Ethics
Lecture 6: Virtue, the Eye's Own Act, and Man's Purpose

Transcript
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Look at the girls with that one. It's not moral virtue at all, is it, right? You see? But I see better with this eye, at least at a distance. Reading is just reverse. It's kind of strange. But as far as distance, right, I can see better with the left eye than with the right eye, right? It might take an ophthalmologist or somebody, right, to say, why is this, what is the virtue of this eye, right? What is the shape of my, you know, cornea and so on, right? It enables this eye to see better, right, than this one here, right? You see? So it may take some time to figure out what is the virtue exactly of the eye, right? Okay? And that's where Aristotle's going to spend a lot of time on investigating, you know, the virtues of what? Of man, right? And we'll come back to that thing. But I've got to be back in Worcester at 7 o'clock for a meeting, so if I don't go now, and I'll be patient, right? And I'll be patient, right? Yes. Yeah. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or in illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelica Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand the literature of our time. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. So we talked about what good is, right? Yes. What is good? Yeah. Yeah. And do they want it because it is good, or is it good because they want it? How do you know that? Because it's not connected to their desire. Well? We interpolate it. Well, no. We try to reason it out, right? What kind of an argument did we use to reason it out? Induction. Induction, yeah. Yeah. And what objection did we have against saying that there was a, something was good because you want it? What was the objection to that? There are many things that we want which are not good. Yeah. So everybody has in their life something they wanted that they themselves admit was not good for them, right? Okay? But if something is wanted because it is good, why was the good not always wanted? That's part of it, yeah. Yeah. And why is it then that the bad is sometimes apparently wanted? Senses, okay. Hmm? The senses or reason can be deceived. Yeah. The senses and the reason, they can be deceived by the likeness, right? Of the bad to the good and so on. Or they can be what? See the good in something and not see the bad, right? Okay? So, it's because between the good and the bad and desire comes the senses or reason and they can be deceived or their knowledge can be incomplete. Okay? And of course, notice, huh? The good is acting upon the heart through the senses or through the reason. So it's twice removed from being a cause of the good, right? Okay? It's going in the opposite direction. The good to the senses to the heart. So the heart is being moved by the good. And so when you're being moved by something that is sometimes good, sometimes by an apparent good. But the apparent good moves only because it resembles what is truly good. And so the good itself is really the first cause, huh? Okay? And then we came to the second thing. What is better? Now, if you wanted to, you could go to the fifth book of wisdom and say that the perfect or the complete is better than the, what, imperfect or the incomplete, right? But Aristotle, in the fifth book of wisdom, he shows that perfect has three basic meanings. That the word perfect or complete, huh? Something is perfect or complete, he says there, when it has all its parts. Like when I was a student in Quebec, you'd see it in the restaurant. Repos complet. What does that mean? Complete dinner. Yeah, it means you're going to have an appetizer, the main course, and some kind of a little dessert, right? That's complete, it's got all the parts. And then, like that first sense, something is complete in its kind when it has all the ability of that kind of thing. So we could say that Homer is the complete poet, right? Aristotle says Homer taught all the other Greeks how to make a good plot. And Hegel says how excellent are the characters of Homer, right? He compares the French tragedians and how one-sided their characters are and kind of narrow, and the characters of Homer, you know, are many-faceted like a diamond, you know, with all these different surfaces. And then the words that Homer uses, tremendous. So Aristotle and Hegel and so on point out how excellent Homer's assimilies are. Like he compares the generations of men to the leaves and the trees. I've been raking up leaves today, so I know what that is. One generation is going, and then another generation will come in the spring, right? Yeah. Okay? Beautiful similies. So Homer is a perfect poet, right? The plot, the characters, the diction, right? He's got everything a poet needs to have, right? Or he wrote tragedy, and he wrote comedy. We've lost the Margites, but Aristotle says the Margites is to comedy, what the Iliad is to tragedy. So he's the complete poet, right? He's not like Aristophanes, who can only write comedies. Or like Moliere, who can only write comedies. And then the third meaning Aristotle gives