I'm called for, right? It doesn't make life more pleasant, you know? And so anger very often takes on the sense of something, what, bad, right? It's a strong emotion in a person. You're always reading a newspaper about somebody hitting his wife or in a fight at a bar or whatever it is, but they got angry, right? And they shot somebody, went out, back, back, back, back, a gun. Some stupid thing, right? But because of the anger, right, they're just being led astray by it. It's a strong emotion, huh? So a lot of times, eros or anger, right, because they're both strong ones, right, take on the connotation of being something bad. It's like something else in, when Aristotle talks in the ninth book of Nicomache Ethics about self-love. Usually in daily speech, even in Greek times, too, self-love took on a kind of bad sense, right? Oh, he loves himself. If we say that, right? Um. People take that as being something bad, right? But as you know, there can be a good self-love, right? And in fact, the second commandment of love says, love your neighbor as yourself, right? So it must be a good love of oneself if one is commanded to love your neighbor as yourself, right? But why is it that self-love has taken on kind of a bad connotation? Well, because people love themselves, tend to love themselves too much in the wrong way, right? And therefore, in practice, right, their self-love is often bad in some way, right? Their self-love is often selfish, huh? You see these stuff? So self-love, like eros, like anger, right? Because it often is disordered or excessive, huh? It has a connotation to do something bad, right? But you have to be kind of careful about simply saying self-love is bad, right? Okay, can you follow me? As some say, as Augustine narrates, huh? In the 14th book of the City of God, huh? But they do not differ in this way because, as Augustine also says in the same place, each and second scripture is taken in good and in a bad way, right? There's a good and a bad self-love, right? There's a good and a bad anger, right? There's a good and a bad amor, right? Okay? Therefore, amor and dilexia do not differ, just as Augustine himself in the same place concludes that it is not different to say amor and to say dilexia. Now, but against this is what Dionysius says in the 4th chapter about the divine names. That to some of the saints, the name amor, in the Greek of Dionysius, it would be eros, right? Seems more divine than the name dilexio. And I say, Dionysius, you talk about that text sometimes, you know? It's because the word amor, eros, it's got the idea of an intensity of love that dilexio doesn't have, right? Chosen out sounds kind of, you know, kind of bland, right? Not firm, right? Okay? And it's interesting how, you know, the love even of the saints for God, right, or the church for God is compared to the love of the husband and the wife, right? Okay? And so you want to bring out the intensity of that love, right? You compare it to the eros, right? But also the fact that the eros is more in the love that is emotion, and that's even more of being moved, right? And that one can love God more through God moving you to love him, right? Than your own, what, power to love him, right? So we have to always, what, pray that he would, you know, reclaim our hearts, right, huh? Because we depend more upon him moving us to love him, right? Than we have the ability to love him as he should be loved, huh? And therefore it's more like eros, huh? Which kind of seems like, you know, people always say they fall in love, right? And when they fall in love, it's like they have no control, right? They suffer this, right, huh? Okay? Well, if the person they're loving is responsible for this situation, then they have no control, right? But in a sense, that's what's true about the love of God, right? That God's responsible for our loving him, right, more than we are. We could be responsible for our hating him or, you know, rejecting him or turning away from him. But for loving him, it's even more responsible for our loving him than the reason we're supposed to, right? You know? There's always been a Latin there. The charity of Christ, you know, urgent nos, you know? Yeah, moving us, huh? So you have to do a lot of, you know, care here in looking at these words, huh? Thomas says, I answer that it should be said that four names are found in some way pertaining to the same. And there's a certain problem with the transit there now, right? Because you have, they said more names in Latin and in Greek for that matter. You've probably seen that book of C.S. Lewis, right? Like, the four loves, right? Because you're looking at the four Greek names for love, right? Okay? But let's look at the Latin words, the answer. To wit, amor, right? To wit, amor, right? which in Greek would be eros, the, what, love or sense love. Dilexio, right, which I etymologically kind of translate as chosen love, right, huh? So you could say that Hamlet has for Horatio, what, dilexio, right, huh? I think this is a bunch of choice. Charity, which in Greek would be, what, agape, right? Okay. And friendship, which in Greek would be, what, phadia, right? Okay. And notice how the word for, you know, the love of wisdom there, same root there is in philia, friendship, right? Philia. Okay. And so you wouldn't speak of eros in the philosophy so much, but philia, right? They differ over in this, that friendship according to the philosopher in the 8th book of Nicomache in Ethics, the 8th and the 9th books are devoted to friendship, is as a, what, habit, right? Okay. And part of the reason why Aristotle, if you read the text there, in the 8th book, part of the reason why he says that