Wisdom (Metaphysics 2016)
Lecture 2: Knowledge, Wisdom, and the Wise Man

Transcript
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I don't know why a woman does this, right? But they know that, you just don't do that. You're going to be in trouble doing that. A teacher could say, you still like My Fair Lady, because it's got a lot of good sense in there, you know, about the difference between men and women, right? Would you be annoyed if I forgot your birthday? Of course not! How do I care? So things you learn that they are so, but maybe without blame, something can explain why, huh? I told you I should give this lecture on transiting men and women, did I tell you about that a little bit? So, I can point out one difference here, you know. First of all, my experience, though, who's more apt to disown a child, the father or the mother? Yeah. See? And who's more apt to make the mistake of trying to force the offspring into his own line of work, or whoever it is? Father, right, huh? See? Now why is this what? So, right, huh? See? Well, the reason I would give is that the father sees the offspring as a continuation of himself. See that with Henry VIII, right? He wants a son, right, huh? And I always tell the story of him. We were expecting our second child, right? And I was in the hospital there, kind of waiting there in the waiting memorial hall. And there was the guy there who was obviously kind of nervous. And this is his first child on the way, right? And so, he said to me, have you been through this before? And I said, yeah, this is my second one. And he says, oh, yeah, okay. What was your first one? I said, a boy. I said, you got what you wanted, then? I said, yeah. I know, you can see it. It's the way he said it right there, you know, huh? See? But a man wrapped to make that mistake of wanting a boy, right, rather than a woman, right? While a woman thinks that it'd be a healthy baby, that's the first one, right? But the woman sees the baby more as a, what? Fulfillment of herself as a woman, right? Perfection of herself. While the man sees the child more as continuation of himself. So, if the kid doesn't live up to his expectations, right, then he kind of disowns him in some sense, right? While the woman, to disown the child, we like to deny her own perfection, her own fulfillment, right? So, you kind of see that there's a reason why these things are so, right? And the man who can give something of the reason why, you know, seems to be wiser than the man who just knows these things from, what? Experience. So, I used to give this lecture, and then, you know, some should, when I first started teaching, it was all boys still, right? And then, when the girls are going to be admitted, you're having, you know, maybe two or three girls from high schools coming to sit in a class, right? They say, oh no, he's not going to talk about this nervous, is he? The guy's getting very nervous. So, this is because they know the cause here, right? Well, the others do not, right? That's why they seem to be wiser. The experienced know that it is so, but do not know why it is so. But these know why it is so, and the cause, and the cause is answering the question why, right? You may recall from the logic there, right, that Aristotle distinguishes those four questions. Does it exist? And then, what is it? And is it so? Is this that? And then, why is this that, right? And to know that it is, is not as advanced in knowledge as to know what it is, right? And to know that it is so, is not as advanced in knowledge as to know why it is so, right, huh? The man who knows why it is so, knows that it is so too, right? But he knows the cause now, right? He's much wiser than the man who just really knows that it is so, right, huh? Who was the most beautiful woman at the party last night? Why, you, my dear, of course. So that's the first way he's kind of showing that, right, huh? But now he gets a second sign here. Whence also we think that the chief artists about each thing are more honorable, and know more, and are wiser than the handicraftsmen, because they know the causes of the things, what, made, huh? Let's take the example there, you know, the great chef, you know. And then you've got the subordinate guy who just peels the potatoes, right, and cuts them, you know. And I want them to cut this way tonight. Or I want them, you know, cut this way tomorrow night, you know. Oh boy, just cut them this way, and tomorrow cut them this way, okay? Now who seems wiser anymore? See? Because he doesn't know why they should be cut this way, right? I'm making french fries, that's why, tonight, see. I know what the ultimate thing is, huh? So the chief artist, right, commands the lower man, right, huh? So the general knows why these people should go here. Why? You know? He sees the whole picture, right? He sees the reason why you have to do this in particular. But you don't know why in particular you have to do that, right? Here's not the question why. Here's what to do. See? Whence we also think that the chief artists about each thing are more honorable and know more and are wiser than the handicrafts men, because they know the causes of the things, what? Made, huh? So many things do we use in our house or something or place, and we don't know why, you know? We just don't do this or do that, you know? For the latter are like inanimate things. Well, put down here, huh? They make, but they do not know what they make. It's fire burns, right? Inanimate things make each of these by a certain, what? Nature. While the handicrafts men do so through custom, right, huh? Hence the chief artists are wiser, not