Love & Friendship
Lecture 22: Unequal Friendships and the Nature of Loving

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How in these two great works that have come down to us on Homer, the Iliad and the Odyssey, right? The Greeks regard the Iliad as a greater work than the Odyssey, right? But they're both great works. And the Iliad, in a sense, is the tragedy of the friendship of what? Achilles and Patroclus. But that's a friendship, as it were, of the first kind among equals, right? Now the second work, the Odyssey, right? He's kind of celebrating the friendship of Odysseus and his wife Penelope, right? Waits, is it 20 years for him, right? Faithful Penelope, right? But also the friendship between Odysseus and his son, and the friendship between him and the faithful Swainby, right? Okay. And I think I mentioned before how in those three friendships among non-equals, you have this reflected again in St. Paul's epistles, right? Where when Thomas is dividing the text to St. Paul, St. Paul is giving advice to husbands and advice to wives, right? Advice to fathers and advice to sons, right? Advice to masters and to slaves, right? The same three, right? Which still exists in his time, as he did in Aristotle's time, right? So when Aristotle takes up the household or the family, right, you've got to talk about the relation of the husband to the wife and vice versa, and the father to the son or general to the parents to the offspring and vice versa, right? And then the master to the slave and the slave to the master, right? Okay. And those same relations exist when St. Paul is writing, and therefore he's giving advice as to how a husband should behave towards his wife, right? And how a wife should behave towards her husband. And how a father should discipline his sons in general, right? And whether suitable or unsuitable in the way he disciplines them, right? And how a son should behave towards his father, right? In the same way for the master and the slave, right? Okay. He says there's another form of friendship, another genus you might say, of kinds of friendship. The one according to what? Superiority, right? And the prime example is that of the father towards the son, right? Now, what did Cicero say? The son is always in debt to the father. Okay. So it's a friendship between unequals, huh? And in general, the older to the, what? Younger, right, huh? So you see that in all the different arts and sciences, right, huh? And the man to the woman, right? This is very popular in our days, right? Okay. And the ruler to the, what? Ruled, right, huh? So the friendship there of the Pope and Ratzinger or something like that, right? Okay. But this is a friendship of unequals, right? The ruler to the ruled, right, huh? Now, these differ from each other, right? He's going to say that the friendship of the father for the son is not exactly the same as that of the son for the, what? Father, right? The friendship of the husband for the wife and that of the wife for the husband is not exactly the same, right? Of the master or the ruler for the ruled, right? And vice versa is not the, what? Same, right? Well, in the case of the friendships that we spoke about before, the friendship of Hamlet for a ratio and a ratio for Hamlet is the same kind of friendship, huh? There is not the same of parents to children and rulers to rule. That's one difference, too. But neither of the father to the son and the son to the father, nor of the husband to the wife and of the wife to the husband. Okay? Now, what's the proof of that, right? Well, in the third paragraph he says, for the virtue and the work of these is, what? Different, right? Let's take the first example he gives you, which is that of the father and the son, right? Perfect, huh? Is the virtue and the work of the father the same as that of the son? Well, one of the virtues of the son would be, what? Obedience, right? The son should obey his father, right? And in general, the offspring, right? Their parents, right? Are the parents supposed to obey the child? That's a disorder in the household, right? Okay. And what do we expect the father to do, huh? See? Well, the father should discipline the child, right? But he should also advise the child, right? He should also, what? Have some foresight, right? Okay? To expect the child to discipline his father? Or the child to, what? You know, have foresight for his father's life? Well, we expect the father to have some foresight, right? So the very virtue and the work of the father and that of the son are quite different, huh? And that, on account of which they love, is also different. Now, we saw that principle used even in talking about the distinction among the friendships among equal, right? And that love is because of something lovable, right? And because of the good or the virtue and the pleasure or the usefulness are different kinds of goods, right? Then the lovings are different, right? And therefore, the kind of friendship is different, huh? Okay? We're saying, the reason why the father loves the son and the reason why the son loves the father is not the same. Now, why does the father love the son, right? Well, he does, yeah. But the father's reason for loving the son is that the son is a continuation of himself. Okay? And so we use the term reproduction