friendship is a habit is because you have to love your friend for his own sake, right? If you just love your friend for your own good, you just have the love of wanting, you know, that's not really friendship, right, in the full sense. I have to be willing and good to you in an unselfish way. You know, I want good things to happen to you. I want to do good things for you. Apart from me, I get out of this, you know? But you can't do that by your emotions, because your emotions, as I said, are limited to what is agreeable to your senses, and that's my good, that's not your good. And so you need a habit to overcome that, what, selflessness. You have to be habituated, right? Is that not? And, you know, as a parent, you know, he'd kind of spontaneously do these things, right? You know, if the child gets a box of candy from August so-and-so for his birthday, you know, and he's starting to chump those things, he'd say, gee, can I have one of those? And then he'd say, usually they'll offer you one, right, you see, you know? And he'll use some candy, you'll offer him one, you know? And so he's kind of being habituated to, what, think of others, right, huh? Because obviously he's not going to enjoy the piece he gives to you. But, uh, or let another, you know, kid play with your toy or something he wants to play with, right? But, you know, you could play that tomorrow, you know, so-and-so play with it a little bit now, you know? So you're being habituated to kind of, what, have concern for others, and therefore you're getting a, what, a love that is, uh, kind of unselfish, right? That's necessary for true friendship. But here's another reason for it, too, that there's a connection between a habit and, what, choice, huh? Notice how we speak of that, right? In the strict sense, a friend in the full sense is somebody you choose, right? We choose our friends, huh? But it's an emotional thing, people use it, especially, like, fall in love, right? It's as if they didn't choose this, right? Okay? And sometimes, you know, like the characters we saw earlier, it's almost against their will, right? For which by good quality, she said, to him, it's you first to suffer love, you know? And he picks up in the word, suffer love, right? Because it's against his will that he loves this woman, right? You see? But Hamlet has chosen a ratio, huh? And when Aristotle is contrasting the sophist with the philosopher, right, in the metaphysics there, he says that the philosopher and the sophist differ by their choice of life, right? And if he gave the sophist a choice, you can either be wise, but not appear wise to the world, or you can appear to be wise to the world, but not be wise. What did you choose? The sophists would choose to appear wise rather than be wise. But the philosopher would choose to be wise rather than appear wise. So they differ by their choice, huh? Of life, huh? So the sophists, the lover of wisdom, right, he's chosen wisdom, right? And in philia, or friendship in the strict sense, you are what? Choosing your friend, like Hamlet has chosen what? Horatio, huh? Okay. Amor, however, and Dilectio signify more the what? Act, huh? Itself, huh? Or the undergoing. Charity, however, can be taken either way, to name the act, right? Or to name the habitual disposition, right? Act, however, is differently signified by these three. For Amor, love, is more general among them, right? For every Dilectio or charity is a love, huh? But not the reverse. For Dilectio adds above love a choice preceding, as its name sounds, right? Whence Dilectio is not in the concubisable, which is one of the two powers of emotions, right? It keeps on the irascible, but it's in the will only, right? And it is only in a reasonable nature. So it can be found in what? Man, or in the angels, or in what? God, right? Charity, however, adds above love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is estimated to be of great worth as the name itself indicates. Charity, right, I suppose. But, dear, huh? Okay? Carus, huh? Is that Latin? Dear, huh? Caritas, okay? Now notice, the main distinction we're interested in here, though, is the difference between what? Sense love and what? Dilectio, right, huh? And sense love is the love following upon sensing or imagining, right? And chosen love is the love following upon reason, right? So we have sense love to some extent in common with the dog or the cat, right? And we have the love of the will in common with what? The angels and, well, God, right, huh? So we have these two, right, huh? When C.S. Lewis, you know, was trying to speak about the love of the angels, huh? He calls our love ferocious. He's talking about the intensity of our love, right? Because the whole angel goes and he loves something, right? And that's why the fall was so dramatic, you know, fainted, right? Right? Turned somewhere, huh? But you and I, we've got the flesh and the spirit, right? And these two loves, and they're often contrary, putting in contrary directions, right? So we don't be as good or as bad as we could be. Because Sarek is just saying, you know, don't try to be as bad as a doe, you can't be as bad as he is. You can be bad, but you can't be as bad as he is. But at the same time, it's very hard to be as good as an angel too, right? And the second difference, huh, is that the emotions are something, what? Bodily, right? And there's a bodily change in the emotion, huh? That's especially clear in concubiscence, huh? And anger, right? Fear, you know, the strong ones, right? You're aware of the bodily change that's going on. I remember holding a cap in my hands, you know, and the dog, brr, brr, brr. You can feel the cap, you know, being afraid, right? You