Love & Friendship
Lecture 8: Likeness as a Cause of Love: Thomistic Analysis

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So, but what is it that's getting in the way there, you see? You're competition, right? Okay. So Irving has noticed this, huh? There are no friendships among men of talents more likely to be sincere than those between painters and poets. They're alike enough to be friends, but not in competition in the same art, right? And therefore, the painter and the poet can be a friend more easily than two painters that might be trying to outdo each other or two poets like, or two novelists trying to outdo each other, okay? So he's talking about the friendship there between Goldsmith, who's a poet, right? And Sir Joshua Reynolds, a famous painter, right? He says, possessed of the same qualities of mind, governed by the same principles of taste and natural laws of grace and beauty, but applying them to different yet mutually illustrative arts, they are constantly in sympathy and never in collision with each other. So he goes on to talk about that, huh? So notice, it's paratchitans, that those who are alike are enemies. Because a likeness as such would make them, would tend to bring them together, right? But because of the competition there might be, then they could come in, what? If two men had the same taste in woman, and both attracted to the same woman, then they would be, what? In competition, right? But if they're both like the same movie actors or something, right? That would bring them together, right? Because they're not pursuing the same thing, right? Okay? So you see how topical disposes those objections, huh? Okay. Now what's the passage here from Basel's Lechel-Sagel-Johnson here, on top of page 3? Well, I can be like one man in one way and be friends with him because of that likeness, and be like somebody else in some other way, and be friends with him for that reason, but those two guys can't, what? Yeah, yeah. So he says it's not like a geometry where quantity is equal to the same to each other, right? If you're my friend, and you're my friend, does that mean you two guys will necessarily be friends? No. Because you might be my friend, because of the likeness we have, we both like baseball, let's say, huh? And you and I both like philosophy or something, right? But you don't like baseball and you don't like philosophy, right? So I can be friends with both of you, and you guys can't get along. And that's a thing we've experienced, haven't you? Sometimes you can be friends with two people who don't get along. Sometimes it's funny, you bring them together, you know, and there's friction, huh? Now these selections from Jane Austen, huh? Jane Austen's a very practical woman, right, in her novels, huh? Good ideas of what courtship should be and so on. But these people are not suited to get married, right? In her opinion, their dispositions were so totally dissimilar as to make mutual affection, what, incompatible, right? And the other novel there, the same novel. We are so totally alike, said Fanny. We are so very, very different in our inclinations and ways that I consider as quite impossible we should ever be tolerably happy together, even if I could like him. There never were two people who were dissimilar. We have not one taste in common. We should be, what, miserable, huh? So there's this long dispute about whether that's dissimilar, right? And sometimes you don't see the likeness at first, right? Sometimes it comes out, you know? Was it Chester said men and women are essentially incompatible? He's commenting on this, you know, divorce, you know, and the reason for divorce, incompatibility. That's not a reason for divorce, he says. Men and women are essentially incompatible. But still, that's the same, you know, a likelihood between a man and a woman, right, for them to get along. But in this particular thing here, it seems that they're opposites in some way, right? He is lively, you are serious, but so much the better. His spirit will support yours. Is your disposition to be easily dejected into fancy difficulties greater than... they are. His cheerfulness will counteract this. He sees difficulties nowhere, and his pleasantness and gaiety will be a constant support to you. Your being so far unlike Fanny does not in the smallest degree make against the probability of your happiness together. Do not imagine it. I myself am convinced that it is rather a favorable circumstance. I am perfectly persuaded that the temperance had better be unlike. Is this an objection to likeness being a cause of love? It's better that they be unlike, the husband and wife. Some opposition here is, I am thoroughly convinced, friendly to matrimonial happiness. So we say opposites attract, right? Is that true? So that would seem to go against the idea, but Thomas will have an answer to that, right? It's other reference from James Boswell here. This is a time when he and Simon Johnson went on a tour of the islands there off the coast of Scotland, right? Cole called me up with intelligence. It was a good day for the passage to them all, and just as we rose, a sailor from the vessel arrived for us. We got all ready with dispatch. Mr. Johnson was displeased that my bustling and walking could be up and down. He said it did not hasten us a bit. It was getting a horseback in the ship. All boys do it, said he, and you are longer a boy than others. He himself had no alertness or whatever it may be called, so he may dislike it, as Oderant Hillerum Tristes, whom we people hate a merry fellow, right? But sometimes a gloomy person might search out a person who's what? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? Humorous, right? 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Humorous, right? Hum I've no more business to marry Edgar Linton than I have to be in heaven. See? He's the guy who's good, right? And if the wicked in there had not brought Heathcliff so low, I should have thought of it. It would degrade me to marry Heathcliff now, so he shall never know I love him. And that, not because he's handsome, Nellie, but because he's more myself than I am. Okay? Aristotle, when he talks about self-love and love of a friend, right? A friend is another self, right? And so the love you have for yourself, in a way, is being carried over to the person who's like you, huh? You see them as another self, huh? That's what she's saying there, right? He's not even handsome, right? But he's more myself than I am. Whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same. And Linton's is as different as a moonbeam from lightning or frost from fire. My great miseries in this world have been Heathcliff's miseries and so on. All these things he's been through with Heathcliff. And the next page there. My love for Linton is like the foliage in the woods. Time will change it. I'm well aware as winter changes the trees. My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath. A source of little visible delight than necessary. Nellie, I am Heathcliff. He's always in my mind. Not as a pleasure anymore than I am always a pleasure to myself. But as my own being. I think it's interesting, huh? That you may be more attracted to somebody because they are like you, right? Than the person who's what? Who, right? I think I was mentioning how Monsignor Dion was saying, you know, sometimes a student is attached to a professor because he's what? Like the student, right? Rather than because he knows more than the other professor. So you might see one professor who knows more, is wiser, and the other professor is more like you. So you tend towards the professor who's more like you, right? Rather than the professor who knows more, huh? It's a danger in the life of the mind, huh? But now, as Thomas will point out when we get to the first article on the effects of love, he's talking about whether union is an effect of love. And he'll make a distinction there between the union that is an effect of love and the union that can be a cause of love, right? And he's going to kind of expand on the idea that likeness is a cause of love. Because if I love you because you're like me, what about loving myself? See? I'm not really like myself. I am myself, right? So in that sense, my love of myself is even more stable, right? Than my love of someone who's like me. Okay? Okay? Now, you see a sort of danger there, right? Let's take a theological situation here. If you take God and your neighbor, right? Who's better? Infantly better God, right? But who is more like you? Yeah, yeah. So if you love more the one who's like you than the one who's better, then you'd love your neighbor, right? More than God, which would be disorder there, right? It's the same thing that she's undergoing there, right? And since you are even more than like yourself, you are yourself, right? You might like yourself more than what? God, right? See the famous words of Augustine, huh? Amor sui, the love of oneself. Usque ad contemptum dei, makes the city of man, huh? And the amor dei, right? Usque ad contemptum sui, the love of God, going as far as to have us in contempt for oneself, right? Makes the city of God, right? See? But if there's some truth to what the novelist there, Weathering Heights, is pointing out, right? That we tend to be more, what? Attached, right? To the person who's more like us than the person who is, let's say, better than us, huh? Do you see? And maybe more attached to ourselves than anybody else. But there's obviously a danger in there for the Christian, huh? I'm going to be more attached, right? To myself, maybe, than to God, huh? You know how Christ said, you know, if you love your mother or father or brother or sister or more than me, you're not worthy of me, right? Okay? But these others are more, what? More than God. Yeah, yeah. And maybe that tends to be very strong, right? So you're fighting against something that's very rooted in you, right? Do you see that? I think it's very interesting, this particular passage she has there in the novel, right? But you can see other applications in life, huh? Like I told you how my mother used to always say, you know, when you choose a doctor, don't choose a doctor for his personality being like yours, right? But choose a doctor for his what? Medical