here, right? And I say to students, what does the word reproduction mean, right? Does it mean production? See? Who is reproduced? Yeah, see? Reproduced means to produce again, right? So the son is not produced again. He's produced for the first time, right? You see? It's the father and the mother that are reproduced in the children, right? Okay? So, the reason that the parents have, the father has, for loving the son is that the son is a continuation of himself, right? A reproduction of himself, right? Okay? This would be new made when thou art old, as Shakespeare says, right? And see thy blood warm when thou feelest it cold. Okay? Now, does the son see the father as a continuation of himself? Reproduction of himself? No. No. But the son has another reason for loving the father, right? That the father gave him life, right? The father gave him, what? Education, right? Nourishment. And then, education, right? Okay? So the reason the son has for loving the father is not the same as the reason the father has for loving the son. And if the reason for loving is not the same, then the love is not exactly the same, right? And if the love is not the same exactly, then the friendship, right, which is based on the habit of loving, right, is not exactly the same, right? Do you see that? So it's the same principle, right? And as we said, you know, this thing runs through our thinking even that in the dianima, right? That the powers are distinguished by their what? Acts, the powers or abilities by their act, and the acts are distinguished by their objects, right? So because color and sound are really different, right? And if you understand or know in some way the difference between color and sound, then you know, secondly, that to sense color, right? And to sense sound is not really the same thing, is it? But one is seeing and the other is hearing. And then the ability to see and the ability to hear are not the same, right? You see that, right? Well, the same way here, right? The habit of some kind of love differs from another habit of loving, because the lovings are not the same, right? And the lovings differ because the what? The lovable, the reason for loving, is not the same, right? You see that? Okay? Now, I'll just make a little side there, you know. Obviously the friendship between God and man, if that's possible, right? Is a friendship between unequals, right? Okay? But does God have the same reason, shall we say, for loving us, and that we have for loving him, see? Well, in case you didn't know it, we're made in the image and likeness of God, right? Okay? So God has a reason for loving us, right? Because we are the very image of God, right? Are we deficient in image, right? Okay? Have we made God in our image and likeness? Maybe the poets did when they had Homer, had Zeus or somebody, right? But no, no, no. But we have another reason for loving God, right? One is that he created us, right? Another is that he conserves us in existence, right? Another is that he shepherds us towards our final goal, right? Okay? Now, do we, does God have that reason? Do we create God? Do we keep him in existence? God is dead, people might think so. That's a lot of nonsense, huh? You saw that cartoon, you know, how do we have a little billboard, you know? Ichi is dead, right? Oh. Signed God. Oh, I know. Amen. But anyway, so God doesn't have that reason for loving us, right? That we created him, or that we keep him in existence, or that we shepherd him to some goal, right? No. No, see? So the reasons that we have for loving God, right, are quite different than the reasons that he has for loving us, right? You see? So, you know, this is helpful, right? When you go to a very unequal friendship. Okay? And again, you know, going back to the first reason Aristotle gave, the virtue and the work, right? Well, I mean, in God you have, what? The work is creation, conservation, right? Things like that, see? Why our virtue and our work are different, you know? Humility, obedience, right? Which is of this sort, right? Theological virtues, right? Okay? We believe God, right? Don't we? Okay? We hope in him, right? How he does this? No. So these same two reasons, then, beautiful, the Aristotle gives you, right? Okay? Now, again, the husband and the wife, right? Are the virtue and the work of these the same? Sowing, no? You know? It's interesting, in the old days, even the court, son, the queen would, what? Sow, right? You know? Men never sow, right? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? You know? But is the reason that the husband has for loving the wife the same as the reason the wife has for loving the husband? About that, huh? More difficult to see, right, than the father and the son. Or if you have this friendship between the master and the slave, or even between the ruler and the ruled, or the man who commands, the man who obeys, right? You can note your officer, right, and those he commands, right? Is the reason that I have for loving the general the reason he has for loving the soldier? Not the same reason, is it, huh? And again, the virtue of the commander-in-chief and the virtue of the soldier is quite different, right? You know, we expect the soldier to obey his officer, right, and to be brave and so on. But we expect the officer to, what, have some