see? And Christ, if you're scared, you're thump, thump, thump, thump, you're aware of the bodily change. But the act of the will is what? Immaterial, just as the reason is immaterial, huh? And of course, the act of the will, you can will things that are immaterial by that too. Like the love of wisdom or love of God, right? You can also will material things by the will, right? But by the emotions directly, you can will these, what, sensible bodily things. There's a lot of differences between these two, what, kinds of love, right? One falls upon reason, the other upon sense, huh? One is involving bodily change, the other is bodiless, right? One is only for material things, as such, right? And the other can be for, what, immaterial things. And one we share with the beasts, I hope we may have a little better, and the other we share with the angels and God himself, right? So there's even four differences there that I've touched upon, right? Between the two, huh? Okay. Now, you can give our distinction to be seen. That's what Thomas says here, because when you take a friendship, when I teach the Love and Friendship course, I always do this treatise on love first, right? Before we do the Christoph's treatise on friendship. And part of the reason is that there can be love without friendship, but there can't be what? Friendship without love, huh? Friendship involves what? Mutual love to begin with, right? Okay? So, I can love things that can't love me in return, right? I can love candy, or love wisdom, right? I can even love a person who might not love me in return, right? But friendship involves what? That the love be mutual, right? So you have to understand love before you can understand what? Friendship, right? And when Aristotle distinguishes the three main kinds of friendship among equals, huh? Only one of which is really friendship in the full sense. You have the friendship of usefulness, and the friendship of pleasure, and then you have the friendship based on virtue. And you have different kinds of love, right? You have more the love of wanting, and we talked about later on here in the next reading, and the love of usefulness, right? I don't love you for your own sake, but I love you because you're useful to me. Or in the love of friendship of pleasure, I love you because you'll please me, right? But then in the love of friendship in the highest sense, in virtue, I love you for what you are in yourself, right? Because you're a good man, right? But I'm taking a little ahead of myself there, okay? But it's definitely not about distinguishing your friendship, right? Even if you take the lovingness in friendship, right? It must be a mutual love, right? And Aristotle adds, it's got to be known, too. I mean, that we love each other, right? But that we know that we are this way towards each other, huh? Okay? And charity, Thomas takes up charity. He, um, one of the famous articles is that charity is a, what? A friendship, right? You know, it's a supernatural friendship, but it is a kind of friendship, right? And, uh, it's beautiful. It's beautiful when you see the objections against charity being friendship, right? It's beautiful. Because if you know Aristotle's truth on friendship, you can see how many objections, you know, are coming from, right? And the way Thomas answers them is really, really, very, very interesting. So at the end of the loan friendship, I give him that article of Thomas on charity with a charity's friendship. But I just give the objections on one page, you know, and keep the other page, these are, you can give the objections, you know, I can answer these, huh? Thomas said, you know, he answers the objections, he doesn't, uh, leave open the cisterns, as he says. Okay? Now, as far as that first text from Dionysius, right, huh? Where he's identifying Amor and Dilexio, right? Well, then he's using Amor in that broad sense, huh? So even sometimes we translate these texts in St. Paul by love, right, huh? Because charity has become somewhat, uh, degraded in meaning, right, huh? And charity doesn't mean so much to love anymore as, you know, works of charity, you know, ethical, Catholic charity is what I want to call it. I mean, you're talking about, about the works of mercy, whatever it is, right? But, uh, so it doesn't seem to name so much as it did, right? There's a, there's a Greek word, agape there, right? Name the very love or friendship that is the virtue, huh? Okay? So the first, it should be said, the Dionysius speaks of love and chosen love as they are in the reasonable ability to desire. That means they will, right? Okay? I know so I'm teasing that. The Latin would be a pity to us for ability to desire, right? And then rationality says something like that, the reasonable, right? And that's the way of referring to the will. For thus, love is the same as chosen love, right? Okay? So sometimes love is what? Taken more generally, right? Or it can be said that love is an emotion and the love that is a chosen love. And sometimes it's taken just for the, what? Emotional. We tend to name the emotion first. Right? Okay? That's the way Dionysius is understanding at that point. Now, the second objection was in terms of the commonness here, let's look at it again here. They had the same object. To the second it should be said that the object of love is more common than the object of chosen love, because love, the name, right, can extend to more than chosen love, huh? Okay? So if you go out on Main Street here and you ask people about love, they'll be thinking of the love which is an emotion, right? And probably of eros, right, huh? One of the annoying things about teaching a love and friendship course, huh, is