Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 46: Matter and Form in Sensible Substance

Transcript
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Aristotle points out in the end of the first book of Nature here, that in substance, matter is for the sake of what? Form. But with accidental form, you could say accidental forms are for the sake of the subject. Because of the imperfection of the substance, right? We need these accidents, right? In other words, for my being a man, do I understand geometry? But God, from being God, understands geometry and everything else, right? So from being what he is, God is everything in a sense, right? He's universally perfect, right? He's lacking in nothing, as Aristotle says in the chapter of perfection, right? By the way, Thomas expressed it, he's universally perfect, right? He's a man who's got everything, right? The one who's got everything. But by being a man, I don't understand even what a square is. And so I have to have all these, what, to perfect me, right? Make me a little more perfect, you've got to add all these things, huh? Am I just because I'm a man? Well, God is just because he's God. The justice of God is nothing added to God, right? It's the same as what God is, right? So I need to have all these accidents added to perfect me, right? So you see the accidents are the perfection of the subject. The subject, in a sense, is the end, right? Geometry is for doing purpose, understanding of those words, right? But matter, in the genus of substance, right, is for the sake of form. So there's a lot of, you know, interesting differences between a substantial form and accidental form. But you first of all, you've got to see the likeness and the proportional likeness. And you should probably see this proportion first, whereby we need to understand the first matter by proportion. Pierre Duyem, the famous physicist, he worked in thermodynamics, huh? And then Pierre Duyem was one of the most profound historians of science, huh? He did a great deal of work in the history of science, huh? So he's a working scientist himself, right? And secondly, he's very famous as a historian of science. And then finally, he wrote on what? What you might call the philosophy of science, right? The nature of science, huh? So he was able to draw upon his experience as a physicist, right? Plus his knowledge of the history of science. And so if you look at the, at the, he wrote around the turn of the century, huh? And, but the edition I have is, is a 1950 edition, you know, 50 years later, they're republishing his work on nature of science. And my edition has, as a preface, the great French physicist of the 20th century, Louis Dubrois, right? And it's beautiful. Louis Dubrois, you know, he started out studying medieval history, right? Then he became a physicist, and he's the father of weight mechanics and so on. So he writes good history here, I mean, good history of science. But I mean, his, his sketch there at the beginning of, of Dubrois' book, you know, noting how he's first of all a scientist, and then a historian of science, and then fighting it on the top of this, he's doing his knowledge, right? Of what science is. And I mention that right now, because Pierre Dubrois says, the most common way that discoveries are made in physics is by seeing in proportion. Okay? So interesting, huh? And it's interesting that Einstein, right, in his kind of nearest thing to a history of science that Einstein has in a book called The Evolution of Physics, right, when he's talking about, about Louis Dubrois' own what theory, right, that was based upon seeing a proportion. And Einstein says, we've seen this more than once as we've gone through the history of physics, huh? That shows you kind of the importance of that, huh? Now, I know myself, when, um, when you study the first six books of Euclid, huh, if you can do book one, you can do books two, three, and four. But then book five is something different, huh? Book five is the theory of what? Proportions. And then book six, he goes back to the triangle and so on, right? And it's amazing the power he has, you know? You think the Pythagorean theorem is where he ends up in book one, right? But in book six, he shows that this is true not only about the square, but about any equilateral, equiangular, right? Plain figure, huh? So that's an amazing thing to do, you know? You think we realize the power, right? Okay? And then if you study theology, right, you see that the parables of our Lord are filled with proportions, right? And his discourses are filled with proportions. And, um, I remember the famous, uh, conversation there where, um, they asked Christ, you know, is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar, though, if he can catch him, right? And he knows what they're up to, Christ. He says, well, show me the point of tribute, right? And so I saw the point, he says, well, whose image is on the coin there? And they said, well, Caesar's, right? You know? And then Christ says, well, then, render to Caesar what is Caesar's, and give to God what is God's, right? And now our Lord is stating a, what? Proportion, yeah. And, uh, the Church Fathers, huh? They come back upon this proportion of our Lord, right? And they say, well, look what he's saying. What has the image of Caesar on it, you give it to Caesar, right? What do you give to God, then? What has the image of God on it? What has the image of God on it? Well, it's our soul, right? You give it to God, right? You see? It's beautiful the way