foresight, right? And not be sacrificing his men unnecessarily, right? Right? And that's why they, you know, they're somewhat critical of the officers there in the First World War, you know, with these, this, you know, just massive killing of people, right, without gaining anything, really, you know? Just kind of a pathetic war, really, in some ways, huh? And Chichot was trying to avoid that, you know, the Gallipoli plan, but he didn't get the proper assistance, you know? But he could have been successful, I think, if it had been done better. So in the Second World War, there, MacArthur would like to, you know, you know, jump from island to island, right, and need the chaps, you know, kind of isolated there, you know, huh? And that way you'd give less injuries, right? Or less deaths. Let them wither on the vine. Okay. But the thing that we look for from the commanding officer or the general is different, isn't it, than what we look for from the guy down below. And so the reason for loving each other is different, huh? Shakespeare's very good on that in the fifth play there, huh? For the Battle of Eisencourt, right? Oh. And he says, The same things do not come to be to either from the other, nor ought they to be, what? Soft, right, huh? Okay. So the husband should not expect the same thing from the wife that the wife expects from the husband, right? And the same thing with children and parents. For whenever children give to parents what is owed to those who have been gendered, right? And the parents have given to sons what is owed to children, the friendship of these will be lasting and what? Good, right, huh? Okay. So if your parents provided for you, right? And nourished you, right, huh? And gave you some advice as to what to do in life, right? What to avoid and what to pursue, right, huh? Okay. Then you've gotten from your parents which you should have gotten from your parents, huh? Now, it's going to come back to this idea of equality because even here there's a kind of equality, huh? Proportion. Now, the loving, he says, ought to be proportional in all the friendships according to superiority. As it better ought to be loved more than he loves, huh? Both the more useful and each of the others likewise. For when the loving comes to be according to worth, then there comes to be in some way equality which seems to belong to, what, friendship, right? But it's a kind of proportional thing, right? But now he's going to, in the next paragraph, huh, he's going to distinguish between the way equality is in friendship and in, what, justice, right? That's kind of a subtle thing here. But the equal does not seem to come about in the same way in the just and in friendship. Thank you. For in matter of justice, the equal is first according to worth, but second according to quantity. While in friendship, that according to quantity is first, but that according to worth, second. Now, what the hell does that mean? Well, notice, huh? They're going down to the store, and I say, would you pick up a quart of milk for me and a loaf of bread? Are you there? You say, sure, okay? Now you do that, and I'm going to settle with you when you come back, right? Now, you come back, and what's the situation now? What's the worth of that milk and so on, right? A loaf of bread would it cost, right? And now I'm going to make things equal, right? I'm going to give you what you paid out for me, right? But first of all, I'll have to see what is the worth of that milk and that bread, right? The same way in a commercial dealing, right? If I'm selling you something, right? What is the worth of what I'm selling you, right? So if I'm selling you this house, and you're going to receive this house, then you have to give me the equivalent of that house, right? And the market value, whatever it is, right? So you're going to make equal, and then the work of justice will be over, okay? Then we have nothing to do with each other anymore. I get the house, and you get the money, right? You take it off, and I get the house, and you get the money, okay? But in friendship, right? First, I was hinting here that there has to be a kind of what? Equality between us, right? And then I treat you what? As myself, right? Because that's where I should treat someone who's my equal, right? Who's another self, in other words, right? Okay? So it's kind of a little subtle difference there, right? There has to be a kind of equality between us, and then I treat you in the way that someone who's equal to me is worthy to treat such a person, okay? Well, in the case of justice, there is a kind of what? Inequality to begin with, and you're trying to make things, what? Equal, right? Okay? And then Aristotle comes to the problem then, right? It is clear that if there is a great distance in virtue or wickedness or wealth or something other, they are no longer friends or expected to be, okay? Now, this is kind of the common thing in Dickens' famous novel there, David Copperfield, right? You know, if you and I live in a little town there, out of the way and so on, I have the opportunity to go to London and become famous, right? And it becomes a great distance between us, right? And I become wealthy in London, and you're back in the small town there. Poor, right, huh? So if there's a great distance between us, then