Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 43: Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories

Transcript
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As far as there's a book game, it is from my favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentilas, right? And when Thomas has the chapter here in Summa Contra Gentilas, where he's talking about names and God and creatures and so on, right? And he has a chapter where he wants to show that no name is said univocally with exactly the same meaning, of God and creatures, right? Okay? And he has a number of arguments to show this, right? Okay? But one of the arguments is in either-or syllogism, or disjuncted syllogism, I want to use a big word, where he says that every name said univocally of many things, right, is either a genus or a difference or a species or a property or an actual. So he takes the five in Porphyry's Asegogate as a complete distinction, right, of name said univocally of many things. And then he goes and eliminates each one of these, you know, that no name is said of God and creatures as a genus, then there's a difference, then there's a species, then there's a God. And then it's all five, right? So that, to me, was a clue to perhaps seeing the Asegogate as a distinction of names said univocally of many things. See, when you look at Porphyry's gradient, he says we're going to talk about what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property is, that kind of thing, right? So he's going to distinguish these five, right, in that book. But what is he distinguishing? And when he defines them, he doesn't define them as a what? Name, right? Okay. You know, say, when you first learn the definitions, kind of in the English translation of Porphyry would say, that which is said, like the genus is that which is said of many differing in species, and answers the question, what is it? And I can say, it's quite a pretty copy, right? But are you talking about a name or not, see? Now maybe Porphyry doesn't know what he's doing. Maybe he does. Says all authority. Maybe he wants to leave genus and species both for the name of a general kind of thing, the name of a particular kind of thing, but also use genus and species for the general kind of thing itself, and a particular kind of thing. Okay? But then there's a little difference there, right? Okay? Now in Erich Grau, it talks about definition as a logos, as a speech, right? Let's say it's composed of names. Genus and difference are the names and the names, right? So, although you could perhaps use genus and species to mean something other than a name, right? It seems you've got to begin there, the sensible name, right? Okay? So, when I made this discovery there in the Summa Cattagentia, that's my favorite book because of a large printed book, you know, I went to Monsignor Dian and I said to him, should not porphyry him, at the beginning of the day, he said, okay, right? Should he not have first distinguished, huh? Between names said univocally of many things and names said what? Equivocally of many things, right? Okay? Monsignor Dian said yes. Okay? And then, we're going to take names said univocally of many things and distinguish them, and then every such name is either genus, a difference, a species, a proper and accurate. See what I mean? Okay? And then, perhaps, you'd have to have another inductive part there, actually, for the first part, where you talk about names said of many things equivocally. And then you'd distinguish between names said of many things equivocally by chance and equivocally by reason, huh? And I think I've done here that I distinguish different ways in which a name is said equivocally by reason, right? Okay? And that would be doing, for name or codical by reason, something like what porphy is doing for names said univocally of many things, huh? But, as it stands, if you want to regard genus, species, and difference and properties as five names, huh? Or five kinds of names, their distinction of name said of many things univocally, right? Okay? So, that's what the isogogiae is. It's about name said of many things univocally, okay? Meaning a name said of many things with the same meaning in mind in each case, right? So, when I say the dog is an animal, and I say the cat is an animal, I mean, I have the same meaning of animal in mind, a living body with sensation. I call it a dog an animal because it's a living body with sensation. I call it a cat an animal for the same reason, exactly, huh? Well, when I say that they weren't batting very good last night, and then that there are bats in the church welfare or something, right? Well, then the, I have the same meaning in mind when I talk about these, okay? You see? Now, the categories. Well, here are also distinguishing names, right? Okay? But, how are you distinguishing those ten, huh? Well, let's go back to the phrase seven, right? If you have a plural answer, you can here, because you've got five, right? Names said of many things, like, nippantly, right? Okay? What are the names that you're distinguishing? Names said of what? What? One. Yeah? But, what is that one thing, more of it? Well, you get more precise than that. Names said of... Well, you see, before Stalin gets to distinguish the ten, right? He distinguishes between substance and accident, and universal and, what, individual, okay? So you get, what, four things, right? Universal substance, individual substance, right? Universal accident, individual accident, right? Okay? You're talking about shape, or my shape, right? You're talking about man, or this man here, right? Okay? So he distinguishes those four, right? Now, is that connected with the distinction of the ten that are on? So, it would be names of a particular substance? Yeah. Names