by doing, because they may not be doing much at all, right? He's commanding. But by having a reason and knowing the, what? Causes, huh? Our builder, Pat. Sometimes he challenges Pat on the way to do something. Pat always has to correct him and say no, because you won't understand necessarily the reason why. And so he just, but he'll eventually, he might see something and then he'll do it the way Pat tells him. He doesn't like it at first, but he's got a lot of experience in building. Yeah. I tell all the time this story of my teacher at the Zurich there, you know, and he was my advisor. My brother Richard made sure that I had him as my advisor. And so I got my, selecting my courses and so on. And so he's looking on my course selection. He says, Duane, where's your Greek? I said, my Greek? He said, yeah, why aren't you taking Greek? I said, well, there are other things I'd rather take. He says, that's no reason, he says. You're going to be a philosopher, he says, you take Greek. Well, now I realize how important it was for me to know some Greek, right? And I'm not particularly good at foreign languages, right? But I learned out of Greek so that I could read ourselves texts, you know, and discover things, even the Gospel of St. John, the Greek and so on. But what's the relation there between the two of us? He's like the chief artist there, right? And he realizes, you know, that the Greek will be important for me down the road there, right? He knows why I should be forced to take Greek, right? Why you should bully me into taking Greek, right? Even when I graduated from the college, I told you, and he said, Duane, I could go out and get some Euclid. And I said, why? Go out and get some. Get a copy of Euclid. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I'm kind of like a dummy, right? Like a firebirdie without knowing why I'm doing it, right? Maybe not the question why. Why is to suffer with—I knew I was a student in Greek there, and Father Peter there, you know, with two foremost hands. their forms. But he suffered a little bit, you know. It was worthwhile. You need that, though. You need that. So, Kusurik was the chief artist. He was wiser. Not by doing, but by having a reason knowing the causes. And now he gives another, what, sign here, right? On the whole, the sign of knowing is the ability to teach. You know, someone can teach and know something. Now, can the man of experience really teach? He knows you should do it this way, but he doesn't know why. If someone asks him why, he can't really teach. And because of this, we think that art is more reasoned out knowledge and experience. For the artists are able to teach while the others are, what, not able. Why do you need to know Greek, huh? Because the translations are so lousy, right? What did Plato say? Until philosophers are kings, or kings are philosophers, who have bad government. Well, until translators are philosophers, or philosophers are translators, you can have bad, what, translations. We used to get the, what do you call that, those little green volumes there, you know, with Greek and Latin, you know. The lobes. Lobes, yeah, yeah. And the translation is so lousy in there. And actually, you know, we've seen some of them where the translator has managed to give exactly the opposite sense, the opposite, say the opposite of what the guy he's translating is saying, right? And so, you can see why it's important to know Greek, right? Protect yourself, right? Start from these guys. That's what, as a thought of Peter Phelan, he said, about scripture translations, and it's not enough to know how to use a Greek or Hebrew dictionary. That's translated scripture, you've got to understand scripture, you've got to understand revelation. Yeah. I was going across a strange text that Thomas did in the Summa County Gentiles. You know, when you get into this study of act and ability, right? And what's the kind of most general distinction that we take up under act, right? Well, it's a distinction between, you know, form and motion, right? It's not too hard to see the distinction between form and motion, right? You take a ball and you roll it. The form and the motion are not the same thing, right? But there's a connection between the fact that it rolls and that the cube doesn't, right? Because the form is different from the ball and the cube, right? The cube doesn't roll along, right? But the motion is not the same thing as the form, is it, huh? Okay. Now, later on, you find out there's something that is like motion and sometimes called a motion, but it's pretty different from motion in the strict sense because motion motion is the act of the imperfect, huh? The act of what is able to be as such. And so if you take a motion like walking home, right? When you're walking home, you haven't walked home yet. But now, what about something like hearing or seeing or understanding, right? Is that the same thing? When I'm understanding something, have I understood it yet? Yeah. And when I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? See? I used to see the girls, you know. And I love you. Have I loved you yet? Oh, yes. Well, this is the act of the perfect, right? Nice contrast there, right? You want to call understanding a motion? Now, this course is more like a motion, right? But understanding, as the name indicates, standing, it's not like a motion, is it? Now, I've seen texts of Thomas where he seems to, he wants to give them a name other than motion. He'll call it in Latin operatio. Well, then I got into this interesting text the other day in the Summa Kadra Gentila's there, where he's talking about three different