that makes friendship, what? Difficult, if not impossible, right? Or if you remain, what? Rather ignorant, right? And I go and I get all kinds of degrees and all kinds of knowledge, right? Can you expect to be my friend? Of course, you see this in Basel's life of Johnson, you see, because Johnson goes from the small town down to London and becomes world famous, right? And then some bumpkin from the town shows up, right? And expects to be on intimate terms with Johnson, right? You see? But now there's been this great, what? Disparity, right, huh? In education and fame and everything, right? Can you expect them to associate, right? That's an impediment to friendship, right? Yeah. That's an impediment to friendship, right? That's an impediment to friendship. So the wealthy marry the wealthy, right? Usually. But then, you know, we saw that thing before, that love is supposed to overcome these distances, right? Because love is a power that unites. This is clear in the gods, right? For these excel much in all good, son. This is clear also in kings. Those falling short of them a lot do not expect to be friends of them. Or do those worthy of nothing expect to be friends of the best or wisest, right? Now, as Aristotle explains in the beginning of the Nicomarckian Ethics, you can't have in ethics the precision that you have in what? Mathematics, right? Okay. And this is why he adds now in the next paragraph. There is no precise limit in such things, right? Up to which they are friends, for many things taken away, it remains, right? Okay. So how much inequality makes friendship impossible, right? Not to be expected, right? He can't say precisely, he says, right? Okay. Okay. He says when it's separated much, then it seems to be impossible, right? Okay. And notice the example he gets here. As from God, no longer, right? And he may be speaking a bit according to the, you know, the Greek position about the gods, right? Okay. But would the Greek hope to be the friend of Zeus or Pablo or something like that, right? Right? Okay. Aristotle does say elsewhere in the ethics, you know, that if God is friends of man, he'd be of the philosophers who are lovers of wisdom, right? Okay. But notice he's kind of raising the question here, here. And here's a question for us as Christians, right, to think about, right? How can there be friendship between God and man, right, when there is such a distance, in fact, an infinite distance among them, right? Because as I mentioned before, when Thomas is giving the reasons, you know, why the Incarnation is reasonable, right? One reason he gives is in terms of friendship between God and man. That God becoming a man makes easier for there to be friendship between man and God, huh? That's interesting, right? You see? But as if, again, you won't be too precise, but as if it would be much more difficult, suddenly, right? Not necessarily impossible, but it would be much more difficult for man, right, and God to have friendship if God, what, didn't become man, right? Okay? Maybe not absolutely necessary for God to become man or for there to be friendship between us and God, but it would be very difficult, right? And very hard, right? So you could say that, I mean, you could go back and say, well, there isn't a friendship between God and Moses? Well, suddenly there is, right? Okay? But it's kind of interesting, huh? When the Church Fathers talk about the burning bush, right? And it represents the Incarnation. And the bush represents the human nature of Christ and the fire, right? The divine nature. And that the fire does not consume or destroy the bush signifies that the divine nature does not swallow up or destroy the human nature. That he's both God and man, right? And that this arouses the wonder of Moses, right? Anticipates the fact that the Incarnation is the most wonderful thing that God has made. Thomas, in the fourth book of the Summa Cana Gentiles, says that this is the most wonderful thing that God has, what? Made, right? And then he quotes the principle that Aristotle taught us, that what is most in any genus is... the cause of all the rest and therefore this most wonderful thing that god has made the incarnation is the reason why everything else wonderfully is done was done it's all to point to this so even though the great moses you might say where is christ right when moses is in the line leading to christ right and even in that burning books right there is a figure of the incarnation but um in anticipation that god was going to become man right and even more so when he does become man right then friendship between god and man becomes much more what possible right and and and maybe you could say that because because of um the incarnation there's more friendship between god and man than there was before you see and when men turn away from the incarnation or the incarnate one then then they tend to lose their friendship with god right you know but it's something connects with whatever style saying here right that when there's great inequality then friendship becomes something very what difficult huh okay and then aristotle raises a certain problem about this huh because a friend is someone who wishes well to you right but i was so much well to you that you would be so much greater than me that therefore there would be