of perfect is what has reached its end or purpose. Okay? So kind of simplifying the text of Aristotle, you can say that if the perfect is better than the imperfect, the complete and incomplete, then the whole is better than the part, and the end than what is for the sake of the end. But then we took of those two which seem to be more fundamental. Yeah, yeah. Because you could say the part is for the sake of the whole. And therefore the whole, in a way, is the end or purpose of the part. So perhaps that's the most basic general statement about what is better. The end is better than what is for the sake of the end. Now, how did we show that was true, that statement? How do we do that? Another induction. Well, first, by induction, right? Which is better, medicine or health? Which is better, knowing or studying? My little son, he was very young. He said, why can't we be born knowing everything we have to know? Why do we have to go to school, right? I said to him, you want to be born an angel. That's the way the angel is created, right? His mind is filled, right? His mind is full. But that's not the way we're created. So, knowing is better than studying, right? Having money is better than making money, right? Having dinner is better than making dinner, right? So we can see inductively that the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end. But then we also gave a general reason for saying that the end is always better. And that general reason we applied is a very famous one in philosophy. And with the brevity of wisdom, brevity is a soul of wit. Ligdo and Aristotle and Thomas and so on. Aristotle and Thomas. They always give that general principle, saying, that in account of which more so. But I like to unfold that general principle, right? And what is that general principle when you unfold it? Yeah, yeah. When the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other. It belongs more to the cause. So, we start with very simple examples, right? If hot is said of the fire, and of the air around the fire, but of the air around the fire because of the fire, which is hotter. Yeah, okay. And if wet is said of the cloth instead of the water, but of the cloth because of the water, which is wetter. Yeah. Now, we apply this in every part of philosophy. So, in logic, for example, right? When you reason by syllogism from the premises to the conclusion, then the conclusion becomes known as well as the premises. Just like in geometry, right? When you reason out of theorem, right? Now, the conclusion is known as well as what you reason from. But the conclusion is known because of the premises. So, which is more known? Yeah, yeah. And if the premises were not more known, would we use them to prove the conclusion? No. And if the engine of the train, right, pulls a car, and that pulls the one behind it, right? Which is more pulling that car? The engine. Yeah, yeah. Because mover is said of both of these, right? But one is a mover because of the other, right? You take the pietas there in Rome, right? Which maybe I'll see again next week. And you say, was the pietas made by a hammer and chisel or by Michelangelo? Well, what came in contact with the marble? Yeah, the chisel and the hammer had to hit the chisel, I guess. I don't know if that's what they do. But Michelangelo is more responsible for the pietas than the hammer and chisel, right? Because they made the thing only because they were being moved by him, right? I put it in my hand and you wouldn't get something that would remain in the St. Peter's, huh? But then we can apply it to the question of the end and what is for the sake of the end. Like applying it, say, to the end of the means. They're both good. Well, they can both be good, right? They can both, therefore, be said to be desired or wanted, right? But you desire the means for the sake of the end, right? So good or desirable is being said of the end and the means, but of the means because of the end. Therefore, the end must be more good or more desirable, right? Okay? That's how you might syllogize that God is better than everything else because everything else is made in some sense for the sake of being like God, right? So God, in a sense, is the end of the whole universe and the Alpha and the Omega, right? Beginning and the end. So if he is the end, the last end of everything else, he must be better than anything else, right? I'm going to go on further and say how much better he is, but as a starting point, you know, he's better than anything else. Okay? Having talked about good and better, then... And the next thing to talk about is what is better than all the rest. And that's the best, right? And that's going to be, in human life, the last end. The end of man, the end of human life. Now, how did we reason out, in a rough way at least, the end of man? Well, we started off with two definitions, right? And one is the definition of end. And what's the definition of end? Yeah, that for the sake of which, right? The end is that for the sake of which something is or is done. So if the chair is for the sake of sitting, then sitting is the end or purpose of the