Love & Friendship
Lecture 19: Friendship: Definition, Types, and the Perfect Friendship

Transcript
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You know, in the Greek word, you see right away a connection between friendship and love, right? In the word itself. Philia is a Greek word for it, but friendship is a Greek word. Philia. And in a way, our word is Philadelphia, right? It refers to brotherly love, right? Right. Adelphus is a brother in Philia. And neither. Right, the, the, um, is Philia, right? To love, right? Okay. And this is where you get the word, like in Philosopher, right? Where it's a lover of wisdom, right? Okay. That's one of the many words in Greek. You see that book by C.S. Lewis called The Four Loves? But there he takes different Greek words like eros and agape that we have, especially in the Testament, and so on. But here in the text of our show, you can see right away that Philia is tied up with some kind of loving, right? And so he's very good when he begins here. Perhaps these things have become clear if the lovable is no. For everything does not seem to be loved, but only something that is lovable, right? So if there's love in friendship, there's got to be something lovable, okay? And so you have to see what the lovable is before you can see what the love, or the kind of love it is, and therefore the kind of friendship it is. Do you see that? Okay. We saw something like that in our study of the soul, right? You have to know what color is, let's say, and what sound is, and the difference between color and sound, the objects, to know the difference between sensing color and sensing sound, right? To know the difference between, therefore, seeing and hearing, right? And you have to know the difference between seeing and hearing, to know the difference between the senses or the ability to see or the ability to hear, okay? So the ability to see and the ability to hear are distinguished by seeing and hearing. And they're distinguished, since they're both sensing, by the object, color and sound, right? Well, it's a little bit like that here, right, huh? That friendship involves habitual love, right, huh? And so you have to distinguish friendship by the kind of love there is, or the loving there is. And the loving is always for something that's lovable. And therefore you have to go all the way down to lovable. Very thoughtful man, this guy, Aristotle. And this is the good, meaning good in the full sense, like virtue, right? Like an example we had from what? Hamlin Horatio, right? Okay? Give me that man that is not a passion slave, right? That's a good man, right? And this is the good or the pleasant, right? And the pleasant to the body or to the imagination, the senses, right? Or the what? Useful, right? Okay? You're lovable because you're good, or because you please me, or because you're useful to me, right? Okay? But the useful seems to be that to which some good or pleasure comes to be. So that the good and the pleasant would be lovable more as what? In, in the sense. The useful more as a what means, right? So the useful friendship eventually will be seen to be the lowest of the friendships, right? Okay? Do they love the good, or what is good for them? If you see something as good but not good for you, you don't tend to love it, do you? It's not for me, right? Okay? For these differ sometimes, huh? And likewise about the pleasant. It seems that each one loves what is good for himself, that the good is simply lovable, but to each what is good for each, huh? But each loves not what is good for himself, always, but what appears so to him, huh? This aura makes no difference, the lovable will be apparent, huh? So sometimes we love something that's truly good for us, and sometimes something that appears to be good for us, right? But even if it's truly good for us, we don't love it unless it appears to be good for us. But it might appear to be good for us without really being good. Okay? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. So, there being then, now the main point, there being then three things on account of which we love. We love a bulls. Friendship is not spoken of in the love of inanimate things. So is a bottle of wine a friend? You might speak that way mostly sometimes, right? But do we speak of friendship between me and a bottle of wine? No. Or between the child and candy? You might have liked candy when you were a kid, but do you write candy as your friend? For there is no loving in return, right? I might like the candy, but the candy doesn't like me in return, right? For there is no loving in return or wishing good to that. It is perhaps laughable to say that I wish good to the wine, right? Or good to the candy. But if at all, one wishes it to keep well so that one might have it. But one is going to consume it, destroy it, right? Okay? You have to watch out when a man says to a woman, you look so good, I can eat you. That would be the right kind of law. But it is said that one ought to wish good things to a friend for his sake, right? Okay? And it says those wishing good things thus could be called well-wishers, benevolent, if the same does not come to be from the other. But friendship is an undergoing, what? Good will in return, right? Now he's going to add another thing to the aspect of friendship that we mentioned before. For at one to add, not did it, right? Okay? So, in order for you and me to be friends, I have to have good will towards you. I wish you good. But you have to wish me good in return. But is that even enough to say you have friendship yet? Or must you add that it's known to us that we have this good will towards each other. Okay? For many wish well to those they have not seen, thinking them to be good or useful. And one of these might undergo the same towards