the Church Fathers, you know, extend that, what? Proportion, huh? But, I mean, Scripture, you know, you see the Lord is my shepherd. That's based on the proportion, right? Scripture is, um, filled with proportions, huh? Um, and one time in a senior seminar, there's a senior philosophy major who would take this, and I just did it on proportion. And each student had to take a different book of Aristotle's, and, what, bring out the proportions that he uses, huh? But if you go back to Plato, you see the same thing. One of the most famous works of Plato is the Republic, right? And in the Republic, he shows something in book one, and the conversation seems to be completed, right? Beginning of the second book, someone says to Socrates, you want to seem to have convinced us? Or do you want to really convince us? And Socrates says, well, I want to really convince you, you know, that's what I was saying. And so this starts the major part of the, what, Republic. But it all grows out of a proportion. The proportion among the parts of the soul and the parts of the, what, city. And the parts of the city easier to see than the parts of the soul. And so he blows it up, right? So the whole Republic, one of the most famous works of all, of Plato, is based upon, what, development of one proportion. But a lot of times when they talk, they say about reason and emotions, both Plato and Aristotle, they use proportions, huh? You know, Plato sometimes compares, he says, reason is to the emotion like a man is to the horse. When the man gets on top of the horse, there's a horse too. He tries to throw him off, right? Or you can give up and let the horse do what it wants to do. Or you can get back on the horse, you can get back on the horse until the horse starts to, what, obey you, right? Well, it's like that emotion, right? But it helps you to understand that, right? Aristotle has a very famous portion there where he's talking about reason and emotions. And he says, Should reason rule the emotions like a master rules the slave or like a father rules the son? Well, the answer is, that's a father rules the son, right? But notice the difference, huh? When the master rules the slave, it's not for the good of the slave that he rules them. It's for the good of the master. But when the father rules the son, it should be for the good of the son himself, right? And so it means it rules the emotions. It doesn't, it shouldn't be tyrannizing about them, right? But it's ruling them for the good of the emotions themselves. You can see this in good family life, right? That the children are emotionally more, what? Athletic, right? Than in a family where there's no discipline at all, right? Where the children are allowed to go, you know, how about it? And they wear themselves out, right? Because there's no restraint upon the emotions, huh? So you can see, that the rule of the good parents over the child's emotions is for the good of the emotions and the good of the child himself. So these proportions are very important in what? Understanding. You can see how the parables are sometimes based on the proportions. You know, when a man asks, he owes money to the high guy, right? And he forgives him, and then he goes out and grabs the guy and goes, well, that's only our father, right? Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us. You can have a proportion of just three things, right? You can say, for example, that nine is to six, as six is to what? Four, right? So God will be to me as I am to my, what, neighbor or something, right? The man who's offended me, right? Okay? So you're using me twice, right? As God is to me, so I should be too. Him, right? God's going to be to me as I am, you know. So, I mean, you can't understand the Our Father without proportion, huh? In fact, they can't understand what it means to say Our Father. Because that's based on proportions, huh? You see? So, philosophy and scripture and theology and science, right, are dominated by proportions, huh? And so it's not, you know, something unheard of. You have to use proportions here to understand things, huh? And when you try and understand things that are far apart, the likeness of the ratios is the kind that you have to use, huh? You see that in these words, like before and after and so on, in and out and so on, that the word is carried over by likeness of ratios. Right, the second sense of before is what? Before and being, right? And this is before that and being, if this can be without that and not vice versa. And then you carry it over to knowing, right? You can know this without knowing that, but not vice versa, then this is before that. I can know plain geometry without knowing solid geometry, but not vice versa. So, plain geometry is before solid geometry and I know it. Just like bricks are before brick wall and feet. Just like there's a ratio, huh? Okay? So, in the third paragraph there, in page three there, he said, but none of these is substance, even in joint of matter, yet it is the proportional in each, right? There's something proportional, right? There's something between substantial form and accidental form. And just as the accidental form is responsible for something being actually what it is, like a chair or a table or something else, right? So, the substantial form is responsible for its being what it is, a man, a lion, or a dog, right? And when you lose your soul, you don't have to be a man anymore. This body, right? The Aristotle says, the eye of a dead man is no more an eye than the eye of the, what? Statue