said of individual substances, or particular substances, right? Okay? And the way Thomas, when he explains this distinction of the ten, as you know, he follows the purposes of rule of two or three, right? Okay? Okay? Not three. And he says that a name said of individual substances is either said of them as regards what they are, right, or it's said of them because of something in them, in addition to what they are, right? Or it's said of them because of something outside of them, okay? And then the first one gives rise to the category of what? Substance, right? So, a man is said of you and me, or individual substances, as regards what we are, right? And we're generally, what, animals said of man, like man is, right? And therefore we're generally us. And then maybe living body of animal, right? And then body of living body, and then substance of body, right? And then there are names said of you and me, not very easily of what we are, but by reason of something existing in us, right? In addition to what we are. Like you and I are said to be white, huh? Okay. And, or you and I are said to be healthy, I'd say, right? Okay. And then there are things said of you and me, by reason of something on the side of us, huh? So you and I are said to be in this room, right? Or you and I are said to be clothed, right? Or you and I are said to be what? Sitting, right? Okay. So I won't go into the law of distinction again, but you see what you're doing, right? So, it's quite a different distinction that's being made in the two words, right? Okay. Now, notice how substance signifies what a thing is, right? Now, there's only two places that I know of, where Aristotle enumerates all ten of the categories, right? And one is in the book called the categories, and the other is in the book called the topics or the places of them, okay? And in both, he gives exactly the same ten, in exactly the same order, one exception. In the categories, he calls the first of them, usia, which we translate by the word substance, right? In the topics, he calls it, what it is, okay? Okay? That's very revealing, isn't it? Let's say what it is, how much, how, towards what? Very concrete, right? So, Aristotle will often use the word substance to mean what it is, right? And of course, his definition tells you what a thing is, right? So, in the seventh book, he talks a lot about what it is, and he talks a lot about definition, right? It signifies what it is, and what belongs to definition, and so on, right? Okay? But, one of the questions that eventually is going to be elucidated there is, in these material things, is a thing and what it is exactly the same? Or even in mathematical things, right? Is a circle and what a circle is identical? Well, if a circle and what a circle is were the same, and there's no difference whatsoever, would you have more than one circle? No. Because what a circle is, is something one, right? So, if a circle and what a circle is identical, would it be more than one circle? Okay? And if what a man is, and a man were identical, would there be more than one man? In the same way for a dog and a cat, and so on, right? Okay? Now, Plato, in a way, had anticipated this with this strange idea of the forms, right? Because, in the form of man, in the form of dog, in the form of cat, which exists in the world by themselves, there's only what pertains to what a dog is, what a man is. So, there's only one form of man, only one form of a dog, right? Mm-hmm. And in some, somewhat unexplained ways, Aristotle explains, you and I partake, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Of what a man is. And all the cats partake of what a cat is. And we might ourselves speak this way at some time, like we've got any, exactly the same thing as Plato does, right? Okay? And Aristotle will argue in the seventh book, you know, if I'm a man, because I partake of what a man is, the form of man, and so on, and a dog is a dog, because he partakes of what a dog is, what do you need your parents for? So, Aristotle, in the seventh book, will be kind of reasoning against Plato, right? With obvious difficulties and some not-so-obvious difficulties, huh? But notice how this is preparing the way, in a sense, for the understanding of the immaterial substances, huh? Because will it also be true in the immaterial substances that the individual and what it is are distinct in the way that the material substance and what it is is distinct, huh? Well, that involves partly understanding of material substances and even the mathematical things, why they can be two of exactly the same kind, huh? And, you know, to start, or Euclid starts at the point, right? How can you have two points when they're exactly the same, right? Two points, huh? But you can have one at the beginning of the line and one at the end, right? Because one's here and one's there, right? So there's a connection between the fact that you would have the continuous quantity, right? And, of course, sometimes we define the continuous as that which is divisible forever, right? Kind of the definition that's worked out in the sixth book of the actual variant. There's also the definition in the categories that the continuous is that whose parts meet at a common, what? The boundary, right? Okay. So the two semicircles and a circle meet at the diameter, right? Okay. So involved in the idea that the continuous is part, outside the apartment. Okay. So if someone says to you, you know, why can you have many windows, let's say, exactly the same kind? And I suppose the safest answer is to get enough glass. Why can you have many chairs of exactly the same kind, huh? Well, these being metal chairs, because you have enough metal, right? How is it going to have many wooden chairs exactly the same? Well, it's