them, right? Such then would seem to wish well to each other. But how could one call friends those ignorant of how they are to each other? Okay? Now he's going to gather in the last sentence here, everything together, the kind of definition of friend. It is necessary, therefore, that they have good will, that's the first thing, right? Towards each other, right? And wish good things. And then the third thing, knowingly, right? And on account of something lovable. Either the good or the pleasant or the useful, right? Okay? So Aristotle sees here, in his first reading, or second reading, actually, Thomas is, I divide it by readings, they're called lexios and Thomas, right? Lexio, we mean reading or lecture. Four things involved in what? Friendship, right? You see? So he's put those four things down. Put them together in one definition. Friendship, there has to be good will for wishing well, okay? That's one thing that you have to have for friendship, right? Okay? So I really wish well to the candy? No. Do I really wish well to the steak? No. No. I might want the steak to not be spoiled, or the candy not to, you know, because it's sweetness or something, right? Okay? If I'm really wishing good to myself, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So this is one thing that's required, huh? Okay? The second thing that's required is that this good will, or wishing, be what? Mutual, huh? Okay? And the third thing is that this mutual good will be known, right? Okay? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. And all of this because of something lovable, either the good or the pleasant or the useful, right? So we're still saying that, well, this is in the form of a definition. We're saying that friendship is known mutual goodwill because of something lovable, right? I'm going to put it more in the form of a definition. It's known mutual goodwill for wishing well because of something lovable. You need all four of those things he's saying, right? To know what friendship is by definition. Now, a definition is a very precise thing. In one sense, it has the precision of spelling, right? Because in spelling, if you leave out a letter, you haven't spelled the word correctly, have you? And if you add a letter that doesn't belong there, right? You haven't spelled it correctly, right? And if you don't have the letters in the proper order, it's not spelled correctly, right? Although you could say that spelling is really kind of arbitrary, isn't it? Shakespeare didn't know how to spell his name like they said, you know? But a definition, if you leave out an essential part, or you add a part that isn't essential, or you don't have the proper order, right? You kind of, what? You fail to define it, right? So, any of these parts that can be left out in the definition of friendship? Now, in this distinction of the love of one to those three, you've got one way that our style is going to, a fundamental way, is going to divide, friendships among equals, right? Okay? I love you because you're good, right? You're not a passion slave, or I love you because you please me, right? Please my senses, or please my imagination, right? Maybe tell good jokes, right? You know, every time I meet you, you've got a good joke. Okay, you see? Or you're useful to me, right, huh? You write a recommendation for me, right, huh? You're going to vote for me, right? Okay? You're going to give money to my campaign, huh? You're going to give me a good deal on that car, is it? You know, I got my regular car back in the garage, you know, but some woman in the parish there, you know, saw me at that blue car. You know, and she would, I was expecting somebody to say something, you know, no one's saying anything about it, you know. Because I usually go to Mass every morning, and they kind of know me, so. But I guess the woman came to my wife, you know, I was so surprised with that car, Dwayne had. It's just a bright blue, you know. I don't know if you saw it out there, but it was good. I thought that it was for your wife. Yeah, I was joking. I think I'll put a price on it. You got to pick it up this time. See, Enterprise would give me a price on this car. I don't know what the reputation is. I didn't know what they call it, PT Cruiser. I didn't request it, you see, but some woman was waiting for her car, you know, from Enterprise and mine, and they brought a Toyota and this PT Cruiser, and she'd be waiting a half hour, you know. She was supposed to have been waiting on it before me. She said, what do you want? I said, you've been waiting a half hour. Why don't you take one you want? She did the Toyotas. It's like it's taking a PT Cruiser. Don't jump it up your ass. Okay. Now, at the beginning... The third reading, he's going to come back to those three kinds of lovable, right? And he's going to say that because these are three kinds of lovable, there's three kinds of love, and therefore three kinds of what? Friendship. It's all very logical what he's doing, right? And it's like what you learned in the study of the soul, right? That the powers of the soul have to be known by their acts, but they're acts by their objects. So if the objects are different and the acts are different, and the acts are different, the ability to perform those acts are different, huh? But these differ in form, and that's referring back to the lovable, okay? The good, the pleasant, and the useful. And therefore the lovings, right? The act of love, right? Are different. And therefore the friendships are, right? Okay? The friendship being more the habit, right? Of loving in this way, right? Thus, he says, there are three forms of friendship, equal number to the love, to the lovable, right? For according to each of these, there can be a return of love, huh? I wish to be useful to you and you to me. And