up there is. It's a comparison, right? This is lightness there, but it's not really an eye anymore. It's not able to see anything, right? The eye of the dead man sees no more than the eye of the statue up there. Okay? Now, in the next two paragraphs, before the last paragraph, I did a couple of corollaries of things that follow upon some things that have been said here. From these things it is clear that the act and thought of what it is is other when the matter is other. For as some it is the composition, as some the mixture, and as some another of those said. Well, this is the idea that form and matter are like relatives, huh? You can't have just any form and just, what? Any matter, right? Okay? So, take these simple examples again. I'm making this chair, I guess they had to, what? Screw this part into that part, right? Okay? But you first of all have to shape this part in a certain way, right? Okay? Now, if I make myself a manhattan, I get out there, get the screws out, and get the whiskey and the vermouth, and you screw one to the other, right? Yeah. No. No, that's not the form, right? You see? So, it's the idea that not just any form is in any matter, right? This becomes very important when you study the soul, because, you know, you don't have this transmigration of souls. And Aristotle says for the soul of a man to go into the body of a dog, right? Well, these are what we call organic bodies, which means in Greek, a body composed of tools. And that would be like for the art of the cook to go into the, what? Tools of the carpenter or the tailor or somebody else, right? And each art has its own tools, right? Each soul, right? Has its own body, right? And they'd fit. And so you can't have just anything. Aristotle says something like that about pleasure there in the 10th book of the Nicomachian Ethics, huh? The pleasure is not, what? Something the same that you can sprinkle on all different kinds of things, right? But the pleasure of one activity really fits that activity. There's something unique about the pleasure, right? So the pleasure of hearing Mozart's music, right? Is different from the pleasure of seeing a painting or something, huh? You can't really, it's not really the same pleasure. It's not like, you know, sugar you could shake with many things or salt you can put in many things, right? You know, a little pleasure here, a little pleasure there. But no, it's in there, it arises from the thing itself. And it's very important when you get into political philosophy, right? Where Aristotle would say not just any form of government can be realized in just any, what? People, you know? Sometimes we used to accuse, you know, our State Department and our government sometimes trying to realize maybe the American form of government or something like it in a people that aren't ready for it yet. There's always a question about that, right? And, you know, like the African countries, you know, after they've got independence, you know, maybe prematurely, you might say, at the Second World War and they try to impose kind of a American or British form of government upon these things. But were they in practice republics or democracies? Or no, no. They're just kind of a coloring, you know? Like the Soviet probably would be, you know, under the commies, right? Just a rubber stamp thing there, right? Okay. Now, the next paragraph he talks about when you define a thing, you define it by its matter or by its form or by both. Both. By both, you're going to be complete, right? But sometimes you give a kind of definition that's imperfect of just one, right? So, you know, take an example in modern science. If you ask somebody, what is water? What's he going to say? H2O. Now, he doesn't say how the hydrogen and oxygen are united, does he? He just gives you the matter. It doesn't give you the form. Well, it's incomplete then, right? Okay. And someone said water is two to one. That's what it is. It doesn't give you the matter, right? Now, I ask my students, what is the Pythagorean theorem? Do you know the answer they give? A squared equals B squared plus C squared. That doesn't tell you what the Pythagorean theorem is. I was going by something talking about how precise math is, you know, and you state mathematically. I want to say the Pythagorean theorem when they give you that. You don't get that in high school. That doesn't tell you what the Pythagorean theorem is. That doesn't tell you what the Pythagorean theorem is. There's no mention about equilateral, I mean, that right angle triangle or even squares or anything, right? It could be just, you know, three numbers. You don't seem to see it, right? Okay. We got something in the form there, but something's not the matter, right? Squares and things, huh? Okay. So, then at the end, then, he summarized again. It is clear, then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it is. For this is as matter, this is form and act, and the third is the, what? Composite of the two, right? Now, he's going to say much more about these things and especially about form, right? But in the third reading now, which we'll be taking up next time, he's going to talk about substantial form, right? It's going to be very interesting the way he does this, you'll see. Eight, seven, six, five, four, three, two, one. In the name of the Father and the Son of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Glad they are in light and met. Carding angels, do from the lights of our minds. Order in whom their images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas and Jolly Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Son of the Holy Spirit. Amen. So in the first two readings of the Eighth Book of Wisdom, first out is shown that in material substance there is matter and also form. And now in the third and fourth reading, he's going to talk about form, what it is and so on. And in the third reading, which we're going to look at today. And then in the fourth reading, he'll talk about... Chalkboard. What? Chalkboard. I'm sorry. Oh, okay. And then the fourth reading, he's going to be talking about matter. And in the fifth reading, he'll be talking about the union of matter and form. So it makes sense to talk about matter and form by themselves, so to speak, and then talk about their union. Now, in this third reading, he does something like we saw in the third book of Wisdom, the prominence of what? Plato. And Plato, we said in the third book, was the philosopher before Aristotle, the only philosopher, you might say, that talked much at all about anything inside the material world, with the exception of the Van Zag. But the other philosophers, for the most part, just natural philosophers. And Thomas himself sees the principle of the division here, and Aristotle's way of considering form in reading three, that he does so in comparison to the positions of Plato. Plato had tied up forms with the universal, separated from things, which he calls species here in the text, the particular kinds of things that are defined, and so on. And then Plato had compared forms to numbers, kind of his Pythagorean background. And we're not sure, sometimes, whether Plato sees a likeness only, or whether he thinks that the forms really are numbers, right? Aristotle also sees a likeness there between form and number. So this third reading will have basically two parts. And in each part, there will be a four-fold comparison. But in the first part, he's comparing the forms and the natures of things to the species, the separate species. The ideas, as they call them in English, but there's not a very good translation of idos in Greek. Idos is also the word you use in logic, when you talk about genus, species, difference, using the Latin words. Well, again, us in Greek, and then species would be idos, E-I-D-O-S, in English, I think. Form might be morphate, right, in the Greek, kind of something like that. So it's going to have a four-fold comparison between form and species. And then, or four points to be made, so to speak, or actually some of them will have one point in them. And then a four-fold comparison or likeness between forms and numbers, huh? Okay. So, let's look at the beginning here of the third reading, where he's going to compare form with the separated species that Plato has. It's not until the second paragraph on page five of your text that he's going to begin to have a second comparison to numbers on. Now, as he said, there's a four-fold comparison, and the first comparison is in the first two paragraphs here of reading three. And what the Platonists did is kind of a strange thing. They seem to try to make the whole nature of these material things be form. And Aristotle would say, well, that's obviously not correct, huh? But maybe there are some things whose whole nature is to be just, what, form. Thomas is often quoting Boethius, you know, divina substancia, forma est. The divine substance is a form, huh? And the same thing could be said about the angels, huh? So, he begins by kind of alluding to this question that's raised because of the Platonism. One should not ignore, he says, that sometimes it is hidden, right? Whether a name signifies the composed substance, and signifies, therefore, the combination of matter and form, or merely the act and the, what, form, huh? Okay? A little bit like, you know, what is a Manhattan, right, huh? Is it whiskey and sweet vermouth put together in the ratio of two to one, right? Or is it just the ratio of two to what? That's what Manhattan is, huh? Well, the Platonists, to caricature them a little bit, would be saying that the essence of Manhattan is two to one. It's just the formal aspect, huh? Aristotle would say, no, no, you know, two to one is important in Manhattan, but you've got to have the whiskey and the sweet vermouth, right? And maybe in a stinger you have the ratio of two to one. So how does two to one mean? It gives you the whole nature of Manhattan, huh? Because in a stinger you have two parts of brandy, one part white cream de mentha, huh? So just the forms, it would then, the Manhattan and the, what, a stinger would be, what, have the same nature, right? You know? I think we'll have a two to one tonight or something. Aristotle is an equally homely example here. For example, whether house is a sign of the common, that is a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus, thus, right, which involve, therefore, both the matter and the form, right? Or simply of the act of the form, that it is a covering, right, huh? Okay? What do you think the house is? Aristotle would think it's both, right, huh? And that's an example taken from, what, artificial things, huh? And then an example taken from math. And whether a line is two in length or just two. You know how the, sometimes the Greeks would say, the point is a one, and then a line is a two, because two points in the way determine a line. And then three lines are a surface, or I mean three is a surface, and then four is, what, a body, right? And so the Platonists would tend to say, well, maybe, you know, a line