Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 45: Accidental and Substantial Form: The Proportion

Transcript
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He's alluding a bit to his position about the heaven and the body, because Aristotle didn't think that the sun, the moon, and the stars underwent substantial change, right? Or that he even underwent alteration or growth or anything like that, or that he underwent what? Change of place, right? And maybe we know better than that now, okay? But they have the same kind of matter, right? But Aristotle, you know, he complains about the distance between himself and the, what, sun, the moon, and the stars, huh? And in the biological works, you know, it talks about how he wanted to know better the sun, the moon, and the stars, but they're not accessible to him. Why the animals, he can cut them open, and he was doing a lot of anatomy and things of that sort, huh? But he couldn't do anything like that, the sun, the moon, and the stars, huh? Didn't have, obviously, a telescope or anything like that in those days, right? And the other more solar instrument than even a telescope. So that last paragraph, if you don't want to spend too much time on me, is kind of alluding to that position, right? That a body could have, what, change of substance, like you and I are subject to with death and so on. And also had, what, change of place, right? But maybe the reverse isn't so, but if you had change of place, it's not any change of, what? Of substance, huh? If the sun, the moon, and the stars, right, change of place, but don't, what, change their quality or their substance, it seems, huh? Now, when Thomas talks about that, he says, well, maybe it takes them longer than the lives of many men for a change to take place, you know? So Thomas is aware of the fact that you're not together sure about the sun, moon, and stars, right? Okay? Let's take a little break here, since it's a natural place between the first and the second reading. Okay. At the beginning of the second reading, Aristotle notes that among the thinkers before him, they all agreed that matter, in some sense, was substance, right? But substance as form, right? It's more hidden, right? Since the substance is the underlying thing, like we said before, the underlying matter, subject of change, right? Underlying the two contraries. And as matters agreed upon, and this is the one that's in ability, he means to say what is a substance as act of sensible things. Now, at this point, he's going to go into the acts or forms that are more known to us, right? Because they're sensible, right? And so he's going to discuss the position of Democritus, right? And then said, well, Democritus only enumerates some of these accidental forms, right? But then substantial form will be proportional to what? Accidental form, right? In the same way that he had a proportion of first matter to an actual substance underlying accidental change, huh? So, Democritus then seems to think that there are three differences, huh? The underlying body, the matter for him, was the atoms, right? They're all almost the same thing. But they differ either in, and these are the older, obscure words of Democritus, in shape, right? Or in position, or in order, right? So, straight and curved, right? And upside down, or on the side, and so on. And before and after order, right? But then, in the next paragraph, Aristotle points out that there seem to be many other differences, besides these ones that he mentions, huh? But all of this is just kind of expanding the idea that there are many different kinds of accidental form, right? And you want to kind of see what accidental form is, and then proportionally what substantial form is, huh? But that will lead us on gradually to this, right? But there seems to be many differences, such as some things are said by the mode of composition of their matter. That you might say, what? Water is H2O, right? Two to one. Well, he didn't talk about two to one, did he? Carbon monoxide is one to one, right? CO2 is okay. Two to one is fine, but one to one is a bad ratio. Marriage is good, but in these times, it's bad, right? Okay. What's that polygamy? I don't want polygamy one to two. Such as honey water, right? Okay. Or Manhattan. Manhattan is two to one, right? That's really important. I've been doing a bad thing. And the stinger is two to one, huh? Okay. Others by being bound together, such as a bundle, right? Thomas and the Exhibition said, like a woman's hair are bound together, right? Okay. Others by being glued together, such as a book. I don't know what the books are like in those days. Others by being nailed together, such as a wooden box, right? Or screwed together, or something, right? And some in many of these ways, huh? And others by positions, such as a threshold and a lintel, I suppose. The one is below, and the one is, what? Above, right? So why is this a threshold? Why that's a lintel? Because one is above, and one is, what? Below, right, huh? It's not because they have a different order or shape or something, like he said, but their position. And dinner and breakfast. I guess they'd get the same thing for dinner and breakfast, huh? Like the fish there in the east, you know, for breakfast as well as dinner. Well, they differ by the time, right? Breakfast is what you eat, you know, the morning, dinner, and the evening or something. And others by undergoing some sensible qualities, such as hardness and softness. Density and rareness, dryness and wetness. And general, some by excess and some by defect, huh? Now he's pointing out, nevertheless, that these accidental forms, by reason of them, something is said to be what it is, right? So what is this? Well, it's a chair, right? But it's more a chair because of its, what? Shape