chair, right? If taking medicine is for the sake of health, then health is the end or purpose of taking medicine, right? And then the other definition was the definition of what? Yeah, and this comes, I think, from the first book of Plato's Republic, huh? Now, what's the definition of a thing's own act? End or purpose. No? Exclusively or better than anything. Yeah, yeah. A thing's own act is what that thing either alone can do, right? Or at least that it does better than other things, right? So to see is the eye's, what? Own act, right? Because only through the eyes do we see. To hear is the ear's own act. That's only through the ear is to be here. To walk is the feet's own act, even though the hands could, if you're very agile, in some sense walk, right? But in no way as well as the feet can, right? Or if you're desperate to get the cork out of the wine bottle, right? And you don't have a corkscrew. You could use maybe a knife, right? And pick it out, you know? I mean, people, they do it desperate sometimes. But, is that the knife's own act, to uncork a bottle? No. That's the corkscrew's own act, right? Okay? Some corkscrews are better than others, but they do it better than a knife would do that. Now, once we had defined end or purpose, meaning that for the sake of which, and a thing's own act, then we wanted to see a connection between these two, huh? And what connection did we see between these two? A thing's own act is its end or purpose, right? Now, how did we arrive at that conclusion? By induction or by syllogism? No. Yeah. And actually, we went kind of two-layered induction, right? Because we began with the tools of man, right? Like that ballpoint pen's own act is to what? To write. And to write is also the end or purpose of the ballpoint pen. And the knife's own act is to cut. And to cut is the end or purpose of the knife, to cut things. And you can go through all the tools in your house or in here, right? And each tool has its own act. And that act is the end or purpose why that tool's in your house. The hammer is there for one reason, and the saw for another reason, right? And the knife and the fork and the spoon, and so on, right? Each of them has its own act, and that's its end or purpose, right? And then we can go to the organs of our body, which comes in the Greek word for tool, huh? And the eye and the ear and the teeth in front and the teeth in back and so on, and the heart and the liver and so on. Each of the organs has its own act, right? And that's the purpose of that organ, right? And that's the purpose of that organ, right? And that's the purpose of that organ, right? And that's the purpose of that organ, right? And that's the purpose of that organ, right? And that's the purpose of that organ, right? And then we could go to the occupations of men, right? The cook has his own act. The cook. And the teacher has his own act to teach, right? And why do we hire cooks? Yeah, and why do we pay teachers? To teach. Yeah. So each occupation has its own act, right? And that act is the end or purpose of that occupation in human society. So, if you want, you could make an even larger induction. If every tool and every organ and every occupation has its own act, right? And each of these, its own act, is also its end or purpose. Then you could make the grand induction that a thing's own act is its, what? End or purpose. And what's that got to do with figuring out or reasoning out the end or purpose of man? We're now going to reason not by induction. But by what? Syllogism, right? We're going to take the proposition that a thing's own act is its end or purpose, right? And apply it to man. If man has his own act, right? Then we could say man's own act is his end or purpose. And does man have an act that either he alone has? Or at least that he has better than anything else in the world? Yeah. Since man is an animal that has reason, right? It's the act that involves reason. That's man's own act. If you define reason strictly, man alone has that act. But even if you're kind of mixed up like the moderns, right? Yeah. But even the moderns call man homo sapiens, the wise ape. So he has this act better than anything else, right? So if the act with reason is man's own act, and man's own act must be his end as induction has shown, right? Then the act with reason must be man's end or goal, right? Now, I could have been a little more precise in my induction from the very beginning, right? I could have said that the end or purpose of the ballpoint pen is not just to write, but to write well. So if you're taking notes and you notice that sometimes the ink comes out, sometimes it doesn't, and you've got blanks and so on, right? Like the old typewriters, you know, used to have a bad key, you know, and you have to go back and then hit again and hit again and finally come out so you could see it. At least that's my experience in life, old typewriter. And is the purpose of the eye just to see? Why'd they give you those funny-looking things in front of your face here, huh? Yeah, yeah. Well, the purpose of the eye is not just to see, but to what? See well, right, huh? And, you