there's back and forth, right? I remember once being in a guy who was working in the stock market there, you know, and back and forth, New York, this place, you know, and he's passing a little favorite guy down there, you know, and he's saying, Matt, you know, he'll pass something back to me now, you know? You know, back and forth, he's having a certain thing, and you realize this guy wants to be useful to you, and you want to be useful to him. So there's a kind of a friendship there between you, right? Okay? But men loving each other wish good things to each other, and that whereby they love, right? Okay? So in the U.S. Senate there, they have clubs, you know, where some of the senators like to tell jokes, get together, right? And some of these even, you know, Republicans and Democrats will be there, right, huh? They had Dole and Gore on some program the other day there, you know, and they're both making jokes, you know, because they're not running for office anymore, these two guys, and both making jokes about the previous debates that they were in, right, and what they didn't do right, and so on, because they're being asked about what's going to happen in the debate tonight or the argument tonight. And he says, Those loving on account of the useful do not love each other in themselves, huh? Okay? I'm not loving you for what you are in yourself, right? But insofar as there comes to be something good to them from each other, right, huh? Likewise, those on account of what? Pleasure, right? He takes an example of that. For they do not love the witty for the sort of person they are, but because they are pleasant to them, right, huh? They tell these jokes that are pleasing to hear, huh? Now those loving on account of the useful love because of what is good for them, right? The one who's loving. Those on account of pleasure because of what is pleasant to them. And not as the one loved is in themselves, but as they are useful or what? Agreeable, right? You're my friend so long as you're useful to me. Or you're my friend so long as you please me, right? Okay? And there's one guy who could tell jokes for, what was it, about half a year they say, you know? And then he started peeing his chokes. So now he sees us to be, what? Pleasant, right, huh? Okay? So Narastal is going to make a distinction or point out a distinction between these friendships and the friendship based on the other person being good, right? And he says these friendships, the useful one or the pleasant one, are by accident, by happening, right? Okay? I'm loving you because you happen to be useful to me. Tomorrow, I may have other needs and other problems and you're no longer useful to me, right? Okay? You see that in the friendships among politicians like that, right, huh? Because very often when a man is nominated, say, for the presidency, it's customary, you know, to nominate for the vice president, someone who would balance the ticket maybe either geographically or in some other way, right, huh? So when Eisenhower... was nominated he was eastern establishment right so they went to california got nixon who was a what west coast right when kennedy was nominated he got lbj right because kennedy was strong in the north but weak in the south and lbj was you know strong in the south so that between these guys were really what friends in the highest sense but they were useful to each other right huh okay but then another time you might not be any more useful to me after the election or something right yeah yeah yeah yeah so um um you're not my friend because what you're on yourself but because you happen to be so accident comes so the quick would be some bebekahs accident in latin here more or less but but by happening you could say okay now um for the one loved is not loved as he is just as he is in himself right you know so it knows how hamlet's friendship over horatio is based upon what he is in himself huh give me that man that is not passion slave and i'll wear him in my heart it's because of what horatio is in himself that he wants him as his friend and he wishes well to him okay it's not because horatio is amusing to him although he may be but that's not the reason why he's his friend right or because he's particularly useful to hamlet though he may be at the time he wants him to watch the king's reaction right for the one loved is not loved as he is just as he is but insofar as these provide a good being useful and those a what pleasure right okay now one consequence of these friendships being by happening you might say right such as these then are easily loosened when they do not remain the same for if they are no longer pleasant or useful they what cease to love where is it washington irving has that little thing called the wife and the sketchbook there i think it is where the man is quite well to do and he marries woman right he's really going to treat her well her life is going to be a fairy tale he says and then he has these financial reverses and he's afraid to tell his wife you know his real situation and irving says to him you know well you can't wait forever to tell her right and uh it's better that you hear about your condition from you than from some stranger right so um yeah you've got to get the big you know mansion in the city you know and go out live in a little cottage in the countryside there right so his wife is out trying to straighten out the cottage you know and he's coming home now and uh of course uh he doesn't exactly what her reaction would it be to this right she has promised all his luxuries of life you know and so on and all of a sudden it's going to be very humble things of course she's quite cheerful she's playing her songs and so on you know okay and he's you know but she loved him for his own sake right yeah it's a beautiful story