competence, right? I think there's some practical wisdom about what Mother was saying, right? It's like the advice that Dionne is giving about teachers, right? Sometimes people vote somebody into office because they're, what, like themselves, right? Rather than because they're the person who's best qualified for this position. And that has terrible consequences, right? But the supreme one is loving your neighbor or yourself more than, what, God, right? Because the neighbor's more like you than God, huh? And like the Vatican, not Vatican, the Fourth Order of the Council, right? The one that they quote a lot. It says, you can never notice a likeness between God and the creature without a greater, what? Unlikeness, huh? And so you have many references in Scripture to this, huh? So in some sense, our neighbor's more like us, right? And therefore, we might love our neighbor or ourselves. Because we're more than like ourselves. We are ourselves. More than God, huh? You see the danger there? Okay. On the other hand, if you go back to the words of, say, John there, where he talks about the beauty of the vision, right? In the epistle there. It's the first epistle, I think it's third chapter, second verse. When he appears, we shall be like him, he says, for we shall see him as he is, right? So when we see God as he is, we'll be more like God than we ever were before, right? And therefore, we'll love him more than we ever did before, right? So likeness there is a cause of love, right? St. Teresa of Avila says, God is altogether simple, she says. And the closer one gets to God, the simpler one becomes. It's a bit very interesting the way she says that, huh? Okay, now another quote from Jane Austen there, but again, her common sense there, towards the end of the last paragraph. Elizabeth really believed all his expectations of Felicity to marry her sister, right? To be rationally founded, because they had for their basis the excellent understanding and super-excellent disposition of Jane, and that's good things in Jane, right? And a general similarity of feeling and taste between her and himself, right? Okay? So, they're the two causes of love, right? Goodness and similarity, huh? So, let's look at what Thomas has to say about this. One goes forward to the third thus, it seems that likeness is not the cause of love, for the same is not a cause of contraries. Now, the contraries are what? Love and hate, right? So, if likeness were a cause of love, then unlikeness would be the cause of hate, right? Right? So, this is a probable statement that we bring out in Felicity of Nature, right? Contrary effects have contrary causes. And vice versa, contrary causes tend to have contrary effects. So, I say, if the butter becomes hard sometimes, and the butter becomes soft at other times, and hard and soft are contraries, would you expect the same cause of the butter becoming hard and the butter becoming soft? No. You expect there to be contrary causes, right? And maybe hot is the cause of the butter becoming soft, and cold is the cause of the butter becoming hard. So, contrary causes, hot and cold, are causes of contraries, and vice versa. Contrary effects have contrary causes, right? So, if likeness is the cause of love, then likeness shouldn't be the cause of hate, but it should be opposition or difference, right? Okay. For the same is not a cause of contraries, but likeness is a cause of hate. For it is said in the book of Proverbs, in the Old Testament, chapter 13, verse 10, that there are always disputes between the proud, right? Okay. So, if we both want to be the top dog, right, we're going to be in, what, competition, right? Like Hotspur and the prince, right? Okay. play. England could not stand two Henry's, right? And the philosopher Aristotle says in the Eighth Book of the Ethics that potters quarrel with each other, right? Okay? Now we touched upon that in our previous readings, right? You know? Why is it that painters and poets are apt to have sincere friendships like he saw in the example of Goldsmith and Joshua Reynolds, right? But you saw in his own life, right? Irving had many friends among the painters, right? Okay? But it's because there's a sufficient likeness there for love, but it's not a likeness in something that they compete in. But the two potters, I want to sell my pot and you want to sell your pot, and there's only one buyer, but then I hate you because you're interfering with my business. You see? Okay? If I want to be president, you want to be president, we're just equally ambitious, very much alike, aren't we? Both want to be president. We can't vote be president. So now we're, you know, each other's, what? Throats. You see? But is that per se or per oxidance? Is the likeness as such driving them apart? No. No. It's because they get into some kind of competition because of likeness, huh? If they didn't, then they would be, what? Attracted to each other, right? Okay? So tell us when you point it out, I'm sure they'd apply to the objection, huh? Moreover, Augustine says in the fourth book of the Confessions that someone loves in another what he would not want to be, as