know, if you've got a heart that's not functioning properly, right? You know, they might try to fix you up if they can, right? Okay? And you expect to cook not just, you know, burn the meat every night, but to cook well, right? And you expect the pianist to play the piano reasonably well and not make constant mistakes like I would. Um, so you could say that the end of each thing having its own act is to do that act what? Well, right? So therefore you could say that man's end or purpose is the act with reason done well, right? Now, perhaps you could add, as Aristotle would do, in the first book of Machian Ethics, a third part, right? Because you want to see well just for a day or a week or a month. You want to see well throughout life, right? So Aristotle says one swallow does not make a, what? Summer, right? Oh, one swallow. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. It's like, yeah, I wouldn't bring it out. At least I was joking this, at a cocktail party, right? One slower's not a good evening, you know. But Aristotle, it must have been a Greek proverb about the birth, right? So, Aristotle then draws this line around the end of man. It's man's own act, the act with reason, right? Done well throughout life, right? Now, at this point, it wouldn't be hard for a Greek to, instead of saying, done well, right? To say, according to human virtue, right? Man's own act, or the act with reason, to be more precise. He'd say, done well throughout life. But then, for the phrase, done well, the Greeks would substitute sometimes, according to, or by, human virtue. Or the Greek word for virtue is, what? We use the Latin word. But now, the reason why we can substitute that phrase for done well, is because we understand, in general, what is meant by virtue. And we're very narrow-minded in the modern world, and we start off with too narrow an understanding of what virtue is. But in the broad meaning of virtue, virtue is as general as a thing's own act. Okay? Anything that has its own act has its own virtue, or vice, for that matter, right? Now, what's the connection here between a thing's own act and a thing's own virtue, or for that matter, a device, huh? They're not the same thing. A thing's own act and a thing's own virtue. But there's a connection between them, right? And you have to know what a thing's own act is before you can know what its own virtue is. And for that matter, you have to know what a thing's own act is before you can know what a thing's own vice is. Okay? Now, what's the connection between these two? The way Aristotle defines virtue there in the Nicomarckian Ethics, in the broad sense, is what makes a thing good and its own act good. Okay? So virtue is the quality or disposition of the thing, right, that enables it to do its own act well. And vice is the opposite of that, right? Vice is what makes a thing bad and its own act bad, right? So the vice of a thing is the quality or disposition of that thing which makes its own act, huh, be done badly, right? Not well. Do you see that? Okay? Now, I take a simple example, huh? What is a nice own act? Say a nice own act. Well, we all know it's to cut, right? Okay? Now, what would be the virtue of the knife? What would make it a good knife and make it... Sharpness. Yeah. So sharpness would be the main virtue of a knife. Okay? Well, we all know it's to cut, right? Well, we all know it's to cut, right? Well, we all know it's to cut, right? And notice, sharpness is not the same thing as cutting, right? It's not the same thing even as cutting well. But sharpness is the disposition, the quality of a knife, that enables it to do its own act, which is cutting well, right? And what would be the knife's own vice? Don'tness, right? Sometimes you apply these to the vine, don't we, right? What's a different sense than me, right? And now, of course, being a practical knowledge here, what I was eventually going to ask a third question, that is, how do you sharpen a knife, right? Okay? So even for something as lowly as a knife, we can talk about its virtue or its vice, right? And so you might say that the purpose of a knife is not just to cut, but to cut well, right? Or you could say the purpose of a knife is to cut by the virtue of a knife, which is sharpness, right? Okay? So, at the end of the first book of the Nicomachian Ethics, after Aristotle has given this definition of the purpose of the purpose of man. Then he sees the need to consider human virtue. And at the end of the first book of the Nicomachian Ethics, he will divide human virtue into two kinds, one of which we call moral virtue, and the other we call the virtue of reason itself, intellectual virtues. But, notice this phrase, act with reason, that's a little bit broader than what? Yeah. See? So, the acts of reason are acts with reason, but also the acts of our heart, even our acts of our will, right? And our emotions even. They can partake of reason, right? They can be directed by reason, measured by reason, and so on. And then they will be an act with reason. And even our exterior acts, like walking and eating and so on, right? They can be with