that the book publishers will come through, right, they go through all the catalogs, right, they say, okay, there's a course here in this college called Love and Friendship, you know, a guy named Purpose is teaching it, right? Okay, well, we'll send him our books on sex now, I'll say, that's kind of embarrassing, because you've got this, I feel like, you know, running into this and saying, you know, just stop sending me your text, your pornography under the guise of textbooks, you know, because they're really vulgar things. And I was embarrassed, the secretary was just kind of, you know, junk coming in, and, but that's where their minds are, right, huh, you see, you know? Um, uh, they're kind of tied to that, right, huh, but sometimes you use the word love in a broader sense, right? I'm a lover of wisdom, right, and it's not, uh, erotic love, I don't think, it's not an emotion, right, you see? So we will use the word love also in that broader sense, right? So you have to be, you know, or I can say, I love candy, right, or I can, I love, I love Shakespeare, I love Mozart, right, you see? I love the beautiful. So, I mean, the word love can be used in a broad sense, or it can be used just for, what? In a particular sense, for emotion, and maybe even for eros, and, you know, even that very, very particular sense, huh? Uh, Plato, Plato in the, in the, um, when he's talking about love there in the symposium, right, um, he's explaining how, when you speak of a lover, you mean a, what, romantic lover, right? And that's an example of giving the name, he says, of the whole to the part, right? And he compares it to the Greek word poet. Poet in Greek means a maker, that's all it means. But, the common name maker has been given to the poet, in particular, because he stands out among all the makers, right? They thought that Homer had made was the greatest thing ever made, right? So he is the maker, you know, he used to make apple pie, but he makes the Iliad, right? He makes the Odyssey, right? He's the teacher of all the Greeks, right? He's doing something, right? So that's what Thomas is saying, you apply to the second objection, right? If you take love in the broad sense, it's about the good, right? If you take it in the narrow sense, it's about the good that the senses know, right? Now the third one, huh? It says that both deletio and amor are taking the good sense and the bad sense, huh? And you can't distinguish them by saying amor is bad and deletio is good, huh? To the third it should be said, that love and chosen love do not differ by the difference of good and bad, but as has been said, in the understanding part, however, love is the same as what? Chosen love, that's the name. And thus Augustine speaks there about love. Whence a little afterwards, he adds that a rectified willing is a good love, and a perverse willing is a bad love. Because, however, the love which is a concupiscible passion inclines many to the bad, hence they had an occasion to assign them the aforesaid difference, okay? And because those strong emotions like the sexual desire or anger and so on, they generally lead men astray, right? And even fear, you might say, we usually lead men astray in the time of battle, right? So often those emotions take on a connotation of something bad, but they don't necessarily have to be that. Just like self-love usually has a connotation of bad, right? He loves himself. Now, at least that has a bad sense, right? He's saying he's a little bit selfish or something, right? Or thinks too much of himself, and they say he loves himself, huh? Okay? But strictly speaking, self-love can be good or bad, depending upon how you love yourself, right? Okay? God loves himself. God loves himself. right now the fourth thing here is going back to the what the um said contra right okay where dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names that to some of the saints the name amor eros right seems more divine the name deletio right well if we read saint john the cross right now saint john the cross is writing in the way in which the song of songs is written right mechanical mechanicals huh okay so the intensity of the love right being brought out let's see what he says to the fourth it should be said that therefore some maintain that even the will the name of love amor to be more divine in the name of chosen love because love amor implies asserted in what passion right especially as it is in the sensible ability to desire while chosen love we suppose the judgment of reason it doesn't expand upon as much as it is in other places he talks about the same text right but it's the idea that you are what a big move by god right you see you can see it very clearly in in the case of um saint teresa of avala and saint theresa right where they're receiving an increase a great increase in the love of god under the likeness of being wounded right even physically right it's very much a passio suffering right you see if you go back to those texts that we read earlier right the ones that we had from trees of avala and saint theresa um so you're you're getting a great increase in the love but it's like you're being wounded by god and loving him more than you did or like when francis receives a stigmata and so on right or padre pio and they're um so god is more responsible for that piece of love than they are themselves right it's a great a great uh privilege and so on okay i'm gonna get a little break now before we go on to the next article here which is another okay so the fourth and last article in this uh first question on the nature and kinds of love is whether love is suitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of