you know beautiful story but good in some other cases huh okay you have some of these these funny have you ever seen some of these comic movies you know where the man is marrying for money and the woman is doing the same thing oh and he's pretending to have money he doesn't have oh she's pretending to be well right and then the two of them get married right and they suddenly discover no one has money it's a very funny yeah i've never seen this in one of them movies you know old movies but it's okay now of course you know as our style will see later on the pleasant there it's especially found among the young right and i often refer to the remark that you know mommy and daddy say you know when you a child you know go to play at somebody's house and did you have a good time yeah that's that your mama says right yeah yeah i had a good time okay but no you like to play with that kid because he has the same what he's into the same game as you are right huh okay but now you lose interest in that game or in that occupation you might want somebody else as your friend now right you see so if you're creating If you're crazy about baseball, you want somebody who will play baseball with you, right? If you're crazy about, you know, playing some stereo game or video game or something like that, you want someone else who, right, is into that, right, huh? Okay. I was in high school. These guys used to go down to the St. Paul Chess Club every Friday night, every Saturday night. I didn't mind playing chess. I was like, wow, what's that crazy about, right? See? So they go down, they play chess all night, yeah. So if you enjoy chess, you've got to play with somebody, right? Well, then, right? But if you lose your interest in chess and get interest now in girls or something else, well, then you're no longer, you know, the friendship is broken up, right? Okay. So he says, such as these are easily loosened when they do not remain the same. For if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease to love, huh? Okay. Some days as a college professor, you know, the student wants you to write them another recommendation, right? Okay. So they're going to be rather pleasant to you and so on and so on. But once they've got their position, they've moved on and so on, well, then you're no longer useful to them, right? Or maybe in a later position that they have in life, you're not in a position to recommend them because you're working them as a student, right? But you don't know them as they're working that job, so they need someone else to recommend them, so someone else now is going to be their friend, right? But the useful does not remain for it is other at other times, right? Of course, that's why they compare it to the friendship among nations, huh? You know, like some British statesman said, you know, we have no permanent friends, but we have permanent interests, see? So at some time, England is the friend of what? France against Germany, right? But in an earlier period, you know, during the Napoleonic era, England was a friend of Germany or Austria against what? France, right, huh? So the permanent interest was the balance of power there in Europe, et cetera, right? And sometimes, you know, that means you've got to be the friend of Germany, other times you've got to be the friend of France, right? So you're not the friend of France because it's France, or the friend of Germany because it's Germany. Well, there's something like that in the useful friendship, right? When that, in account of which they were friends, has ceased to be, the friendship is also, what? Dissolved, right? Dissolved, right? As if the friendship were only in regard to that, huh? Okay? That's contrary to what Chet was talking about, that love, that alters not when alteration comes, right? Because that's the highest kind of love, right? And the highest kind of friendship. Such a friendship seems to come about, especially in the old. For such do not seek the pleasant, but the useful, huh? So you have the old ladies that call each other each day, right? Just to make sure the other one is what? Okay, right? And if they don't get an answer, you know, well, then, you know, they inquire it, right? You know, because maybe they need a doctor or something, right? Or, I'm going to the store. Can I get you anything? No? And then you go to the store. Can I get you anything? Well, it's kind of useful, right? Okay? And to those also, sometimes, even in the prime of life, for the young, who seek the, what? Useful, right, huh? It's more characteristic of the old, huh? Okay? Now, as Aristotle would be pointing out, the friendship, the useful friendship is more characteristic of the old, the friendship of the pleasure of the, what, young, right? Right? Those in the prime of life can have more of the higher friendship, huh? Well, they can have any one of these at any age, right? But I always quote this kind of cynical remark of my politician friend Roy, huh? He says, a man first looks upon his wife as a mistress, and then as a friend, and last of all, as a nurse. They have the three kinds of friendship, you know? Both pleasure, kind of a more true friendship there in the middle, and then finally, you know, that's why you have to marry a woman younger than you, so you can take care of her. Because this is very common in the old days, you know, where there was some co-education, all these things, so that you tend to marry, you know, sometimes, you know. So, you know, ten years would be a difference, you know, between the husband and the wife, if not more. And so she was a nurse in the old age. So, Henry Clay there has always been nursed back to health by his wife, you know, and those things. For such, huh, do not at all live together, especially the old. For sometimes they're not even pleasant, right? Nor