a man loves an actor who would not wish to be an actor. This, however, would not happen if likeness were the cause of love. For thus a man would not love in another what he himself had or wish to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love, huh? So let's take the example of men, women there, I say. If a man is masculine, right? Does he want the woman to be masculine? No. He wants you to be feminine, right, huh? If the woman is feminine, does she want the man to be a feminist? No. She wants him to be masculine, right? Okay? So this seems to be an objection, right, to see that likeness is a cause of what? Love there, right, huh? Moreover, each man loves what he needs, even if he does not have it, as the sick love health, and the poor love wealth. But insofar as he needs and lacks them, he has an unlikeness towards them. So here the poor man loves the wealthy, right? The sick love health, so the opposite of what they are. So how can you say likeness is a cause of love, right? Now you're loving what is the opposite of what you are. Therefore, not only likeness, but also unlikeness is a cause of love, huh? Moreover, the fourth objection, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that we love those who have done well to us in matters of money and safety, and likewise all love those who preserve friendship towards the dead. All, prolifeness is not the cause of love. So we naturally, what? Love a brave man, right? Does that mean we're all brave? And we naturally love a man who's generous with his money. But some of us might be, what? Stingy who love this generous man. So how can the stingy man love the generous man? Because they're opposites, right? How can the coward love the courageous man? When they're opposites, right? See? Injections there? But against this is what is said in Ecclesiasticus. I guess they call it Sirach now, don't they? Chapter 13, verse 19. Every animal loves what is life itself. They have Plato as a dialogue on this, whether likeness or opposition, perhaps. And Aristotle refers to that in the beginning of his books on friendship, right? Now, Thomas again sees a fundamental distinction. I answer that likeness, properly speaking, is the cause of love. But it should be considered that likeness can be found between two things, between things, rather, in two ways. In one way from this, that both have the same human act, as two having Likeness are said to be what? A light, right? In another way from this, that one has an ability, and in a certain inclination, but the other has an act. And here's an example from the older physics. As we say that a heavy body existing outside its place has a likeness, with a heavy body existing in its place. Or also has ability, has a likeness to act itself. For act is an ability itself in some way. So, if you actually know something, right, and I'm able to know it, are we in some way alike? Not as much as if you actually know something and I actually know it, right? Then we're much more alike, yeah? But for me to be able to know what you know, right, is a certain likeness to you, right? A lot of times you see in the arts, you know, that an older man, right, may recognize that a younger man, it kind of invades ability for something, right? The way Mozart's father recognized that Mozart had this musical gift, right? But it needed to be, what, developed? And that's why he set off around Europe, introducing him to all the styles of music in Europe and so on, right? And he could learn from people. I remember one time, one of the basketball players at, some say, you know, play on the basketball team, let's say, how some guys are natural athletes, right? And in a shorter time, they'll be, you know, hitting the basket better than the guys that do it for years, you know? So, if I'm a good player in basketball, whatever it might be, baseball, football, and I recognize in you kind of a, what, an ability for the sport, right? See, you've got to develop that ability, right? You've got, you've got, you know, you see? So, there's a kind of a likeness between us, right? And what I have in actuality, you have an ability and it's seed, so to speak, right? Okay? So, but like, almost like saying an acorn like an oak tree. Well, not actually, no. But in ability, it is, right? An oak tree, yeah? So, that's a kind of more distant likeness, huh? And so, I can be attracted to someone who's actually like me, that I'm actually like them, right? Or I can be attracted to someone or something who has an act, but I have in, what? Ability. And that's a kind of likeness, too, but a more, what? Distant one, right? Okay? So, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of likeness, and now, in the next paragraph, he talks about how one likeness causes more the love of what? Friendship or wishing well. And the other, more the love of what? Wanting, right? Okay? The first way of likeness, therefore, causes the love of friendship or well-wishing. For from this, that any two are alike as having one form, they are in some way one in that form. As two men are one in the form of human nature, and two whites in whiteness. And therefore, the