operations, or three different kinds of operations, right? And one is what? Motion, being moved by something. Another is moving another. And then there is an act which he says is not, which is actual, right? And not like imperfect, like motion. And it's not tending towards something else, like moving or making another, right? So he says, some things are trying to be like God by moving, and that's trying to become actual in themselves. Others are trying to become like God by moving other things. You know, like God, it was a cause. And some things are doing both, because they're moved movers. So they're becoming like God by being actual in themselves. They're coming to be actual in themselves. And by being a cause. I was kind of struck by the fact that he used the word operation for all three of these, right? Now, Thomas, I know, sometimes he speaks of how Plato and even Aristotle sometimes would extend motion to things that are not motion in a strict sense. And he comes up when Thomas is describing these wonderful things in Plato where he says, the through itself is before the through another, right? And therefore, what is moved by another before is something that moves itself, right? And so God moves other things because he, what, moves himself, Plato says, huh? Other things. So, well, what does he mean? Well, he means that God knows and loves himself. And it's by knowing himself as the exemplar of all things. And by loving himself, he wants to communicate himself so far as possible. So by moving himself, that is, by knowing and loving himself, he moves other things, right? And he says, Thomas, and sometimes Aristotle, even in the Dianima, he'll speak of understanding and sensing as being a kind of motion, right? So I've seen that kind of extension of emotion, right? But here in this text, he uses the word operation, extends it for all three, right? So I was talking to my friend, Warren Murray, on the phone there, and I said, Warren, how would you translate operatio in this text? I gave the text, right? And he says, you think it would make any sense in English to say operation? That this thing here that's being moved is operating? That doesn't seem right to me at all, you know? So what would you use to cover those three without forcing, you know, the optimist of an operation to be in English, right? Warren says, well, activity? He says, well, I've got another suggestion, Warren. I said, how about the word doing? Now, when I'm making an apple pie, which I never am, am I doing something? I'm making a chair, which I never do. Am I doing something? I don't find any force there, do you? Now, somebody calls me on the phone and says, Duane, what are you doing? And I say, well, I'm listening to Mozart. Did you find that, Forrest? I'm very mad. We'd find that. Even understanding something, is that doing something? Do you understand? Yeah. Now, take the example that Thomas has there, from Aristotle. Aristotle, when he talks about a stone, a heavy thing falling to the ground, right? He doesn't want to say that the stone is the mover. That the mover of that downward motion of it is... He doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want to say that he doesn't want The agent that gave the thing, it's what? Wait, okay? But now, take this example, though. Suppose I got a stone in my hand, right? And I leave a go of it. What does the stone do? Do you find that accurate? Okay, almost done. See? Yeah. But it's really being moved, right? Okay. Or take a set example. So, suppose you take an ice cube out of the... My wife says refrigerator, but I say icebox. We have a terrible fight about this. She's trying to get in this refrigerator, and I say icebox. She's from the east, you're from the west. From the west, yeah. Yeah. So I say, you take an ice cube out of the icebox, and you leave it on the counter, right? What does it do? What's up? Yeah. Okay. Or you put a, you know, piece of butter on the hot pan. What does it do? Yeah. See? So these are examples of being acted upon, right? But it doesn't seem to be too forced to say doing, right? But I don't say it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So I think, so we're in agreement that goes with translation, you know, but doing, right? So if you ever get to the ninth book of wisdom there, I'll say, I'll speak of a fundamental distinction now between, acts is between form, right, and doing, right? And you have these three doings that Thomas calls three operations, the poor guy. And maybe it's okay in Latin a little bit, but, you know, but in English maybe you can say doing, you know? Because you wouldn't say that the form of a thing is, is it's doing, right? It's doing that, huh? Clay is doing a sphere or something. You can say, I'm doing something, I make it into a sphere, right? And I mold into a sphere. But you wouldn't say that the shape of the clay is the doing of it, you know, I think. So I think it's not a bad way of speaking, huh? Form, between form and doing, right? Of course, the first thing we think of form is shape, right? Because that's the shape, that's the form that's most known to us, right? When you get to the soul, you talk about substantial form, you've got to move it, right? But it's in that line of form rather than the line of doing, huh? So. But it's strange what Thomas does, right? Because he distinguishes, by name sometimes, motion and operation, right? And motion is the perfect act, the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's able to be still. And operation names the act of the perfect, right? The act of the actual. And then he points out, oh, with Plato's way of speaking