because you have enough what? Wood, right? So there's two things involved there. Some kind of material, right? Like metal or wood or glass. But some kind of material that is extended, huh? There's a certain quantity, right? And so, because the quantity is divisible, right? Okay. And because that quantity, one can be here and one can be there. Now, if there's a substance that is not material, that doesn't have length and width and depth, then the basis for there being many individuals of the same kind disappears, right? You see? So this understanding of material substance and why there can be many individuals of exactly the same kind prepares the way, right, for understanding later on something about the material substances by way of, what, negation at least, huh? And that's why when Thomas, say, talks about the angels, huh, he would deny that there's any two angels of exactly the same kind. And that in each of the three hierarchies, right, in each of the orders, huh, there's a beginning, middle, and end, and within each beginning, beginning, middle, and end, right? But you never have two that are exactly the same. be the same kind of, huh? Of course, there's an interesting question there where Thomas asks, you know, would the angels love each other more if they were exactly the same kind? And of course, Thomas has an interesting answer why they love each other more, because they're not exactly the same. And he says, the more intellectual, the more understanding, right? What a creature is, the more it's concerned with the common good, with the ordinary universe, right? And of course, the common good in the ordinary universe is more, what, satisfied by inequality than by, what, equality, right? An old teacher at the Surrey used to say, God hates equality. And they say that no two saints, even in heaven, will be, what, equal, you know, star difference from star, right? Okay? And you can see why the envious will not be in heaven, right? That envy is contrary to what heaven's going to be like, huh? So, but just as no two saints will be equal in heaven, no two angels are, what, equal. And they love each other more for their inequality, because they love most of all the common good. And they see the order that comes from the inequality. It's kind of interesting, right? But it says Aristotle is preparing the way for this understanding, but Plato is too, huh? Because in the world of forms, there's only one form of each kind. There can't be two forms of man himself, or two forms of dog himself, right? But each form is unique, huh? Although Plato's misunderstanding, you know, what the entail sentences are. It's not, Aristotle kind of, you know, makes fun of a little bit of Plato. He's a little bit like the poets, you know, who imagine the gods to be, what, kind of superhuman beings, right? And, you know, if you read Homer there, you know, Homer is concerned about showing fairies because his wife is on the other side in the Trojan War. There's going to be some domestic disturbance, you know. So it's very human, these gods in some way. But it's not really true, right, huh? You see, Aristotle says, not really knowing the nature of the gods, they imagine them to be like us, but just, you know, kind of superhuman beings, huh? And, you know, some of the philosophers before Aristotle had, you know, talked about this thing. And often he said, you know, if cattle could make statues and so on, they'd make their gods look like cattle, you know. He said, Ethiopians, they make their gods look black, you know, and the Greeks make their gods look blonde and hairskins and so on. And, like, you know what the gods are, right? But they imagine them to be like themselves, but somehow perfected. And Aristotle said, he said, well, Plato's doing it, but, you know, man himself, the dog himself, right, huh? But nevertheless, Plato is seeing something of the truth of what the material sense would be. That each would be of a different kind, huh? And no two would be of the same kind, huh? And that's a wonderful, what, discovery, right, huh? I don't know what the man in the street thinks, but probably the man in the street thinks of the angels of being kind of like us, you know? Many of the same kind, huh? That's a good idea, huh? So those are some of the things talked about in the, what, seventh book, huh? The distinction between, I think it's the most interesting thing in some way, the distinction between a material substance and what it is without getting into Plato's position, right? But there isn't a complete identity there between the nature of the material substance and the individual substance itself, huh? But then how that will prepare the way for understanding something about the material substances. But now, in the eighth book, I'll bring some copies there. How many do you need, by the way? Eight, ten? Ten, how many? I think it is ten. Okay, I think I have some, it says I have to have a lot more. But ten is enough, I think, or what? Because there's one listening piece that the finalized will become ten. But at least ten, huh? Yeah, I'll see. Okay. But in ten, he's going to approach substance, now not in a logical way, but from what? Natural philosophy, right? From the understanding of matter and form, and therefore, the way of motion, huh? Okay? Now, a lot of times, the wise men will lead us by the hand. They call it monoduxio. From the lower sciences, to wisdom, right? So in book seven, he's kind of leading us by the hand from logica. And then in book eight, more from what? Motion, huh? From natural philosophy, huh? He's leading you by the hand. But Thomas, in contrasting the two, will speak of the one proceeding per modem motus, right? The way of motion. And that's appropriate to natural philosopher. But setup, huh? Is more the way