affection of one tends toward the other, as in something one with one's itself. And therefore, it wills the good for the other, as just as for itself. So, I want to say in the Greek proverb, a friend is another self, right? If I see you as just like me, right? Then, some of the love that I have for myself, it's carrying over to, what? You, huh? And just as I wish well to myself, so do you, who are just like me. And therefore, the affection of one tends toward the other, as in something one with itself. And therefore, it wills the good for the other, as just as for itself. But the second way of likeness, where I have an ability, but you have an act, right? Causes the love of wanting, right? Or the friendship of the useful, the pleasant. For there is a desire for its act in each thing, existing in ability as such. And it delights in reaching this, if it is sensing and, what? Knowing, right? So, if you know something, actually, that I'm able to know, then I can be attracted to you, because you're useful to, what? Me, huh? Developing my knowledge of the subject. Do you see? So, you distinguish there's two kinds of likeness, then, right? Like this, of act to act, and of ability to act. And it ties it up with the two kinds of, what? Love that we distinguish. before. It's beautiful how he does that, right? It has been said above, however, that in the love of wanting, the lover properly loves himself when he wills that good which he wants. However, one loves himself more than another because he is one in substance with himself, but to another in the likeness of some form. So if I like you because you like me, even more so do I like myself because I am myself. And therefore, if from this that another is like him in partaking of a form, he is himself impeded from reaching the good he loves. The other is made hateful to him, not insofar as he is alike, but insofar as the other is impeding his own good. And because of this, potters quarrel with each other because they impede each other in their own profit. And there are disputes among the proud because they impede one another in their own excellence, which they want. So professors are always wrangling, right? They're always disagreeing, right? Because no one wants to excel, right? Okay. So you have to see the distinction then between what? The as such and the by happening, right? The parousy and the procedence, huh? Likeness, he's saying, as such is going to bring us together, right? But if it happens that because of our likeness we pursue the same thing that we can't both have, then it impedes us, right? Okay? Not so much with truth, you see, as such, right? Because if I know the Pythagorean theorem, that doesn't prevent you from knowing it, doesn't it? But if it's something that we can't both have, we can't both be president, right? We can't both marry the same woman, we can't both occupy the same position, maybe, right? You see? Then we come into competition, right? Okay? So two philosophers might be competing for the same position in a college or something like that, right? So the two philosophers are ahead of each other, while the philosopher would be a friend, maybe, of the political scientist because they're not competing for the same chair or position. You see? That's kind of still proactive, isn't it? Because as such, the two philosophers would be, what, more brought together, right? Raising very similar interests and so on. Okay? So that's the reply, he says, to the first objection, right? Which is potters quarrel with each other, right? And there's always disputes between the proud. Is it true of other vices? If there's a likeness in vice that's coming other than pride, does it tend to, or, I don't know if there's an answer to that. You see, if because of our, we're alike in something that leads us to pursue something that we both can't have, right? Then we come to conflict, right? You see, I said truth isn't that way, you know? But if you're talking about, say, discovery, right? You know, the honor of being the first man to discover something, right? And you see this competition between scientists sometimes, right? Or even between nations, you know? Who was the first discoverer of calculus? Was it Leibniz or Sirizing Newton, you know? There's all kinds of conflict sometimes, you know, in the scientific world, huh? You see, both of us can know the same thing, right? But we can't both have the honor of being the man to first discover this, right? Okay? So I'm trying to beat you to be the first man to discover it, right? Do you see? Because the honor is, we can't both have that honor, okay? What we both have is full, right? Okay. Now, the second objection. Notice, go back to the same objection for a second. A man loves an actor who would not wish to be an actor, right? Okay? Now, Thomas sees here a more distant likeness, but a, what? Proportional likeness, huh? Okay? To the second it should be said that in this also, that someone loves another what he does not love in himself, there is found the likeness according to proportionality. For just as the other is toward what is loved in him, so the man himself is towards what he