than it is because of its, what? Matter, right? That's only a chair in ability. Whipped, you might say, right? Okay? So it is clear that the what it is will be said in so many ways. He wants you to have this sink in about what an accidental form is, right? In some sense, the accidental form is responsible for the thing being what it is, right? But in a kind of accidental way, right? But the substantial form will be responsible for what the thing is in a substantial way. You see? But it's an ellis to that. So it is clear that the what it is will be said in so many ways. It is a threshold because it is placed thus. And the being, meaning what it is to be a threshold, means it's being placed thus, huh? While being for ice means having been solidified in a certain way. Very primitive science, you know? And the being of some things will be defined by all of these, huh? Because some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together. Others are solidified. So you could say in the case of the chair, there's what? Shape? There's also what? Things, parts screw together and there's sort of an order among parts and so on, right? So you have many things involved in what? What makes a chair to be a chair, right? Is it the shape of the parts or is it being screwed together? Or is it the arrangement of the parts, right? Well, it's all of these, right? Okay? They're all necessary to make it to be what it is, huh? Okay? This kind of strikes me as interesting here, um, let's take it all, uh, going back a little to a slip earlier, it's interesting that the word substance, if you look at it in the fifth book of wisdom, and the word nature, um, they have a quite different origin, these two words, right? And look at it in my opinion, at the Latin, where I have words here. Nature comes from the word, what? Natura. Yeah, the word burr. Burr, okay? Natus. Yeah. The root meaning here, and the key, is birth. And so, nature, first being nativitas, right? Birth. And substance, of course, you know, from standing under, I think, so on. But, the word nature is secondly carried over from birth to the source of the baby within the mother. Okay? And then it's carried over and kind of generalized to the source, not just of birth, but of any change, but a source within the thing that is changing. And that's the meaning of nature that Aristotle defines in the second book of natural hearing. He's saying that natural philosophy is about natural things. Natural things are things that are by nature. What do you mean by nature as opposed to art? Well, he defines nature as the beginning of the cause of motion and rest, in that which it is, right? An enriched cause. And then afterwards, he points out that nature is matter and form, right? But matter is form in the genus of substance. And he first shows that nature is matter, and then he shows that it's form even more form than matter. That's interesting, right? And he's very good at showing that. He says that by nature, something is a natural thing. By matter, it's a natural thing, only an ability. By form, it's this or that natural thing and act. So form is even more nature than what? Yeah. It's interesting, huh? He first sees here, matter as substance, right, in the previous reading, and now he's going to see form as substance, right? But form is meaning more substance than what? Matter. He first sees matter as nature, and then form as nature, and then form is even more nature than matter. So, it's interesting, they do different words, and they have a different group of meanings, right? But they have a synopsis of overlap, right? And one overlap is that two meanings of substance, and substance in the sense of matter, and substance sense of form. And two meanings of nature. Nature in the sense of matter, makes a sense of form. And then nature, finally after a little more distance, nature takes on the sense of what a thing is. And that's what it means to be solved substance, what a thing is. It's especially close to what form. This form is what makes a thing to be what it is. And it's interesting, huh? That these words sometimes, right, become synonyms. See, nature and substance, you can't say the synonyms, because they both have many meanings, and they're not exactly the same meanings, right? But sometimes one meaning of nature is the same as another meaning of what? Substance. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Substance can sometimes mean in general what a thing is. And that's one meaning of nature. Nature would think what it is. Another overlap, as they say, is matter and form. But also the order, right? The nature, the existence of matter, is seen before nature in the sense of form, even though form is more nature than matter. And substance in the sense of matter is seen before substance in the sense of what? Form. See, they're indicated at the beginning of this reading. They've never been agreed about matter being substance in the sense of matter. They don't all see form with some kind of substance in the sense of it. But it's actually not only substance in some sense, but even more substance than matter. You see? So you have matter and form and in that same order, right? And reverse order, right? The order in which they're known, right? And the order in which they they are. So form is more nature than matter, but matter is known to be nature before form is known to be nature. And in the genus of substance, matter is more known to be substance than form, but form is more substance than matter. Okay? And so he's going to meet when he talks about matter and form, after he knows that they're there, he's going to talk about form first in the third reading, right? And then talk about matter afterwards, huh? His form is primarily substance, huh? And you can see these immaterial