to lead the man from logica. It's only in the mind that something is said of something. And outside of the line, nothing is said of anything. Okay? So to proceed by way of how something is said of something, right? Is to be in the domain of logica. And so if you lead you to see something about being him, in fact, this whole distinction of being according to figures of predation is, say, you're distinguishing them, right? With the help of something that's proper to logic. You're distinguishing them by the way something can be said of individual substances. But even in the Aisha Golgi, you're distinguishing things by the way they can be said of them. But if you're distinguishing individual and equivocal names, you're again distinguishing by the way something can be said of something, huh? Said of something with the same meaning in mind, different meaning in mind, and so on, right? Well, this is a distinction in the way something is said of something. And that's proper to logic, huh? Talk about the way something is said of. It's a very, you know, right on the nail on the head, yeah. Or what is it? Hit the nail on the head, yeah. It's quite a difference between proceeding in the way like the natural philosophy does and the way the position does, huh? It's interesting that it begins kind of from the, what? The logic, huh? The logic has a certain affinity to wisdom. And one affinity it has to wisdom is its universality. Because the things logic talks about can, what? There's something said of everything, right? There's like universal about this, right? Not everything's emotion. Something said of everything. And the mind, in some ways, is all things. But then, the other way that logic is like wisdom is in its immateriality. One scene of the iron used to quote that words that Heath has in his edition of Euclid there. Heath has a quote there from Hopeless, you know, I think it is. You know, that mathematics purificat optimistis. It purifies the iron and the mind, right? In a way from material things, huh? Because there's a way in which geometry is a certain, what, purity, huh? A certain immateriality, huh? But when seeing the answer about logic even more so purifies the iron and mind, it's even more immaterial than logic, huh? You can see how the mind gets mixed up with mathematical logic and so on. But there's some kind of, what, immateriality there, right? I can compare it to an answer. Philosophy, huh? Very much material. Uh, let me take a few more minutes here. I'll take another big different book, seven years. Aristotle approaches substance and accident by definition, right? A definition, which is a Latin word, it comes from the Latin word philis, which means end or limita, okay? Now in Greek, you have some kind of definition. Horas, which has a delimita. Sometimes you'll see horbizmas, which is related to our word horizon, right? The horizon is what? That line that separates the sky from the ground, right? Now, if you think about the word, the origin of the word definition, or horas, a limit is something very, what? Very precise. And if you have the city limits of Worcester, or any other city, but let's take the city limits of Worcester, if I had the limits of the city of Worcester, should any part of Worcester be outside the city limits? No. No. Because you have it around the limits, right? But should any part of the surrounding town, Shrewsbury and Holden and so on, be within the city limits of Worcester? So you could say that a definition is a tight fit, huh? Okay? It's a very exact thing, huh? So it should include only the thing being defined and nothing else, right? And Aristotle says, Can you define, then, an accident? Or can you only define substance? But it is. Well, an accident is really something of another. It's something of something other than itself. So can you really say what an accident is without bringing in something other than itself? But isn't that contrary to what a definition is? A definition should contain only the thing being defined, he said, right? So, in that sense, it seems that only substance can be defined. Well, if I was going to try to define health, let's say, right? Well, it would be something like health is the good disposition of the body, something like that, right? Well, now, I'm defining health as something of a, what? Another. So I'm bringing into my definition of health something other than health, namely the body, which is a good condition. So is that contrary to what a definition is? The most perfect, the most perfect definition of definition. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So Aristotle says, Because either, either there is definition only of substance, because substance is not something of another, right? Or if you want to admit that there is in some way a definition of health, right? It brings in something other than health. Then you're changing the meaning of definition, right? Okay? Definition has two what? Meaning, right? You see? Okay? That's interesting, right? You see what Aristotle's doing, huh? Because he's saying, either there's definition only of substance, or if there is definition of accident as well as substance, definition has two meanings, you know? Because the definition of substance contains only substance. But the definition of accident contains in it that of which it is an accident. Okay? So, the distinction in substance, or, I mean, excuse me, distinction in definition, whether it be two kinds of definition, right? Or one can be defined and the other cannot, corresponds to a distinction in things. Why is it that an accident either cannot be defined at all, if you take the definition in the strict sense, as something containing only the thing being defined, right? Or, if you want to carry the word definition over and say, good