no friendship between us and then i'd lose out in this greatest of good or one of the greatest of goods huh friendship right whence also it is asked he says if friends do not wish to friends the greatest of goods such as to be gods right huh for they would no longer be friends to them or goods for friends are goods right right you know you love yourself most of all right and even the order of charity you have to love yourself more than your neighbor but if i'm wishing well to you right but i wish you to become when i wish such great a good to you right that to be such an inequality between us and then we can all be friends and therefore i lose this very great good of mine maybe a friendship with a little tension there right you see okay um i remember reading uh reading a little account there by some uh nun right talking about the time she decided to be a nun right and apparently there's some young man who's interested in her right and uh of course obviously to be the nun is a higher state than the matrimonial state huh but now does he wish her to be a nun when he wants to marry her see see see because he's apparently going to lose her now see um but yet if he wishes her well then he should right so she said the young man's last words to her were well i'm glad god's getting you instead of another man it's kind of funny but uh it reminds me you know when you're still stuck here right you see what i want my best friend to become pope see what they say when a man is is made a bishop huh he has to almost you know cut himself off a bit from his buddy buddy friends that he might have had before right he has to you know kind of treat everybody uh reasonably and equally you know and so on and so maybe you know if if you became pope i would no longer be able to what teach you yeah yeah i couldn't sit around on friday evenings and drink beer or wine with you anymore you know i mean you know you know you're so far above me that you know i can't you know i'm gonna lose my friendship right like thomas abeckett and uh king whatever his name is yeah yeah that's funny if it has been well said that the friend wishes good things to the friend on account of the latter it would be necessary that the latter remains such as he is for he wished the greatest goods to him as being a man right further perhaps not all for each one wishes good things especially to himself right but i think this is kind of the way of difficulties your style was posing it right huh okay you know how in In Greek literature or Greek mythology, in a sense, a man is raised to the status of a god, right? You have this in some of the plays and things of that sort. Now, would I want my friend to be raised to the status of one of the mortal gods? Now, look at this there. Well, I wish good to him. This is an advancement in life, right? But, you know, see? Now, next time we'll be looking at the last reading here. And then we would do a little things, fundamental things in ethics there, because, you know, it's in talking about love, as we did in the treatise on love, and now about friendship, and so on. We had to talk about the good, right? Because the good is the object of love, right? And Plato is very subtly in the dialogue called the Symposium. It's a dialogue about love, right? But the occasion for the dialogues about love in the Symposium is the victory of the tragic poet Agathon. And, of course, if you know Greek, Agathon comes from the Greek word agathos, meaning good. So, in honor of the poet whose name means the good, they have six speeches about love, right? I think Plato is subtle there, right? And that there's a connection between love and the good, right? So, if you have to know the object before you know the act, right? Maybe we should have talked about the good before we talked about love, right? So I have to correct that. And, of course, to understand good is the fundamental thing in ethics, right? And you have to understand good before you can understand better, because better means gooder, if that were grammatically correct, then. Okay? And so, you have to understand, in ethics, the first thing you have to understand, really, are what is good and what is better. And most people don't understand that. Okay? And so we'll teach a little bit how to understand what is good, what is better, right? Okay? God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, the writer of Ross, and help us to understand all that you're at. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Amen. Okay, now in this last reading that we're going to be doing on friendship, first out with more things to say, but the last we'll be doing here, he's going to be comparing loving and being loved. And both of them, of course, are essential to friendship, because friendship is mutual love, right? So you can't have friendship without loving and being loved, right? But now Aristotle's going to raise the question, does friendship consist equally in loving and being loved? Or does friendship consist more in one than the other, right? At the same time, he'll be reflecting on his experience, what do people seek more? Okay? Of course, he's going to be pointing out that people seek more to be loved than to love, right? He'll say some interesting things about this attractiveness of being loved, right? Then he'll