sometimes, right? And even Aristotle, you could translate the word motion over, right? But it seems kind of an awkward thing to do in some ways, right? And then in this text, he does with the word operation, right? Maybe it's kind of like the word you can make a perfect act, but you can still. Well, you see, with the word doing, you know, we distinguish between doing and making sometimes, right? And making is a operation that goes outside, right? Something outside. By sensing or understanding is what remains in the doer, right? And you say, well, why does the, but it's making kind of doing, you'd say yes, right? But why is doing sometimes kept for this activity that doesn't have an exterior product, right? See? When the case of making is opposed to that kind of doing and making, there's a product, right? So, if I'm doing something like listening to the music of Mozart, I have nothing to show for it. If you're doing something like making a chair, you have nothing to show for it. A chair, right? And so, making adds something, right? That's quite sensible and noticeable, right? And you've got a chair when you get done, right? You've got an apple pie when you get done, right? You've got a glass, whatever it is. And so, making is a doing that has a, what? Something in addition, right? Something noteworthy, right? And so, it gets a new name. That's making. And then we keep the name doing for the doing that is not a making, right? Okay? But nevertheless, you could say making is a doing, right? So, it's, you know, already you've got it for two of those three things that Thomas is talking about, right? And then it's maybe, what? And not too much of a stretch to say that the, what does the stone do when you leave go of it? What does the butter do when you leave go of it in a hot pan? You know? It melts. See? What does the ice cube do? It melts, right? I'll take an example of saying, you know, teaching is acting upon the mind of the student, right? I told you this guy was telling me, you know, that he started teaching philosophy there in one of the universities in the east there, west, I guess. And he talks about looking down these students, you know, and they're looking at them and saying, why are you doing this to me, you know? It's like they're saying that, you know, like, this philosophy, why are you doing this to me, you know? But you're certainly acting upon them, right, now? And they are undergoing, right? So you're like moving them and they're being moved by you, right? But now, as I was saying, Dwarren was saying, in a school, what does the teacher do? Presumably he teaches, right? It's hard to say what they're doing now. Probably can't tell you. But he teaches, right? That's what he does, right? What does the student do? Yeah, yeah. But learning is really like motion, you know, being moved, yeah. But you would call it doing, right? That's what the student does. He's learning. And, you know, so you can use the word doing there for something that's being moved in a way, right? Though the student is not moving, you know, as much as the stone is, right? Anyways. He's got less motion than the stone. Yeah. Okay. So in the whole, the sign of knowing is the ability to teach, right? This is like a third sign here, right? And because of this, we think that art is more reasoned out knowledge than experience. For the artist, he's able to teach while others are not able. You can say, why this is so, right? Okay. And so if you ask the teacher, why is it so? And he can't explain, he's kind of failing. He can't quite teach fully, right? Okay. There's another sign there. Further, we think that no one of the senses is wisdom. Are you wise because you hear or you smell or you, you know? No. Although they are the chief ways of knowing singulars, huh? Because if you challenge my memory, you've got to go back to the senses, right? So they're the chief way of knowing singulars, right? But the senses do not say the why it is so about anything, such as why fire is hot, but only that it is hot. And you find out if you stick your finger in it, right? Okay. Okay. So now, notice he's done, right, huh? He says that you have sensing in the beginning, and from that arises memory. And for many memories, experience, right? And then from experience, what? Knowledge is universal, which he's calling art, using that kind of a sense, right? Okay. So you see in the order there, right? Okay. Now he's going to start to distinguish among the arts, right, huh? So is he already started looking before and after here? Very definitely, right? Right? Because sensing is before memory, right? Memory is before experience. And experience is before a knowledge of universal. And knowledge of why, right? Which is what art is trying to be, right? Okay? Okay. It is probable that the first one finding any art beyond the senses common to all was admired by men, right? Not only because some of the things found are useful, but also as being wise and distinguished from what? Others, right, huh? So it's interesting that we kind of admire the man of art for things he can make, right? Not just because they're, what, useful, right? He seems to know things, right? The man who invented the telephone, right? It's kind of marvelous things being invented, right? Now, many arts having been found, right? Some being for necessities, right? And some for passing the time pleasantly, right? Like the poetic art, right? Or the art of music. Always the finders of the latter were considered wiser because their sciences were not for practical use, right? And I said, that's a little more questionable now, especially in our democratic