is just, what, two, right? And the other is just the kind of material in which it is. And you can see how man is influenced by, what, maybe mathematics, right, huh? We'd say, well, a sphere is what? Is it rubber, or is it glass, or is it just a sphere? What is a sphere? You just think of it being the form, huh? And leaving out the matter. And whether an animal is soul in a body, which Aristotle would think, right? Or just a soul, right, huh? Which is substance in the act of some body. You know, at the end of the Phaedra, Socrates seems to be thinking that he's just a, what, soul, huh? Maybe a soul kind of imprisoned in a body in some way or other, huh? And his friend, Crichto, you know, says at the end there, where shall we bury Socrates? And Socrates' famous remark is, well, you have to catch me first. And, of course, if he's just the soul, it's going to be hard to catch, huh? And you still think he's going to suck if he's being the body, huh? But I suppose you have this idea carried over into origin a bit, huh? And we're all created kind of like a spirit. ...substance, and then those of us who sinned got stuck in bodies and so on. Well, is our whole nature then just for, huh? And he says, if you use the word animal to mean both, the soul by itself, and also the combination of soul and body, then you would have the word animal being used equivalently, huh? In a sense, the pithes are almost doing that, right? Because they'd speak of the separated species, right? Man himself and dog himself. And then you and I, we material things, we kind of partake of the species of man, huh? The dogs partake of the species of dog, right? So then we're not really a man in the same way that the species man is, huh? That's just form, huh? We're kind of partaking of this form in some way, but we've got some matter, huh? So he says, animal might even be said of both, huh? But you'd be using it equivocally, right? Not equivocally by chance, but by reason, huh? Not by one definition, but as towards one, huh? Incidentally, in ethics, huh, we do talk about something being rational essentially, and then something else being rational or reasonable by partaking of reason. So Aristotle would distinguish between the part of the soul that is reason itself and the part of the soul, like the will or the emotions that can partake of reason. But would they be reasonable in the same way? But not in a purely equivocal sense would they be reasonable because they're partaking of reason. So if your will is ordered by reason or your emotions are measured by reason or ordered by reason, then they partake in some way of what reason, they listen to reason. But they're not rational in the sense of being essentially rational. Now he says, this makes a difference towards something else. It's being kind of obscure, right? But nothing towards the investigation of what? Sensible substance. Aristotle's already clear that sensible substance, material substance, what a man is, involves matter as well as what? Form, huh? That man is a composite, huh? But maybe there are some things, he's hinting, that are just what? Form. I was quoting Boethis, divina substancia forma est. And the same thing would be true about the angels, huh? They would just form. Now, it's hard to talk about that, right, huh? Okay? And so, he's pointing out now in the next sentence there, that if you had an immaterial substance, huh, that was complete, huh? We don't really know that these immaterial substances are complete. But the nearest thing to it would be, what? The human soul, right? But if the human soul is a big substance, then it would just be, what? Form that substance, huh? And then, a soul, and what it is to be a soul, would be the, what? Same. But what it is to be a man, and a man, are not the same. Unless even the soul is to be called man, in that position. And also, he's touching upon here, huh? This is in some ways to help more in Book 7, but we talked about it before. That immaterial things, huh? What a thing is, and the thing are not entirely the same. So, Socrates, and what a man is, are not entirely the same thing. If they were entirely the same thing, you couldn't have more than one man. To be Socrates, it would be, to be a man, right? But, in the case of a immaterial substance, huh, a Raphael, and what it is to be Rayfield, right? Or what he is, would be the same, huh? Okay? And this goes back to the thing we were talking about a little bit last time, I think, alluding to Book 7, that immaterial things, it's possible to have many individuals of exactly the same kind. And this is possible also in, what? Mathematics, huh? But what is the beginning of this possibility, huh? What's matter, and what follows upon matter, namely, extension, so matter, in that sense, is subject to quantity, is divisible, is the reason why you can have many of the same kind, huh? Someone says, why can we have many chairs here of exactly the same kind, huh? Well, the simplest answer is, you have enough wood. Or if it's a metal chair, you have enough metal, right? Why can you have many glasses, maybe, of the same kind here? Well, it's because you have enough glass, right? So it's wood or glass or some other kind of matter that's subject to, what? Quantity. So when your mother made cookies, maybe, or something like that, and they spread the dough out and then they dump, dump, dump, dump with the little cookie thing and made all these gingerbread men or whatever they are. One is here, one is there, right? But in the immaterial substances, you don't have