loves in himself. For example, if a good singer loves a good writer, right? Or in Washington Irving's example, the painter and the poet, right? There can be noted there a like disproportion, as each has what belongs to him according to his what? Art, right? Okay? So for a man to be masculine is like a woman to be feminine, right? Do you see that? Okay? So in a way, for the masculine man to like the feminine woman, and vice versa, is likeness, right? Not likeness of the same kind, right? But proportional likeness. Because masculinity is to the man what femininity is to the what? To the woman, right? Do you see that? And so a man in one art, who's excellent in his art, right? Right? Thus someone who practices another art, who's excellent in his what? Art, right? Okay? So Mozart and Shakespeare would have liked each other, right? They've been contemporaries, right? Because Mozart is to music, what Shakespeare is to the drama. Okay? Or Sophocles is to tragedy, what Homer is to the epic, right? Okay? They used to say, the Greeks, you know, that Sophocles is Homer writing tragedy. And Homer is Sophocles writing epic. They'd be still a likeness there, right? But Sophocles is the tragedy, but Homer is the epic, right? And so they would be attracted to each other, huh? Notice the first objection is based upon a likeness in the very same thing, right? And therefore, what the puzzle is, why don't they like each other? They're so much alike. You know? See? Or two guys who have exactly the same taste in books, right? And when they use bookshop, and there is the rare edition of the rare book, you know? And we both, what? Want it, yeah, see? Or two women, you know, down in Paganini's Bargain Basement there in Boston the old days, you know, and where these things are really, you know, being marked down their price, you know, and there's a dress they both want. There's only one dress left, right? And they'd actually be in fights down there, you know? We used to women who got exactly the same taste in clothing and so on. Why are they so opposed? There's only one dress that they can, that they both want. And who'll get it, you know? Fights on first! And they really have fights on. They have to have to bring them up, you know? But on the second one, the second objection is a little different, though, see? Because there you don't see the likeness at first, right? You see? So if I'm masculine, why don't I want women to be masculine? You know? I say, well, for her to be masculine wouldn't be like for me to be masculine. For her to be feminine would be like for me to be masculine. You see? See the idea? Just like I buy a pair of shoes that fits my foot, and you buy a pair of shoes that fits your foot, right? And therefore, we're alike proportionally, right? That's a more distant likeness, so you don't see it right away, huh? And now the third objection, an even more distant likeness, because here you have someone who doesn't even have a proportional likeness, right? He lacks the thing that he wants, huh? And loves, huh? But he has a likeness of ability to act, right? Which is much more distant, huh? To the third, it should be said, that he who loves the very thing he lacks has a likeness to that which he loves, as what is an ability to act, as has been said, huh? Okay? So I'm attracted to the man who actually knows, not because I'm ignorant. In fact, if my ignorance was inseparable for me, I wouldn't be a friend at all of a man who knows, but it's because I'm able to know, right, that I have an affinity with him, huh? I'm attracted to him because I'm able to know and he can make me actually know. Do you see? So there still is a likeness there, right? But even more distant than a proportional likeness. Do you see that? And to some extent, that's true of us in respect to God, right? Do you see that? Okay. We're able to have something of what God actually has, right? That's a very distant likeness, right? There's some ability in us to see God as he is, face to face, but with God's help and so on, right? We can partake of eternal life, which God actually has, what he actually is, eternal life. Now, like that is the reply to the fourth objection. To the fourth, it should be said that according to the same likeness of ability to act, the one who is not liberal or generous with his money, right, loves him who is liberal or generous insofar as he expects from him something that he wants, right? You know the famous attack upon the philosophers, where the ancients said, How come, he says, how come you see the philosophers around the doors of the rich men? You don't see the rich men around the doors of the philosophers, how come? Well, you know what the philosopher answered? Well, that's because the philosophers know what they need, but the rich men don't. So, because I'm able to, what, have some of your money, right, that you actually have, right, I'm attracted to you with at least the love of wanting, right? You see? If I wasn't able to, you know, have some of your money, I wouldn't be attracted to you at all, right? Do you see that? Insofar as he expects from him something that he wants. For on both sides