customs, right, huh? Okay. But even with us, huh? Would you think of Shakespeare or the carpenter as wiser? And, you know, Plato speaks of Homer, the teacher of all the Greeks, right? And he says, the carpenter was the teacher of all the Greeks. No, no. And yet the chair seems to be something more practical, right? And useful than the Iliad. But the Iliad arouses more of wonder, right? Yeah, I see. It's no more difficult to see, though, right? Whence all these sciences haven't been built up, but those sciences were found that are neither for pleasure, like the art of music or the art of Wodic art, nor for necessities, right? Farming and fishing and making houses and so on. And first, in those places where men had some, what, leisures. They had some division of labor, and some men were freed from the very, what, practical things. Hence, the mathematical sciences first began around Egypt, right? For there, the priestly class was allowed leisure, right? Now, it's kind of funny, how two of my great teachers up in the vault there were priests, right? One was Monsignor Dion, and there was Fr. Boulay, right? Well, because at that time, we had a surplus of priests in Quebec, you know? So that some priests, you know, could become, you know, what, scholars or thinkers, you know, right? And they didn't have a lot of parish duties, you know? I remember in the parish there in Shrewsbury there, that I went to order to see one of the priests there and talked about something about the CCD program, right, and so on. And he went to his room there in the parish house there, and while I was there, that phone was ringing like every half hour, if not sooner, and some, and how can a man, you know, you know, sit down and read the commentary on the Gospel of St. John in this situation, right? And my brother Mark and I taught in California, you know, and we got into a parish there. And he said, oh, in fact, I know you'll come to college professors. It's in the CCD program, right? Oh, he says, but we'll keep you as substitutes, right? So every night it was, Tuesday night, or the night it was at the end of the thing, we come back from St. Mary's College there, and we're waiting for a call, you know. There's always somebody who wants to come in. Then we have to run down to the thing and get the little thing they're going to talk about that night or something and come back in the ER meal, you know, and prepare the thing, you know. But anyway, I remember a woman coming in, you know, to see the pastor. I can't get my boy to come to CCD, you know. Can you talk to him? And I say, my God, you know. The parent can't get the kid to come to CCD. You know, the pastor's got to go talk to him. I mean, the kinds of demands upon these people, you know. But in Quebec there at that time, you know, and I think it's in safe shape now. The church is in a lot of troubles in Quebec. And, yeah. But the priesthood class was allowed leisure at that time in Quebec, right? And so Deconic, and, well, Deconic was not a priest, he had a dozen children, but, but, you know, you know, those three were the greatest teachers there, right? And they had leisure, right? Deconic used to have in his office down at the university that he had a bed that he could sleep on, right? And, you know, I'd, sometimes after dinner, I'd go back and study in the library or something like that, you know, and then I'd be going back, and the library was closing, right, and about 9, 10 o'clock at night, and here's Deconic walking down to his office, you know. So he had some leisure, too, but he had to find some quiet places. Now, I mentioned how Aristotle's using the word art here now in kind of a, what, very loose sense, right? It's not art as distinguished from, what, prudence and science like he does in the sixth book of the Ethics, right? So he says, what the difference is between art and science, or episteme, as it would be in the Greek, right? And other things of the same kind, like foresight or prudence, right, has been said in the Ethics, right? So if you want to go to, you know, distinction of the virtues of what? Reason, right? In the Ethics, you have what? In the end of the first book there, you have the distinction between the moral virtues, right, and the virtues of reason itself, right? And then in the second, third, fourth, and fifth books you deal with the, what, moral virtues, right? So in the second book you get the definition of moral virtue and so on. And then in the third book you meet courage and temperance, right? And then the lesser moral virtues in book four, and then book five is all devoted to justice, right? And then it comes to the sixth book, which is the virtues of reason, right? And you have, what, natural understanding, right, and you have episteme, and you have Sophia, wisdom, right, and you have art, and foresight, prudence, but Churchill and I, we call it foresight. And that's what it means, really, in the word, okay? But he's been using art here just in the loose sense or a broad sense of the knowledge of the, what, universal and aiming at the knowledge of the cause, right? Okay, okay. So, that's the conclusion he's going to draw here now. But that, for the sake of which we have now made a discourse, is this, that all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first, what, causes and beginnings, right? So if the man who knows the cause is wiser than the man who just knows that it is so, right? Well, then the man who knows the cause of the cause, if the cause has a cause, right, it's wiser, right? And in the fullest sense, the man who knows the, what, first cause, right, the cause that is not a, what, effect