wanting and i see in lactan uh these two kinds of love were named the amor amachitia and the amor what concupiscentia right okay and thomas you know will use the words that are commonly being used but people can understand what you mean the love of friendship right you don't mean friendship the love of friendship but the kind of love you should have in true friendship which is the love of wishing well to your what friend right so it might be more precise to call it the love of wishing well and the love of what wanting right huh okay so it is moved forward to the fourth thus it seems that love is not suitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of wanting for love is a passion but friendship is a habit as the philosophy says in the eighth book of the ethics actually in the eighth book of the ethics aristotle distinguishes between the act of friendship and the habit of friendship right so already you know this is in uh out of context here but but as thomas will point out we're not talking about the little friendship being what friendship itself the habit but we mean the kind of love you should have right if you're true to your friend huh okay for you wish well to your friend and your friend is not just the good you want for yourself but habit cannot be a part dividing passion therefore love is not suitably divided by the love of wanting the love of friendship it's kind of misunderstanding what the love of friendship means right okay it's the kind of love that should be in true friendship not the love which is friendship at least not to have it further nothing is divided by that which is numbered with it for man is not numbered with animal but wanting is numbered with love is another passion from love right he spoke about desire as being different from love right therefore love cannot be divided by wanting moreover according to the philosopher in the eighth book of the ethics friendship is to be full the useful the pleasant and the honorable right you you you virtuous. But the useful and pleasant friendships have wanting, huh? They have the love of wanting. In the useful and pleasant friendships, I like you because you're useful to me, or because you please me, so I'm not really reaching well to you so much as to myself, right? But Aristotle will say that those are not friendships in the full sense, huh? And if you go to Cicero, only that third kind of friendship, the one based on virtue, is worthy of the name friendship, right? Aristotle will say that's the only friendship in the full sense, but we do call these other people friends, so, you know, he wants to use the word in those three senses, right? Okay. But against all this, huh? Some things we are said to love because we want them, just as someone is said to love wine, huh? On account of the sweetness which he wants in it, as is said in the second book of the topics. Apparently there wasn't a lot of candy around those days, so if you had a sweet tooth, you had to get sweet wine, huh? So Thomas, you know, often use that example, he's talking about someone getting drunk, not because he wants to get drunk, but because he wants the sweetness of the wine, right? But he keeps on getting high as he pursues that sweet tooth. But to wine and other things of the sort, we do not have friendship, as is said in the eighth book of the ethics. Therefore, the love of wanting not to be divided against the love of friendship. Now, the way Thomas begins here is really marvelous, and it's a very important thing to see. I answered that it should be said, as the philosopher, that's Aristotle again. Thomas is the most, what, humble student of Aristotle, right? As the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that to love is to wish good to someone. Hence the movement of love tends thus to two things, as two objects. To the good which someone wishes to someone, either himself or another, right? And to the one to whom he wishes the good. To that good, therefore, which someone wishes to another, is had the love of what? Wanting. But to the one to whom one wishes the good, is had the love of friendship. Now, the point I always make with the students is this, huh? For wine, right? Or candy, one can only have the love of wanting. Okay? For oneself, me, you have only the love of what? Wishing well. But now, the ambiguity comes in. Another person, right? What kind of love do you have for them? It could be the love of wanting, or it could be the love of wishing well, right? So I take those three, right? I take the candy, or something like that, or the wine, something like that, for which you have only the love of wanting. For yourself, you have only the love of wishing well. But for another person, you can have either the love of wanting, or the love of what? Wishing well. And you're sometimes not aware exactly what this love that you have, huh? Okay? And you might have, you know, when, say, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the little treatise on the love of God, right? Have you seen that? Or... It distributes four love, or four stages, rather, in man. The first stage, man doesn't love God at all, right? But he loves himself, right? Second stage, he runs into difficulties in life, and things, and so on. So he turns to God, right? For help. And now he has the love of what? Wanting for God, right, huh? Okay? He needs God, right, huh? Okay? And sometimes they call that love of wanting. I need love, right? Okay? I need the wine, I need the candy, okay? And then, in turning towards God, in prayer, wanting God to do things for you, right? You get somewhat acquainted with God. And then you begin to see that God is lovable apart from what he does to you, right?