condition of the body is a definition of health, right? Which it is in some way, right? You're changing definition from something that contains only the thing being defined to something that contains the subject or something other than the thing being defined, right? Then that difference in being able to be defined or not, or being defined in one or another way, corresponds to a difference in things, right? That a substance is a thing in itself, right? While an accident is either not a thing so much in its own right, but it's something of another thing. It's something of another thing. It's a strange kind of reality, right? Now, that goes down when you go to, say, privations, right? Can you define blindness without sight? That's in some ways even strange, isn't it? Because blindness excludes sight, right? Well, if you're blind, you lack sight. It's a lack of sight. But you can't define it without bringing in, so to speak, its opposite. That's kind of strange, isn't it? In case you can't define health without bringing in a subject. You can't define lack of blindness without bringing in, that I would just say lack of. You can't define neighbors without knowledge, right? Now, someone says, what's the difference between sight or blindness and deafness, wrong? You've got to bring in, but it's a privation of lack of, huh? Now, what's in between an accident and a lack? Yeah. Or you could say motion, right? Yeah. Can you define motion without bringing in something that's more there than motion? Could you define, let's say, let's take something like motion, but maybe it's easy to work with. Is learning the same thing as knowing? But can you define learning without bringing in knowing in? Here's a strange thing. Can you seem to be defined, right? Of course, in the case of motion, somebody says, well, defying means what? We say it's limited, right? But emotions can be something indeterminate, right? It doesn't mean to define it, right? So it may be more than just two meanings of definition, right? If you move from substance to accident to motion to what? Privation or lack, right? Do you have different meanings of definition? The same thing. But that corresponds to difference in being, right? In fact, substance is being primarily, right? So it's kind of interesting the way Aristotle is using definition, right? And whether something can be defined or not, or it can be defined in one way, and something else is defined in another way. It's kind of secondary meaning definition to bring out differences in things themselves, right? Kind of an amazing thing, huh? But when Thomas is talking about... When Thomas is talking about... When Thomas is talking about... When Thomas is talking about... When Thomas is talking about... When Thomas is talking about... When Thomas is talking about... You know, the ten categories in the figures of predication, right? In the commentary on the fifth book there. You know, the modi ascending, the ways of being, right? In some way correspond, in this case, to the modi predicandi, right? Now you've got to be careful, because there's not exactly a one-to-one thing, but corresponding to the ways things can be said of individual substances are really different ways of being. My being in this room, and my being a man, and my being a geometry, those are really different kinds of being, right? But man and geometry and being in this room are said of being in different ways, right? But these different ways of being said of being correspond to different ways of being. So it's kind of an amazing thing to see that. But acting ability, when you start the consideration of acting ability in the ninth book, you'll start from acting ability as they're found in motion. And you could say book eight is kind of in the middle. Because the distinction of matter and form, you're being prepared for understanding something involved in the distinction of acting ability, right? But it also looks back to substance, as you talked about in book seven, right? So it's interesting the way Aristotle ordered these, so. It's interesting that at Deval there, the two greatest minds there, taught about logic and natural philosophy. But you kind of see how basic these things are, right? Because you have to be led into these things about being as being. You have to be led into wisdom from logic and natural philosophy, especially, right? So you kind of taught the natural philosophy, and Diyan taught the logic, you know? You had it again there. So sometimes, you kind of go to Diyan and say, would you give me a logical analysis of this, to be honest, lay it out? I'll share you the, I'll spare you the, going through book seven, yeah? So I'm doing that somewhere, the one I did, TAC, you know. The first time I went out there, they wanted me to do book seven. So that's the last one I slept to do, my favorite. They wanted me to do that, so I did that. But a very interesting thing, isn't it, right? Those two things kind of stick out in my mind, the idea that either there's a definition only of substance, right? It's telling you something about substance and accident. Or if there's also a definition of accident, it's a definition in a somewhat different sense, huh? And sometimes, in logic, you know, you've maybe seen, I talk about definition. Sometimes we distinguish definitions by how or by what you define something, you know, we'll say, well, you can define something by its effect or by its cause, but it's more perfectly defined by the cause. Or you can define it by genus and difference, or by genus and property, right? And so on. And they were talking about a distinction, the way you might define one and the same thing, right? But, if you go back to the definition of definition, as speech signifies what a thing is, well, because the