any, what, matter, and you don't have this extension, part outside of part, huh? So, you can't have one here and one, what, there, huh? And you have the same thing in geometry because you do have part outside of part, huh? So like in the first, what, theorem in Euclid there, where on a straight line you deconstruct an equilateral, what, prime, and you take one end of it and use it as a center and rotate the line around that and you get a circle and you take the other one and rotate around there. Well, one circle is here, one circle is what? There, right? But even before that, the two endpoints are two even though they're exactly the same kind of thing. There's no difference in kind between the point, one in the circle, or the straight line and the point at the other end, huh? But they differ because one is here and one is there. You've got part outside of part, huh? And this is the way that they say that your soul and my soul are distinct even when they're separated from the body, huh? Because your soul is made for your body and my soul is created for my body, huh? So it goes back to matter, right? The distinction between your soul and what? My soul. Now, in the material substances, a thing and what it is would be altogether the same, huh? So this is the first comparison, Aristotle makes, huh? And although he disagrees with Plato as to the, what it is of the sensible substances, saying that they involve matter as well as what form, right? Yet Plato, in a way, in speaking of these forms apart from matter, makes only one of each kind, huh? And therefore he's kind of anticipating what we're going to say about the separated substances, what in theology we call the angels, right? They can only be one of each, what? Kind, huh? And that's why they can only be one God, right? Why, they can't be two sons in God, too. Okay? So that's the first comparison he makes between Plato's species up there, you know, and form in the sense, or substance in the sense of what? Form, huh? Now in the third paragraph he makes the second comparison. And you might state two things here, that the form is not one of the material ingredients of the whole, and the form doesn't come to be from the matter in the sense that the matter is made into the form, huh? Now, take a simple example here. Take the word cat, right? And when you ask somebody what are the parts of the word cat, they think of the letters C, A, and T first, right? But then you confront them with the word cat that has the same letter, right? And you say, well, then in the word cat, besides the three letters, there's an order, right? And the order is different than in the word act, right? Because order means before and after, and the C is before the A in the word cat. But in act, it's reversed. The A is before the C, right? Now, is that order that's in the word cat, or the order that's in the word act for that matter, is that another part of the word in addition to the letters, the three letters in there? In other words, I take a C, an A, and a T, and then I take a certain order, and I put them all together, and now I've got the word cat. And I take the same three letters in a different order, and I put them together, and now that I form the word act, is that the way you do it? No. Would it be a formal part of the way? Well, in a sense, you can speak of the parts of the word cat as being the letters, and the order of them, right? Which, if you like speaking of matter and form as the parts of us, right? But is the order a part like the letters, or is it a little different? And is the order made out of the letters? Notice, if you go back to the need to introduce order as something here besides the letters, right? The reason why we were forced to say that was that the word act and the word cat may have the same letters, right? But they're not the same word, right? So there must be something in the word cat that isn't in the word act, and vice versa. It's a different order, right? As he said. And that explains why the words are not the same word. But notice now, if the order, the two orders, were made out of the same letters, just as the two words are made out of the same letters, then why wouldn't they be the same order, being made out of the same letters? You have to have an order of the order, a form of the form, right? To explain there being two different orders. Because you're made out of the same letters, that doesn't explain their difference, does it? So there have to be a form of the form, an order of the order, right? Then we ask, now, was that order made out of the letters? Then you have to have a form of the form of the form, right? This will go on forever, right? Because you have to have a different form in each case, right? And if you have to have a form of the form. The same thing if you had, you know, like a wooden chair and a, what, wooden table. It would have exactly the same kind of wood, huh? Well, then wood, the fact that they may have the same kind of wood, doesn't explain their difference, that one is a chair and one is a table, right? So then we distinguish between the wood and the shape of the wood and the arrangement of the wood, huh? And then someone would say, now, is the shape of the chair, is that made out of wood, just as the chair itself is made out of wood? Well, if you said it was, then you'd have to say that the shape of the table was also made out of that same wood, right? Now you're back to the same thing you said before, right? That the chair, just as the chair and the table were made out of the same