substances are more like, what, just a form without matter. They're much more substantial than we are. I told you I put that guy in his place there one time in class, you know. He kind of puzzled, some reference that has to be made to angels. And he's stuck kind of puzzling, and he said, do angels really exist, he says? I said to him, they're more real than you are. And they are, huh? My old teacher, Kasurik, said, you first see your grand angel after your death, you know. This is God. My goodness, this is God, you know. He's an impressive creature, you know. And he'll say, no, no, no. That's higher. And of course, each angel is so unique, each one. He said, you never count them, because, you know, he's like, you're seeing two of the same to count. This is like a holy new creature. I mean, this is the new creature. Now, in the next paragraph, the second paragraph, you might say, but the first, the first whole paragraph on page three, he's talking about how you might try to, in some cases, take some of the accidental differences and reduce them to what's most fundamental, right? So maybe shape might go back to straight and curved, right, huh? Okay? Or smoothness and roughness and so on. So straight and curved are kind of the basic shapes, huh? And I say, what's a semi-circle? Well, it involves straightness and curve, right? But you can reduce it back to straight and curved, right? Because this is straight and this is curved, huh? Okay? Now, in the next paragraph, huh? He's pointing out, now, none of these forms we've been talking about, because they're known to us, is substance, right? No accident, son. It is clear, then, from these, that a substance is the cause of each thing's being. We're not to seek in these what is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now, none of these is substance, even when joined with matter. Yet, it is the proportion on each, right? Okay? Now, go back to the proportion we had there, right? We first see matter in the Jesus of substance. So, let's put the proportion on the border again. You see, the first matter is to man and lion, or these two substances. Something like clay is to sphere and cube. Okay? Now, we can see that if clay is able to be a sphere and able to be a cube, is it by clay that it's actually a sphere? No. No. Or is it by clay that it's actually a cube? No. No. So, there's something else involved in the sphere and cube besides clay. And it's that by which the clay is actually a sphere, by having a certain shape, right? And it's by some other shape that it's actually a cube, right? And by yet another one, it'd be a pyramid or something, right? Okay? Well, going back to an analogy, right? The first matter is able to be a man or a lion, right? But is it a man through being the first matter? No. Is it a lion through being the first matter? No. Well, then there must be something by which the first matter is actually a man, right? And something else by which it's actually a lion, and something else by which it's a dog or a cat or a tree or something else, right? Okay? What should we call that? Well, if you say that by which the clay is a sphere or a cube is some accidental form, right? Well, then we can call this by which the first matter is a man or a lion a form too, but a substantial form, right? Okay? But notice, a substantial form is coming to a subject that in itself is only an ability. But the accidental form is coming to a subject that is an actual substance. So the accidental form is responsible for the actual substance being in some way, but not being simply. So health is not responsible for me being, but for my being healthy. Geometry is not responsible for my being. It's not the geometry that I am. It's through geometry that I am a geometry. See? But through the substantial form, I am. So when I was generated, you could say I came to be, right? When I studied Euclid, did I come to be only in a qualified sense, right? I came to be a geometry, right? Okay? So accidental form and substantial form are alike in that through them, they're subject of as being, right? But the substantial form is being simply without qualification. And through accidental form, only in a qualified sense, huh? Okay? When I die, I cease to be. When the dog dies, it ceases to be. Okay? But if I forget my geometry, do I cease to be? Probably really if I'm done, you know. I'll cease to be a geometry, right? But losing my geometry, I won't cease to be. When I die, then I'll cease to be, huh? I sold one, right? But I won't. The kind of thing composed of soul and body, right? And Charles de Connick had his audience with Pius XII there, you know, before the definition of the assumption, right? Pius XII had these private sessions with some of the world's theologians. So as de Connick was saying in his argument there with the presenting to the Pope, that if the body of Mary, right, was not assumed into heaven, Mary is not in heaven. Which impressed the Pope, right? It's a good reason, right? You know, the argument in favor of the assumption. But when you say St. Peter's in heaven, that's a synecdoche, huh? The soul of Peter's in heaven, huh? Your soul is, most of all, your soul, right? But still not the whole of you, right? So strictly speaking, you will be in heaven after the last judgment, right? Get your body back, right? I hope so. What was the definition of substantial form again? I'm not defining it. I'm saying you've got to know it by how it is proportional, right? To the accidental forms, right? So I'm saying that since the clay is able to be a sphere, and able to be a cube, but not at the same time, right? Is it a sphere or a cube by being clay? No. By being clay, it's able to be a sphere. It's able to be a cube, right? So there's something by which the clay is actually a sphere, or actually