of anything, right? Okay? So cause and effect, like, what, genus and species and logic, right? The same thing can be a cause and effect, but not the same thing, right, huh? But maybe there's some effect that is not a cause, but there's also, what, a cause that is not an effect, right? And that's the first causes, right? But that for the sake of which we have now made a discourse is this, that all hold what is called wisdom. This is the other name he uses, right? But he often refers to this book as first philosophy, but he also calls it wisdom here. But wisdom is a word that could be applied, what, to God. We wouldn't say God is a first philosopher, right? So in some sense, first philosopher is more accurate, but wisdom is common to what we see as a way of speaking, right? Okay? It all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first causes and beginnings, right? Now, the distinction between the word cause and beginning is given where? Yeah, but it's in the fifth book of wisdom, right? In the fifth book of wisdom, he takes up the meanings of the words used in wisdom especially, and in the axioms, and to some extent everywhere, and he begins with the word beginning. And then he goes on to take up the word cause, right? And so beginning is a little broader than what cause. right every cause is the beginning but not every what cause right but sometimes the word beginning is applied more to some causes than others right so you wouldn't speak of the cause called in so much as a beginning right much you speak of the mover or maker as a beginning right and even to some extent another way matters beginning right so sometimes the word beginning is appropriated to some cause so in the apocalypse right God says I am the Alpha and the Omega the first and the last and then finally he says the beginning and the end right well in both keys you're talking about a cause right but the end is the cause of the causes they say right fourth kind of cause Aristotle distinguishes when you say God is the beginning you're using beginning now is opposed to end right and God is a cause in the sense of the what mover maker yeah now when Aristotle says in the in the physics there if you recall that he's the term beginning causes and elements right and when he distinguishes these words in the fifth book of wisdom beginning is more general than cause as we said and causes more general elements huh but if you wanted to appropriate these three words the different kinds of causes elements would refer to what primarily material cause and beginnings would refer to what the movers or makers and then causes for the form which makes a thing to be what it is and the end which is that's the sacred which right which in some way the cause of the what others being causes right so beginning can be you know appropriated right to the to the most of all to the mover maker maybe lesser to the matter right but in that particular one it's most of all to the mover right the maker and so when God says I am the Alpha and Omega the first and the last the beginning in the end he's a cause in the sense of mover maker when he says beginning and when he says in he's a cause in the sense of that for the sake of which okay so in in the Summa Contra Gentiles right huh the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles is about God in himself or by himself right then the second book is about God as the beginning of things right as the maker of things the creator and so on and then the third book is about God as the end of things right and then his providence you know directing things to the end so it corresponds to the second and third books to arm the beginning and the end the archae and the telos right in Greek again he says beautiful like Thomas explains that right what's the song say right sing joyfully to the Lord all your land serve the Lord with gladness come before him with joyful song know that the Lord is God he made us his we are his people the flock eat in us what is that that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's 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that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that's that Very nice praise of Mozart. John Paul II said the church could not fail to do homage to Mozart. So I did, you know, just to protect Mozart, you know, for people who think his music's too secular. But that for the sake of which we have now made a discourse is this, that all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first clauses and beginnings, right? You see, that comes out of this, right? Seeing the order all the way up to art. So that it has been said before, he's kind of summarizing here. The experienced man seems to be wiser than any of those having just, what, sensation, right? But the artist, the man who knows universal, and in some way the cause, then the, what, experienced, right? The chief artist and the handicrafts man, right? The chief art, right? It was the ultimate, what, end, right? So just think of the great chef who's going to make the final product and was going to go out on the table there for the king. And somebody else is preparing maybe some ingredient for it, you know? But that's as far as they go. They don't know what the end part is going to be. Things are all brought together, you know. Oh, my goodness, you know. That would be a magnificent thing. Fit for a king, as you say, right? That's it, that's it, yeah. Okay. And then he says, the looking science is more than the, what, making, huh? Now, you know, in philosophy we speak of, what, practical philosophy, which is like the making, in a sense, dealing with