say that friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, huh? Okay? And he's very brief as far as showing that. In fact, he doesn't even give the reason. It's so obvious. But Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary, will give the reason, huh? Okay? And Aristotle just gives a sign of the truth, the way he's going to say. Okay? So it's going to be a comparison, then, of loving and being loved, and seeing in which of these does friendship consist chiefly. Okay? Okay. Okay. It doesn't consist equally in them, right? And he's going to be pointing out how people are inclined to seek more to be loved than to love. The one reason for that, he says, many seem through love of honor to wish to be loved more than to what? Love. Now, what is honor? It's very close to, yeah. Honor involves a reverence shown to somebody, right? Because there's something excellent in them. Something excelling in them, right? So, is there a connection between wanting to be loved and wanting to be honored? Is there a likeness between the two? And to be loved would seem to be a sign of there's something good in me, right? And so, just as I seek honor as a confirmation of the good or the excellence that is in me, right? So, also I seek to be loved by others as a confirmation of the good that is in me. That's that one lousy popular song, you know, you're nobody until somebody loves you. But, no, the thought is there, right, huh? You think you're a nobody, right? Or you feel like a nobody until someone loves you, right? Okay? So, Aristotle is saying, in a sense, that to be loved is in a way to be what? Honor, right? Okay? They're not exactly the same thing, but there's a certain closeness to the two, huh? Okay? And so, you could say, vice versa, that to love someone is in a way to, what? Honor them, right? Okay? And, of course, you know, in the liturgy, there's a connection between loving God and, what? Honoring or praising Him, huh? They're very closely related, huh? In the Psalms and liturgy in general, right? Okay? So, it begins with that observation, which is a very subtle one. Now, whence the many are lovers of flattery. Now, what is flattery? I would display it on it. Well, strictly speaking, flattery is undeserved praise, right? Being praised more than you deserve or more than what you did deserve, right? Now, we talked about that a bit when we talked earlier in the readings, friendly topics there, right? And how, when you go to somebody's house for dinner or something, we praise the meal, even though they might have cooked the meal a little bit too much, or they might have put a little bit too much salt, pepper, or some other thing, here or there, right? But you might be invited again or want to get on. You flatter them, right? What a wonderful meal this was, huh? Okay? There's an awful lot of flattery going on in the world, huh? Okay? And makes life more pleasant, right? But we saw also how Brutus was saying to Cassius, huh? That a true friend would not, what? Flatter, yeah. See? Because if you flatter me, then I don't correct my faults, and I don't, what? Perfect whatever it is I'm doing, right? I kind of rest in what I've done, huh? And so flattery in that sense is not coming for my good, right? Now, in that sense, flattery as well as envy is opposed to true friendship. Now, of course, envy is much more opposed to true friendship, because envy seems to be contrary to what's so essential to friendship that I wish well to you, right? And therefore, I should rejoice in the good that happens to you. Rejoice in your success in something, right? And so if I'm sad, right? Because I see your good fortune as kind of reflecting on my lack of good fortune, or your success reflecting on my lack of good fortune. I'm being a foil for my lack of success, right? Then I seem to have sadness over the good that has happened to you. And how is that compatible with wishing well to you? I should rejoice in that, huh? Okay. Now flattery seems to be more in harmony with the friendship because I flatter people to some extent because I want to please them, right? That seems to be something that a friend wants to do is to please his friend, right? But if I'm praising you more than you deserve, then what? Am I really after you're good? So we have, you know, Christians, we have something called fraternal correction. Thomas has, I think, a section on that in the Summa, or you have a disputed question, I think, on fraternal correction, right, and what your obligations are. So that's what true friendship would involve, right? Not flattery, huh? For the flatterer is a friend excelled, right? Or pretends to be such, right? And he pretends to love more than to be, what? Loved, right, huh? That's in the appearance, huh? And then in the third paragraph, he makes this point that we already alluded to. For to be loved seems close to being honored, which the many, what? Desire, right? Okay. But coming back now to the first paragraph, does that agree with your experience, huh? That the many, whatever the reason for this, does it agree with your experience that the many wish more to be loved than to love? One person does. Well, sometimes I point to the famous prayer of St. Francis, huh? And, you know, sometimes you can sing it, you know, in a vocal version of the church, huh? But