reason, right? So, there are some virtues that are reason itself, and they call those sometimes intellectual virtues. I just call them the virtues of reason. But the moral virtues are the virtues of what partakes of reason. And they will be primarily in either the will or in the emotions. Okay? And so, Aristotle, in books 2 through 5, mainly, also 6 in a way, but, yeah, 2 through 5, rather. In books 2 through 5, he considers the moral virtues. And then in book 6, he will consider the virtues of reason. Now, Shakespeare refers to this, in the kingdom of this room. There's a character there in the very beginning who's studying that part of philosophy, right? It treats of what? Happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. A very good description of what the Nicomachean Ethics is about, right? It's about human happiness, the purpose of man, what that is, and even virtue, huh? Provide this end or purpose is especially achieved, huh? Aristotle will also talk about how the virtues are, what? Acquired, right? Okay? So that question is raised already in the dialogue called Amino. Because Amino begins the dialogue called, after him, by asking Socrates, well, how is virtue acquired, huh? Is it inborn? Or is it acquired by practice? Or is it taught? Or, you know? And Socrates says, well, I don't know. furthermore, I don't even know what virtue is, he says. But anyway, you know sometimes. But eventually the philosopher doesn't know. ask that question right now i mentioned how a friend has in his kitchen right the thing that says much virtue in herbs little in men right but there you see that broad meaning of the word virtue right where the salt or the pepper or the sage or whatever the herb is right it can have what its own virtue of ice right and so a fresh herb right from the garden right will probably be more virtuous right than one that's been in a jar for a year or two and a shelf right and the herb could lose its what virtue right and not season the food right so well and our lord there in the sermon on the mount in the fifth chapter of the gospel of saint matthew for example in the sermon on the mount there he says you are the salt of the earth right and if the salt loses its what so yeah you could have said if the salt loses its virtue you know it casts it out and walk on it right so if a man loses his virtue right you know cast him out right there you see that broad meaning of virtue i mentioned how in the rhetoric aristotle speaks of wealth as the virtue of money not the virtue of the man but if money's own act is to buy right if you're wealthy you can buy well see by poverty to be the vice of money huh now it may require you know more study than it does with the knife to discover what a thing's virtue is so what is the virtue of the eye right and why do i see you better with my left eye than my right eye right this is my virtuous eye right but you're not talking about moral virtue right not to the girls with this eye no no um i see better at least at a distance with this knife and then syllogize to the purpose of that so what we did in this case let's put the syllogism on the board that we leave there we say man's own act is man's in it huh man's purpose the act with reason is man's own act therefore this is the record syllogism right now the major premise here is simply a result of applying that general statement we learned by induction you learned by induction from the tools of man the organs of man the occupations of man right that a thing's own act is its end right so therefore man's own act will be his end huh and then if you know that man is an animal that has reason huh then you can see that the act with reason is man's own act and therefore you can syllogize that the act with reason is man's end right now that's one way the first way you see now reason out what man's end is you by a long induction establish a statement but you're at the other statement to syllogize now there's another way you're at the other statement you're at the other statement you're at the other statement you're at the other statement you're at the other statement you're at the other statement you're at the other statement you're at the other statement It can reason using the same things we learned, huh? A little bit shorter, right? And using the if-then syllogism, hypothetical or conditional syllogism. And this syllogism is approached through seeing a, what? Proportion, right? And a proportion, now, in the sense in which Euclid defines proportion. Sometimes you use the word proportion for ratio today, right? But Euclid uses the word proportion there, or analogy in Greek, for a likeness of ratios. So in a proportion, you're going to have four terms. While in a ratio, you have two terms, right? Now, what do you mean by ratio here? Well, you mean the order or relation of one thing to another, right? Now, sometimes they give you an IQ test. They'll have a part of the exam seeing if you can see a proportion. And maybe they'll say A is to B as X is to, and then you have to choose the right one. And your ability to supply the fourth term is a sign that you see the, what? Yeah, that you