praxis action, and then we speak of, in Latin, speculative philosophy, but in Greek they speak of theoretical, but the English word, looking, yeah, looking. Because looking is for the sake of seeing, it's not for the sake of doing, looking as such, right? Okay. Now, if we go back to the end here of the premium, you can see the first thing he did is the last thing he mentions in the epilogue there, right? On the end of page five there, the last paragraph there. What is the nature of the knowledge that has been said? We haven't got to that yet. That's going to be now in two and three, right? And what is the goal that the investigation and the whole knowledge of our world must reach? The goal we're aiming at is to know the first gods, which turns out to be God, of course, right? But we just learn what the goal is now, right, huh? In the first, what, reading, right? Now in the second and third reading, we're going to ask, what kind of knowledge is wisdom, right? We know what the goal is, right, huh? What kind of knowledge is it, huh? We kind of hinted that it's about the first cause, but he's going to come back on this, huh? So let's begin to look here at the second reading. Since we seek such knowledge, it's thought to be considered about what sort of causes and about what sort of beginnings is wisdom the knowledge. He's already shown that in a way, right? But the same thing he's going to talk about what kind of knowledge it is. Perhaps, he says, it would become clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise man, right? He's going to work out a, what, a six-part description of the wise man. We think first that the wise man knows all things, so far as possible, right? Not having a knowledge of these, what, in particular, right? I used to always say to students, I used to say, what's the pejorative sense of a wise guy? Hmm? You say, a wise guy, oh yeah, wise guy, know it all? Right? Isn't that what you say? Just a wise man in some way knows everything, right? In what way is it possible, though, for a man to know everything? Yeah. You must know it in what? In general, right, huh? Okay? Now, it's not until the fourth book of wisdom that you learn that wisdom is about being in the one, right, huh? That's most universal, right, huh? Then you get into these distinctions of act and ability, right? And substance, and how much, and how, and so on, right, huh? But this, in a sense, is maybe most known about the wise man, huh? We say that about people in life sometimes, you know, he's got it all together. Don't we say that? You know, some of you don't have it all together. But they had the idea of it all in some way, right, huh? You find the same thing in Greek, topon, now the all, right? To go to a man who's wise in his area, he seems to know everything, right? Doesn't he? You know? You know, I've had a couple of world histories in my house there, you know? And since, I used to talk to Dave Fay, who's a very good historian, and kind of pure historian, right? But kind of, he admitted that that was the goal of the historian, you know, to see world history, right? You know, just kind of see the whole, the whole thing, right? What's his name? He was Chicago, William McNeil, right? Well, one that's the most interesting one, I think. Either way it's a dividing world history and so on. I finally met him at a conference there, and I guess who he was speaking about? Hey! The potato in history. Ha ha ha ha ha! He was talking about how Hitler never would have come to power with the strength he did. It would not have been for the potato in Germany, right? I guess during the Thirty Years' War, right, you know, they marched into Germany, you know, take whatever food they could, of the armies, right? But they didn't get the potatoes because they were under the ground. That's what the pheasants survived on, and that's built up the pheasant group, you know, that became the stock of the German army, right? And the German army was, now it's first at West Point, you know, the old museum, you know, it's not the new one, but the old one, there was a statue of the Prussian soldier, right? And it said, the foremost soldier of the modern world, you know? I really admired that, you know, because they admired that, you know, even though they were their enemies in the sense, right? They were in both world wars, but they admired them as really being the best soldiers here on the world, but the potato is important for that. Kind of funny, man. They were a wonderful man. Then we think, wise, the one who's able to know things, what? Difficult. Not easy for man to know, huh? To sense is common to all, hence it is easy and nothing wise, right? You know? Okay. Now, is that common thought that we have? I'm sure I still have a good sitting here. It's in some common thought that the wise man, who's a man you admire, right? You admire a man for knowing something that's easy to know. You know, if I come in, you tell me how many chairs in the room, I'm like, oh my goodness, you know? What an accomplishment. What an accomplishment. So when he says we, he's not using, as I say to the students, he's not using the editorial we. He's talking about we in general, right? You understand the cosmos, right? Not easy to know the cosmos, is it? The universe, huh? Further we think wiser in every science, the man more, what? Certain. He's giving two things in this sense. So I stopped there. Well, when do you go to a wise man? You're not too sure. A question I couldn't solve. My teacher, Kassari, couldn't solve you. And so at Laval there, I was reading Thomas, and of course, following the lecture, Dionne, and I put...