do they have need of such association unless they're useful. For they are pleasant to the extent that they have hope of some good in some place with these that are strangers. Now, young, as he said at the top of page four, the friendship with the young seems to be an account of pleasure, right? Did you have a good time, right? That's really a sign that you're talking about were you pleased, right? Pleasing to be over playing with so-and-so. For these live by emotion, right? And they especially seek what is pleasant to them in the present. But as their age changes, so other things become pleasant to them, right? So one time you want to ride a bike, now you want to drive a car. One time you want to play this sport, now you want to play that game, right? Hence they become friends and cease to be quickly, right? For the friendship changes together with the pleasant. And the change of such pleasure is what? It's swift, huh? Okay. And the young are amorous, huh? For the most of passionate love is by emotion and account of pleasure. Hence they love quickly and quickly sees, changing many times the same day. It's all of a sudden an exaggeration. But you see that in Roman Julia, right? Romeo is in love with Rosalind and he goes to the house of the Capulets, right? To see Rosalind and then he sees Juliet. Now he's in love with Juliet and he comes down to Friar Lawrence. He says, oh my gosh! You know, you were moaning about Rosalind and now you're moaning about Juliet. So on. And these wish to remain together and to live together for thus it comes to them according to friendship, right? People are falling in love with a different person every year, right? And I contrast with them the friendship that is not by accident or by happening, right? But the friendship of the good and alike in virtue is the perfect friendship. For these wish good things alike to each other insofar as they are, what? Good, right? But they are good in themselves, huh? Those wishing good to their friends on account of them are most of all friends. For they are thus through themselves and not by, what? Happening. Hence the friendship of these remains as long as they are good and virtue is something that is, what? Stable, right, huh? So notice the reason why Aristotle is saying this is the perfect friendship. It's per se, to itself, huh? Okay? And not to happening, huh? Now, if you look at Plato's, not Plato's, but Cicero's little thing on friendship, huh? There, it's only this friendship-based and virtue that he calls friendship. He won't give the other a term, right? Aristotle will use the word friend for the ones because we do, in daily life, call them friends. Right? You know? Like, Garrick had many friends, right? But, I was reading about, you know, a thing about Stalin there this year, you know, when these new barber fees are young or things. The Red Czar, they called him. Oh, wow. But he had many, he liked literary people, right? Hmm. He must have found them pleasing, right? Like, did these things, huh? That was not a friendship based on virtue, what do you mean, huh? See? But he found this kind of conversation, discussion, pleasing, right? And he read lots of fiction and things of that sort of thing. So, a lot of these, like, upper-uppers in the Russian thing, they're like, they have, you know, literary people around them because they're pleasing to hear these. Okay? But it's a friendship of pleasure, right, huh? Yeah. And sometimes, you know, you see how presidents, you know, I've had some people they like to play golf with and so on, right? Oh. See? Someone who's, who's, who's, pleasure to play golf with. Hmm. You know, this guy was a good conversationist and so on. Hmm. But that's not friendship in the highest sense, is it? And each is good simply and to his friend, huh? Okay? For the good... Good are both simply good, and they're also, what? Full to each other. And likewise pleasant, for the good are pleasant simply and to each other, right? Now, that's what Aristotle is saying here. This is another reason to say that this is the perfect friendship, right? Because if you're courageous, if I love you because you're courageous, because you're wise, because you're moderate, and any other virtues, right? You will be more useful to me than a fool, right? You know, the old saying, you know, with friends like that, you don't need enemies, you know? You see? So although I'm a friend of you, not because you are useful to me, right? I'm a friend of you, and I chose you as a friend because I saw that you were a courageous man, that you were a wise man, and a moderate man, and you're eating and drinking and so on, right? Yet you're more useful to me in those ways, right? You can drive me if you're sober and not if you're drunk, right? And you're more useful to me in the battlefield if you're a courageous man than a coward, right? And you're more useful to me in life if you're wise and give me good advice and so on, than if you're a fool, right? He says, also, you're really more pleasant to me, right? Because if I'm a wise man or a courageous man, I enjoy the company of wise and courageous men, right? But it's not only because you're like me, right? But you're like me in something that is naturally pleasing. Or if you're like me in being a coward, well, there's a basis of friendship there on the basis of a likeness, but it's a likeness of something that is not in itself pleasing, right? Okay? If I like you because you're a fool like I am, well, folly is not a likable quality in itself, right? So I have more reason, huh? If you're courageous and I'm courageous, to take delight in each other, right? And so the highest kind of friendship has what the lower kinds have, but maybe two, what? Higher thing, right? You're more truly pleasing, right? And more truly useful