see the likeness of the ratios, right? My R is worth a point of D, so. Okay. How important is it, the ability to see a proportion in our thinking? How important is that? Very important, huh? If you study Euclid, huh? You get to book five, which is really about proportions, huh? When you apply the theory of proportions back to plain geometry in book six, huh? You have tremendous power, you see. It's actually amazing. In the first book, Euclid ends up with the Pythagorean theorem, right? But in the sixth book, he'll show that any, you know, regular figure on the hypotenuse of the right-angle triangle will be equal to the ones on the sides. But he doesn't see these proportions, right? So it's extremely important in mathematics, right? And if you go to mathematical science, natural science, physics, huh? Pierre Duel, I'll say, who was the physicist who did so much in the history of science, he speaks of how proportions are the most, what, common way that things are found in physics, by seeing proportion. And Einstein, in his book, The Evolution of Physics, talks about this, how common this is, right? And he gives an example there of the discovery of wave mechanics by Louis de Broglie. How did he discover the inverse square law? Now, when you can, if he's inverse square law, you know that gravity, huh? That force of gravity diminishes, what? Inversity is a square. If you double the distance, the thing is only one-fourth of what it was before. If you triple the distance, it's one-ninth, right? So the inverse, one over x squared, right? But how do they discover that? See? If you go back to Newton and the discovery of it, it's by an analogy to the way light diminishes with distance. Same rule. Diminishes one over x squared, huh? So if I, you know, I'm shining light on your face and I go back, double the distance, how much less light are you going to be receiving? One-fourth? Oh, my. Now and a half, same rule. Same. And so if gravity is like light, it's kind of spreading out like it does evenly, right? Then this suggests that we have that same what? What? Actually goes back to theorem Newton, too, before that. But anyway, so it's very important in mathematical physics, huh? Now if you go through the books of philosophy, you'll see that proportions are running all through the books of philosophy. One time in the senior seminar, I had this, you know, each student had to do different... book in philosophy but just pick out the proportions of being used everybody's heard of plato's republic right the whole republic the middle part there is generated from a proportion a likeness of ratios between the parts of the soul and the parts of the what city yeah okay um so philosophy is just filled with proportions on and in the fourth two of dialectic hairstyle talks about disabilities in proportion now in uh in poetry right the most beautiful metaphors and similes are based upon proportions i always give the example from roman juliet you know when juliet is found currently dead on her wedding day right and the simile used there is death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field perfect huh beautiful and of course if you look at our lord's parables right they're filled with what proportions huh you see the lord is my shepherd right the lord is to us as the shepherd is to his flock right that's based on proportion right now sometimes you have a portion you know using one term twice right like i said that um eight is to four as four as four is to two you know so the our father is based upon proportion right when you say forgive us our trespasses and we forgive those who trespass against us so god will be to us as we are to our neighbor okay that's a portion right so now going back to things that we made our induction from right you can see many proportions there right like if i said that seeing is to the eye as what is to the ear hearing and fear yeah yeah but the fact that you can supply the missing term there right is a sign that you see a likeness right not that seeing and hearing are the same thing not that they are the same thing but the ratio the relation or the order of seeing to the eye is like that of here okay now in mathematics we say um four is to what like two is to three was five or is it six because some people they say there's a difference of one between two and three right and between four and five is the distance we're not saying is the distance the same but what is four two like two is to three it's six yeah so it's really not five here but six right just this two is two is two of the three parts of three so if you look at six as being three twos this is two of the threes right so it's four is the six is two is two is three so you have to you know understand the proportion now suppose we ask this question here what is to man as let's say seeing is to the eye okay we have to see what is the ratio of seeing to the eye right seeing is an act and how is the act seeing to that thing called the other there it's its own act right yeah that's the act that characterizes the eye right okay now is there some act which is the man that characterizes man right as