among the things that St. Francis prays for, that he might seek more to what? Love than to be loved. Yeah. More to love than to be loved, right? Now, St. Francis, of course, is a saint, right? So if this saint has to pray, or feels it important, huh? One of his most famous prayers, to ask God, right, that he might more love, or might more seek to love, right, than to be loved, what does that say for the rest of us? Use more riches, huh? Okay. St. Augustine says this, too, in his Confessions. He talks about how he desired more to be loved than to love. Yeah, yeah. That's a very good witness. Thank you. Now, in the next two paragraphs, right, first I was going to see there's somewhat a difference between being loved, though, and being honored, right? He's spoken of their likeness, huh? And it said that to be loved in a way is to be honored, right? Okay. But he points out a little difference between the two. And that is that we seek to be loved for its own sake, even if nothing else were to come from it, right? Okay. Well, we seek more to be honored to confirm our incertitude, right, about our own, what, excellence, right? Okay. So I was always running up to Monsignor Dion with my latest thinking, you know, and see if he'd agree with me. You know, huh? Not because I was seeking honor for him, but if he said that was good, praise what I said, that would confirm me that I was on the right track, right? If he said no, then I usually fell in the second thought that it wasn't as good as I thought it was, huh? Okay. However, they do not seem to desire honor for itself, but by accident, by happening, huh? I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. For the many rejoice being honored by those in power on account of hope. On account of the hope they have of receiving something from them, right? So the student might rejoice, huh? The professor is praising his work. Because he has hope now of getting a good what? Great, right, huh? For they think to obtain from them what they need. So they rejoice in honor as a sign of undergoing good things. The good things are going to undergo and get. But these desiring honor from the good and the knowing desire their own opinion about themselves to be confirmed, right? I thought it was pretty good, but I guess you don't. They rejoice that they are good, right? Believing in the judgment of those saying so, right? So we commonly say, and to some extent I think we believe it, we're not a good judge of ourselves and how good what we are saying we're doing is, right? But when someone who is good at those things, right, says, hey, that was pretty good what you did, then we, what? Like that praise, right? Because it confirms our opinion that this was the right thing to do or it was good what we're doing, right? But it's better to be loved because they rejoice in being loved by, what? Itself, huh? This is a common thing in Aristotle that the through itself is more so than the thing that is through happening or by happening, right? Just like he was talking about the three kinds of friendship. And he said that the highest kind of friendship, I love you, kap auto, per se, through yourself, for yourself. Well, in the useful friendship especially, but also in the friendship of pleasure, I am loving you for what I can get from you, see? Which is kind of loving you by happening, right? Because you happen to be useful to me. That's why I love you, okay? But here he's using that same kind of distinction by saying that although these two are very much alike, right? So much so that you could say that to be loved is in a way to be honored, right? Nevertheless, he can say that it's a better thing to be loved than to be honored, huh? Because to be honored is sought for the sake of something else, right? For what you can get out of the one who honors you, right? Or what you could expect to get out of him. Or because of the confirmation of your opinion, right? For the fact that you're honored. But to be loved is something that you, what? Want for its own sake, right? Why do grandparents want to be loved by the... It's kind of for its own sake, right? Okay, they rejoice in it for its own sake. Now there's a confirmation of something good in the grandparents, but you see that it's good to be loved by the grandchildren, okay? So he draws a conclusion then, right? Whence it would seem to be better to be loved, right? Than to be honored, right? Being desirable for its own sake. And friendship, which consists in loving and being loved, not in honor as such, right? Is therefore, it is also desirable to itself on the very bottom of the page. Now, in the last paragraph of page 11, Aristotle is going to give a sign compared to this more important question, does friendship consist more in loving or in being loved? And we don't know why, but he doesn't give the reason. He's going to conclude, of course, that friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, but he passes over the reason as being obvious, Thomas says. But for us still, it's, of course, Thomas gives the reason, huh? Okay? And the second thing Aristotle does then is to give a, what? A sign of the truth of what he's saying, right? Before I look at his sign, huh? What would be the reason for saying that friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, huh?