substance and accident are not really the same kind of thing, then there's a distinction between a thing that can be defined by itself and a thing that can be defined only as something of a, what? Of another, right? Of course, I remember that when I talk about motion, because Descartes and John Locke, you know, father of modern philosophy and the first of the great rationalists, you know, Descartes and then Locke, one of the important empiricists, they both say you can't define motion, and for Locke it's one of the simple ideas, right? Well, in a definition, there's never one word, right? You've got to have some kind of multiplicity to have a definition, and so on, but if you realize that motion is something of another, that it's never motion itself, it's emotion, it's something other than motion, you know, that walking doesn't go for a walk, it's always something other than walking is walking. Then you realize that motion is, that seems like an accident, right? It's something of another. So now you've got a basis, right? Maybe you can say what it is of another, and then you have a tune that's there that's enough for a definition, for something more explicit than just a name. Suddenly they take a different example, and they say, what about a point, right? Well, a point has no part, so you can't make speeches more distinct than the word point, drawn from different parts of the point, right? But if the point is the limit of a line, the point is the end of a line, right? Then it's something of another, right? And so you can say, what is it of another? What is the other? Well, in this case, it's a line, right? Well, what is it of a line? Well, it's not a part of the line, but it's the end of a line, or the limit of a line, right? So to say the point is the end of a line, or the limit of a line, is more distinct than to say it's a point, you see? But the multiplicity necessary for being more distinct there doesn't come from seeing two parts of the point. It's not like you see a knife. A knife is a tool composed of a blade and a handbook, right? A blade and a handbook are different parts, so you can kind of spell out the parts and get something more distinct than a knife, right? So you can't do it at a point. But because the point is something of another, it's the limit, you'd say what it is of the other. And now you've got the multiplicity for a definition, for something, for speech, it's more distinct than a knife. So I'd say, a motion is like that, it's something of another. We'll bring that other in, and say what it is of that. Now you've got something more than just the name motion. So did they both, did they guard in a lot? They didn't, you're saying that it was a failure to understand a substance accident that made them not be able to? Well, I'd say it's cast light upon that, right? Let's see. Because they're saying you can't define emotion, right? Which means that you can only name it, right? Now, when you get to the ninth book of wisdom, Aristotle will say you can't define act. Well, you can know what it is, but you can't define act. Aristotle knew where the thing stopped. It didn't stop with motion, because motion can be defined by ability and act, but act cannot be defined by anything else. So there's got to be something that you know without definition, otherwise you wouldn't know anything. Just like the statements, right? There must be some statements that are known, but not known to other statements. Because if every statement had to be known to other statements, then there'd be, what, infinity statements, you'd have to know before you know any statements. You couldn't begin to know any statements, because any statements you use to prove a statement, you'd have to prove them before you could use them. And the statements you use to prove them, you'd have to prove them, you know. Couldn't even take away. Of course, I didn't know my favorite, the one there recently. You'd have to say, you know, no. Statements exist. It kind of proves itself, right? And the man who says statements do not exist, has, of course, made a statement, huh? It's kind of hard to maintain that statements do not exist. And that is itself a statement. And the ball game is, oh, really, you know. So there's some statements, like statements exist, that are known, but not known to other statements, huh? There's some statements that are known to be false, like statements to other things. Okay, well, I mean, that, you know, it's kind of obvious, right? You know, Descartes kind of quotes the definition of motion kind of an obscure translation of what it is. Who understands all these words, you know? They're just plain words, you know? And the kind of makes himself look kind of ridiculous, you know, the man understands the definition. But you know, once you give up defining motion, then you're missing, you know, one of the main middle terms for showing the dependence of worship on a mover, which is the beginning for knowing that God exists, right? So in a sense, you're closing the door, right, to reason, knowing that God exists, right? Now, the first fact in the Council, you know, it's kind of a faith now that we can know the existence of God by reasoning. And the other thing I can, the Council will teach you that, having the first Hacking Council. But this is kind of making it possible, you know, because you're eliminating the study point for that, aren't you? It was a very serious mistake, in their part. But the philosophers who come after it, they didn't bother trying to define motion, or even bother to say, you know, can't define motion, right? I mean, just kind of take it for granted, you know? You know, they're accustomed, you know, to... What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today? What's that shot there for today?