to me, right? Okay? And same with the man and the woman there, right? If the woman is truly modest, right? That's a pleasing quality in a woman, right? See? Or if she's a prostitute, it's like this sort. Or if she's got qualities that are not in themselves pleasing, right? So there's less reason for me to be pleased with the prostitute than with the modest young lady. Do you see the idea? Okay? So Aristotle is saying that this is another reason why this friendship is more perfect. It has everything that the lower ones have, but much that they don't have, right? Such a friendship, he says, is with reason stable, for it joins together in itself all things which ought to be owned to friends. For all friendship is an account of the good, or an account of pleasure, either simply or to the one loving, and by some likeness. But all the four said belong to this as such, for in this they are alike in the rest. And the good simply is also pleasant simply, but these are most of all lovable. And hence, to love and friendship in these will be the greatest and the, what? The best, huh? And then he takes one more sign here. And that is the rarity of these friendships, right? The best things are rare, huh? And such are likely rare the friendship of the virtuous. Why? For such men are few. Okay? Now this goes all the way back to the words of the seven wise men of Greece, right? The seven wise men of Greece are at the end of the 7th century B.C., right? Beginning of the 6th century, huh? And among them is Thales and Miletus, and I'm regarded as the first philosopher, huh? But they always had in the list of the seven wise men Thales and Pitykus and Bias and Solon, right? We'd all give her up. But Pitykus said it's difficult to be good. And Bias and Pryin says, few are good, many are bad. Okay? And Christ is something like that, right? Many are called, but few are chosen, right? Or broad is the road that leads to destruction, right? So such, he says there, are likely rare. For such men are few, right? The mass of men prefer a life suitable to beasts, he says in the first book. And he says there, are likely rare. And he says there, are likely rare. But you're not the first wise man to say this, right? Heraclitus said to the Son, For such men are few. Further, there is need of time, well, that's what we were saying, right? in being accustomed to each other. For according to the proverb, it is not possible to know each other before they have taken the required amount of salt together, right? That's the idea, I suppose, to eat together and so on, right? Okay, that's the expression, right? To put salt in your thing. One cannot receive or be friends before each appear lovable to each and is, what? Trusted, right? Now those quickly being friendly to each other wish to be friends, but are not if they are not worthy of love and know this, right? For the wish for friendship can come about quickly, but friendship cannot, okay? So, it's very rare that the best friendship is found, right? And it's probably, you're lucky if you have somebody like Horatio that you can be a friend of, huh? But even if you and Horatio are both virtuous, and there's a few men that are virtuous, huh? It would still take, what? Time, right? For you to become friends so you could trust each other and know that you are worthy of this, right? Okay? That's what happens with the two gentlemen of Rona, right? I can read the great play. It's a very interesting play. A great play of Shakespeare, right? But Proteus at the end there asks Valentine for his forgiveness, right? And he forgives him, right? Okay? But they're young, right? They're passionate, you know? Especially Proteus, huh? But Proteus is named from, what? The god of... Who's always changing his shape, right? Okay? Proteus in Greek mythology and Homer appears in the Odyssey there, right? He's always changing his shape. You grab on, hold on to him. Now, false is water is an expression you find even in Shakespeare, right? But water is always changing its shape, right? If you pour this water into another container and another container, keep on changing its shape, right? That's where Proteus seems to be, right? He's in love with Julia and now he's in love with Sylvia and again? You know, same day, right? He's just got through with a terrible saying goodbye to Julia and all of a sudden he's in love with Sylvia to the point of going to betray his friend Valentine and to the Duke, right? So he can move in and take his place with Sylvia. Kind of funny, huh? Used to see this when I was young I used to see this young lady at church, you know, in daily mass and she said she's a kind of nice girl, you know? So, gee, I wonder who she is and how can I get to know her, right? So I tell my best friend, you know, about her, see? And he's pretty clever, see? So what he does he calls up the house for the telephone number of the house and where the house is and he says I'm doing the parish survey I think it's all information He pats it on to me, you know but he said I was tempted to ask me out by self-purpose and he said I was kind of clever with the house I was saying this is my parish survey and I don't know who they are, you know? So So I mentioned that before This then, he says the top of page of five is This then is perfect both according to time and according to the rest and according to all these We should stop there, huh? Yes as far as they resemble it, right? But Aristotle will nevertheless speak of these lesser friendships as friendships in some sense, huh? As distinguished from Cicero's way of speaking of only the highest friendship is friendship We shouldn't really call these useful friends friends Well in some imperfect and diminished sense Aristotle says we'll call them friends and in so far as they resemble in some distant way Right? The