there seems to be a friendship of usefulness. Or, and I guess another solution to this, or it ought to be said that although all men do not have virtues of this kind according to complete habit, they have them nevertheless according to what? Seed-like things are reason, right? The seeds of all the virtues are in reason, see? And reason tells me I should be courageous, right? So even though I'm a coward and not courageous, my reason tells me this is where I should be. And therefore, when I see this courageous man, I respect him, right? Do you see that? They have them nevertheless according to seed-like things of reason, whereby he who does not have virtue loves the virtuous as conformed to his natural what? Reason, huh? Do you see that? So a man who can't control his anger, right, huh? Right, like the man who is, what? Mild and has anger under control, right? Because he sees that's the way a man should be, right? But it's not the way he is. But he has natural reason. There's a likeness there, right? Between the seed of sobriety and the man who is a sober man. Do you see that? Okay? So notice the difference then between the first objection and the other objections, right? The first objection was based upon the fact that we saw the likeness continues to be both. They're both potters, or whatever they are. They're both proud. And then why are they in conflict if likeness is the cause of love, right? And there the solution was that it's prejudice, huh? It happens, right? That they become in conflict, right? Because of their likeness in something, they're both pursuing the same thing they can't have, right? I want to sell my painting, you want to sell your painting. So we're in conflict, you and I, right? Do you see what I mean? Yeah, there's a married couple, the husband's a composer, music, and the wife is an artist. The Russians have come here. She's in the various, whether it's plastic arts or whatever they call it, he's in it. But that's a different example, sorry. I just don't know. But then, in the other objections, as you go further away, put more distant likeness, right? The likeness of race shows, huh? Masculinity is to the man, is feminine to the woman. And then the ability, the likeness of ability to act is even further away, in a sense, huh? And then you can't say, well, these people aren't alike, so why are they attracted to each other? Well, just a minute now. They are alike, but in a more, what? A more remote way, right? And there's a likeness of us to God, too, right? In Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason, there he speaks of reason as being, what? Godlike, huh? A very distant likeness, but there's something Godlike about reason, huh? Let's stop you just for a moment about the words here. Pick the word lovable. And I guess in English you can put the E in or leave it out. I don't know. I'm not going to picture it that day, though. Lovable. Take that word, and I'll take the word lovely. Both the word lovable and the word lovely are derived from the word for love, right? But what would be a synonym for lovable? What is lovable? That's the word, yeah. But in terms of the causes there, what is lovable? You see, lovely would be a synonym for beautiful. Right. Okay. Oh, so synonym. But lovable would be, what? Good. Good, yeah. Yeah. So Augusta would say nothing is lovable but the good, right? Okay. But among good things, being good-looking, another expression we have in English, but as you can see with the expression good-looking, or good looks, right? It's a little more particular than good, right? You see that, especially the senses, huh? Because you give me a nice-tasting food and say, hmm, this is good, right? I won't say this is lovely, right? Okay. So even with the senses, you can see that good is broader meaning than what? Lovely, right? Lovely is used only with respect to the music, maybe, or the painting or something, right? The eye and the ear, right? But good is used for all the senses, right? You can see it in this expression of good-looking, right? It's no more particular than good, right? You see that? Sometimes they say the good is what pleases, and the beautiful is what pleases when seen, right? When known, right? Okay. That's going back to the first cause of love, right? Okay. And now this likeness, huh? If I say, I like you because you're like me. I think it's interesting that the word like, first here it's a verb, and there it's more like, I don't know, just here it's something. They're connected, right? You see? So the English word kind of indicates that there's a connection between likeness and liking. Now, let's compare the two words here. Liking and loving, right? Liking, are they the same, or are they different? Liking and loving, right? There's a certain song, right? Yeah. I remember my daughter saying, you know, I don't like this, I love it. So it's like you're loving the same thing. If I love candy, do I also like candy? If I love God, do I like that? If I'm a lover of wisdom, do I like wisdom? So, are they synonyms, or is there any some difference between liking and loving? Like a grain. Yeah. Love is more intense, right?