seeing is to the eye the act with reason right yeah let's act with reason that's a little broader than act of reason act of reason is the reason okay i'm talking about reason now about the man the animal that has reason so if you see that proportion the act of reason is to man, is seeing is to the eye, right? Now, we can make an if-then statement then. If seeing is the end of the eye, then the act with reason is the end of man. Notice, this is not a statement of fact now again. Because an if-then statement doesn't say that something is or is not so. It says that if this is so, then that could be so, right? So you need a statement that something is or is not so before you can show that something is or is not so. But now, it's more known to us that seeing is the end of the eye, right? But seeing is the end, the purpose of the eye. So if that in fact is so, then I can syllogize that the act with reason is the end of man, right? Now notice, huh? You can reason in this way because one ratio is more known than the other. If I came downtown, that's my example. I said, I go downtown and grab the first guy walking along the street there. I presume, and hopefully a guy who's never gone to school, right? Or college, right? And I pull out a ballpoint pen and I say, what's the purpose of this? What would he say? Right, yeah. And I put on a knife without scaring the guy. And what's the purpose of this? That's what you cut your steak with, right? You know? Okay. And what's the purpose of an eye? What? To see, right? And what's the ease for? To hear. And if you said, what's the purpose of man? Will he come out? Uh-uh. Uh-uh. He'd hesitate, right? See? That the purpose of man is either unknown to him or certainly much less known to him than the purpose of the ballpoint pen or the purpose of the eye, right? Okay? So once you see that this is to man as seeing is to the eye, you can then construct, right? And see the truth of the if-then statement. And since this is known to him, then you can syllogize from the known ratio to the what? Unknown or less known, right? Do you see that? Now I could make as many of these as those things we started off with in our induction, right? I might say, what is to man as writing is to the pen? See? Well, how is writing to the pen? That's the pen's own act, right? Well, there's something that is to man in that same way? Yeah. The act with reason, right? And that construct the if-then statement. If writing is the end or purpose of the ballpoint pen, then the act with reason would be the end or purpose of man. But everybody knows, every adult anyway, that the purpose of the ballpoint pen is to write. Therefore, the end or purpose of man must be the act with right, with reason. Do you see it? Now, like I did before, I can be more precise, right? Suppose I say that, suppose I add to my ratio over here, seeing well is to the eye, right? Well, then, is it the act with reason, period, that is to man exactly like seeing well is to the eye? Now, if I had taken the right example there, seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the ear, right? And suppose I changed it and I said, seeing well is to the eye as hearing is to the ear, as walking is to the ear, as hearing well is to the ear. But if you said hearing is to the ear, that would not be correct. You've got to have to add now, hearing well is to the ear, right? See that? So if I add seeing well here, I'm forced to add well done over here, right? Okay? And then I can construct and say, if seeing well is the end of the eye, then the act with reason done well is the end of man, right? And then syllogize that the act with reason done well, right? You have to develop first, because some of you see the basic structure of the argument, right? And seeing well throughout life is the purpose of the eye, right? If I add seeing well throughout life, I can add over here, the act with reason done well throughout life, right? And then syllogize even more completely, right? If seeing well throughout life is the end of the eye, then the act with reason done well throughout life is the end of man. But that is the end of the eye, we all know. Therefore, this must be the end of what? The end of man, right? Now, there's a third kind of syllogism, you know, which is the what? You've got the categorical syllogism or the simple syllogism, which we used in the first argument, right? Using a statement we got from induction, right? This is the regular syllogism. We have the hypothetical syllogism, conditional syllogism. I call it the iftunny syllogism. And the third kind is the what? Disjunctive, yeah. The either-or syllogism, right? Okay. Now, if you go through Euclid there in the first book of the elements, he uses all three kinds of syllogisms, right? And I think it's in theorem six there in book one, in one theorem, he uses all three, okay? He's proving that if the angles are equal to base, the sides will be equal, he uses all three. He examined the reasoning carefully, right? So, you know, three is the first number of all, which we say all, right? So, I'd say it goes back to Trinity, I don't know, maybe it does, huh?