highest kind, huh? Okay? So he's going to be talking about these three kinds of friendship Again, right, huh? But these are called friendships among what? Equals, right, huh? As opposed to the friendships you'll talk on later on between unequals like the friendship of the father and the son, right? and the friendship of the master and the servant, or the husband and the wife, right? But notice how Aristotle, in a way, is anticipated by, what, the poet Homer, right? Because in the Iliad, he represents the friendship among equals between Patroclus and Achilles, right? These are men who have fought many battles together, right? So they are alike in having this virtue of what? Courage. And courage is the virtue which is most known to us. And you know how we have in this country, we have the Medal of Honor, which some people call the Congressional Medal of Honor, but the soldiers just call it the Medal of Honor. But virtue is something honorable, right? But as I say, the Medal of Honor is given for courageous acts. I can get the Medal of Honor for one glorious afternoon on the battlefield, right? But I can be eating and drinking moderately all my life, and it won't give me a Medal of Honor. And I can be just all my life and pay what I owe people, you know, and so on. It won't give me a Medal of Honor, right? So in some way, courage is the virtue that most stands out. And the Greek word for virtue, arete, and the Latin word for virtus, etymologically is translated into English by manhood, right? And manhood first has that sense, most of all, of courage. So in some sense, the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus is based on virtue, the virtue that's most known to the Greeks. When Aristotle takes up the moral virtues in the third and fourth and fifth books, he begins with courage, right? And then he goes to moderation, ends up eventually with justice, right? So virtus, it's that sense, vir, manhood, manhood, huh? You can see Shakespeare often uses manhood in the sense of courage, and then sometimes he'll use it in the broader sense for even justice, right? For manhood means, you know, the disposition or habit that fits the man, that a man should have, right? So you have a broader sense. But then in the other great work that's come down to us from Home of the Odyssey, there you have celebrated the friendship of not only of Odysseus and his wife, Penelope, but of Odysseus and his son in Aptolemus, I guess, and the friendship of him and his, what, faithful servant there, the swineherd, Evelius, huh? So in a sense, the two greatest works that come down to us in Greek fiction, one is a celebration of friendship among equals, and the other is a celebration of friendship among, what, unequals, huh? And Aristotle will talk about those two kinds, huh? So as Socrates says in one of the dialogues, the poets are the fathers of wisdom for us, right? Well, it's like, you know, imperfect wisdom compared to that of the philosophers, but there is something there, right, huh? And like you were talking in that conversation we're having there in between, I mean, Odysseus, you know, has a few affairs on the way home and so on, but, you know, you can't expect the poets to have too perfect a notion of these things, and the philosophers, you know, criticize them, you know, for attributing to the gods the kind of faults that men have, right? You know, adultery, he says, and robbery, and things of these sorts, right, huh? And, but now, as far as the first kinds of friendships, the friendship among equals, Aristotle will distinguish these three kinds, but only one of them is friendship in the fullest and the greatest sense, huh? And that's why later on you get into the Summa Theologiae and you want to talk about charity, and one of the first questions Thomas will ask is whether caritas is a friendship, right, huh? And, of course, the objections are more understandable if you know the ethics here, because one objection will be, you know, well, by charity you're supposed to love your enemies, right? But isn't friendship, you know, mutual? How can this be friendship, right? Or you're supposed to love even the sinner, right? But if charity is friendship, it should be the highest kind of friendship. And here and now you're loving the man who doesn't have virtue, the sinner, right? And so, you know, Thomas will have a reply to these objections, but you know how he, I'm assuming, he always objects to himself. But you can see, you know, that these objections have occurred to someone who knows human friendship, right? And now he's going to consider it a supernatural friendship, okay? And of course, church is primarily between God and man, right? And this is a friendship among unequals, in case you don't know. They're very much unequal, right? But it's in some ways like the friendship of father and son, right? And, you know, the beautiful words there in St. John, right? Right before he talks about eternal life, right? Oh, God as he is, and so on. But we are called the sons of God, and we are, he says, you know? That's very interesting, huh? And of course, sometimes scripture compares it to what? Husband and wife, right? Okay. And sometimes even to master and servant, right? But all these human friendships among unequals have a certain likeness to the friendship they're going to have with God, right? Okay. But, you know, Christ will say, you know, Thomas will be starting this consideration of these things. He'll quote, I no longer call you servants, but friends, right? Christ says. So, very interesting to study. I used to end up the course on friendship, love and friendship, you know, by talking a little bit about charity at the end, you know. But I give them, you know, the objections on one page, and then the next day I give them the answer. Because