wood, so there must be something else in the chair and the table besides the wood to explain the fact that they're not the same thing, one's a chair and one's a table. So likewise, since the shapes are not the same shape, right? If the shapes were made out of the wood, but out of the same wood, you'd have to have another what? Shape of the shape, a form of the form, right? To explain the difference, huh? Because they're both made out of the same material, it doesn't explain the difference. There's actually something else in there, right? And then you'd ask about that, was that made out of the wood, right? Then you'd have a formal form, it's going on forever. So it's better to stop in the beginning and say that the, what, form is, not only not a material part, but it's not made out of the, what? Water. Okay? That's a very strange thing, huh? It might seem to be, oh, where'd it come from, you know? Was it created? So you thought it was created, right? You can say that the letters are able to be in this order, right? And able to be in that order, right? And the wood is able to be in this shape and able to be in that shape, huh? And what you can't say, strictly speaking, that the order is made out of the letters, or the shape is made out of the wood, huh? Okay? So this is the second comparison he's making, huh? To those examining, the syllable does not seem to be from the elements in composition, nor is the house bricks in composition, as if it's a material part, right? And this is right, for neither the composition nor the mixture is from those things in which it is a composition or mixture. So in Manhattan, is two to one made out of whiskey and sweet vermouth? Yeah, they're in the form of, in the ratio of two to one, yeah. But is two to one made out of these things, huh? Likewise in none of the others, huh? For example, if the threshold is by position, an example in the second reading, the position is not from the threshold, but rather the latter is from the former. Nor is man, animal, and two-footed, but there must be something else which is besides these. If these are a matter, right? Neither an element itself, neither a material part, right? Nor from an element. But when taking away, they state the matter. If then this is the cause of the being and substance, because the form that makes the thing to be what it is, right? They'll be saying this is the substance itself, huh? Aristotle would tend to call form substance sometimes, huh? Because it's much more substance than what matter is, huh? Now, the third comparison is in the fourth paragraph, and this in a way follows from its not being, what? Made from the matter, right? And that is that either it's not, what? Generated and corrupted at all, or it's generated and corrupted only, what? Accidentally, right? Okay. This, then, must either be eternal, or it must be corrupted without ever being corrupted. And have come to be without ever coming to be. Now, stop in there for a moment, huh? If you talk to a carpenter, right? Okay, crazy. Did you make a chair today? Yes, I made a chair today, right? Did you also make the shape of the chair? What would he say? Yes. Yeah. But did he make the shape of the chair in the same way that he made the chair? Not the same way. You make something out of some material, right? And he said the shape was not made out of the material, so he didn't really make the shape, except in an accidental sense, right? You can say he brought the shape into existence, right? Yes. In bringing the chair into existence, huh? He didn't bring the shape into existence by itself, huh? The shape as such didn't come to be, huh? And if he were to break up the chair, right, well, then the shape would no longer be there. But would the shape as such go out of existence, or would it be the chair that ceased to be? The chair. The chair, yeah. As far as itself is concerned, always be, right? It wouldn't be generated, or corrupted, even accidentally, huh? That's kind of interesting, right? Because you see, even in material things, that the form as such is not generated, that it's not made out of the matter, and the form as such is not corrupted. And the form as such is not corrupted. And the form as such is not corrupted. And the form as such is not corrupted. If it, in some sense, comes into existence, goes out of existence, it's only through something else coming into existence and going out of existence, huh? Okay? A little bit like what we talk about accidental B, right? You know? Can you make a Christian geometry, right? Well, there's a way of making a Christian, and a way of making a geometry, but there's really no way of what? Making a Christian geometry, huh? So it's in making somebody a Christian, and making him a geometry, you could say in some sense you've made a Christian geometry, right? But not as such, right? It's only something coming into existence and going out of existence to do some other, what, change, right? Okay? And if I'm taller than my son at one point in our lives, and then you're on in life, I'm shorter than him, right? Have I really changed? From being taller than him to being shorter than him? Okay? No, it's really he who has changed his, what, height and size, right? Okay? So it's really, the change is not in relation as such. It's not a kind of change, huh? As such. Well, you can say, in some sense, I was taller and now I'm shorter than my son, right? But this would be, what, not a change in me as such. So there's something like that here, right? The form as such doesn't come to be