a cube, right? And that could be said to be what? A form, yeah. Because the clay doesn't exist by reason of this, right? But it is a sphere, huh? Or a cube by reason of this, huh? Well, that was then, if you understand the proportion, right? The first matter can be a man, or a lion, or a dog, or a cat, or a tree, or a stone, right? But is it one of these in particular because it's the first matter? No. It's all of these in ability, right? But there must be something, then, whereby the first matter is a man rather than a lion, or a lion rather than a dog, right? Which is proportional, right? To that whereby the clay is actually a sphere, or a cube, or a pyramid, or something else, right? And so we call that form, right? Not because the word form means the same thing here, but it's not purely equivocal either. Because it's proportional, right? And so we call it a substantial form as opposed to an accidental form, right? Now, there's a likeness between substantial form and accidental form. You can say they both are an act as opposed to an ability, right? And by both of them, something is in some way, right? Okay. But by the substantial form, something is simply without qualification. By the accidental form, it only is in some way, some qualified way, huh? You can say that the substantial form comes to a subject that's only in ability. So actuality is found first in substantial form, not in the subject, right? The accidental form comes to a subject that is an actual substance. So actuality is found in the subject of accidental form before it's found in the accidental form itself. And that's why some accidental forms are in effect of the substance of the thing, right? Because actuality is found first in the subject. But in the case of substantial form, it isn't, right? So as I say, you have to see the likeness there, but also see the, what, differences, huh? You know, the third and the fourth tools of dialectica, the third tool is the ability to see differences between things, right? And the fourth tool is the ability to see likeness. As Aristotle says in talking about the fourth tool, to see a proportional likeness exercises the mind much more than to see a likeness of two things of the same kind, right? Because it's a more distant likeness, huh? Why, to see the difference between things that are close together exercises the mind more. But so, you've got to, in a sense, see the likeness of substantial form, proportional likeness, a substantial form to accidental form. But you've also got to see some of these differences that I mentioned, right? And as I say, you know, you can point out two likenesses, at least, between them, that both forms are an act as opposed to an ability, right? And by both forms, something is, in some way, right? But then you can start to talk about the differences. By the substantial form, something is simply the thought qualification. By the accidental form, it's only in what? Yeah, yeah. Now, you know, this is even easier to see if you go down among the lesser categories, huh? You know, it's just an example of a class. If I say to a student, huh? If you leave this classroom, you will cease to be. Doesn't that sound like a threat? And if the student charges me of threatening him, right, I say to the judge, Well, all I meant, Your Honor, was that if he left the room, he would cease to be in the room. Well, no one understands you to admit that, Mr. Burkwast, right? You said he would, what, cease to be. Then you're using it without qualification, right? You mean he would, what, die, right? Okay? So if you leave the classroom, you don't cease to be. You cease to be in the classroom, right? Okay? And vice versa, right? When you came into the classroom, did you come to be? No. Did I come to be with? Yeah. You could say, but you have to add that, right? You've come to be in the classroom, right? It's interesting kind of how in language, huh, we tend to often lengthen something. Like, what's the difference between, say, a name like Ann, and a name like Annette? That's a female version of Ann. No, no, no. Annette is like saying little Ann. Little Ann. Yeah. And I knew someone whose name was Annette. And then she got older, she wanted to be called, what, Ann, and not Annette because it's some kind of, you know, little girlish life. You see what I mean? But you see that in other words, huh? You see that in other words, huh? You say dad, and then daddy, you know? But daddy's a little more like what the child would say, right? You kind of, you know, put it down and closer to them. Well, the same way when you start about to be, right? You see. When I was generated, I came to be. When I walked into this room, I came to be, I got to add, in the room, right? Okay. When I studied Euclid, I came to be, not period, I came to be a job, right? So that's being in, I say, couldn't, couldn't you say it, use a Latin, right? But not simply, right? So by substantial form, you are simply, right? And if you lose your substantial form, then you cease to be. Accidental form, you come to be in some way. And if you lose your accidental form, you cease to be in some way, right? You see? So, that's the difference, right? By both of them, you are said to be in some way, right? But by substantial form, you are said to be simply, by accidental form, it's in some qualified diminution. Okay? So you've got to see a number of those differences, then. Where the fact that substantial form comes to a subject, right, that is only an ability. And therefore, actuality is in substantial form before it's in, what? Its subject. But the accidental form comes to a subject that is an actual substance. And therefore, actuality is found in the subject of accidental form before it's found in the accidental form itself. And then, you can say later on that.