there's a tendency, you know, to not wrestle with the problem and to try to look ahead right away to the solution to it. How can this be friendship, you know, if it's, even to sinners, and even to those who hate you, right? You know? But Thomas will make some distinctions that are quite relevant to that. So we won't meet next week. I'm going to be down there in Kentucky again there at Fort Knox, I think. Because, you know, it still requires the official notification of Congress, but that's just, you know, easy as done at the beginning of October. So, it's supposed to be on October 7th, so the next Thursday, I see. But as, I think the father, probably, me, I have to put one of the things for the major. So I make these puns, you know, I say, this is, you know, I say, this is a major accomplishment. Because that's kind of, you know, you know, I think they go from being a captain to being a major. So, more responsibility. But then, week to week from now, we'll start with the fourth reading here, right? Okay. So, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise the Lord. And help us to understand all the truth of it. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So the first reading was on the reasons, right, for considering friendship in this part of philosophy. And the second reading was working out the definition of friendship, right, which involves love, but love that is mutual, right, and mutual love that is known to the partners. And because of something lovable, either the good in the full sense, virtue, or because of the pleasant, right, or because of the utility or usefulness. And then the basis of those three kinds of lovables, and therefore three different loves, right, and therefore three different friendships. In the third reading, he distinguished the three kinds of friendships among what? Equals, right? Okay. Now, in the fourth reading, he's going to compare a bit the lesser friendships, based upon pleasure, or based upon usefulness, with the highest and the fullest kind. So friendship is not said equally of these three, but said completely or fully or perfectly, only of the friendship based on virtue. But the other associations can be called friendship, not purely equivocally, because they have a certain likeness to that. full and perfect friendship. And he's going to talk about that, huh? So he says, the one through the pleasant, the friendship, that is to say, through pleasure, has a likeness, huh, to that highest kind of friendship. For the good, meaning the virtuous, are also pleasant to one another. So there's a likeness of the two, isn't there? It's not purely equivocal that the word friendship would be said of this based on pleasure. Likewise, he says, that through the useful. For the good or the virtuous are also such to each other. So a courageous man is a useful man to have. And a just man and a wise man, right? Give you good advice and so on, right? He's useful, right? Okay. So even this useful friendship has a likeness to the full and perfect kind of friendship. And now, in terms of, what about being long-lasting, right? Well, sometimes these lesser friendships resemble the greatest friendship, right? In being not completely transitory, right? Okay. And he says, And friendships in these especially last, when the same comes to be from each, such as pleasure. And not only thus, they get pleasure from each other, but also the pleasure is caused by the same thing, huh? Such as in the, what? Witty, right, huh? Mm-hmm. You tell good jokes, and I tell good jokes, right? Oh, yes. And so even in the U.S. Congress, they have, you know, these kind of informal clubs where even Republicans and Democrats are friendly with each other, you know, and they get along because they're both got a sense of humor and they tell good stories and jokes and so on, huh? The way Abe Lincoln, right, could tell these funny stories, huh? He's known for this, huh? He says, When the pleasure is taken in the same sort of thing, right, huh? Okay. And not as in the lover and the beloved, huh? Now, he's talking here about the case where the one person is attracted to the beauty of the other person, and the reverse is not true, but there's some other reason why they associate them. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing that person, so the one who is not particularly good-looking or whatever, right, rejoices, right, in the beauty of the other person, and the other one rejoices in being served. By the lover, right? And being flattered and all this sort of thing, right, huh? Okay. But the beauty of the one person ending, sometimes the friendship comes to an end. For the seeing is no longer pleasant to this one, right? No longer pleasant to see. And to that one, service is no longer paid. Tribute and worship, right? But now, another way that they can be long-lasting, not only if they take pleasure in the very same thing, but many again last, he says, because they have the same, what? Customs, right? And so we think of Shakespeare's play there, Anthony and Cleopatra, where they're kind of attached to each other, right? Even though it's a friendship of pleasure, right? But Anthony and Cleopatra are somewhat the same. Customs, right? They like to live it up, both of them, right? And so on. And if they have, you know, habits that are similar, but they're familiar with. But the other ones, he says, are not so stable, right? Those exchanging, not the pleasant, but the useful and amorous matters, are less friends, and their friendship less lasting. Now there, I guess he's talking about the mixed friendship again, right? I remember years ago, a famous incident of this sort of thing, you know. You might have a wealthy man who's older, right, and not particularly handsome, right? And he's got some young, beautiful girl, right?