or cease to be. So there's something necessary about the form, if it was not a form only in matter. Okay? Do you see that? Kind of subtle, huh? But it goes back, in a way, I think he's ordered this third, because it depends upon having seen something of the second one, right? That the form is not made out of what matter, right? And if he said, you know, that he really made the shape today, right? Well, then you say, what do you make it out of? See? Because he can't really, what, create out of nothing. So, it's only, in an accidental sense, one could say that he made the shape at all. He made the shape in making the chair, I could say. But he didn't make it by itself, but through itself. But it has been proved and shown elsewhere, that no one makes or begets the form. But it's the individual that is made, right? It is a composite of matter and form. And what is from these that is generated, huh? This goes back, even, to the seventh book of wisdom, but also back to the first book of natural hearing, the physics. Because there we see that what comes to be is always composed of matter and form. And when the hard becomes soft, right, huh? Hardness cannot become softness. Hardness itself cannot be soft. Even the hard of such cannot be soft. So, there must be some kind of matter underlying the hardness that is able to be soft, huh? But when it becomes soft, it loses its hardness, huh? And if it became hard again, it would lose its softness, right? So, this is one way of syllogized there in the Summa Ketologiae, that God does not change, right? You see, what changes is composed. And before that, you see that God is not composed. He's out here as simple. Therefore, God cannot, what, change. You have a syllogism there in the second figure, right? Where you're affirming, composed of everything that changes, and denying, composed of God. Therefore, God cannot, what, change. So, if what we need comes to be, it ceases to be, you know, generated corrupted is a composite of matter and form. But then form, as such, doesn't come to be. Or it ceases to be, it's the opposite of matter and form. And if you can say, in some sense, that the form has begun to be, or it ceases to be, right? It's because something else, really, has begun to be, or ceased to be, huh? But again, that kind of prepares you for thinking about the angel, right, huh? The angel doesn't have any word about dying, in our sense, huh? Okay? Nor would an angel be, what, generated, right? It would be created, but it can't be generated or corrupted, huh? It's not a composite of form. It's just form. And, you see, the problem with, the odd word, of course, is our soul, right? But if a form existed only in matter, then it couldn't be without the matter, right? Okay? It would come to be, or cease to be, with the corruption of the composite, right? And so, the problem about the human soul was to see, does it have an existence only in the body, right? Or does it have an existence that is not entirely in the body, or not entirely shared by the body? And that's unknown to us, the answer to that at first, right? But we reason back from the effect, huh? We say that you have to be before you can do something, right? And that says, Descartes, right, I think, therefore I am, right? When you're doing something, you must be. So, it depends upon seeing, is there something that the soul does not in the body, right? Because if there's something the soul does not in the body, there's some doing that's not in the body, well then, the existence of the soul can't be entirely in the body, and it's the understanding that you first see is not in the body, the understanding of the universal. And that goes back, then, to what we were saying earlier, that the cause of there being many individuals of the same kind in material things is matter is subject to what quantity? So, that a triangle or a circle that's here or there in the continuous is going to be, what, individual. So, if the reason was understanding in a body, then what I understand is it would be received in a body in the continuous, and therefore as individual and not as, what, universal. So, the fact that we know things universally is a beginning for understanding that we're knowing something by knowing that it's not in the body, and since you have to be before you can do something, then we have a being that is not, as we say, immersed entirely in the body, right? So, the body shares in the existence of the soul, but not completely, right? So, the soul has an existence apart from the body. That's a very subtle thing, right? But, Clayton Aristotle, one of the kind of discoveries among the philosophers, but shows it perhaps better than Clayton. Okay? Well, now it comes to that fourth thing, right? About separation, right? And he's in the term of truth yet here in this book. So, he says, Whether the substances of destructible things are separated is not yet at all clear. You see, Plato had the substance of these things. What a man is, what a dog is, there's a world out there, right? And Aristotle doesn't complete the, refute that, huh? He does so in the, finally in the 13th and the 14th books, huh? But that it is not possible for some is clear. Whatever are such as not to be apart from some things, such as house or utensils. But, of course, here you deem us with what we call an accidental form, huh? And they would hardly be able to be, what? Separated, huh? And the nurse tells us, Well, perhaps indeed, neither these things themselves, nor any of the things which are not formed by nature,